The Washington Post
Trump’s dream of a nuclear deal meets reality of unwilling Russia and China
The White House’s insistence that denuclearization will be part of this week’s talks has rankled Chinese authorities.
The agenda of the planned meeting Thursday between Trump, China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit has not been released, but Trump has said on several occasions that he would like to discuss “denuclearization.”
“The president has made it clear that, among other topics, he will discuss the reduction of nuclear weapons in the world, whose proliferation President Trump believes is very dangerous,” White House assistant press secretary Olivia Wales told reporters Friday.
Less clear is whether China has any interest in such discussions.
At a news conference on Monday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning declined to answer whether nuclear weapons talks would be included in the summit. When Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi last week, the U.S. readout of the call noted that the two had discussed “the importance of meaningful leader-level conversations to advance goals such as peace and denuclearization.” The Chinese readout did not mention nuclear weapons at all.
The White House’s insistence that denuclearization will be part of the talks has rankled Chinese authorities in the lead-up to the summit. Beijing has been particularly resistant to any suggestion that it might enter negotiations to limit the size of its nuclear arsenal or subject it to international monitoring.
“That’s not up for discussion [at APEC]. China’s position is clear on this, it’s always been clear,” said a Chinese official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing the sensitive diplomacy.
China has long resisted joining U.S.-Russian nuclear agreements, arguing that Washington and Moscow must first make deeper cuts to their vastly larger arsenals before Beijing can be expected to participate.
China’s nuclear stockpile has roughly doubled in the past decade. It has about 600 warheads compared with roughly 4,000 militarily available weapons each for the United States and Russia, which together constitute about 86 percent of the global total inventory of nuclear weapons, according to estimates by the Federation of American Scientists.
“We do not expect to get to any kind of agreement,” said one U.S. official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss plans for the talks. “I would characterize this as the entry point, the first conversation, certainly at the leader level between these countries on … how we can go about reducing the number of nuclear weapons.”
Even that initial diplomatic foray may prompt some resistance from the Chinese side, according to analysts.
“There is very little political will in Beijing to entertain substantive trilateral nuclear control talks,” said Tong Zhao, an expert on China’s nuclear program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “China wants to make sure that the United States and Russia bear the responsibility for reducing their nuclear arsenals, and it wants to avoid any indication that China shares that responsibility.”

For decades, China maintained a relatively small nuclear deterrent, but while it is still far from being a nuclear peer to the U.S. and Russia, it is catching up fast. The Pentagon has estimated that at its current rate of expansion, China could have a stockpile of around 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.
Other Defense Department assessments of China’s growing arsenal have pointed to the development of smaller, lower-yield nuclear weapons that could give Beijing more options for limited nuclear strikes, rather than relying primarily on larger, more destructive weapons designed for retaliation against major attacks.
China’s growing nuclear reach was showcased in July, when it launched a long-range ballistic missile from a submarine into the Pacific Ocean for the first time, advancing its pursuit of a nuclear triad capable of striking by land, sea and air.
Satellite imagery has revealed rapid work on new tunnels and deep shafts at China’s Lop Nur nuclear testing site, one of the country’s most secretive testing facilities, as well as an expansion of a site used to manufacture nuclear warhead components.
In February, the U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, Thomas DiNanno, made the surprise accusation that Beijing had secretly conducted a nuclear explosion in June 2020 — which, if confirmed, would be a breach of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. China, which signed but never ratified the treaty, has denied the allegation.
Beijing widely viewed the accusation as part of a White House effort to push more substantive negotiations on nuclear arms control, the Chinese official said.
Nuclear risk is a long-standing and prominent concern for Trump — motivating his controversial diplomatic outreach to North Korea in his first term, the war with Iran in his second, and the “Golden Dome” missile defense project. At the same time, the president — who once said in a Washington Post interview that nuclear weapons were “the biggest risk for this world” — is presiding over a more than $70 billion modernization of America’s nuclear deterrent and has called for the resumption of nuclear test detonations.
When the U.S. withdrew in 2019 from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a key Cold War-era nuclear pact with Russia, Trump argued that it should be replaced with a deal that included Beijing, saying, “We’d certainly have to include China at some point.”
Trump officials criticized the Obama-era New START Treaty with Russia, which placed limits on both countries’ deployed warheads and launches on the grounds that it did not address China’s growing program. Attempts during Trump’s first term to bring China into negotiations over potentially joining New START were rebuffed, and the treaty formally expired in February.
In November 2023, President Joe Biden and Xi agreed to resume nuclear arms control talks after a nearly five-year hiatus. About eight months later, Beijing abruptly suspended the discussions in retaliation for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, underscoring how even limited cooperation on nuclear security could become hostage to disputes elsewhere in the relationship.

Early in his second term, Trump again called for wide-ranging defense talks with Russia and China, telling reporters, “There’s no reason for us to be building brand-new nuclear weapons, we already have so many.”
These talks, administration officials insist, can no longer just be with Russia.
“Today, the United States faces threats from multiple nuclear powers. In short, a bilateral treaty with only one nuclear power is simply inappropriate in 2026 and going forward,” DiNanno said in February.
The Chinese “only see downsides to any kind of discussions with the U.S. on numbers and capabilities,” said Bonnie Glaser, director of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund, who has participated in unofficial nuclear dialogues with Chinese officials and scholars. “What Xi Jinping probably wants is a photo op.”
Nonetheless, she noted that there are a few potential areas where dialogue could take place. One is over the increasing integration of artificial intelligence into nuclear command and control systems. In 2024, Biden and Xi issued a joint statement affirming “the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons.” That agreement could be strengthened and Russia could be brought into it, recent media reports have suggested.
CNN recently reported that Chinese officials have broached the idea of reciprocal visits to U.S. and Chinese nuclear sites as a confidence-building measure, along the lines of previous agreements between the U.S. and Russia.
Rose Gottemoeller, the chief U.S. negotiator for New START and later deputy secretary general of NATO, said the best outcome for the summit would be a simple “statement of intent on pursuing further discussions on nuclear controls,” followed by U.S. bilateral negotiations with both countries. She noted that although the U.S. and Russia have “70 years of experience negotiating in this arena” and a long track record of holding talks even when the relationship was at its rockiest, for China, this type of dialogue “will be new.”
Negotiating meaningful arms control agreements between two nuclear-armed superpowers is difficult enough, but adding in a third with vastly different capabilities adds a level of complexity that experts have referred to as the “three-body problem,” a reference to the popular apocalyptic Chinese science-fiction franchise.

As for Russia, it is pursuing negotiations with the U.S. over ending the war in Ukraine, as well as a wider “security architecture” for Europe that could include discussions of NATO nuclear deterrence and the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus. Experts say the Shenzhen summit might not be the meeting for wider discussions on the nuclear arsenal.
Given the economic support Russia has received from China since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, pressuring China into nuclear concessions is probably not a high priority for Moscow.
“I don’t think that Russia is particularly keen on talking about kind of nuclear issues in this particular format, because they would much rather talk with the United States bilaterally,” said Pavel Podvig, a senior researcher on Russia’s nuclear weapons at the Geneva-based United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. “Just the symbolism of having the trilateral meeting would probably be good enough [for Putin].”
Michael Birnbaum contributed to this report.





