Sözcü Haberler - Dünya İsrail endişeli: Tutuklama kararı ‘gizli’ olarak çıkabilir AA 29 Nisan 2024 - 21:23 Güncellenme: 29 Nisan 2024 - 23:55

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Haberler - Dünya

İsrail endişeli: Tutuklama kararı ‘gizli’ olarak çıkabilir

İsrailli yetkililerin, Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi'nin “gizli tutuklama kararı” çıkarmasından endişe ettiği bildirildi. İsrail Başbakanı Netanyahu'nun, ABD Başkanı Joe Biden ile görüşerek konu hakkında yardım istediği öğrenildi.

İsrail endişeli: Tutuklama kararı ‘gizli’ olarak çıkabilir

İsrailli yetkililerin, Gazze’deki saldırılar nedeniyle Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi’nin (UCM) Avrupa seyahatlerinde ortaya çıkacak şekilde bazı yetkililere “gizli tutuklama kararı” çıkarmasından endişelendiği belirtildi.

Yedioth Ahronoth gazetesinde yer alan habere göre, UCM’nin olası tutuklama kararına karşı çalışan ekipte yer alan İsrailli bir kaynak, mahkemenin İsrailli yetkililere karşı gizli tutuklama kararı çıkarabileceği yönündeki endişeleri olduğunu aktardı.

Haberde, mahkeme tarafından olası bir gizli tutuklama kararı çıkartılan İsrailli yetkililerin, bu durumu ancak Avrupa’ya seyahat ederken öğreneceğine inanıldığı da vurgulandı.

BIDEN’DAN YARDIM İSTEDİ

İsrail'in "Walla" internet sitesindeki haberde de, İsrailli yetkililerin UCM'nin Netanyahu, Savunma Bakanı Yoav Gallant ve İsrail Genelkurmay Başkanı Herzi Halevi hakkında tutuklama emri çıkartmaya hazırlandığı konusunda son iki haftadır daha fazla endişe duymaya başladığı belirtildi.

Netanyahu ile ABD Başkanı Joe Biden arasında dün gerçekleşen telefon görüşmesinde UCM'nin Gazze Şeridi'ne yönelik saldırılar nedeniyle İsrailli yetkililer hakkında olası tutuklama kararının gündeme geldiği ifade edildi.

Adı açıklanmayan İsrailli 2 yetkiliye dayandırılan haberde, Netanyahu'nun UCM'nin olası tutuklama kararına ilişkin endişelerini Biden'e ilettiği kaydedildi.

Görüşmede, Netanyahu'nun Biden'dan UCM'nin olası tutuklama kararını engellemek için yardım istediği aktarıldı.

ABD: UCM YETKİSİZ

Beyaz Saray Sözcüsü Karine Jean-Pierre, günlük basın brifinginde UCM'nin Netanyahu'ya yönelik muhtemel tutuklama kararına ilişkin gündemi değerlendirdi.

Jean-Pierre, UCM'nin yetkileri konusunda ABD olarak bugüne kadarki pozisyonlarının değişmediğini ve mahkemenin İsrailli yetkililer hakkında hüküm verme yetkisine sahip olduğunu düşünmediklerini söyledi.

ABD'li sözcü, UCM'nin hem Hamas'ın 7 Ekim'deki saldırıları hem İsrail yönetiminin Gazze'deki saldırılarıyla ilgili olarak yetkisinin olmadığını, "UCM soruşturması konusunda görüşümüz açık ve net. Biz bunu desteklemiyoruz ve onların bu alanda yargı yetkisi olduğuna inanmıyoruz" sözleriyle savundu.

NE OLMUŞTU?

The Times of Israel gazetesine konuşan adı açıklanmayan üst düzey İsrailli bir yetkili, İsrail Milli Güvenlik Konseyi'nin olası bir tutuklama kararını engellemek için kampanya yürüttüğünü söylemişti.

İsrailli gazeteci ve siyasi analist Ben Caspit ise "Walla" sitesi için kaleme aldığı yazıda, İsrail Başbakanı Binyamin Netanyahu'nun tutuklama kararını engellemek adına yoğun telefon trafiği yürüttüğünü, başta ABD Başkanı Joe Biden olmak üzere liderlere "durmaksızın telefonla baskı yaptığını" aktarmıştı.

İsrail Dışişleri Bakanlığı da UCM tarafından İsrailli yetkililer hakkında tutuklama emri çıkarılması ihtimalinde oluşabilecek yansımalara karşı dünyadaki büyükelçiliklerinden hazırlıklı olmalarını istemişti.

Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Arab Foreign Ministers 04/29/2024 02:26 PM EDT Office of the Spokesperson

The following is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met today in Riyadh with the Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, and Jordan, as well as Palestine Liberation Organization Secretary General Hussein Al Sheikh.  They discussed the importance of a sustained increase in humanitarian assistance to address the dire situation in Gaza. The Secretary reaffirmed the United States’ support for efforts to achieve lasting peace in the region, including through a pathway to a Palestinian state with security assurances for Israel.  Secretary Blinken emphasized the need for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and the release of the remaining hostages held by Hamas. The Secretary also underscored the importance of regional coordination to prevent the conflict from spreading.

Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud in Riyadh 04/29/2024 02:14 PM EDT

 Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud in Riyadh

04/29/2024 02:14 PM EDT

Office of the Spokesperson

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met today with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud in Riyadh. The Secretary underscored the importance of sustaining the increase in humanitarian assistance to Gaza, reaching an immediate ceasefire in Gaza that secures the release of hostages, and preventing further spread of the conflict. The Secretary and the Crown Prince discussed ongoing efforts to achieve lasting regional peace and security, including through greater integration among countries in the region and enhanced bilateral cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Secretary and Crown Prince also discussed the urgent need to reduce regional tensions, including a cessation of Houthi attacks undermining both freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and progress on the Yemen peace process.

APRIL 29, 2024 G7 Leaders’ Statement on Synthetic Drugs Threat

 APRIL 29, 2024

G7 Leaders’ Statement on Synthetic Drugs Threats

We, the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7), affirm our joint effort to fight the production, distribution, and sale of illicit synthetic drugs, and the criminal networks which traffic these drugs, which collectively impact the health, security, and well-being of our citizens and of people around the world. Such drugs, especially synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, its analogues and nitazenes, represent an escalating and critical public health emergency, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastating impacts on our communities and economies.

In order to collectively address this shared challenge, we are ready to work together and drive international action to disrupt the production and trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs, to dismantle the illicit financing networks that support the drug traffickers, to identify emerging drug trends, in order to prevent their expansion and to respond to public health impacts.

In particular, we commit to take enforcement actions to:  i) dismantle drug trafficking networks and the supporting illicit financing networks using all available tools, including judicial and law enforcement actions, and hold drug traffickers and their facilitators accountable; ii) disrupt the illicit global supply chain of synthetic drugs as well as of the precursor chemicals that are used to manufacture illicit drugs, and iii) support international scheduling and regulation of dangerous drugs and precursor chemicals.

We will redouble our efforts to:  i) raise awareness and knowledge, especially among the youth and persons in vulnerable or marginalized situations, of the adverse effects of drug use, particularly illicitly manufactured and distributed synthetic drugs; ii) share information to identify and quickly respond to new drug threats; iii) promote evidence-based practices to improve the quality and availability of substance use prevention and treatment services; and iv) provide adequate training to support effective law enforcement, health-related, and preventive care.

We confirm our intention to further enhance international cooperation in counternarcotics.  In this regard, we welcome the crucial work of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Narcotics Control Board, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the World Health Organization and the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. We appreciate the long-standing work of Europol and Eurojust in facilitating international police and judicial cooperation to fight international drug trafficking. We welcome the European Ports Alliance initiative to fight drug trafficking and organized crime and the foundation of the new European Union Drugs Agency.

To show our steadfast commitment to fighting against this pernicious and expanding threat, we will instruct relevant ministers to work on strengthening international cooperation on this critical issue, raise public awareness, facilitate non-discriminatory and voluntary access to drug-related prevention and treatment services, and coordinate enforcement efforts.

We encourage all countries concerned by the threat posed by illicitly manufactured and distributed synthetic drugs to join the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats and to undertake measures arising from its workstreams and recommendations. We also call on all countries to take appropriate action to counter this deadly scourge, including justice and law enforcement action against illicit precursor suppliers, transnational criminal organizations, and their enablers.

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Statement by the United States on the Twentieth Anniversary of UNSCR 1540 04/29/2024 10:07 AM EDT Office of the Spokesperson

 

Statement by the United States on the Twentieth Anniversary of UNSCR 1540 04/29/2024 10:07 AM EDT Office of the Spokesperson United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 obliges all states to prevent transfers of WMD-related goods and know-how to and by non-state actors. It remains one of the most important tools available to the international community to confront the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery, and their financing, all of which continue to pose a serious threat to international peace and security. We call on all nations to be especially diligent in their implementation of 1540’s obligation to ensure that transfers of sensitive goods and know-how with both WMD and legitimate commercial applications not be allowed to fall outside of regulatory control and into the hands of proliferators. The United States remains highly concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risks posed by other non-state actors seeking to acquire, develop, traffic or use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery.  We urge all nations to work together to fulfill our respective UNSCR 1540 commitments and to keep pushing us and all Security Council members to implement new provisions in UNSCR 2663, which extended the 1540 Committee’s mandate to 2032.

The National Interest April 25, 2024 NATO’s Real Problem is Europe, Not The U.S. American power is overstretched, and the future of NATO and Europe itself depends on the continent’s ability to adapt. by Ramon Marks

The National Interest 

April 25, 2024 

NATO’s Real Problem is Europe, Not The U.S.

American power is overstretched, and the future of NATO and Europe itself depends on the continent’s ability to adapt.

by Ramon Marks

Following the organization’s seventy-fifth anniversary, the conventional wisdom about NATO is that it is threatened by growing U.S. “isolationism.” Critics say that former President Trump could withdraw the United States from NATO if he is reelected. Controversy in Congress delayed supplying $60 billion in additional military aid to Ukraine. Trump has said that “he would encourage” the Russians “to do whatever the hell they want” to allies that fail to meet the 2 percent of GDP defense spending pledge. Some even express worry that the United States might withdraw its nuclear umbrella over Europe.

Overlooked in all this is that the attitudes of European allies about NATO and U.S. protection have always been variable. Just three years after NATO’s founding in 1949, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Germany entered into a separate European Defense Community Treaty. The initiative reflected the vision of Jean Monnet, who dreamed of establishing a supranational organization for European defense. The idea of an integrated European military, led by a European defense minister, died in 1954 when the French parliament refused even to consider the concept—a harbinger of Gaullism and French skepticism about surrendering any defense responsibilities to a supranational organization, whether an Atlanticist or European grouping. 

Despite visions of an independent European defense alliance, NATO has been the mainstay of Western European security for over seventy-five years. Over that time, allies relied on the United States as NATO’s leader and dominant contributor. All Supreme Allied Commanders since NATO’s founding in 1949 have been American generals or admirals. The total population of NATO allies in Europe now exceeds 447 million. The European Union, composed mainly of NATO allies, constitutes the largest trading bloc in the world. The United States has remained, however, the military backbone of NATO, notwithstanding the vast European accumulation of wealth and resources since World War II.

Europe’s dependency on the American military has grown even greater since the end of the Cold War in 1989. Allies cut back their defense budgets in the years following, shifting those funds to finance social programs, the so-called “peace dividend.” Over two decades, Europe shed 35 percent of its military capabilities. Meanwhile, allies remained sanguine that the United States would continue to provide the bulk of protection for democracies in Europe, an assumption that has turned out to be accurate. At least until now, U.S. defense budgets have remained consistently higher in terms of GDP percentages than those of most European allies since the Soviet Bloc’s collapse.

As a result, when conflicts broke out in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, the United States had to take the military lead for NATO. Western Europe’s militaries were not up to the job, even against foes that were far less formidable than the former USSR. To even lead a NATO military coalition, U.S. diplomats had to wrestle first with the reservations of European allies led by France. They hesitated to bring any armed force to bear on a conflict in the heart of Europe without first receiving a UN Security Council resolution authorizing NATO military action. 

To the extent that Western Europe has taken any genuine interest in addressing its military responsibilities since the Cold War, it has done so as much or more through the European Union than NATO. In 1992, EU members agreed under the Treaty of Maastricht to set up a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Its missions included “the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.” In 1999, the Member States of the European Council issued a declaration calling for a common and independent European policy on security and defense outside NATO. Javier Solan became the EU’s first High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. 

To their credit, European allies did rise to the occasion after 9/11, invoking NATO Article V and supplying AWAC crews to operate along the U.S. Atlantic coast in the immediate aftermath of the attack. When, however, it came to fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, NATO allies hedged their support with “caveats,” mostly declining to engage in offensive action against the Taliban alongside U.S. allies. The European drift from NATO accelerated in the late twentieth century when Brussels established the EU Political and Security Committee and the EU Military Committee. All these EU initiatives, providing for a separate defense relationship apart from NATO, began well before President Trump came on the national security scene.

As Brussels set up a new defense cooperation structure under the EU flag, Washington hoped that these initiatives might help speed the achievement of more European self-sufficiency in defense. That did not happen. As of 2023, a majority of allies still did not meet NATO’s agreed target of at least spending 2 percent of real GDP on defense. While more will likely reach that target in 2024, the reality is that most of those countries will be Eastern European and former members of the Warsaw bloc, not, for example, Germany, Spain, or Italy. 

What has spurred NATO momentum toward meeting two percent goals has been less President Trump and more the Ukraine War. Whether Trump returns to the White House or not, European allies have been mugged by the reality of Moscow’s conventional invasion of a country bordering NATO. Europe is finally beginning to realize that Washington has finite resources while facing mounting military demands around the world, including China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Korea, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, and the Red Sea. One Biden administration official has been quoted as saying that the United States “is pretty maxed out…” Even without Trump, the United States can no longer be realistically expected to play as significant a future role in Europe as it has over the past seventy-five years. Far more than isolationism or the histrionics of a presidential candidate, the real dynamic causing Europe to reassess defense responsibilities is the realization that American military capabilities are increasingly overstretched. 

The issue today is how NATO, accepting this changing reality, must adapt for the future. A good start would be having a European general or admiral rotate regularly with an American flag officer as Supreme Allied Commander. Seventy-five consecutive years of an American SACEUR is enough. 

Another key step, made apparent by Ukraine, is that Europe must urgently build up its own military. Even a 2 percent GDP budget requirement will no longer be sufficient to this end. The United States spent about 3.4 percent of its GDP on military defense in 2023. During the Cold War, it spent from 5 percent to 10 percent of its GDP on the military. With Russia pawing at NATO Europe’s borders, it is finally dawning on allies that they must begin a crash defense buildup, as called for by NATO’s Secretary General. 

Finally, European allies must make up their minds about how the NATO alliance will have to work with the European Union on military matters. In a major strategic move, the EU just dispatched its own naval armada, Operation Aspides, to the Red Sea to defend commercial shipping from Houthi attacks. The EU’s independent task force is commanded by an Italian admiral whose flag is set in Athens. The European Union naval forces are acting only to repel Houthis missiles and drone attacks, not going so far as to attack Houthis positions. Meanwhile, a U.S. and British-led task force, Operation Poseidon Archer, is not only defending shipping from Houthis attacks but also launching offensive strikes against Houthis missile and drone sites. 

If the European Community wants to evolve into a more robust military organization, NATO’s role must be adjusted to leverage that reality. For example, it may be possible for some kind of special arrangement where the EU itself joins NATO in a hybrid partnership. As the military contributions of the United States to Europe decrease over time, allies could drift from NATO, focusing more on a regionally centered EU military alliance. For NATO to survive, European allies must be persuaded to remain committed to the thirty-two-member coalition even as the U.S. role becomes less dominant. 

Proving Macron wrong, that NATO is not “brain dead,” will be a challenge. Throwing more wood on that fire, President Macron just called for a stronger, more independent European defense policy, declaring that Europe must no longer be a U.S. “vassal.” Regardless, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must continue its stabilizing role not only in Europe to contain Russia but also as an alliance capable of dealing with crises on its other peripheries. It must be prepared to act collectively as it has in the past in other regions, including the Middle East or even Asia, as it did in Afghanistan. America’s choices will be considerably less of a threat to the alliance and the continent’s future than Europe’s failure to adapt to a shifting world.

Ramon Marks is a retired international lawyer and Vice Chair of Business Executives for National Security (BENS).

Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan 04/29/2024 10:21 AM EDT

 Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan

04/29/2024 10:21 AM EDT

Office of the Spokesperson

The following is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met today with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum.  Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Fidan discussed efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire that would secure the release of hostages and help alleviate the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza. The Secretary emphasized that it is Hamas’s refusal to accept a deal that is responsible for the conflict continuing, and urged that all efforts be brought to bear to convince Hamas to accept the immediate ceasefire proposal that is on the table. The Secretary and Foreign Minister also discussed ongoing efforts to secure a durable and lasting peace in the region, including through a pathway to a Palestinian state with security guarantees for Israel. Secretary Blinken emphasized the importance of avoiding an escalation of conflict in the Middle East.

Secretary Antony J. Blinken At a Meeting with Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council Member States 04/29/2024 07:43 AM EDT

 Secretary Antony J. Blinken At a Meeting with Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council Member States

04/29/2024 07:43 AM EDT

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

Saudi Arabia

The Secretariat General of Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf Riyadh

MINISTER AL THANI:  (In progress) (Via interpreter) to welcome His Excellency Mr. Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, for his participation in this joint meeting with – between the GCC and the U.S.  And we look forward to finding common grounds and to coordinate between us, especially in light of what the region is witnessing in terms of conflicts and our responsibility to achieve peace and security at the regional level and to coordinate at all levels.

So it’s very important for us to coordinate this on our joint strategic relationship, and I should also refer to the (inaudible) for cooperation and development, and President Biden’s participation in July 2020, and the historic Strategic Partnership that it established based on the achievements of previous summits to enhance cooperation and coordination between us at all levels, and also at the ministerial level, which was evident in the last joint ministerial meeting between the GCC and the U.S. which was held in New York on September 18, 2023, on the margins of the UN General Assembly meetings and – which also stressed the importance of continued work. 

This strengthened (inaudible) developments and military escalation in the Middle East is extremely grave and dangerous to international peace and security, and (inaudible) to all work together, and we’ll concentrate a concerted efforts to achieve peace and exercise self-control and to prevent war in the region.  Foremost among these challenges in the Middle East is the failure of the international community to find a solution to the Palestine problem, which continues to see the bloodshed of innocent women, children, and elderly as a result of the Israeli aggression on Gaza. 

From here, I mean, the State of Qatar, of course, is calling for ceasefire, and – of the military and processes and operations, of course, and then to provide all humanitarian aids and relief aids Israel to – the whole world must stand as one front.  Israel is not to use the humanitarian aids as (inaudible) so as to bridge all the national resolutions.  And I’d like to make sure and stress the importance that the State of Qatar will do its best along with the –  mean, the other countries in the councils towards the peace process will – so as to serve the Palestine – and cause Israel – and based on the very and self-situation of Qatar on behalf of the Palestinian – I mean, cause Israel’s – and we call for the (inaudible) solution, Israel based on the respect of international law, as we’ll go back to the 1967 borders Israel’s – as to – so as to help push the peace process regionally and globally.  

Distinguished guests, we would like to stress the importance of cooperation between all the GCC countries and the United States of America (inaudible) work all together so as to bridge what might provide peace and stability for the region and the whole world, and supporting all diplomatic efforts as well.  I mean, and – (inaudible) regional conflicts builds to the conclusion of this important (inaudible).  I wish you all the best – and for our people, for more growth will (inaudible) peace.  And God’s peace and mercy upon all of you.  

And now I give the speech to His Excellency Antony Blinken, the State Department and Secretary of the United States. 

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Well, thank you very, very much.  And let me just say at the outset how grateful I am to be together again with all of our colleagues, colleagues who share a clear interest in building a more stable, a more secure, a more integrated region for everyone.  That work is more important than it’s ever been, and of course, it comes against the backdrop of conflict with Israel and Hamas, and increasingly destabilizing actions by Iran and its proxies.  I want to thank the chair of the GCC, Qatar, and especially my friend Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Al Thani, for genuinely tireless efforts to try to find a path to an immediate ceasefire and release of hostages in Gaza.  Thank you on a personal as well as professional level for everything that you’re doing.

The most effective way to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, to alleviate the suffering of children, women, and men, and to create space for a more just and durable solution is to get a ceasefire and the hostages home.  But we’re also not waiting on a ceasefire to take the necessary steps to meet the needs of civilians in Gaza.  President Biden has insisted that Israel take specific, concrete, measurable steps to better address humanitarian suffering, civilian harm, and the safety of aid workers in Gaza, including in his most recent call with Prime Minister Netanyahu. 

We have seen measurable progress in the last few weeks, including the opening of new crossings, an increased volume of aid delivery to Gaza and within Gaza, and the building of the U.S. maritime corridor, which will open in the coming weeks.  But it is not enough.  We still need to get more aid in and around Gaza.  We need to improve deconfliction with the humanitarian assistance workers, and we have to find greater efficiency and greater safety, and deconfliction is at the heart of that.  

And finally, we have to make sure that we’re focusing not just on inputs, but on impact.  All of this is going to be a focus of the next few days for me as I travel on to Jordan and Israel.  I’ll have a chance to meet with humanitarian groups, with the Israeli Government, to hear from them where more work is needed, and to continue to press for tangible, immediate, and sustained progress.  

Even as we focus on these immediate needs, we continue to work with our GCC colleagues on a plan to build a just and lasting peace, a pathway to a state for the Palestinians with guarantees for Israel’s security as part of a more integrated and a more secure region.  Today’s also an opportunity to advance efforts to promote greater stability in this region and to prevent conflict from spreading, which has been one of our core objectives from day one, ever since October 7th.  

We’re focused on addressing the greatest threat to regional stability and regional security: Iran.  This is the first meeting since Iran’s unprecedented attack on Israel, the first direct attack from Iran to Israel, with more than 300 projectiles, including over 100 ballistic missiles.  This attack highlights the acute and growing threat from Iran, but also the imperative that we work together on integrated defense.  That’s the focus of the meeting that’s coming up in a few weeks with the U.S.-GCC Working Group on Integrated Air and Missile Defense and Maritime Security.  This brazen attack also underscores the risks of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon and why we must continue to work together to make sure that that does not happen.

Today we’ll also discuss ways to prevent – preserve freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.  The Houthi attacks have not only undermined security, but they’re undermining the lives and livelihoods of people throughout the region, including in Yemen – the very people they profess to want to represent.  The costs of goods are going up, harder to get things into Yemen, including to the north where people so desperately need it.  We’ve seen an – mini-environmental catastrophe with the sinking of a ship that spilled oil and fertilizer.  We’ve seen attacks on ships that were actually bringing food to the people of Yemen, and of course we have a larger impact on the global economy.  

So this needs to stop, and we will be resolute in doing everything we can to put a stop to it.  We’re working to forge as well a diplomatic solution to conflict in Yemen and to meet humanitarian needs for all of its people, and here, I applaud the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the work that it’s been doing so assiduously over the last couple of years to try to move in that direction.

Finally, I would just say that I think one of the things that the last few months have brought into the sharpest possible relief is that there really are two paths forward for the region as a whole.  One – riven with division, with destruction, with violence, with permanent insecurity; the other – greater integration, greater security, greater peace.  I think the meeting today shows that many more of us want to pursue that affirmative path, and I’m grateful to our colleagues from the GCC for working in partnership to advance in that direction.  Thank you. 

SECRETARY GENERAL AL-BUDAIWI:  (In progress) (Via interpreter) the Gulf Cooperation Council and the United States of America.   The GCC states attach a special importance to their (inaudible).  Welcome His Excellency of the State Department – Secretary of the State Department of the United States of America, taking into concentration the importance of the GCC (inaudible) its historic partnership and relationship with the United States of America which has been shown through enhancing the joint cooperation – I mean, (inaudible) three meetings in less than a year, aiming, looking forward – looking forward to achieving success with such important meeting.  I mean, a – the holding our meeting today underlines a strategic importance of the historic relations between the two sides and their joint commitment to build on the outcomes of the previous ministerial meetings and summits, and the most recent of which was the summit held in Jeddah in July 16th, 2022, and the joint ministerial meeting in New York in last September, with a view to fostering consultation, coordination, cooperation in all areas, which would contribute to maintaining regional and international security and stability. 

Ladies and gentlemen, this – I mean, our meeting today is of a great importance, particularly in the light of the exceptional difficult and unprecedented circumstances in the region, which makes it imperative to intensify efforts at all levels, with a view to de-escalating situation and avert the region new levels of violence, tension, and instability due to the war in the Gaza Strip, the military escalation between Iran and Israel, and the increasing tensions in the Red Sea that pose a threat to maritime security and freedom of navigation, as well as the potential risk of nuclear proliferation and ballistic missiles and drones.

So we reiterate the GCC firm position towards the Israel aggression on the Gaza Strip, demanding an immediate, long-lasting ceasefire, and calling Israel to stop hostilities throughout Gaza, including the city of Rafah, in order to ensure delivery of all humanitarian and relief aid and basic needs to the people of Gaza.  We also stress the need for the international community to adopt effective policies and measures to stop escalation and the acts of violence against the Palestinians in the West Bank, including the city of Jerusalem and Islamic sanctities, and to discontinue the settlement and the confiscation of lands as the displacement of the Palestinians from their lands, and to support the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and establishment of their independent Palestinian state on the 1996 boundaries, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative and relevant international resolutions. 

Here, I would like to point out to the statement issued by the 44th extraordinary meeting of the GCC Ministerial Council, where we affirmed our commitment to our call for an international conference with participation of all concerned parties to discuss all issues related to the Palestinian issue, with a view to reaching a solution that would end the Israeli occupation and establish an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative.  

Your highnesses, your excellencies, the continued escalation between Israel and Iran poses a grave threat in the region which would (inaudible) intensify the conflict and undermine regional security and stability.  Hence, we call on all parties to exercise utmost self-control and resolve political dispute through diplomatic channels in order to avert the region and its people the dangers of war.  We also express our great concern over the escalating tensions in the Red Sea, following the ongoing attacks by the Houthis on maritime navigation in the Bab al-Mandeb and the Red Sea area, which pose an unacceptable threat to the international trade, region security, any other national interests.  We re-underscore the UN Security Council Resolution 2722 of January 2024, which demands the Houthis to stop attacking the transiting vessels in the Red Sea.  

Your highnesses and excellencies, the GCC-U.S. distinguished cooperation relation have produced several tangible achievements which constitute the cornerstone of these relations.  In this context, I would like to commend the outcomes of the GCC-U.S. Strategic Partnership, as five joint summits were held over the past years in addition to several ministerial meetings that provided clear guidelines on how to further move forward with our present partnership and developing it. 

These ministerial meetings resulted in forming joint working groups on the following areas: working group on the integrated air missile defense system, working group on the maritime security, working group on cyber security, working group on military training, working group on special operations, working group on combating terrorism, working group on the special group for Iran, working group on trade and investment.  All these working groups seek to strengthen our Strategic Partnership.

Also, I would like to proudly point out to the advanced level of joint military cooperation and coordination, as we are currently forholding the upcoming meetings of the working group on – upcoming meeting of the working group on air and missile defense – and the working group on maritime security – next May, with a view – I would like to extend my appreciation to both parties for the tangible efforts, actually for enhancing military cooperation.  And also, I would like also to thank both sides’ specialists for their ongoing efforts to hold the GCC-U.S. Trade and Investment Dialogue scheduled for June 26th, 2024, in the United States.  I also welcome the invitation to GCC-U.S. business roundtable on June 27th, 2024, organized by the American Chamber of Commerce, in Washington on the sidelines of the 10th U.S. Investment Summit. 

My friend, Tony Blinken, I welcome Your Excellency once again to this meeting with your GCC friends.  I strongly commend our distinguished partnership, which has always been seeking to strengthen the foundations of security, stability, prosperity, and common understanding. Wishing our meeting every success with this (inaudible).  God’s peace and mercy upon all of you.

Social Europe Is the world getting out of control? JAN ZIELONKA 29th April 2024

Social  Europe

Is the world getting out of control?

JAN ZIELONKA 29th April 2024

A world in turmoil, Jan Zielonka writes, needs a democratic Europe, with a new social contract, offering hope to the helpless.

children in Gaza with empty pans seeking food Spectating at the desperation of children in Gaza has left many feeling powerless (Anas-Mohammed/shutterstock.com)

In a recent interview for the New Statesman, a former head of Israel’s internal-security service, Ami Ayalon, disarmingly confessed: ‘We have to assume we shall have a war with Hezbollah not because we want it or they want it but because we are losing control.’ And this feeling of helplessness is not confined to Lebanon or the Israel-Palestine conflict.

We did not want to have a war with Russia, but we lost any grip over the predatory behaviour of its president, Vladimir Putin. We know that uncontrolled markets may crash again, causing enormous social damage, but we lack the instruments that could bring global markets into line. We comprehend the horrendous implications of climate change, but we repeatedly break environmental pledges under pressure from firms, farmers and fans of diesel cars. We lament the rapid if not wild development of artificial intelligence, but we elect to wait and see what happens. We expect another health alert caused by new viruses or antibiotic-resistant pathogens, but the erosion of public health services proceeds unabated.

The feeling of helplessness requires social-psychological rather than political therapy. Doomsayers do not believe in a better future, no matter what. Yet even famous pessimists such as Thomas Hobbes believed that government could and should make a difference: only in a ‘state of nature’ without a Leviathan, was life ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’, a war of ‘all against all’. Sadly, today only a few believe governments can secure the future.

I used to be considered a naïve optimist in the 1980s, when arguing that workers’ strikes in Poland or human chains lighting candles in the Baltic states could bring down the Soviet Union and tear down the Berlin wall. I still believe rich and educated Europe can overcome the ‘polycrisis’ of today. We were able to prevent Russia taking over the entire Ukraine, the 2009-10 European debt crisis was contained, new medicines are constantly being invented and the recent EU AI Act offers citizens some protection from new, intrusive technologies.

That said, I cannot deny that the European Green Deal is being rolled back in front of our eyes with devasting implications, especially in the medium to long term. The arms race has accelerated and confidence-building measures are being dismantled, which increases the prospect of war by default or design. The financial and migratory crises are contained but their roots are not addressed satisfactorily, so they may return with a vengeance.

Moreover, all these individual challenges are feeding into each other. We can argue about the gravity of this or that threat and question the prophets proclaiming the apocalypse. But it is hard to deny an accumulation of fundamental problems which will not go away without adequate responses. How have we got into this mess?

Rotten politics

Incompetent if not malicious politicians are usually blamed for the sorry state of our governance. The problem is that we are blaming different politicians, depending on our ideological stances. Those who vote for liberals from the centre-right-and-left parties blame populists for nationalism if not xenophobia, ‘post-truth’ if not open lies and authoritarian tendencies dismantling democracy. Those who vote for populists blame liberals for ignoring ordinary people and transferring ever more powers to markets and non-majoritarian institutions such as the European Commission, central banks or constitutional courts. They also accuse liberals of opening borders to ‘illegal’ migrants, ‘subsidised’ Chinese products and ‘alien’ cultures.

This emotionally laden polarisation makes it difficult to design policies enjoying overwhelming popular support, without which it is difficult to tackle the congeries of challenges in a firm, coherent, durable and cross-partisan manner. Unfortunately, problems persist even when populists and liberals join hands, which suggests that polarisation is only one of the many factors explaining our weak grip over this jumbled environment.

For instance, the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine brought together such strange political bedfellows as the social-democratic German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, and the far-right Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, among the European opposition. And yet this joint approach failed to arrest Russia’s aggression, with detrimental implications not only for Ukraine but also for the European Union as such.

I am not proposing that we should have sent European troops to Ukraine or, alternatively, should push Ukraine under the bus. Rather, well-intentioned policies were based on several misguided assumptions. For example, we believed that Ukraine could defend itself without attacking mainland Russia. Providing Ukraine offensive rather than merely defensive weapons was rightly considered escalatory, but this implied that the costs to Russia of waging war were bearable. These costs proved also limited due to the modest effectiveness of our sanctions—economic sanctions represent a plausible alternative to direct military engagement but no predator can be contained by them alone.

It was also an illusion to believe that European societies could cope with the costs of war without significant public assistance. The influx of refugees or even grain from Ukraine affected many social groups states neglected. Money invested in Ukraine also comes from others’ pockets and little has been done to divide these costs evenly. Angry citizens have staged a rebellion which puts governments and their policies under pressure.

Our hope that the world would help Europe solve its problem on the eastern border was misguided too. In Africa, the middle east, Latin America and Asia there proved to be little sympathy for rich and selfish Europe. Even in north America—despite the tardy backing from the United States Congress last week for aid—there is a widespread belief that Ukraine is essentially a European problem. And it is difficult to impress Putin without a European army.

Democracy versus autocracy

Our apparent helplessness to secure Europe’s eastern border suggests that it is hard to regain control over crucial matters simply by providing united leadership guided by noble aims. Perhaps democracy is no longer able to fulfil citizens’ expectations in the ‘hybrid’ environment of today. Perhaps we need to accept that China rather than Europe will run the 21st century.

Yet while autocracies such as China or Russia can do a lot of damage, my experience of living on the ‘wrong side of the iron curtain’ suggests they are not so powerful as they may seem. The most important source of power is knowledge, which requires freedom to think and discuss. Besides, as Prince Talleyrand, Napoleon’s foreign minister, famously observed, ‘You can do many things with bayonets except sit on them.’  History shows that people demand freedom sooner or later—and when they do, autocracies tremble.

However, power is a relative, not absolute, concept. Autocracies may well be strong when democracies are weak. The flaws of democracy preoccupy me most because they erode our key advantage over autocracies. What can we do to improve democratic governance?

First, we need to overcome the polarisation that prevents any meaningful compromises leading to new social contracts. A government that is not underpinned by a social contract is weak and arbitrary. Democratic governance cannot be just for the people: it must also be by the people. Elections may well change governments but citizens do not sense that their vote counts.

This is why most Europe’s citizens are not satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. If we believe that integrated Europe should help us regain some control over this unruly environment, then we also need a genuine social contract at the European level. The current renaissance of nationalism and sovereigntism does not though bode well.

Secondly, we need to enlarge the spatial and temporal horizons of democracy. Democratic governance is still confined to the borders of nation-states, defending the short-term interests of present-day voters. No wonder democracy stumbles in an increasingly connected world running at high speed.

How can a national government regulate multinational firms effectively? Successful migration policy requires long-term engagement of multiple actors in distant places addressing such roots of migration as war or poverty. Climate change will affect mostly future generations which do not have a vote in any elections and therefore are missing from political radars. The internet has transformed the notion of time and space, yet democracy has hardly noticed—we should do something about that.

Thirdly, we must intensify, not abandon, our efforts to promote democracy abroad. This is because in the ‘flat world’ of today we need genuine partners in enhancing peace, social justice and sustainable development. After disastrous versions of democracy promotion in Afghanistan and Iraq some advocate a return la géopolitique de grand-papa, based on strategic alliances even with autocrats, while others prefer to focus on the back yard. Yet an inward-looking EU obsessed with its own problems will not recruit many supporters, while courting autocrats is not just immoral but stupid: have we forgotten the tragic history of our ‘strategic alliances’ with Reza Pahlavi (Iran), Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (Tunisia) or Muammar Gaddafi (Libya)?

The best way to promote democracy is to act by example. If we can show that our democracy is able to generate social contracts leading to peace and prosperity, people in other parts of the world will be tempted to follow suit. Europe will not regain its sex appeal by making patronising speeches while offering paternalistic funds.

This is a joint publication by Social Europe and IPS-Journal

Jan Zielonka

Jan Zielonka is professor of politics and international relations at the University of Venice, Cá Foscari, and at the University of Oxford. His latest book is The Lost Future and How to Reclaim It  (Yale University Press, 2023).

Yetkin Report : Anayasa tartışması sorunları perdelemek için sis bombası işlevinde - Murat Yetkin, 29 Nisan 2024

Anayasa tartışması sorunları perdelemek için sis bombası işlevinde

Yazar: Murat Yetkin /  29 Nisan 2024, Pazartesi 

Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan 31 Mart yenilgisi sonrasında ağır ekonomik ve siyasi sorunları perdelemek için TBMM’den çıkması kolay olmayan Anayasa değişikliği önerisini sis bombası gibi kullanıyor. (Foto: Cumhurbaşkanlığı)

Cumhurbaşkanı Tayyip Erdoğan Anayasa değişikliğini önündeki önemli sorunları perdeleyip dikkatleri dağıtmak için adeta bir sis bombası gibi kullanıyor.

Hukuk Başdanışmanı Mehmet Uçum’un 28 Nisan gecesi, Erdoğan’ın CHP lideri Özgür Özel ile görüşmesine günler kala yayınladığı “Yeni Anayasa’nın Ana İlkeleri Neler Olabilir” metni dahi tek başına bu girişimin muhalefetin tepkisini çekip dikkat dağıtma amaçlı olduğunu gösteriyor. Uçum’un ustaca “Cumhuriyetimizin lideri Atatürk”ten -sanki yol açan başkalarıymış gibi- gelir dağılımı eşitsizliğine dek, adeta yeni “Yetmez ama evetçiler” ortaya çıkarabilecek ifadelerle süslediği metninde iki sonuca kapı açılmak isteniyor:

Yüzde 50+1 koşulunun kalması hem MHP ile ittifakın devamı hem de Erdoğan’ın bir sonraki seçimde dördüncü defa aday olabilmesine;

İlk üç maddenin değiştirilemezliğini söyleyen 4’üncü madde, “darbe Anayasasından tamamen kurtulma” şekeriyle kaplanarak bir sonraki değişimde muhtemelen laiklik ilkesi ve vatandaşlık tanımlarının değiştirilmesi.

Bu yolla muhtemelen Özel’in daha Erdoğan’la görüşmeden önce bu sözlere tepki vermesi ve yeni bir polemiğin başlatılması hedefleniyor.

Gerçek gündem sis perdesinde

Oysa Özel, Anayasa değişiklik teklifini Cumhurbaşkanının kendisinden dinlemek istediğini söyledi; danışmanından. Ayrıca Cumhurbaşkanıyla görüşmede kendi gündeminin Anayasa değil, ekonomik kriz, siyasi davalar, belediyelerin sorunları, dış politika ve yaklaşan 1 Mayıs olduğunu da kamuoyu ile paylaştı.

Yoksa şu anda ne halkın ne de dar gruplar dışında siyasetin böyle bir talep ve ihtiyacı var.

Halkın talep ve ihtiyacı bir an önce ekonomik krizden kurtulmak ki siyaset de böylece kendi dinamikleri içinde daha demokratik bir hatta ilerleyebilsin.

AK Parti 31 Mart seçimlerini Anayasayı değiştirmediği için kaybetmedi; ülkeyi ve halkı içine sürüklediği ekonomik krizden çıkartamadığı için kaybetti.

Bu gerçeği Cumhurbaşkanı ve AK Parti Genel Başkanı Tayyip Erdoğan da gayet iyi biliyor, Cumhur İttifakı ortağı MHP lideri Devlet Bahçeli de.

Erdoğan’ın ihtiyacı ise kamuoyunun dikkatini yeni kemer sıkma tedbirlerinden, dış politikadaki (başta ABD) sorunlardan, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığının tepkilere yol açan müfredat çalışmasından ve AK Parti içindeki 31 Mart hesaplaşmasından Anayasa sis bombasıyla dağıtmak.

Meclis’te değiştirme senaryosu

Üstelik Anayasa değişikliğini Erdoğan’ın (Bahçeli desteğiyle de olsa) halkoylamasına sunması önünde iki büyük engel var.

Krizden çıkış için Hazine ve Maliye Bakanı Mehmet Şimşek’e emanet edilen Orta Vadeli Programın (OVP) başarı garantileri arasında 2028’e dek seçim yapılmayacağının gösterilmesi.

 Türkiye’de her halkoylamasının seçimden farklı olmadığını ve AK Parti iktidarı bakımından OVP’yi ihlal edecek seçim ekonomisi riskleri taşıyacağını yatırımcılar biliyor.

Kaybetme riski. Erdoğan ekonomik krizden çıkışı riske atarak gideceği, bir halkoylaması kabul görmezse 20 küsur yıllık iktidarı ağır hasar alır.

Bu nedenle Erdoğan sorunları sis perdesi arkasında bırakıp dikkatleri oraya çekeceği bir Anayasa değişikliğini 600 sandalyeden 360’ına ihtiyaç duyacağı halkoylaması yerine 400 oy toplamaya çalışıp TBMM’de gerçekleştirme senaryosuna başvurabilir.

Olmazı göstererek vakit kazanma

Bunun iki yolu var.

- MHP ile devam edip, yeni yönetimiyle İYİ Parti ve son derece parçalı hale gelen parlamentodaki diğer partilerle tavizler gerektiren pazarlık süreciyle 400 oyu bulmak,

- CHP ile devam edip TBMM’nin bütçe yapma, yürütmeyi denetleme ve güvenoyu dahil yetkileriyle Cumhurbaşkanının yargı üzerindeki etkisini azaltıcı yeni bir yönetim sisteminin pazarlığına oturmak.

Erdoğan, görüştüklerinde Özel’e Mehmet Uçum’un önerisini tekrarlarsa zaten CHP seçeneği olmasın istiyor demektir.

Geriye MHP ve diğer partilerle, bu arada DEM ve HüdaPar ile Kürt sorunu ve laiklik konusuna da göz kırparak pazarlığa oturma kalıyor. Uçum’un bu öneriyi İYİ Parti’nin yönetim değişikliğiyle başa Müsavat Dervişoğlu’nu getirmesinin ertesi günü yapması da tesadüf olmasa gerek.

31 Mart’ta oyları ilk defa CHP’nin gerisine düşüren AK Parti “olmayacak dua” gibi Anayasa değişikliğine “âmin” dedirtmek istiyor. Zor görünüyor. Ama Erdoğan’ın hem zamana hem dikkatleri gerçek sorunlardan dağıtmaya ihtiyacı var. Anayasa değişikliğini bu amaçla sis bombası gibi kullanıyor.

NBC/REUTERS : France's Macron says " Europe could die" in a speech at La Sorbonne University in Paris - Thursday, April 25, 2024

 NBC NEWS / REUTERS 

'Europe could die,' France's Macron says as he calls for stronger defense and economic reform

“We are not equipped to face the risks,” Macron said in a speech.

Paris : Speech of Emmanuel Macron at La Sorbonne

French President Emmanuel Macron at La Sorbonne University in Paris on Thursday.

Jeanne Accorsini / Sipa via AP

April 25, 2024, 5:07 PM GMT+3 / Source: Reuters

By Reuters

French President Emmanuel Macron appealed on Thursday for stronger, more integrated European defenses and said the continent must not become a vassal of the United States, as he outlined his vision for a more assertive European Union on the global stage.

With just three years left of his second and final term in office, and after losing his parliamentary majority in 2022, Macron, 46, wants to show his critics that he retains the energy and fresh thinking that helped propel him into the presidency in 2017 and that he has not become a lame duck leader.

“There is a risk our Europe could die. We are not equipped to face the risks,” Macron said in his speech at the Sorbonne University in Paris, warning that military, economic and other pressures could weaken and fragment the 27-nation E.U.

Macron said Russia must not be allowed to win in Ukraine, and he called for a boost in Europe’s cybersecurity capacity, closer defense ties with post-Brexit Britain, and the creation of a European academy to train high-ranking military personnel.

“There is no defense without a defense industry ... we’ve had decades of under-investment,” he said, adding that Europeans should give preference to buying European military equipment.

“We must produce more, we must produce faster, and we must produce as Europeans,” Macron said.

Europe “must show that it is never a vassal of the United States and that it also knows how to talk to all the other regions of the world”, he said.

Macron has long called for European “strategic autonomy” involving less reliance on the United States, a stance that has gained greater resonance in the face of former President Donald Trump’s renewed bid for the White House. Trump has often accused Europe of free loading on defense at the United States’ expense.

However, many E.U. officials believe there is currently no credible alternative to the U.S. military umbrella, and some suspect Macron of pushing French industrial interests.

Economic challenges

Macron said Europe also risks falling behind economically in a context where global free-trade rules are being challenged by major competitors, and he said it should aim to become a global leader in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, space, biotechnologies and renewable energy.

The E.U. should agree exemptions to its own competition rules so it can support firms in sectors such as AI and green energy in the face of “oversubsidies” by the United States and China, Macron said.

Europe needs less fragmented markets for energy, telecoms and financial services, and must also cut red tape, he added.

The French leader hopes his speech will have the same impact as a similar address at the Sorbonne he made seven years ago that prefigured some significant E.U. policy shifts.

Since then, much has changed, with major geopolitical challenges including the war in Gaza, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and growing China-U.S. tensions.

Thursday’s speech was billed by Macron’s advisers as France’s contribution to the E.U.’s strategic agenda for the next five years. The agenda is due to be decided after the European elections, when E.U. leaders will haggle over the bloc’s top jobs.

Macron has seen his personal popularity tumble, while his centrist Renaissance party is trailing the far-right Rassemblement National (RN) in polls ahead of the June 6-9 European Parliament elections.

Another challenge for Macron is that in the European Parliament, his group, Renew, is now the third-biggest but could fall to fourth place, opinion polls show, which would further limit his influence.

Reuters

Önder Özar'ın notu : Fransa CB Macron'un Sorbonne Üniversitesinde 25 Nisan 2024 perşembe günü yaptığı konuşmanın tam metni yayınlandı. Bu metin günlük alışkanlıklarımıza göre çok uzun. Hızlı okuma kaydıyla yaklaşık yarım saat zaman gerektirebilir. Bu nedenle,  konuşmaya blog hesabımda yer vermiyorum. Arzu edilirse,  özgün metni (fr) ayrıca e-mail adreslere iletebilirim. 

ASPI- The Strategist - EU’s red tape Is helping Russia 29 Apr 2024|Laurence Boone and Nicu Popescu - 29 April 2024

 

ASPI- The Strategist

EU’s red tape Is helping Russia

29 Apr 2024|Laurence Boone and Nicu PopescuRussia–Ukraine war

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The European Union’s spending rules and public-procurement processes are plainly inadequate to the threat posed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. If the World War II Allies had been subject to such strictures, they would have been unable to buy landing craft for the invasion of Normandy in 1944, equip General Charles de Gaulle’s Free French Army, or issue war bonds in time. The EU’s regulations undermine its capacity to mitigate the war’s effects on Europe itself, weaken its ability to protect itself from a broad range of hybrid attacks, and prolong Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.

That is why some European leaders have increasingly called for the EU to put its economy on a war footing. French President Emmanuel Macron, for example, has rallied a coalition of countries to increase support for Ukraine. But while such a shift is urgently needed, efforts to this end have so far mostly been confined to the military sphere, leaving both Ukraine and the bloc vulnerable in other domains.

For example, the procedure for financing and building a new electricity interconnector to Ukraine—which might become increasingly essential as Russia intensifies its strikes on energy infrastructure—would probably not differ from the pre-war procedures. Now as then, a project that could be built in, say, one year, can easily take several more years, owing to bureaucratic barriers.

Consider that in autumn 2022, when Russia began destroying Ukraine’s electricity-generation capacity, Romania requested funds for an electricity interconnector to Moldova – which had started experiencing blackouts as well—from NextGenerationEU, the bloc’s pandemic-recovery program. After nine months of preliminary work, the EU reached the obvious conclusion that the project made little economic sense. While correct from the criteria for financing projects under the NextGenerationEU s and from a profit-maximising perspective, such an assessment ignores the broader risks of Russia’s brutal war on the EU and candidate countries.

Similar issues arise with other types of infrastructure spending. Today, if Poland or Estonia needs to build a road or bridge for security purposes—to boost its capacity to deploy military assets along the border or to some hard-to-reach border village, for example—it would be difficult to access or fast-track funding from international financial institutions, the EU’s Cohesion Fund, or NextGenerationEU, let alone the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or the Council of Europe Development Bank. But what may be fiscally unsound in normal times takes on new meaning in a war economy. Indeed, all member states would benefit from improving the ability of the EU’s frontier countries to move troops and defence equipment.

While diplomatically firm, Europe is still wobbly when it comes to committing resources. The situation is comparable to the first years of the multi-year eurozone debt crisis that began in 2009—at least until then-European Central Bank president Mario Draghi delivered his famous vow in 2012 that the ECB would ‘do whatever it takes’ to save the euro. The EU has yet to commit to do whatever it takes to deny Russia’s victory. The contrast between the bloc securing €750 billion ($1.2 trillion) for the pandemic-recovery fund and struggling to raise even €100 billion for Ukraine’s existential struggle in the continent’s largest war since 1945 reflects Europe’s aversion to common projects beyond the economic sphere.

The EU must change, and fast, to mitigate the Russian security threat. That means providing more aid to Ukraine, devising an emergency plan for ramping up domestic military production, and adopting a European Defense Production Act (DPA).

First, the EU should consider supporting Ukraine with a lend-lease program, similar to the one that the United States used to supply the Allies with military equipment, food, and other material resources before officially entering World War II. The US dispensed around $50 billion (roughly $800 billion today),worth of goods, deferring payment.

Most of these debts were repaid in joint action toward the creation of a liberalized economic order, but some were eventually reimbursed; the United Kingdom paid its final loan installment in 2006. The EU could use common borrowing to finance such a program, like the pandemic-recovery fund before it. The threat posed to the bloc by the Ukraine war is arguably greater than that of COVID-19.

Second, European policymakers must devise contingency plans for military emergencies, including the conversion of civilian factories into defense plants. After all, Ford began assembling B-24 bombers and Chrysler shifted to manufacturing tanks during World War II.

Lastly, a European DPA would help mitigate the effects of hybrid aggression against the EU by hostile powers, including on electricity infrastructure, gas supplies, and telecommunications equipment. It would also establish a robust framework for addressing military and security shortages, with guidelines for fast-tracking acquisitions, expanding industrial sites, managing contracts, introducing trade controls, and securing supply chains.

This new legislative framework should be modelled on the US DPA, which was enacted in 1950 and allows the president to expedite and expand the supply of materials and services needed to promote national defence, broadly defined, by regulating—or even commandeering —private industries. For example, during the COVID-19 crisis, companies were mandated under the DPA to assign the highest priority to government contracts for medical supplies and equipment. In addition to direct purchases and purchase commitments, the DPA authorises the use of other financial incentives, such as loans and guarantees, to enhance domestic preparedness, which includes funding research and development.

A European DPA would establish a framework for addressing hybrid, and possibly more conventional, threats by hostile powers acting and help fast-track processes for public procurement and spending, while still preserving institutional checks and balances. Adopting such legislation, together with a lend-lease program for Ukraine and contingency plans for military emergencies, would represent a credible commitment by the EU to its own defence and to its NATO commitment. Given the full-scale war next door, it is high time the bloc confronted reality: it must protect itself.

AUTHOR

Laurence Boone, a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations, is a former secretary of state for European affairs of France. Nicu Popescu, a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations, is a former minister of foreign affairs and European integration of Moldova. Image of the Ford Willow Run plant building B-24s: Ford.