China to continue pushing for Pacific Island nations to sign regional trade and security agreement

China to continue pushing for Pacific Island nations to sign regional trade and security agreement

By foreign affairs reporter Stephen Dziedzic

Posted 20h ago20 hours ago, updated 17h ago17 hours ago

Wang Yi and Frank Bainimarama host a meeting.

Wang Yi (centre) has so far been unable to convince the 10 Pacific Island nations to sign the agreement. (Supplied: China Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Help keep family & friends informed by sharing this article

China's government says it remains confident it can strike a sweeping trade and security agreement with 10 Pacific Island states despite being forced to shelve its proposed agreement.

Key points:

China's Foreign Ministry has played down the significance of the setback

A number of Pacific Island leaders have raised concerns about both the substance of the pact and China's approach

Samoa's Prime Minister has suggested the agreement could be discussed at the next Pacific Islands Forum leaders' meeting 

Beijing has since released a position paper on the Pacific, but several key components of the draft deal — including free trade, joint police efforts and cybersecurity measures — are omitted from the document. 

China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with 10 Pacific counterparts on Monday, less than a week after a copy of the Common Development Vision agreement was leaked to the press.

The proposal stoked controversy among Pacific Island nations, with Federated States of Micronesia President David Panuelo warning it could stoke geopolitical confrontations in the region and undermine the sovereignty of Pacific countries.

On Monday, China's ambassador to Fiji confirmed some Pacific nations had "concerns" about some "issues" in the agreement and said Beijing would try to seek consensus from them.

But Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian played down the significance of the pause when asked about it by journalists in Beijing.

"As for the joint document you mentioned, it involves an ongoing process of discussion," he said.

"Not every meeting has to issue a joint document.

"At the foreign ministers' meeting this time, all parties reached new consensus on this, making an important step towards reaching the final agreement.

"The parties agreed to continue to engage in active and practical discussions in order to build more consensus."

A screen shot of a video call between Wang Yi and Pacific Island foreign ministers. 

Wang Yi and Fiji's Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama chaired the meeting. (Supplied: China Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Separately, the state-owned tabloid Global Times appeared to take aim at Mr Panuelo for blocking the agreement, saying "a few people" in the Pacific "under the pressure and coercion of the US and former coloniser may be willing to serve American interests at the cost of their national and people's interests".

However, an increasing number of Pacific Island leaders have now raised concerns about both the substance of the pact, and the way China seemingly tried to push through the agreement ahead of Mr Wang's meeting on Monday.

Samoa's Prime Minister, Fiame Naomi Mata'afa, suggested during a press conference on Monday that her country had been rushed by China, saying: "We have not made a decision [about the agreement] as we did not have enough time to look at it."

Diplomatic sources told the ABC that Fiji had indicated to China ahead of the meeting it would not be able to secure an agreement because some Pacific Island nations had reservations about its impact.

But they also stressed that China had not abandoned the pact and Beijing would now likely redouble efforts to convince Pacific Island nations to sign it.

Pacific nations walk away from region-wide trade and security deal with China

Pacific Island countries agree not to sign a region-wide trade and security deal with China as Foreign Minister Penny Wong pledges to build a "stronger Pacific family" through security and defence.

Leaders at a press conference. 

Read more

Anna Powles from Massey University said while Chinese officials had adopted the "language" of consensus, they "clearly haven't put it into practice so far".

"The outcome shows that there was clear resistance to the deal on the part of Pacific leaders due to concerns about substance and the process by which Beijing sought to have it adopted," Dr Powles told the ABC.

"Adopting consensus in the current environment is going to be challenging given publicly stated concerns from FSM (Federated States of Micronesia) and Palau as well as Niue."

The Samoan leader also suggested the issue could be raised at the next Pacific Islands Forum leaders' meeting, which is likely to be held in July.

Dr Powles said discussing the issue at the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) would be "challenging" because four PIF nations still recognised Taiwan rather than China.

"Taking the deal to the PIF may be an attempt to derail it completely," she said.

China's position paper makes no mention of free trade or joint policing

After the multi-country deal was shelved, China's ambassador to Fiji signalled Beijing would release a "position paper" on the Pacific.

On Tuesday, China's Embassy in the US published the 15-point statement, but the paper made no mention of free trade or joint policing, and only a fleeting reference to cybersecurity cooperation, which were key features of the leaked draft deal.

There was scant reference to climate change action — which Pacific leaders have repeatedly flagged is a key concern and existential threat to their low-lying countries.

China's Foreign Minister descending stairs from plane onto tarmac

Wang Yi arrives in Tonga on the latest stop in his multi-country tour of the Pacific. (ABC News: Marian Kupu, Broadcom)

"Geopolitical point-scoring means less than little to anyone whose community is slipping beneath the rising seas," Fiji's Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama said in a joint press conference with Mr Wang on Monday.

The paper proposed appointing a Chinese government special envoy for Pacific Island Countries affairs, as well as encouraging and supporting airlines to launch flights between China and Pacific countries when COVID-19 is under control.

It called for respecting the "independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pacific Island countries, support Pacific Island countries in independently choosing development paths suited to their national conditions, adhere to non-interference in internal affairs".

"Appreciate that Pacific Island countries firmly abide by the one-China principle, and understand and support China's core interests and major concerns," the paper read.

Chinese Foreign Minister wears mask and does an elbow bump in greeting a woman from Tonga with airplane in the background.

The Chinese Foreign Minister has landed in Tonga as a position paper on the Pacific is released, with no mention of free trade and joint policing.(ABC News: Marian Kupu, Broadcom)

On security, it referred to upholding the "international non-proliferation regime with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as its cornerstone and support the development of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone", as well as combating transnational crime, including cyber-crime, and jointly tackling "non-traditional security threats".

It proposed injecting an additional $US2 million ($2.7 million) into a COVID-19 fund, sending Chinese medical teams to Pacific countries, including Solomon Islands and Kiribati.

It also suggested holding seminars on agriculture, trade, technology, disaster mitigation, governance, as well as training diplomats, providing 2,500 government scholarships, and establishing a poverty reduction centre.

The paper referenced supporting "willing institutions" to establish Confucius Institutes and classrooms with China, as well as exploring cultural cooperation. 

YOUTUBEPacific leaders walk away from China's sweeping security and trade pact.

Posted 20h ago20 hours ago, updated 17h ago17 hours ago

Share

Related Stories

Pacific nations walk away from region-wide trade and security deal with China

Leaders at a press conference. 

China wants 10 Pacific countries to sign up to a sweeping new agreement. But it won't be easy

Wang Yi stands at a lectern in front of an Chinese and two Solomon Islands flags. 

'Threatens regional stability': Micronesia pushes back on China's attempt to ink Pacific-wide cooperation agreement

China’s Premier Li Keqiang shakes hands with Micronesia's President David Panuelo at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing

More on:

abc.net.au/news

The EU Needs to Aim Even Higher on Its Defense Transformation

   MAY 31, 2022 LAST UPDATED 16:44 ET

The EU Needs to Aim Even Higher on Its Defense Transformation

Max Bergmann Tuesday, May 31, 2022

One of the biggest geopolitical questions raised by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is whether it will transform European defense. At first glance, the answer is obviously, yes. After all, Germany declared a zeitenwende, or turning point, announcing it would invest at least 100 billion euros in its military, while also pledging to meet NATO’s goal of spending 2 percent of GDP annually on defense. Other countries around Europe are similarly upping their defense budgets to meet or surpass the NATO goal. And the EU itself has allocated 2 billion euros to support the provision of security assistance to Ukraine.

Europe is suddenly taking defense very seriously and actually opening up its collective wallet. And that’s good news, as a militarily capable Europe could be a geopolitical game-changer, turning it from a security consumer into a security provider.

But look more closely and the answer becomes murkier. Yes, Europe will spend more, and that will inevitably lead to more defense capabilities. But there is a danger that much of the increased spending will be squandered, because it won’t address the main problem at the heart of European defense: fragmentation.

Europe already collectively spends a sizeable amount on defense—roughly $200 billion. But the EU’s 27 members and NATO’s 30 members don’t get the full value for their money, because defense spending is done on a national basis and is only loosely coordinated. On the one hand, this makes sense, as investing on a national basis is the way defense has always been done. On the other, it makes no sense at all, as the entire purpose of European defense spending should be to defend Europe, or at the very least to protect European interests. In most other ways, Europe has already Europeanized its “national interests” by forming an economic and increasingly political union. Yet, despite this, it still doesn’t conceive of defense on a European basis.

As a result, Europe will probably not get the most out of its increased investment. To be sure, spending more on defense will certainly improve European security. It’s long been known that Germany, for instance, must invest considerable resources in simply increasing the readiness of its forces, including its high-ticket platforms like planes, ships and tanks. The additional money Berlin has committed to its defense budget is meant to accomplish that, while also funding a broader modernization. But it may not stretch that far. European states are busy shipping off significant inventories of weapons to Ukraine and thereby dramatically decreasing their own stockpiles. These will have to be replaced, eating into the increased defense budgets.

Additionally, the increased spending, including Germany’s, will not go toward procuring key, costly enabling capabilities that Europe lacks, such as air lift to transport troops and cargo, and air tankers to refuel fighter jets. These capability gaps are why EU countries couldn’t get their citizens out of Kabul, why France and the EU couldn’t operate a limited military mission in Mali and the Sahel, and why Portugal would struggle to get troops rapidly to Estonia without the help of the U.S. military. And because those gaps are not being addressed, Europe—including France, with the continent’s most capable military—will remain utterly dependent on the U.S. to provide basic capabilities. Put simply, the increased spending will not enable Europe to defend itself or its interests without the U.S.

The EU proposal on defense integration looks like incremental progress when what Europe needs is to seize this opportunity to pursue transformational change.

Moreover, as smaller European countries increase their defense purchases, it could easily lead to a hodgepodge of new capabilities that are procured from different companies and countries. The experience of providing military aid to Ukraine has underscored the importance of interoperability, by highlighting how hard it is to mix and match weapons systems from different national suppliers. In the first weeks of the war, the emphasis was placed on delivering older Russian or Soviet weaponry from the inventories of NATO’s former Eastern bloc member states, as the Ukrainian military was familiar not only with how to operate and maintain those systems, but also had the spare parts and components to do so.

In a European context, it is incredibly complicated for European militaries to fight together, as the “tail” of European logistics is so long and complex, with so many different vehicles, helicopters and planes in various national militaries’ inventories. Thus, as money suddenly washes through European defense ministries and privileged national defense firms come calling, there is a huge risk of locking in the fragmentation that Europe so desperately needs to address.

Recognizing this as a problem, the European Commission has proposed a new, trailblazing initiative to help address it. Essentially, the bloc will push EU member states to coordinate and integrate as much as possible, standing up new defense procurement task forces. The EU plan also includes a defense industrial focus, both to try to keep the spending in Europe and to foster greater consolidation of European defense industries.

This new effort could lead to considerable progress. To support it, the EU has proposed 500 million euros to incentivize cooperation, which is critical to break through bureaucratic and parochial hurdles. In short, if countries work together, they can buy more, as the EU could supplement their acquisitions. This is a smart way forward, one that could build on an existing initiative known as Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO, to facilitate pooled defense investments, for which the EU earmarked 7 billion euros over five years in its latest budget in 2020.

The problem is, that just isn’t enough cash.

As a comparison, the U.S., in its $40 billion Ukraine assistance package, has included $10 billion for security assistance. Much of this will go to Ukraine. But billions will also likely flow to Eastern European EU and NATO members who gave away equipment to Ukraine. While this money will come in the form of direct military hardware, rather than cash, it is bizarre that Washington should be devoting more money for EU members than the EU itself. Additionally, the EU funding won’t fill the big capability gaps, where the bloc is most reliant on the U.S.

Thus, the EU proposal looks like incremental progress when what Europe needs is to seize this opportunity to pursue transformational change. Coordination meetings will help, but ultimately what will make a difference is for the EU to put real money into rationalizing and integrating European defense. The easiest way to do this is simply to borrow the funds, just as the bloc did to finance post-pandemic economic recovery through the creation of the NextGenEU. The same could be done for defense investments.

With real money behind it, collectively increased defense spending could be a geopolitical game-changer for Europe. It could make the EU a stronger actor on the world stage, making Europe more respected by both allies and adversaries alike. But for this to occur, the spending has to be done in a way that strengthens European security. This not only means spending more nationally while coordinating efforts through and between NATO and the EU, but also leveraging the EU’s ability to finance investments and to integrate, pool and share resources. This isn’t rocket science. But it requires Europeans to see security not through a parochial national lens, but through a collective European prism—and to back up that vision with money.

Max Bergmann is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served as a senior Adviser at the State Department from 2011-2017.

WPR 

The EU just escalated its economic war against Russia's "war machine.(Defense One)

 

Problems viewing? View as a web page May 31, 2022 The EU just escalated its economic war against Russia's "war machine." European Union leaders said Monday evening that the 27-nation bloc will ban sea-borne Russian oil, which affects about two-thirds of Moscow's estimated $10 billion in monthly oil exports to Europe. The ban will rise to about 90% of Russian oil imports by the end of the year, as Germany and Poland gradually turn away from those sources by the end of the calendar year to further punish Russia for invading its democratic neighbor Ukraine in late-February.  Notable: The new sanctions exempt Russian oil delivered via pipeline. This "temporary" exemption was designed to allow the landlocked nations of Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic to continue their access to oil via Russia's Druzhba ("friendship") line, which has been in operation since 1964 and is the world's longest oil pipeline, stretching nearly 3,500 miles. "Two-thirds of the oil that we have in the European Union is sea-borne, and one-third is pipeline," European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said when announcing the sanctions, which is the bloc's sixth iteration, and includes removing Russia's largest bank (Sberbank) from the Swift financial system, and banning another three Russian state-run media outlets from broadcasting across the EU. These new sanctions will "immediately" cover those "two-thirds of oil imports from Russia, cutting a huge source of financing for its war machine," European Council chief Charles Michel tweeted Monday. "Maximum pressure on Russia to end the war," he added. Brought to you by Accenture Reduce Complexity in Benefit Service Delivery Accessing government services is crucial, particularly during times of crisis. But for many, the experience of interacting with the government can often be difficult and confusing, hindering benefit delivery to those who need it most and ultimately impacting trust in civic institutions. Read More >> Regarding the roughly 10% that's exempt, von der Leyen and Michel would like to close that pipeline-delivered gap as soon as possible; but it's unclear when that might come, since it involves the consent of Hungary's increasingly autocratic leader. "This is a topic we will come back to and where we will still have to work on," she said.  Backup plan: Croatia says it's ready to ship oil to Hungary via a line known as the Adriatic, should Russia cut the supply via Druzhba in the months ahead, according to Reuters. But in the meantime, Hungary's refineries "will have to be updated because the Russian oil is of a different quality than the Adriatic pipeline oil," von der Leyen said. "So it is good to have a certain amount of time and activity to fulfill all these criteria so that Hungary can really switch off the Russian oil."  Bigger picture: The EU's new sanctions "could fan global inflation, already running at its highest rate in decades in major economies, and exacerbate a shortage of fuels in poorer regions that will compete with Europe to import oil," the Wall Street Journal reports. Already, "Europe's race to stock up on oil from other producers has driven the price of high-quality crudes produced from West Africa to Azerbaijan to levels not seen for years."  Dollars and sense: The sanctions could provide an opening for new diesel sales from the U.S., India, and the Middle East, since more cars run on diesel in Europe than the U.S., according to the Journal. They could also hurt Russian efforts to transport its oil abroad, since the new EU measures include a ban on insuring Russian vessels by EU companies. CNBC has a bit more on what's known so far.  Russian reax: "They hate us all! The basis for these decisions is hatred for Russia, for Russians and for all its inhabitants," Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev wrote on Telegram. Next up for the EU: Figuring out how to get an alleged 22 million tons of Ukrainian grain out to markets. It remains stuck in bins and on hoppers because of Russia's naval blockade of the Black Sea. Establishing some kind of reconstruction financing for Ukraine is also on the EU's docket, as well as finding ways to pivot toward renewable energy sources.  Milley: "Right now, the sea lanes are blocked by mines and the Russian navy," America's top military officer, Joint Chiefs Chairman Army Gen. Mark Milley, said Tuesday in London. "In order to open up those sea lanes would require a very significant military effort" and "would be a high-risk military operation." Defense News has more, while traveling with Milley in the UK. Related reading:  "US Army signs deal to backfill Stingers sent to Ukraine," also via Defense News, reporting Friday;  "Key Ukraine city 'divided in half'," Agence France-Presse reports Tuesday, referring to the eastern city of Severodonetsk;  "Oil Jumps as EU Commits to Partial Russian Crude Ban," via the Wall Street Journal, reporting Tuesday; "Russians feel little economic pain now, long-term outlook darkens," via Reuters, reporting Tuesday; "Eurozone inflation hits record 8.1%," via Financial Times, reporting Tuesday; "Biden to discuss inflation crisis with Fed Chair Powell on Tuesday," via CNN, reporting Monday;  And "After a Bumper 2021, Companies Might Struggle to Increase Profits," via the New York Times, reporting Tuesday.   Latest From Defense One Russian Officials Talk About Unplugging the Country from the Internet. But Is That Possible? // Patrick Tucker: For all its efforts, the Kremlin may still lack the capability to close off news from beyond the borders. Defense Business Brief // Marcus Weisgerber: Defense Business Brief: More 'Top Gun' thoughts; B-21 first flight delayed; NRO awards big imagery deals, and more. Defense One Radio, Ep. 102: Derek Chollet, the State Dept.'s 'Swiss Army knife' // Kevin Baron:  Welcome to this Tuesday edition of The D Brief, brought to you by Ben Watson with Jennifer Hlad. If you're not already subscribed to The D Brief, you can do that here.  New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern is visiting the White House today. New Zealand is one of several countries that tightened its gun control laws after a mass shooting—in this case, the 2019 massacre at a mosque in Christchurch. Canada did so in 1989; Germany in 2002; and Norway joined last year, according to the New York Times, reporting last week. "Only the United States, whose rate and severity of mass shootings is without parallel outside of conflict zones, has so consistently refused to answer those events with tightened gun laws," the Times writes. America just experienced 14 more mass shootings over the Memorial Day weekend, according to the Gun Violence Archive, whose latest tragic updates were reported Monday by NBC News. New: Canada may be about to tighten its gun control laws yet again. And those were already much stricter than the few in place across the U.S., the New York Times reported Monday. If passed, the new bill would put a "national freeze" on the sale of handguns; the Washington Post has more, here. See also:  "A Timeline of Failed Attempts to Address U.S. Gun Violence," also via the NYT, reporting last week;  And "Uvalde grieves, says goodbyes at visitations, funerals," via AP, reporting Tuesday from Texas. National Guard to Taiwan? The Pentagon is "proactively planning cooperation" between the U.S. National Guard and the Taiwanese military, Taiwan's president said today. In a meeting with U.S. Sen. Tammy Duckworth, D-Ill., in Taiwan's capital, Tsai Ing-wen said the island is looking forward "to closer and deeper Taiwan-U.S. cooperation on matters of regional security," Reuters reported. Duckworth is one of the main sponsors of legislation to promote that cooperation. The meeting comes a day after China sent 30 military aircraft toward the island, which is part of a regular campaign; and Taiwan scrambled jets and put defense systems on alert in response, the Associated Press reported.  And lastly: 59-year-old actor Tom Cruise just notched his most profitable opening movie weekend ever, as "Top Gun: Maverick" collected over $150 million in its first few days across some 4,700 theaters—breaking a Memorial Day record, according to the Los Angeles Times. His previous best weekend was back in 2005 with "War of the Worlds" at $64 million, Fortune reports. The weekend showings now place TGM as among the most profitable films of the ongoing pandemic era, behind "Spider-Man: No Way Home" (at $260 million) and "Doctor Strange in the Multiverse of Madness" (with $187 million), according to Variety. Brought to you by Accenture Reduce Complexity in Benefit Service Delivery Accessing government services is crucial, particularly during times of crisis. But for many, the experience of interacting with the government can often be difficult and confusing, hindering benefit delivery to those who need it most and ultimately impacting trust in civic institutions. Read More >>

DEFENSE ONE | CUSTOMER SERVICE | CONTACT US | PRIVACY POLICY | UNSUBSCRIBE This message was sent from Defense One to onderozar@hotmail.com. You have been sent The D Brief because you have opted in to receive it. Note: It may take our system up to two business days to process your unsubscribe request and during that time you may receive one or two more newsletters. Thank you for reading The D Brief.

Syria: EU Council extends sanctions against the regime for another year

 

● Council of the EU   31/05/2022 19:17 | Press release | Syria: Council extends sanctions against the regime for another year   The Council extended EU restrictive measures against the Syrian regime for an additional year, until 1 June 2023, in light of its continued repression of the civilian population in the country. The Council also removed from the list three persons. The list now includes 289 persons targeted by both an assets freeze and a travel ban, and 70 entities subject to an assets freeze. Sanctions in place against Syria were introduced in 2011, in response to the violent repression of the civilian population. They also target companies and prominent business people benefitting from their ties with the regime and the war economy. Restrictive measures also include a ban on the import of oil, restrictions on certain investments, a freeze of the assets of the Syrian Central Bank held in the EU, and export restrictions on equipment and technology that might be used for internal repression, as well as on equipment and technology for the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications. As part of the EU’s targeted approach to the use of sanctions, Syria sanctions are designed to avoid impeding the supply of humanitarian assistance. Consequently, the export of food, medicines or medical equipment are not subject to EU sanctions, and a number of specific exceptions are foreseen for humanitarian purposes. The EU keeps developments in the Syrian conflict under constant review and can decide to renew sanctions and amend the list of targeted entities or persons based on developments on the ground. The EU remains committed to finding a lasting and credible political solution to the conflict in Syria on the basis of the UN Security Council resolution 2254 and of the 2012 Geneva Communiqué. Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/849 of 30 May 2022 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria, Official Journal of the EU L148 of 31 May 2022 Syria: EU imposes restrictive measures on additional five individuals (press release 21 February 2022) Syria: Council response to the crisis, policy page EU Delegation to Syria

Special meeting of the European Council (30 and 31 May 2022) – Conclusions

 Special meeting of the European Council (30 and 31 May 2022) –

 Conclusions Delegations will find attached the conclusions adopted by the European Council at the above meeting. Conclusions – 30 and 31 May 2022 EUCO 21/22 1 EN

 I. UKRAINE 

1. The European Council resolutely condemns Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. It urges Russia to immediately stop its indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and to immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders. The atrocities being committed by Russian forces and the suffering and destruction being inflicted are unspeakable. The European Council calls on Russia to allow immediate humanitarian access and the safe passage of all civilians concerned. The European Council expects international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, to be fully respected. It also calls on Russia to immediately allow the safe return of Ukrainian individuals forcibly removed to Russia. 

 2. The European Council hails the courage and determination of the Ukrainian people and its leadership in their fight to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and freedom of their country. The European Union is unwavering in its commitment to help Ukraine exercise its inherent right of self-defence against the Russian aggression and build a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future. In this regard, it will continue to work closely with international partners. International justice 

 3. The European Council commends all those helping to gather evidence and to investigate war crimes and the other most serious crimes, and supports the intensive work of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in this respect. It also salutes the work being carried out by Ukraine’s Prosecutor General with financial and capacity-building support from the European Union and its Member States. It welcomes the establishment of a Joint Investigation Team coordinated by Eurojust, whose role has been reinforced, and the ongoing operational support provided by Europol. Russia, Belarus and all those responsible will be held to account for their actions in accordance with international law. Conclusions – 30 and 31 May 2022 EUCO 21/22 2 EN Sanctions 

4. The European Council is committed to intensify pressure on Russia and Belarus to thwart Russia’s war against Ukraine. The European Council calls on all countries to align with EU sanctions. Any attempts to circumvent sanctions or to aid Russia by other means must be stopped. 

5. The European Council agrees that the sixth package of sanctions against Russia will cover crude oil, as well as petroleum products, delivered from Russia into Member States, with a temporary exception for crude oil delivered by pipeline. 

 6. The European Council therefore urges the Council to finalise and adopt it without delay, ensuring a well-functioning EU Single Market, fair competition, solidarity among Member States and a level playing field also with regard to the phasing out of our dependency on Russian fossil fuels. In case of sudden interruptions of supply, emergency measures will be introduced to ensure security of supply. In this respect, the Commission will monitor and report regularly to the Council on the implementation of these measures to ensure a level playing field in the EU Single Market and security of supply. 

7. The European Council will revert to the issue of the temporary exception for crude oil delivered by pipeline as soon as possible. Humanitarian and financial support 

8. The European Union will continue to provide support to Ukraine with a view to addressing humanitarian, liquidity and reconstruction needs. 

9. Since the beginning of the Russian aggression, the European Union has stepped up its support for Ukraine’s overall economic, social and financial resilience, including by providing humanitarian aid. In that regard, the European Council commends the results of the High-Level International Donors’ Conference co-hosted by Poland and Sweden. Conclusions – 30 and 31 May 2022 EUCO 21/22 3 EN 

10. The European Union and its Member States have provided protection to millions of refugees fleeing the war in Ukraine, and remain committed to welcoming and providing safety to them, including by helping neighbouring countries. The European Council invites the Commission to present new initiatives to support this effort within the Multiannual Financial Framework. 

11. The European Union will continue to support the Ukrainian government in its urgent liquidity needs together with its G7 partners. It acknowledges the support announced in the G7 context. The European Union is ready to grant Ukraine new exceptional macrofinancial assistance of up to EUR 9 billion in 2022. In this context, the European Council calls for the examination of the Commission proposal as soon as it is presented. 

12. Ukraine’s reconstruction will require comprehensive support to rebuild the country for the future. The European Union and its Member States are prepared to play a major role in this regard. Therefore, a Ukraine reconstruction platform should be considered. It should bring together the Ukrainian government, the European Union and its Member States, the European Investment Bank as well as international partners, financing institutions, organisations, experts and interested parties. EU support for reconstruction will be linked to the implementation of reforms and anti-corruption measures consistent with its European path. The European Council invites the Commission to make proposals on this basis. 

13. The European Council welcomes the efforts made by Member States to provide in their national law for appropriate confiscation measures and calls on the Council to swiftly examine the recent Commission proposal on criminal law measures in case of violation of EU sanctions. The European Council supports further options in line with EU and international law being actively explored, including options aimed at using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine’s reconstruction. Conclusions – 30 and 31 May 2022 EUCO 21/22 4 EN Military support 

14. The European Union also remains committed to continue bolstering Ukraine’s ability to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty. In this respect, the European Council welcomes the adoption of the recent decision of the Council to increase military support to Ukraine under the European Peace Facility. Economic support 

15. The European Council welcomes the adoption of the decision to suspend import duties on all Ukrainian exports to the European Union for one year. Political support 

16. The European Council takes note of the preparation of the Commission’s opinions on the application for EU membership of Ukraine as well as the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, and will revert to the matter at its June meeting. 

17. The European Union and its Member States will step up their efforts to reach out to third countries in order to support Ukraine in all these dimensions, counter the false Russian narrative and manipulation of information, and prevent sanctions evasion and circumvention. Impact on neighbouring countries 

18. The European Council follows closely the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on neighbouring countries and the Western Balkans. It emphasises the need to provide all relevant support to the Republic of Moldova as it deals with the interlinked energy and economic crises, and migration pressure arising from the war. The European Council reiterates its call for an end to repression in Belarus and recalls the democratic right of the Belarusian people to new, free and fair elections. Conclusions – 30 and 31 May 2022 EUCO 21/22 5 EN II. FOOD SECURITY 

19. The European Council strongly condemns the destruction and illegal appropriation by Russia of agricultural production in Ukraine. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is having a direct impact on global food security and affordability. The European Council calls on Russia to end its attacks on transport infrastructure in Ukraine, to lift the blockade of Ukrainian Black Sea ports and to allow food exports, in particular from Odesa. The European Union is taking active measures to facilitate Ukraine’s agricultural exports and to support Ukraine’s agricultural sector in view of the 2022 season. In this regard, the European Council invites Member States to accelerate work on “Solidarity Lanes” put forward by the Commission, and to facilitate food exports from Ukraine via different land routes and EU ports. 

20. The European Council calls for effective international coordination to ensure a comprehensive global food security response. In this respect, it welcomes the Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission (FARM) - based on the three pillars: trade, solidarity and production - which aims to mitigate consequences for price levels, production and access to and supply of grain. It also supports the UN Global Crisis Response Group, the upcoming G7 initiative establishing a Global Alliance for Food Security (GAFS) and other EU and multilateral actions and initiatives. It reiterates its commitment to keep global trade in food commodities free of unjustified trade barriers, enhance solidarity towards the most vulnerable countries and increase local sustainable food production so as to reduce structural dependencies. The European Council invites the Commission to explore the possibility of mobilising reserves from the European Development Fund to support the most affected partner countries. The European Union welcomes the commitment and support of its partners and of international organisations. Conclusions – 30 and 31 May 2022 EUCO 21/22 6 EN 

21. The European Council underlines the importance of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in the EU’s contribution to food security and calls for the swift adoption of the CAP Strategic Plans. 

22. In view of the ongoing fertiliser shortages in the global market, the European Council calls for more concerted efforts to work with international partners to promote a more efficient use of and alternatives to fertilisers. III. SECURITY AND DEFENCE 

23. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has caused a major shift in the European Union’s strategic environment and has shown the need for a stronger and more capable European Union in the field of security and defence. In this new context, recalling the Versailles Declaration and the European Council conclusions of 24-25 March 2022, the European Union will resolutely implement the Strategic Compass, reinforce its partnerships, enhance its resilience and increase its security and defence capacity through more and better investments, focusing on identified strategic shortfalls. The transatlantic relationship and EU-NATO cooperation, in full respect of the principles set out in the Treaties and those agreed by the European Council, including the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and decision-making autonomy of the European Union, are key to our overall security. A stronger and more capable European Union in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. The solidarity between Member States is reflected in Article 42(7) TEU. More broadly, the European Union reaffirms its intention to intensify support for the global rules-based order, with the United Nations at its core. Conclusions – 30 and 31 May 2022 EUCO 21/22 7 EN 

24. In the light of the analysis of defence investment gaps prepared by the Commission and the High Representative, in coordination with the European Defence Agency, and the various recommendations put forward to strengthen the European industrial and technological base, the European Council invites the Council to examine the following issues, in line with the respective competences conferred by the Treaties: 

a) as a matter of urgency, measures to coordinate very short-term defence procurement needs to support joint procurement to replenish stocks, notably in the light of the support provided to Ukraine, as well as a short-term tool to reinforce European defence industrial capabilities through voluntary joint procurement; 

b) the development of an EU defence strategic programming, procurement and coordination capability, in complementarity with NATO; 

c) further measures to map the current and necessary additional manufacturing capabilities and to reinforce the capacity and resilience of the European defence technology and industrial sector, including SMEs; 

d) the accelerated implementation of military mobility infrastructure projects; 

e) an enhanced role of the European Investment Bank in support of European security and defence, in line with its recent Strategic European Security Initiative. 

25. The European Council looks forward to the presentation of a possible joint European Defence Investment Programme, including exploring a vehicle for Value Added Tax exemption and for European defence projects of high common interest. 

26. The European Council will revert to the matter at a forthcoming meeting. Conclusions – 30 and 31 May 2022 EUCO 21/22 8 EN IV. ENERGY 

27. Recalling the Versailles Declaration and its conclusions of 21-22 October 2021 and 24-25 March 2022, including as concerns the different energy mixes, conditions and national circumstances, the European Council reviewed progress in phasing out the European Union’s dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal imports as soon as possible. Following earlier decisions on bans on imports from Russia and the presentation of the REPowerEU Plan to rapidly reduce dependency on Russian fossil fuels and to accelerate the energy transition, to achieve a more resilient energy system and a wellinterconnected Energy Union, it calls for: 

 a) as a short-term priority, further diversifying supply sources and routes, and securing energy supply at affordable prices; 

 • The European Council encourages the prompt use, ahead of next winter, of the EU Energy Purchase Platform, which is open also for the Western Balkans and the three associated Eastern Partners. 

 • The European Council invites the Commission to explore also with our international partners ways to curb rising energy prices, including the feasibility of introducing temporary import price caps where appropriate. 

 • The European Council invites the Council to take work forward on the EU external energy engagement strategy. 

• The European Council notes the importance of indigenous energy sources for the security of supply. Conclusions – 30 and 31 May 2022 EUCO 21/22 9 EN 

b) accelerating the deployment of renewables; 

• The accelerated deployment of renewables will require immediately speeding up permit-granting procedures for renewables projects, and needs to be underpinned by an industrial cluster aimed at improving innovation, capacity, skills and supply chains for solar and wind power, hydrogen, bioenergy, heat pumps and raw materials. 

c) further improving energy efficiency wherever possible, and promoting energy savings taking into account notably the insular character of certain Member States; 

d) completing and improving the interconnection of European gas and electricity networks by investing in and completing infrastructure for existing and new projects, including LNG and future-proof electricity and hydrogen-ready gas interconnections throughout the European Union, including island Member States, and in renewable production capacity including, based on the upcoming analysis of the regulators and the current geopolitical context, taking advantage of the Iberian Peninsula’s potential to contribute to the security of supply of the European Union. 

28. The European Council calls on the Council to rapidly examine the Commission proposals to deliver on the REPowerEU objectives. 

29. In a spirit of European solidarity, preparedness for possible major supply disruptions and the resilience of the EU gas market should be improved, in particular through swiftly agreeing on bilateral solidarity agreements and a coordinated European contingency plan, which should ensure that major supply disruptions are mitigated. Filling of storage before next winter should be accelerated. In this context, the European Council welcomes the agreement on gas storage and calls for its speedy implementation. Conclusions – 30 and 31 May 2022 EUCO 21/22 10

30. The European Council takes note of the ACER report and invites the Commission to swiftly pursue work on the optimisation of the functioning of the European electricity market - including the effect of gas prices on it - so that it is better prepared to withstand future excessive price volatility, delivers affordable electricity and fully fits a decarbonised energy system, while preserving the integrity of the Single Market, maintaining incentives for the green transition, preserving the security of supply and avoiding disproportionate budgetary costs.

Ali Tuygan (Rtd. ambassador): Moving Toward "No Peace No War" in Ukraine

 

Moving Toward “No Peace No War” in Ukraine

Posted on May 31, 2022 by Ali Tuygan

May 31, 2022

On May 19, in a government statement in the German Bundestag, Chancellor Scholz said, “We all share the same goal: Russia must not win this war. Ukraine must survive.” Putin first has to realize that he cannot break Ukraine’s defense before he would be willing to negotiate seriously about peace, he continued.  “Emmanuel Macron is right to point out that the entry process is not a question of a few months or even years,” the Federal Chancellor added.

A week later, on their joint initiative, President Macron and Chancellor Scholz held a long telephone conversation with President Putin. Reiterating their position of principle, the leaders of France and Germany told Mr. Putin that any solution to the war must be negotiated between Moscow and Kyiv, with due respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The three leaders also reviewed in detail the global food security concerns. Looking at the Elysée Palace[i] and the Kremlin[ii] readouts of the call, one can see no sign of progress.

And on May 23, Henry Kissinger addressed the World Economic Forum.[iii] He said:

“About eight years ago, when the idea of membership of Ukraine in NATO came up, I wrote an article in which I said that the ideal outcome would be if Ukraine could be constituted as a neutral kind of state, as a bridge between Russia and Europe. Rather than, it’s the front line of groupings within Europe. I think that opportunity is now- does not now exist in the same manner, but it could still be conceived as an ultimate objective.” [iv]

“Ideally, the dividing line should return the status quo ante,” he added. He did not elaborate on what he meant by “the status quo ante” but his remarks were widely interpreted as a suggestion that Ukraine had to give up some territory. Thus, he drew a sharp response from Kyiv.

And the next day, a Washington Post article said, “The ‘status quo ante’ mentioned by Kissinger, who was secretary of state to Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald Ford, refers to restoring a situation in which Russia formally controlled Crimea and informally Ukraine’s two easternmost regions of Luhansk and Donetsk.”

Mr. Kissinger also said that Russia should not be driven into a permanent alliance with China.

After three months of the war in Ukraine, claims of victory and declarations of determination to win have started to lose their initial vigor. What is clear is that there would be no winners in this war. Publics across the globe are now becoming reconciled to the suffering and devastation in Europe.

On the one hand, news of the war still makes the headlines but not in the largest fonts as was the case earlier. And it seems that President Zelensky’s calls for military support and expressions of confidence are having a lesser impact. One is hearing more and more that it is up to Kyiv to decide when and how to end the war. On the other hand, concerns over energy and food security are being voiced with growing emphasis.[v]

On May 30, the EU, after four weeks of tough negotiations, agreed to end seaborne deliveries of Russian oil but not pipeline deliveries. Technical details will be worked out in the coming days

Many countries are now after an arrangement with Russia and Ukraine to allow for the export of nearly 25 million tons of Ukrainian grain before the country’s new harvest if there would be one.

During their May 28, telephone call with President Putin, President Macron and Chancellor Scholz reiterated their insistent request for a ceasefire and called upon President Putin to agree to direct dialogue with President Zelensky at the earliest possible opportunity. Two days later President Erdoğan also called for talks.

Energizing diplomacy must be the priority but a meeting between the two leaders can only yield results with adequate groundwork. And that requires having a fairly good understanding of the war aims of the two sides.

The problem is that Ukraine’s position that Russian forces should withdraw to their pre-war positions is a non-starter for President Putin. And despite the Western fine talk, unfortunately, there is no prospect of freeing all the Ukrainian territories now under Russian occupation by military means. Moreover, when exactly Mr. Putin would declare “mission accomplished” remains a question. This is why Western leaders still on speaking terms with President Putin are stepping in to secure a cessation of hostilities and discourage him from going beyond Donbas. Because for a multitude of reasons, a “no war no peace” situation is better than continuing the war.

At the World Economic Forum, Mr. Kissinger also addressed the China-US relationship. He said that the inherent adversarial aspect of this relationship can be mitigated and progressively eased by the diplomacy that both sides conduct, and it cannot be done unilaterally by one side. He added that the US should not by subterfuge or a gradual process, develop something of a two-China solution, and China should continue to exercise the patience that has been exercised up to now.

“Taiwan cannot be the core of the negotiations between China and the United States. For the core of the negotiations, it is important that the United States and China discuss principles that affect the adversarial relationship and permit at least some scope for cooperative efforts,” he said.

Overall, his comments at the Forum must have been music to some European ears.

As for Turkey, on May 30, President Erdoğan had phone calls with presidents Zelensky and Putin. Turkey’s Presidential Complex readout of the call with Mr. Zelensky reiterated Ankara’s readiness to help diplomatic talks between Russia and Ukraine and underlined the importance President Erdoğan attaches to the project of establishing a safe corridor for the exportation of Ukrainian agricultural products by sea. It also said that he looks favorably at joining the Control Center to be formed with the participation of the United Nations as well as the parties and hosting the center in Istanbul. [vi]

The readouts of the call by the Kremlin and the Presidential Complex revealed differences of emphasis in their public diplomacy. 

The former, to show that all is going well between the two countries, chose to underline that the two presidents had a detailed exchange of views on issues of bilateral cooperation, primarily in trade and the economy, noting considerable growth in trade and mentioned a readiness to further promote mutually beneficial ties in energy, transport, and tourism.[vii]

The latter chose to underline Turkey’s readiness to bring together Russia, Ukraine, and the United Nations at a meeting in Istanbul, and to assume a role in a possible observation mechanism.[viii] It mentioned the need to confront the PKK/YPG in northern Syria as agreed in 2019, while the Kremlin readout only said that the presidents also reviewed a number of regional issues.

————————————————————————————————

[i] https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2022/05/28/press-release-telephone-conversation-with-german-chancellor-olaf-scholz-and-russian-president-vladimir-putin

[ii] http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68523

[iii] https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/05/kissinger-these-are-the-main-geopolitical-challenges-facing-the-world-right-now/

[iv] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html

[v] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/may/30/eu-forget-sanctions-russia-ukraine-food-energy-prices

[vi] https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/speeches-statements/558/138153/phone-call-with-president-zelensky-of-ukraine

[vii] http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68528

[viii] https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/speeches-statements/558/138151/phone-call-with-president-putin-of-russia