What Will
2021 bring the Russian Regime and Society
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The system
is consuming itself, with each part of it trying to survive separately at the
expense of its neighbor. In this situation, society is a hostage of the battle
for survival, and an expendable component in political experiments.
For Russia, 2020 would have been a pivotal year even
without the novel coronavirus pandemic: constitutional
reform resulted in a new political regime that functions
according to a different logic, has a different kind of relationship with
society and the opposition, and reacts in a new way to problems. Much that
seemed unbelievable and exceptional last year could soon become the new
normal.
The main political speculation of the year was that
President Vladimir Putin could step down. That didn’t happen, of course, but the
gradual and inexorable removal of Putin from the decisionmaking process is
undeniable.
Putin may rarely be off the nation’s TV screens, but
he is to all intents and purposes absent: he comments, criticizes, and boasts
of successes, but he himself merely observes and orders proposals to be drawn
up.
All the managerial decisions of the past year
(excluding constitutional reform) were put forward and developed by the
government, regional governors, deputies, senators, the presidential
administration, or the siloviki (security services). Before, many people within
the regime were scared to show initiative and take any action without approving
it first with Putin. Now inaction is itself becoming dangerous, necessitating
demonstrative action. The system created by Putin, which previously depended
entirely on one person, has started to come to life and act chaotically.
The president is now willing to delegate crucial
issues of state management. The Federal Security Service (FSB) is trusted with
the fight against the opposition, the government is responsible for the
economy, and the regional governors have been left to deal with the pandemic.
Last year was the first in Putin’s long rule when he finally trusted the
running of the state to a truly strong government.
Putin is gradually turning into a symbol. He is still
a guarantor of stability, but is preoccupied with global issues and therefore
unavailable to solve everyday problems. As a result, the personal factor is
declining, and the autocrat is being replaced by a “collective Putin”: a
faceless coalition of technocrats and siloviki who stand in for the president on
everyday matters.
The collective Putin is incapable of assuming
political responsibility, which remains the preserve of the president.
Uncontrolled and answerable to no one, it acts in the name of an imaginary
Putin, with the real Putin’s tacit approval.
Having been given carte blanche, the system has pitted
itself against society, eroding traditional democratic institutions and
chipping away at trust in doing so. The state is starting to turn into a
repressive machine, crushing indiscriminately and without remorse, and all to
protect an imagined conservative Putin, relying on an imagined “Putin majority”
that in reality is long gone.
This year, regardless of what formal decisions are
made, Putin will move away from everyday decisionmaking, delegating that to his
entourage, and shielding himself from petty problems. This will result in a
flurry of bureaucratic activity at all levels, while rules—both formal and
informal—will lose value, making state policy incoherent. This will translate
into contradictory laws, shocking new legislative proposals, growing initiative
among the siloviki, and the radicalization of the agenda.
The last year was also the most difficult so far for
the “non-system”—i.e., genuine—opposition. There were obstacles at both the
legislative level (initiatives in the fight against foreign influence, foreign
agents, and online libel) and the political level: now being outside the system
is essentially equated to a crime, and the siloviki have a mandate to put down
any kind of anti-Putin movement. The poisoning of
opposition leader Alexei Navalny is entirely in keeping with this logic.
The forecast for this year looks decidedly gloomy. The
initiative is gradually coming to lie with the state apparatus, which is
seeking to keep Putin isolated, which in turn requires complete control over
society.
The regime, oriented as it is on Putin—instead of
society—as a source of legitimacy, is becoming increasingly intolerant of any
sign of independence, and losing the ability to engage in dialogue. This is
inevitably leading to increased tension between the state and society, when everything
that is not pro-Putin becomes suspicious and potentially dangerous.
The criminalization of the “non-system” opposition
will cause the concept of the “in-system” opposition (parties that do not dare
to challenge Putin himself) to lose its meaning. The Kremlin is staking
everything on its own people: figures who aren’t just loyal, but under control.
Being part of the system will no longer be enough to legitimize existence, and
will no longer guarantee anything. This will provoke new conflicts between the
in-system opposition and the authorities, and will lead to attempts to replace
the old opposition factions within the Duma with synthetic simulacra. It will
also exacerbate the tendency for existing parties to start operating outside
of the system in the regions.
All of this will have a wider fallout beyond politics.
Particularly at risk are media outlets that regularly provide a platform for
the non-system opposition, along with opposition-minded journalists and
bloggers. The year 2021 may be remembered for an even larger and more
sophisticated crackdown—both in terms of legislation and enforcement—on
anything seen as hostile to the regime.
In 2016, Putin decided in favor of the methodologists,
and entrusted them with managing Russia’s domestic policy through their
trademark schemes, programming of society, and endless KPIs. In 2020, this
approach really entered into full swing. The constitutional reform and
subsequent vote to approve the amendments were a clear example of how
methodologists solve political tasks: establishing a closely controlled process
and ensuring a guaranteed result that was programmed into the mechanism of its
implementation in advance. Both the reform and the vote were devised from the
outset in a way that excluded any protest or unsatisfactory result.
This year, this kind of management looks set to be the
norm: minimal political discussion, total control, and the formation of an
artificial choice will all be used in elections at both the regional and
federal levels. This leaves the fate of the non-system opposition in doubt. For
many years, the Kremlin allowed its existence while ensuring it did not become
too dangerous. In 2020, that balance was shattered, and even the non-system
status of the real opposition is no longer acceptable to the authorities.
Three factors contributed to this state of affairs.
The first was smart voting, which led to crises such as that seen in Moscow in
the summer of 2019. The second was intrusion onto the agenda: anti-corruption
investigations and criticism of the authorities combined with the inability of
the latter to mount an effective resistance. The third factor was the
definitive seizing of the initiative by the siloviki. The non-system opposition
has become an issue of state security, and the poisoning of Navalny signaled a
transition to a war of mutual destruction.
Before, people were classified as the non-system
opposition if they fulfilled two criteria: having political ambition and
anti-Putin views. Now it’s enough to express critical or even simply
politically incorrect viewpoints, from questioning the accepted
interpretation of the role of the Soviet Union in World War II
to publicly expressing belief that the FSB was behind the Navalny poisoning.
Following the constitutional amendments, the regime is
determined to create a system of protectors against destabilization; a
mechanism for dividing people into “us” and “them.” All the elements of power
are involved in forming this mechanism, with security and stability as their
top priorities.
The problem is that there is no unified center making
decisions, adjusting strategy, and providing a long-term view or plan for the
future. The elements of the system are competing among themselves for
precedence and resources, frequently sacrificing long-term priorities for the
sake of their own, more narrow interests.
In other words, the system is consuming itself, with
each part of it trying to survive separately at the expense of its neighbor. In
this situation, society is a hostage of this battle for survival, and an
expendable component in political experiments.
This year promises to be difficult and dangerous for
civil society, the real opposition, and independent journalists and bloggers:
all those who ask questions of the authorities and demand answers. Last year
showed just how defenseless both society and the opposition are when faced with
a regime that hardly ever encounters any serious political resistance.
Yet there is a limit to the regime’s durability. The
fall in living standards and decreased trust in the authorities, combined with
the latter’s inability to communicate effectively and recognize problems, will
lead to growing unhappiness in society, increased outbursts of local protests,
and the appearance of new areas of conflict. Putin can make any number of
decisions, but does not want to, while the collective Putin wants to, but
cannot always do so. Meanwhile, the new system of immobilizing society and
repressing any resistance could have unforeseen consequences.
By:
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Tatiana Stanovaya
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