Tuesday, February 28, 2023

Atlantic Council : February 28, 2023 Calls mount for Russia to face tribunal for aggression against Ukraine By Irina Paliashvili

 February 28, 2023

Calls mount for Russia to face tribunal for aggression against Ukraine

By Irina Paliashvili


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Calls mount for Russia to face tribunal for aggression against Ukraine


The idea of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine was first proposed by Professor Philippe Sands immediately following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in early 2022. As the war now enters its second year, this initiative continues to gain momentum.


Since the invasion began, the concept of a special tribunal has been developed by various groups of international and Ukrainian legal experts. There have been several significant breakthrough developments in the past few months that have elevated this proposal from an academic proposition to the decision-making level and placed it firmly on the international agenda.


The crime of aggression is the underlying crime that triggers all other crimes. It is a leadership crime, for which those perpetrators who organized, decided on, and ordered aggression are tried. If plans for a special tribunal proceed, the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine would be tried for the first time since the Nazi leadership was tried and convicted by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg following World War II.


It has already been established that the International Criminal Court (ICC) at present and for the foreseeable future does not have jurisdiction over Russia’s use of aggression against Ukraine, so a special tribunal is needed. ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan appears to be an isolated voice disputing this consensus. He argues for reforms to address the gap at the ICC, but has not been able to advance any practical and timely solution, keeping in mind the principle that justice delayed is justice denied.


So far, three options for a special tribunal have crystallized. The first is the institution-based option, which envisages a tribunal established on the basis of a treaty between Ukraine and the UN, following the adoption of the relevant UN General Assembly resolution. If this scenario does not work out, a tribunal could be set up on the basis of another international organization such as the Council of Europe, EU, or G7, preferably still with the backing of the UN General Assembly.


Another option is the treaty-based approach. This would involve setting up a tribunal on the basis of a multilateral international treaty, which would potentially be open to any state. There is also a hybrid option, which could see a specialized court based on Ukrainian law and jurisdiction, with some type of international element. At this stage, the institution-based option involving the UN is widely seen as optimal.


EURASIA CENTER EVENTS

When the idea of a tribunal was first introduced, it was supported by international law experts, civil society, and opinion leaders, but not by individual governments. This began to change after the Ukrainian government elaborated on its initial concept and started working with expert groups to develop the possible format of a future tribunal. Towards the end of 2022 and during the first months of 2023, the debate advanced to the inter-governmental level.


The first breakthrough came in November 2022, when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared that the EU was proposing “to set up a specialized court, backed by the United Nations, to investigate and prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression.” At the same time, the French Foreign Ministry announced that it had started “working with our European and Ukrainian partners on the proposal to establish a special tribunal on Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine.” Dutch officials also confirmed that the Netherlands would be willing to house a new UN-backed tribunal to try Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.


In the first weeks of 2023, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock noted the “disastrous” limitations on the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and called for a “special solution” to address what she termed as a gap in international law. Minister Baerbock also backed the immediate establishment of an investigating authority in The Hague to address Russian aggression.


Speaking in January, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte said he could not accept that the international community would let the Russian invasion of Ukraine go unpunished, and confirmed Dutch officials are working with their Ukrainian colleagues and others to set up an aggression tribunal, preferably in The Hague. Meanwhile, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stated, “if a special tribunal is created, we are not against it.”


The European Parliament adopted a resolution in January 2023 backing the establishment of a special tribunal. Also in January, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) voted for a resolution which confirmed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine meets the definition of international aggression and reiterated its call “to set up a special international criminal tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, which should be endorsed and supported by as many states and international organizations as possible, and in particular by the United Nations General Assembly.”


Recent months have witnessed further practical steps toward the establishment of a special tribunal. In early 2023, a core group of more than 20 countries was created to develop plans for a tribunal, with the first in-person meeting taking place on January 26 in Prague. On February 2, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that an international center for the prosecution of the crime of aggression in Ukraine would be set up in The Hague.


It is evident from recent developments that initial calls for a special tribunal are now evolving toward practical implementation, with the various legal options taking more concrete form and being evaluated in terms of preference. This process will continue in the coming months as inter-governmental engagement on the issue deepens.


Dr. Irina Paliashvili is Chair of the Legal Committee at the US-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC) and International Rule of Law Officer at the IBA Rule of Law Forum.


Atlantic Council 


Atlantic Council : February 28, 2023 Russia’s invasion one year on: Ukraine is stronger than ever By Vitaly Sych

 February 28, 2023

Russia’s invasion one year on: Ukraine is stronger than ever

By Vitaly Sych


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Russia’s invasion one year on: Ukraine is stronger than ever

When my family and I left Kyiv on the first morning of Russia’s full-scale invasion last February, we had no idea if we would ever be able to return home or whether Ukraine itself would survive. In the following days, as the biggest European conflict since World War II continued to unfold, this sense of dread only deepened.


One year on, I can now look back with slightly less emotion and a sense of cautious optimism that is rooted in the remarkable resilience of the Ukrainian nation. Ukraine has not only survived, but has actually achieved a number of landmark battlefield victories over Putin’s invading army and has proven to international audiences that Russia can be beaten.


On the personal front, I have been back in Kyiv since May 2022, although my wife and two children remain among the millions of Ukrainians currently living in exile. Thankfully, they are able to visit.


Life in wartime Ukraine can be extremely stressful but Ukrainians have proven themselves far tougher and more resourceful than almost anyone could have imagined. For those living in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities far from the front lines, the greatest threat has come from frequent Russian missile and drone attacks. This airstrike campaign began on October 10 and has since become a feature of daily life.


During those initial October air raids, I found myself in our makeshift neighborhood bomb shelter for the first time, huddled in an underground car park together with 100 other people and their assorted pets. More recently, if I am at home when an attack takes place, I can often see explosions from my apartment window and feel the impact of incoming missiles through the shaking walls of the building.


Russia’s air campaign brought the war closer for millions of Ukrainians, creating a sense of heightened physical danger along with frequent blackouts. The whole of Ukraine spent the winter season with severely limited access to light, electricity, heating, water, and internet. I often had to walk up 20 flights of stairs just to reach my apartment. For people with mobility issues or families with small children, that is simply not an option.


Despite these hardships, Russia’s air attacks have failed to break Ukraine’s spirit. While everyone inevitably talks about the many inconveniences these attacks bring, nobody really complains. Instead, there is an understanding that this is part of the price we must pay for finally saying goodbye to Russia, and a determination to get on with our lives. After the first major attacks, people were shocked and discussed the implications for days on end. But after a few weeks, cafes and restaurants would fill up again within hours of each new bombardment.


Over the past five months, Ukrainians have acquired vast quantities of generators to provide power for businesses, homes, and public services. Each time a blackout begins, an orchestra of generators starts to play. This rumbling of engines has served as the background soundtrack to the winter season in wartime Ukraine. Meanwhile, we have all learned to keep our gadgets fully charged and to have power banks at the ready, just in case. Life goes on.



Winter is now coming to an end and Ukrainians have not been frozen into submission. Indeed, there have been very few blackouts in recent weeks as Ukraine’s heroic air defense forces and power sector professionals continue to perform miracles. Putin’s bombing campaign is the latest in a long line of unsuccessful Russian efforts to undermine Ukrainian morale.


Surprisingly, the Kremlin-controlled Russian media openly boasted of targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Prior to the onset of the air attacks in late 2022, Kremlin propagandists had consistently insisted that the Russian army only struck military targets. However, it seems that a series of embarrassing military defeats in Ukraine left the Putin regime in desperate need of victories. It says much about the state of Russia’s war effort that the only victory Moscow could hope to deliver was news that Ukrainian civilians were being plunged into freezing darkness in the depths of winter.


The defiant Ukrainian response to Moscow’s terror-bombing tactics reflects the mood in the country as the war enters its second year. It also underlines the counter-productive nature of Putin’s invasion. The Russian dictator wanted to wipe out Ukrainian identity entirely. Instead, he has achieved the exact opposite.


Throughout the country, Ukrainian national identity is visibly strengthening. Many people are switching from Russian to the Ukrainian language in their everyday lives. Monuments to Soviet figures are being removed from public spaces, and streets honoring Russian writers are being renamed. After decades of domestic geopolitical divisions, Ukrainian support for EU and NATO membership has rocketed to over 80% and is backed by strong majorities in every part of the country.


Whereas Ukrainian public anger following the initial Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was largely directed against the Russian political leadership in the Kremlin, we are now witnessing demands for the wholesale de-russification of Ukraine. Most Ukrainians have been sickened by the atrocities of the Russian army and horrified by the obvious popularity of the war among the Russian public. They no longer wish to have anything in common with a nation that destroys entire cities and commits countless war crimes.


Ukrainians also understand perfectly well that when Russians talk about “Ukrainian Nazis” and call for the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine, they actually mean the de-Ukrainianization of Ukraine and the permanent return of the country to Russian control. The atrocities committed by Russian forces in occupied areas of Ukraine have brought home the horrors that would await the rest of the country if Ukrainian resistance were to crumble.


This has helped fuel a national outpouring of volunteerism as everyone has sought to contribute to victory. Ordinary Ukrainians have donated billions of dollars to help fund the country’s defense. People give whatever they can, with some contributing large sums and others handing over their last pennies. One day recently, three young boys approached my car selling home-made bracelets to raise funds for the army. Similar scenes can be encountered in towns and cities across Ukraine every day.


I recently attended a press conference in Kyiv to mark US President Joe Biden’s surprise visit to the Ukrainian capital. Biden made a point of expressing his admiration for Ukraine’s astounding resilience. The reason is simple: we know that our country is currently engaged in an existential fight for survival. If we stop fighting, we will simply disappear. If the Russians stop fighting, the war will end.


As things currently stand, the invasion is far from over. The military situation is complex and unpredictable. Ukraine enjoys strong morale following a series of battlefield successes and is also benefiting from a steady flow of modern weapons from the country’s Western partners. Meanwhile, Russia has strength in numbers thanks to the country’s first mobilization since World War II, while Putin appears to be preparing domestic audiences and the Russian economy for a long war. Ukrainians remain confident of ultimate victory, but there is also widespread recognition that the journey will be long and difficult.


Despite this uncertainty, there are reasons to look ahead with a sense of confidence. One year ago, Kyiv was supposed to fall within a matter of days. Instead, the Ukrainian capital has become a global symbol of courage and freedom. Over the past year, Ukraine has earned the respect of the watching world. Indeed, no country has ever undergone such a complete image transformation in such a short space of time. Once known primarily for corruption and poverty, Ukraine is now a byword for bravery.


For the first time in my life, I firmly believe Ukraine has a realistic change of joining the European Union. When this finally happens, it will confirm a civilizational shift that has been underway for the past few decades as Ukraine has struggled to shake off the shackles of empire and shed the country’s post-Soviet legacy. Despite the horrors of Russia’s ongoing invasion, I am convinced Ukraine is now moving toward better times. Most of all, I am absolutely sure this bright future is thoroughly deserved.


Vitaly Sych is Chief Editor of NV media house which includes a weekly magazine, national talk radio station, and news site NV.ua.


Atlantic  Council

Febr.28, 2023







Joint Statement on Somalia 02/28/2023 08:41 PM EST (Katar, Somali, Türkiye, BAE, UK. ABD )

 Joint Statement on Somalia

02/28/2023 08:41 PM EST

Office of the Spokesperson

The following is a Joint Statement by Qatar, Somalia, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

Begin text:

Representatives of Qatar, Somalia, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America met in Washington, D.C. to discuss Somalia’s security, state-building, development, and humanitarian priorities.

The partners expressed support for the Federal Government of Somalia’s focus on counterterrorism and capacity building. They discussed how to better support Somalia’s fight against al-Shabaab and prepare for the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia drawdown, and agreed to strengthen coordination of international security assistance. Partners agreed on the importance of ensuring timely delivery of stabilization assistance to newly liberated areas. They committed to support Somalia’s efforts to meet the benchmarks on weapons and ammunition management to enable the UN Security Council to fully lift the arms controls on the Federal Government of Somalia.

The partners encourage and support Somalia’s National Consultative Council (NCC) process in promoting political reconciliation and to delineate the roles and responsibilities of levels of government in Somalia, including by finalizing the constitution.

The partners expressed concern about the ongoing conflict in and around Lascanood and called on all parties to adhere to the ceasefire, de-escalate, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and engage in constructive and peaceful dialogue.

They also expressed concern about the ongoing humanitarian crisis driven by Somalia’s worst drought on record. They welcomed support along with international actors to meet the immediate needs of the Somali people, while also strengthening Somalia’s ability to withstand future climate shocks.

The partners agreed to continue work within these areas and reconvene in Doha, Qatar, within the next three months for ongoing discussions and to take stock of progress.

End text.

U.S. DOD : DOD Delivers Field Hospital to Turkey Feb. 27, 2023 | By MacKenzie Margroum

 DOD Delivers Field Hospital to Turkey

Feb. 27, 2023 | By MacKenzie Margroum

At the request of the government of Turkey, United States Marines, sailors, soldiers and airmen worked around the clock to deliver an emergency field hospital from the continental United States to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, Feb. 22, as part of the United States' continuing commitment to assist survivors of the catastrophic earthquake.

U.S. Naval Forces Europe, in coordination with U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, facilitated the delivery of the Defense Department-provided field hospital, with assistance from staffs in Kelly Field in San Antonio, Texas, and Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

Spotlight: Helping Hands

"We are responding to the request for support from the Turkish government to provide a critical medical capability while the Turkish government rebuilds," Brig. Gen. Andrew Priddy, commanding general, Task Force 61/2, said. "I am proud of the professionalism with which the team has responded to assist our Turkish allies and friends who are suffering from the earthquake's devastation."
 
U.S. service members, assigned to U.S. 6th Fleet's Task Force 61/2, are working at the request of the Turkish Ministry of Health through the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure the hospital is established and operational in the province of Hatay, one of Turkey's most severely impacted areas.
 
The field hospital is equipped with an emergency room, two operating rooms and an intensive care unit along with critically needed medical supplies, 100 beds and equipment to ensure the functionality of the hospital.

The Marines of TF 61/2 and airmen from 39th Air Base Wing will set the hospital up over the course of a week, beginning Feb. 25 and will turn the facility over to the Turkish Ministry of Health once complete. Once turned over, the hospital will provide Turkish medical professionals expanded capability to continue providing critical and urgent health care to the citizens of Turkey impacted by the devastating earthquakes.

 
TF 61/2, under operational control of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. 6th Fleet, is responding to the deadly 7.8 and 7.6 magnitude earthquakes that devastated Turkey on Feb. 6. Hours after the earthquake, U.S. Marines and sailors established a forward crisis response operations center at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, in close coordination with U.S. interagency partners and Turkish officials.
 
For more than 80 years, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-U.S. Naval Forces Africa has forged strategic relationships with allies and partners, leveraging a foundation of shared values to preserve security and stability.

 
Headquartered in Naples, Italy, NAVEUR-NAVAF operates U.S. naval forces in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command areas of responsibility. U.S. 6th Fleet is permanently assigned to NAVEUR-NAVAF and employs maritime forces through the full spectrum of joint and naval operations.

U.S. Dept State Office of the Spokesperson Economic Resilience in Central Asia Initiative 02/28/2023 08:21 AM EST

 Economic Resilience in Central Asia Initiative

02/28/2023 08:21 AM EST

Office of the Spokesperson

The Biden-Harris administration launched the Economic Resilience Initiative in Central Asia (ERICEN) in September 2022 to catalyze transformative economic growth across Central Asia in the wake of Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine.  The United States provided $25 million in FY 2022 funding to diversify trade routes, expand investment in the region, and increase employment opportunities by providing the populations of Central Asia with practical skills for a modern job market.  Working with Congress, the United States intends to add $20 million in FY 2023 funding to expand programming under ERICEN.  The United States is also planning to provide $5 million to support regional connectivity through economic and energy programs, for a total of $50 million in regional programs.

ERICEN has three key pillars:

Expanding Trade Routes

  • Expand alternative trade routes, increase shipping capacity, and enhance cross-border E-payment systems.
  • Enhance infrastructure along Trans-Caspian trade routes.
  • Identify logistics bottlenecks and make recommendations to governments and the private sector to improve critical port, rail, and maritime logistics hubs in Central Asia.

Bolstering the Private Sector

  • Facilitate the movement of Western multinational companies to Central Asia and provide additional employment opportunities.
  • Support connectivity among businesses to ensure their access to new markets, focusing on key sectors with growth potential.
  • Work with private sector companies in Central Asia to enhance their cyber security, with a view to better integrating Central Asia firms into regional and global value chains and improving trade with the United States.

Investing in People through Training and Education

  • Expand English language education for young professionals across Central Asia to build a skilled English-speaking workforce, which increases competitiveness in global markets, promotes national economic strength, and supports bilateral trade.
  • Train or retrain Central Asia’s workforce, including returning labor migrants, in entrepreneurship and skills in high demand such as truck driving, increasing their ability to work in markets throughout and beyond Central Asia.

The following U.S. government agencies are collaborating to implement this initiative:

  • U.S. Agency for International Development
  • U.S. Department of Commerce Commercial Law Development Project
  • U.S. Department of State

Joint Statement on Advancing the U.S.-Mongolia Economic Partnership 02/28/2023 01:08 PM EST

 


02/28/2023 01:08 PM EST

Office of the Spokesperson

The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America and Mongolia on the occasion of the 4th U.S.-Mongolia Economic Policy Dialogue.

Begin Text:

To strengthen further the U.S.-Mongolia Strategic Partnership and economic relationship, representatives of Mongolia and the United States held the 4th bilateral Economic Policy Dialogue on February 2, 2023, in Washington, D.C. During the meeting, the two nations discussed joint responses to economic challenges, explored opportunities to deepen bilateral trade and investment, and decided to pursue cooperation in key areas, including critical minerals, clean energy, and the digital economy.

U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Whitney Baird and State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia Ankhbayar Nyamdorj co-chaired the dialogue. U.S. participants included representatives from the Department of State, National Security Council, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Millennium Challenge Corporation, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture, Department of the Treasury, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank, Transportation Security Administration, and Federal Aviation Administration. Mongolian participants included representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Light Industry, Ministry of Economy and Development, Ministry of Energy, and Ministry of Mining and Heavy Industry.

The United States and Mongolia reiterated that countries around the world should partner to hasten global economic recovery, including by working to overcome supply chain disruptions, and affirmed the international community should unite in efforts to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

The two nations reaffirmed their strong desire to build on the overall U.S.-Mongolia Strategic Partnership, deepen the economic relationship in areas of mutual interest, and pursue opportunities for cooperation through existing and new mechanisms, including capacity building and trade promotion. They further reiterated the importance of strengthening Mongolia’s business climate, including through full implementation of the United States-Mongolia Agreement on Transparency in Matters Related to International Trade and Investment. Both sides noted with satisfaction the signing of a Memorandum of Consultations (MOC) marking the successful negotiation of an Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Mongolia on January 24, 2023, an important step toward establishing scheduled, nonstop passenger flights between Mongolia and the United States, thus further expanding economic and people-to-people ties.

The two nations discussed potential collaboration on projects to advance Mongolia’s economic development, diversification, and independence, with a focus on renewable energy and energy security, critical minerals, transportation, food security, intellectual property rights, and the digital economy. The two sides also reviewed joint development programs, including the up to $462 million Millennium Challenge Corporation Water Compact, which entered into force in March 2021 and will expand Ulaanbaatar’s water supply by more than 80 percent. They noted the USAID Mongolia Energy Governance program, which will promote the development of a modern energy sector and facilitate sustainable and inclusive economic growth.

Mongolia commended the financial assistance from the United States to improve herders’ preparedness to overcome severe winter climate conditions.

The two nations highlighted the bilateral relationship is grounded in shared democratic values. They discussed expanded efforts to strengthen the rule of law and governance, fight corruption, and uphold fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression online, noting that a strong democracy and a strong economy go hand in hand.

The United States provided information on its initiatives in the Indo-Pacific in support of a free and open region that is connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient, through potential partnerships in areas including infrastructure, critical minerals, environmental protection, and technology. The two sides intend to further explore possibilities to implement joint projects and work with like-minded partners in and out of the region.

The United States and Mongolia reviewed their 2018 Roadmap for an Expanded Economic Partnership and expressed mutual intent to update it to reflect the broadening scope of bilateral cooperation by including new areas and opportunities for partnership.

The United States and Mongolia decided to maintain the exchange of high-level visits, including holding the next Annual Bilateral Consultations and strategic dialogue in 2023 in Washington, D.C.

End Text.

Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Kazakhstan Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi At a Joint Press Availability 02/28/2023 12:03 PM EST

 Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Kazakhstan Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi At a Joint Press Availability

02/28/2023 12:03 PM EST

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

Astana, Kazakhstan

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MODERATOR:  (Via interpreter) We are about to start the press conference.  I’d like to give the floor to the Secretary of State of the United States, Antony Blinken, and the minister of foreign affairs of Kazakhstan, Mukhtar Tileuberdi.  You can pose your questions after we give the floor to our speakers.  The floor goes to Mukhtar Tileuberdi, the foreign minister of Kazakhstan.

FOREIGN MINISTER TILEUBERDI:  (Via interpreter) Distinguished Secretary of State, Mr. Antony Blinken, distinguished members of the American delegation, and media representatives, today I am pleased to receive my friend, the U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan on his first official visit to Astana.  So far we have met at various international events in Washington, D.C., and today we are here hosting him at his official visit. Welcome to Kazakhstan.

Before noon, during the first half of the day, we had a very productive series of meetings with the U.S. delegation, and the State Secretary also held a meeting with the president of our country, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in the course of friendly and constructive talks.  They discussed salient issues of bilateral and multilateral agenda, as well as prospects of the Kazakhstan-American cooperation.  I am glad to note that cooperation with the United States is developing in the spirit of an enhanced strategic partnership.  This is confirmed by the revival of political dialogue, trade, economic, and investment cooperation.

Mutual trade turnover between Kazakhstan and the United States exceeded 3 billion U.S. dollars in 2022, and this figure is 37.2 percent higher compared to the results of the previous year.  Export is growing because the U.S. is one of the largest investors in Kazakhstan’s economy since 1993.  The total inflow of foreign direct investments from the U.S. to Kazakhstan exceeded 62 billion U.S. dollars, and in the first three quarters of 2022 the volume of American investments increased by 58.8 percent compared to the corresponding period of 2021.  About 590 enterprises with the participation of the American capital function are present in Kazakhstan, and more U.S. companies are showing they’re interested in the Kazakh market.

We have just finished the C5+1 ministerial meeting of the foreign ministers of the Central Asian countries and the U.S., and the participation of my colleagues from the Central Asian states clearly shows our joint political efforts to strengthen regional ties in a complex international situation.  Kazakhstan highly appreciates the commitment of the United States to strengthen cooperation with the Central Asian region.  Our country continues a balanced multilateral foreign policy, in accordance with its diplomatic priorities and Central Asia, and the United States remain our major partners.

For us, as the host country, this makes the C5+1 format a – relevant to mechanism of regional cooperation.  The C5+1 mechanism has established itself as an effective regional diplomatic platform for promoting economic cooperation, security, as well as sustainable development in Central Asia.  During the event, a wide range of issues were discussed, including cooperation on food security, combating terrorism, energy, environment, as well as other pressing issues.

Returning to the topic of bilateral cooperation, I would like to note that the Secretary of State firmly supports the political and economic reforms initiated by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev aimed at ensuring the democratization and the rule of law.  I would like to thank the American side for its intent to further consolidate our bilateral relations.

Thank you for your attention.

MODERATOR:  (Via interpreter) Thank you very much.  We’d like to give the floor to the State Secretary of the U.S., Antony Blinken.

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Thank you very much.  Mukhtar, thank you.  Thank you for today.  Thank you for – as you very aptly described today, a very good day both bilaterally as well as with our C5+1 colleagues.  And it’s always good to be with you, and it’s particularly good to be here in Kazakhstan.  When we hosted your delegation in Washington last May, well, the weather was just a little bit milder than it is today.  But I think it’s fair to say that the temperature outside is more than made up for by the warmth that you and President Tokayev have shown us on this trip.  And I especially want to thank the president for his terrific hospitality, for the generosity of his time, and for the very good conversation that we had.

I’m here to underscore that the strong partnership, and in particular the enhanced strategic partnership between the United States and Kazakhstan, is moving forward strongly.  Ever since being the first nation to recognize Kazakhstan in December of 1991, the United States has been firmly committed to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Kazakhstan – and countries across the region.  In our discussions today, I reaffirmed the United States’ unwavering support for Kazakhstan, like all nations, to freely determine its future, especially as we mark one year since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a failed attempt to deny its people that very freedom.

We applaud Kazakhstan for continuing to host more than 200,000 Russian citizens who fled their country after President Putin launched his war.  And I want to thank the people of Kazakhstan for generously providing food, clothing, medicine, other humanitarian supplies to Ukraine, including setting up those yurts of invincibility in Kyiv and Bucha, where Ukrainians can find warmth and respite from the war.

I also reiterated that the United States strongly endorses the reform agenda that President Tokayev announced last March.  We look forward to seeing the additional concrete steps Kazakhstan will take to realize that agenda, expanding public participation in the political process, increasing government accountability, curbing corruption, introducing presidential term limits, protecting human rights.  Those reforms are an important reason why foreign investors, including from the United States, are increasingly turning to Kazakhstan.  American businesses were among the first to invest here, injecting more than $50 billion into the Kazakh economy going back to 1991.

We are eager to bolster our economic cooperation, not only to strengthen the development and opportunity within Kazakhstan but also to strengthen linkages across Central Asia, promoting the diversification of energy and export, among other investments that will benefit Kazakhstan’s people in very tangible ways.  Kazakhstan also continues to be a valued partner on key global issues: reducing the spread of nuclear weapons by dismantling Soviet-era missiles; contributing to vital peacekeeping operations from Lebanon to Mali; exploring the galaxy through space cooperation; repatriating and rehabilitating more than 600 foreign terrorist fighters and their families.

We’re grateful to Kazakhstan for its leadership in Central Asia and for hosting the C5+1 Ministerial today – this is the fourth one that I’ve had the opportunity to participate in as Secretary – demonstrating our commitment to be a reliable partner to all countries in the region.  We discussed with our fellow ministers from Kazakhstan, from Kyrgyzstan, from Tajikistan, from Turkmenistan, from Uzbekistan concrete ways to continue to advance our shared economic, energy, environmental, and security goals.  The C5+1 is an increasingly important platform.  Central Asian governments are strongest when they work together to address common challenges and to shape their own future.  The United States aspires to be steadfast partners in those efforts.

We’re working to do our part to try deliver solutions to the shared challenges that are affecting our people, from developing clean energy to contributing – excuse me – to combatting diseases like COVID, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis.  Back in September, with food and gas prices surging due to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, the U.S. committed $16.5 billion toward food and security here in this region.  We also set up the Economic Resilience Initiative for Central Asia – $25 million to expand regional trade routes, establish new export markets, attract and leverage greater private sector investment, providing people with practical skills for the modern job market.

Today, I’m announcing an additional $25 million for that initiative, a total of $50 million to build up the regional economy, and especially to make sure that people have the skills they need to succeed in this global economy.  To further empower and connect the people of Central Asia, we’re launching an effort to increase English language proficiency for more than 1,000 young professionals in government and across civil society.

So we’ve had a very productive day of conversations and new initiatives that we hope will build on those discussions to the benefit of our partners in Central Asia.  We sat around the table behind you with our colleagues from the C5+1, and I have a notebook filled with very good, concrete ideas about how we can further deepen our collaboration and address, in practical ways, the challenges that we’re facing.

I mentioned space exploration a few moments ago, so let me just close by noting that seven astronauts are currently orbiting above us in the International Space Station.  They hail from different countries, they speak different languages, but many of these astronauts journeyed to the stars together from Kazakhstan, and they will land here in Kazakhstan when they return to earth.  To me, that’s a wonderful symbol of how this country can be a launching pad for our collective progress on earth, through the partnership between the United States and Kazakhstan, across Central Asia, around the globe.  Thank you.

MODERATOR:  (Via interpreter) Thank you very much, dear colleagues.  Now it’s high time for you to pose your questions.  Please raise your hands, introduce yourselves, and name a person that you would like to address your question to.  Please.

QUESTION:  (Via interpreter) Good evening.  My name is Zhanna Alpysbayeva.  I am from Atameken Business Channel.  I have the following question:  The West declared about the need related to bypassing the sanctions.  In your opinion, what’s the importance of secondary sovereign sanctions for Kazakhstan, and in which case those sanctions can be imposed here as well?   Because – because of these sanctions imposed on Russia, the economies of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are suffering as well.  What are the compensations for our countries?

MODERATOR:  (Via interpreter) Whom you are addressing your question to?

QUESTION:  (Via interpreter) To the Secretary of State.

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Thank you very much.  First, let me start by saying this:  The sanctions that dozens of countries around the world are imposing on Russia, as well as the export controls, didn’t just materialize out of thin air.  Countries came together to impose them because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its aggression against not only Ukraine but against the very principles at the heart of the international system and the United Nations Charter: territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty – principles that matter deeply to countries in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan.

And so in response to what Russia did, countries around the world, including the United States have been supporting Ukraine in its efforts to defend itself against the Russian aggression, but also to try to put what pressure we can on Russia, to impose costs on Russia so that it stops the aggression, pulls its troops out, and restores Ukraine’s full sovereignty.  That’s what this is about.  So it’s important to put it in that context.

We are watching compliance with sanctions very closely, and we’re having an ongoing discussion with a number of countries, including our C5 partners, on the economic spillover effect, because we’re very conscious that this Russian aggression has had real consequences – not just for Ukraine and not only for the principles I mentioned, but in very concrete ways for countries around the world, including here in Central Asia.  We’re issuing licenses that make sense, we’re sharing information with our partners, and we’re supporting the C5 countries in their efforts to diversify their own trade relationships.

So for example, licenses have been granted for companies or entities in countries that are engaged with sanctioned Russian companies so that they have time to wind down those activities and cut their ties with Russia.  It’s not like flipping a light switch.  We understand that sometimes you need time to do it in a way that doesn’t harm your business.  We’ll do our part to strengthen the region and improve the lives of people living in Central Asia, ourselves in concrete ways – I mentioned a few of them with some of the initiatives that we’ve engaged in.  As I said, I announced $25 million through the Economic Resilience Initiative for Central Asia, expanding regional trade routes, so that gives new opportunities, new places for countries to engage and to trade, new export markets so that they’re not reliant just on one country, and then attracting private sector investment.  And today, as I mentioned, I’m announcing an additional $25 million to that effort, bringing the total to $50 million.

So it’s a long way of saying we’re very conscious of the spillover consequences of Russia’s aggression.  We’re doing everything we can to minimize them, to mitigate them, and create new opportunities, different opportunities for partners here in Central Asia.

FOREIGN MINISTER TILEUBERDI:  (Via interpreter) If you don’t mind, I would like to add and say that the Government of Kazakhstan and the leadership of the United States established the mechanism of regular consultations on this matter in order to avoid the negative consequences for the economy of Kazakhstan and in order to prevent a possible secondary sanctions.  We have national coordinators appointed on both sides, and they are in touch with each other, and we are really thankful to the American side for informing us about possible cases of the imposition of secondary sanctions as early as possible.

Therefore, I would like to say that for the time being, there is no single Kazakh company or there is not a single Kazakh sector that has been imposed secondary sanctions.  Thank you.

MODERATOR:  (Via interpreter) Thank you very much.  Who wants to pose our next question?

QUESTION:  Thank you so much.  Vivian Salama from The Wall Street Journal.  Thank you so much, Foreign Minister, for having us.  You actually just answered my first question, so I’m going to mix it up a little bit.  Are you concerned at all about how deeply entrenched your economy is with Russia, that it would take too long for, say, new allies, new partners like the U.S. and Europe to be able to sort of fill that void moving forward?

And Mr. Secretary, you also just answered my first question, but I do have a second one for you regarding the potential Chinese lethal aid assistance to Russia.  There have been a number of public statements from you and your – a number of members of President Biden’s cabinet expressing concern about China’s deliberations.  Can you elaborate a bit on what the U.S. and its allies are doing to persuade Beijing away from such a move, and what consequences it could face if it delivers on any such aid?  Thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER TILEUBERDI:  Yes.  I’d like to say that indeed Kazakhstan has very historic ties with both – with Russia and Ukraine.  Our economies interconnected for long, long time, and that’s why definitely all this situation is quite heavy for us, for our economy, and we trying to avoid any negative effects from the sanctions.  You can understand that Kazakhstan is a member of Eurasian Economic Union, and we don’t have any custom borders between Kazakhstan, Russia, and other members of this union.  So that’s why definitely it’s sometimes very difficult to manage how we can provide this free trade by products and services between our borders.  But at the same time, we trying to evade any possibilities – to avoid any possibilities for evasion of sanctions by Russian or even by any foreign companies.  Thank you.

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Vivian, as you know, this is something that I raised directly with China’s senior foreign policy official, Wang Yi, when I saw him on the margins of the Munich Security Conference last week.  And the backdrop here, of course, goes back to even before Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.  Just a few weeks before that, you’ll remember that President Xi and President Putin had a summit meeting in which they talked about a partnership with no limits.  And that, of course, in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a real concern, including the concern that such a partnership might lead China to materially support Russia in its aggression, including with lethal military support and/or with efforts to systematically evade the sanctions that were being imposed on Russia for the aggression against Ukraine.

And as I’ve mentioned going back to, I think, the first conversation between President Biden and President Xi after the Russian aggression, President Biden raised this concern and made very clear to President Xi that were Russia to engage in lethal material support for Russia in the aggression against Ukraine or the systematic evasion of sanctions, this would be a serious problem in our relationship.

So we’ve been watching it very carefully from day one.  And the reason that I raised this not only with Wang Yi last week but also publicly, along with other colleagues in the administration, is because of concern we have based on information that we have that China is considering moving beyond the nonlethal support that some of its companies have been providing to actually lethal material support for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

And what I can share with you is that we did very clearly warn China about the implications and consequences of going through with providing such support.  We will not hesitate, for example, to target Chinese companies or individuals that violate our sanctions or otherwise engage in supporting the Russian war effort.

Beyond that, what I heard very clearly from countries around the world that I’ve been engaged with over the past 10 days, since these concerns have first been raised and shared with many countries, is that this is not only something that would be a serious problem for China and its relationship with us, but a serious problem with its relationship with countries around the world.

And let me just add this:  China can’t have it both ways when it comes to the Russian aggression in Ukraine.  It can’t be putting forward peace proposals on the one hand while actually feeding the flames of the fire that Russia has started with the other hand.

So I hope that China will take what we said very seriously – but not only what we said, what many other countries around the world are saying – and refrain from any further consideration of materially supporting Russia in the war effort.

MODERATOR:  (Via interpreter) Thank you very much.  Next question.

QUESTION:  (Via interpreter) My name is Yerbolatov.  I have a question to be posed to the Secretary of State.  So you said – you know that we are celebrating the one year anniversary of the war of Russia against Ukraine.  And if we take into account the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation, is there a threat to peace and security in Central Asia in this regard, taking into account the aggression of Russia against Ukraine?

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Thank you.  The concern that we have is not simply the aggression against Ukraine itself and the horrific things that are being done to its people, but, as I said before, the assault on the very principles that are at the heart of the international system, the heart of the United Nations Charter, that we believe are necessary to keep peace, security, stability around the world, including here – the principles of territorial integrity, of sovereignty, of independence.

And a big part of the reason why it was so important for countries to stand up against the Russian aggression is not only to help Ukraine defend itself but also to defend those principles.  Because if we allow them to be violated with impunity, then that does open up the prospect that Russia itself will continue – will consider further aggression against other countries if it sets its sight on them, or other countries will learn the wrong lesson and would-be aggressors in every part of the world will say, “Well, if Russia can get away with this, then we can too.”  And that’s a recipe for a world of conflict, a world of instability, a world that I don’t think any of us want to live in.

So that’s why it’s been so important for so many countries to stand up and say, “No, we don’t accept this.”  I can’t speak to any specific ideas, plans that Russia may have anywhere else.  I think its focus is very much on Ukraine.  But I can say that had we failed to stand up in support of the principles that Russia was violating by invading Ukraine, that would have created I think a greater prospect that Russian aggression would point in other directions.

MODERATOR:  (Via interpreter) Thank you very much.  Due to the lack of time, we have one final question.

QUESTION:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  I was going to ask a question that was quite similar to my colleague’s, if I – Mr. Secretary, if I could ask little bit more, the idea that you had of – you said repeatedly here that territorial integrity, independent sovereignty of all the Central Asian nations.  Do you see that being at risk at all?  I know you just mentioned that you don’t see anything specific from Russia, but what are the types of the things that the U.S. could provide, or the security guarantees, if you want to put it that way, diplomatic support?  What can the U.S. do to ensure that those values are held?

And if I could ask the foreign minister a bit of the same thing.  You mentioned historic ties both with Russia and Ukraine.  To what extent do you feel any threat, any risk from what’s happening in Ukraine, not just on the economic front but also the security front?  Thanks very much.

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Shaun, thank you very much.  One of the things that we’re working on in very practical ways is to demonstrate that the United States is a steadfast partner for countries in Central Asia.  Our support for their independence, for their sovereignty, for their territorial integrity is real, but it’s particularly manifested in two ways.  One, it’s manifested in helping them in different ways develop the strongest possible capacities for their own security, their growing economic prosperity, and the strength and resilience of their societies.  That’s the best way to make sure that going forward these countries can determine their own futures consistent with those principles.  And we’re doing that on a bilateral basis, and we’re doing that, as you mentioned, in the C5+1.

One of the things that we’ve seen in Ukraine is that its own resilience to the Russian aggression of course starts with the incredible courage of the Ukrainian people, the extraordinary efforts of its military.  But I think it goes beyond that.  I think what we’re seeing as well is a resilient society that’s resilient also because it has stronger and stronger institutions, not only within government – those are usually important – but also beyond it, including a vibrant free press, including a strong civil society.  Each of those things is part of Ukraine’s success story in dealing with Russia’s aggression and in creating a country that’s resilient to the aggression, that can deal with it, and that will bounce back from it.

And so it’s a long way of saying that our partnerships here, the work we’re doing here is also to help our friends in Central Asia build these kinds of strong, resilient societies with strong institutions, with ever greater capacity for their people, with more and more investment coming in from the United States and from other countries, with greater connections among them because these governments ultimately are going to be even stronger when they’re working together to meet common challenges.  And I think that creates the kind of region where their ability to uphold their own territorial integrity, their own sovereignty, their own independence will be that much stronger.

FOREIGN MINISTER TILEUBERDI:  Yes.  I just mention that definitely Kazakhstan doesn’t allow to use its territory for evasion sanctions, but it doesn’t mean that for today we have or feel any threats or risks from Russian Federation.

As I answered to the first question, Kazakhstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Commonwealth of Independent States, with other states and countries surrounding Russia.  So our relationship we consider as an alliance in the framework of all these multilateral structures.

And for bilateral cooperation, relationship, we have solid legal base that – which is more important that we have the completed delimitation process, the state border between Kazakhstan and Russia, and as you know is the longest land border in the world.  It’s over – more than 7,500 kilometers.  Now we are in the process of demarcation.  It’s almost 70 percent of this border completed.  We have regular consultations between the government and federal states on the different issues.  And as you know, Kazakhstan will continue its multi-vector foreign policy.  It means that we are trying to keep the system of the check and balances and to develop the mutually beneficial cooperation, relationship with all the countries of the world.   Thank you.

MODERATOR:  (Via interpreter) Dear colleagues, our press conference is over. Thank you for your attention.

Institut Montaigne :After the Fall. Must We Prepare for the Breakup of Russia? ANALYSES - 23 FEBRUARY 2023


After the Fall. Must We Prepare for the Breakup of Russia?

ANALYSES - 23 FEBRUARY 2023


By Bruno Tertrais

ADVISOR FOR GEOPOLITICS

In the Risk board game, where many baby boomers learned the basics of geostrategy, one could look forever for Russia without finding it. Instead, one would come across Ukraine, Ural, Yakutia, Chita and Kamchatka.


It is hard to think of the disappearance of the largest country by area in the world as a credible scenario. Yet the premise of Russia’s collapse has long haunted Russians, just as it stirred the West’s imagination. 40 years ago, a British author published a novel entitled The Fall of the Russian Empire in which he wrote: “Russia, in all its grandeur, brutality, and impenetrable mystery, has been transformed into a human volcano about to explode”.   


It is not uncommon to see empires collapse after major military defeats, which act either as a direct cause or as a catalyst for implosion – the lack of political legitimacy and the disorganization of state structures compounding the human and financial cost of war. This was obviously the case after World War I, Russia included. For the Soviet Empire, the stalemate in Afghanistan was both a revelation of the weaknesses of its armed forces and an incentive for rebellion among non-Russian republics.


He or his successors would then face an even more dangerous scenario: that of the collapse of an empire in which one national group, the Russians, dominates other populations.  


Vladimir Putin, who can theoretically run again in 2024, will do everything to avoid that. We know that he looks up to Ivan Ilyin and has certainly read and re-read the philosopher’s essay What Dismemberment of Russia Entails for the World (1950). Yet it is by no means certain that he could survive politically – or even survive at all – a defeat of his military. He or his successors would then face an even more dangerous scenario: that of the collapse of what continues to be, to this day, an empire in which one national group, the Russians, dominates other populations.


The “top-down power” system imposed by the Russian President in the last 20 years – including the redefinition of the components of the federation – would be severely shaken by defeat. Economically speaking, given that a warring state must choose between guns and butter, Moscow may find increasingly difficult to provide either. Conscripts returning from the military campaign in Ukraine will often feel bitter and at times socially demeaned. Former prisoners that have joined militias will of course be tempted by the shadow  economy of gangs, trafficking and extortion. Finally, as with all authoritarian regimes in which leaders sign a Faustian pact by fuelling competition between different power centers, the risk of large-scale violence would be real between the military, the intelligence services, the National Guard created in 2016, and, of course, the militias of Messrs. Prigozhin, Kadyrov or Shoigu.


The risk of territorial secession would add to that of political secession. There is no real Russian nation, according to political scientist Sergueï Medvedev: “there is just a population governed by a State.” The country now comprises 89 federal subjects, including 21 non-Slavic autonomous republics. Russian citizens (Rossiiskii) are not all ethnic Russians (Russkii), and the proportion of ethnic Russians (approximately 80 percent today) is on the decline. The other main nationalities – notably the Tatars, the Bashkirs, the Chuvash, and the Chechens – are experiencing population growth. As is well known, the poorest populations, often from remote areas, contribute disproportionately to the country’s military; to the point that, as in past empires, they have a sense of serving as cannon fodder for the central government. Was the breakup announced by Hélène Carrère d’Encausse in 1978 – based mainly on demographic data – prophetic?


The early 1990s come to mind, which, like the late 1910s, experienced an eruption of nationalities and demands for independence in the Union as a whole, but also within what was then the Federal Republic of Russia. Not many might recall that  in 1990, each of the 21 constituent republics declared themselves  sovereign. In the present-day scenario, Western observers ought to reacquaint themselves with an abundance of names that will no doubt seem exotic to non-specialists. Who, outside the circle of some of the country’s leading experts, had ever heard of the Chuulhn - the Kalmyk People’s Congress – which, on October 27, 2022, declared the independence of the people it claimed to represent?


And yet the Soviet Union’s disintegration is only a flawed precedent for imagining the outlook for Russia. The USSR had real power centers in its periphery. Russia is “an economically, socially, and regionally fragmented country, consisting of a few developed cities and micro-regions and a vast impoverished and disconnected hinterland.”


The risk of territorial secession would add to that of political secession.


Instead of 15 member states, there are 89 federal entities as mentioned, of which six are not internationally recognized as belonging to the country. Which would be most likely to secede? We immediately think of those on the border (Caucasus, Tuva and even Buryatia,  despite its predominantly Russian population), which also happen to have suffered the most in terms of human losses. We also think of those that are the most homogeneous, where ethnic Russians have sometimes all but disappeared, and which are often the poorest (in the Caucasus, again). Yet others that are among the richest and that have a history of nationalistic claims could also be concerned, particularly two republics in the Volga basin: Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Five centuries after the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan by Ivan the Terrible, the end of the “inner empire” may well come to pass.


A minority fringe of nationalists might look favorably upon the departure of non-Russian peoples from the Federation, especially since Russia’s separation from Ukraine would move the center of its imperium eastward. Yet, it would come at the cost of further demographic decline in a country already performing badly from this standpoint (not to mention that nearly a million people have already left the country since February 24, 2022). Four of the federal entities most likely to deviate from Moscow’s center of gravity are also the only ones with a positive natural balance (an excess of births over deaths) in recent years: Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Tuva. Minority populations could represent 30 percent of the population in a few years.


The precedent of Yugoslavia accordingly comes more naturally to mind than that of the Soviet Union. It is also frequently invoked by the Russian authorities, as a precedent to be feared. Some stakeholders would be better off using the weapon of self-determination referendum, which has been repeatedly used by Moscow to annex several parts of Ukraine. According to one of the most in-depth analyses of this scenario, “The demise of the current Russian Federation is unlikely to follow a single path, unlike that of the Soviet Union, where the fifteen Union Republics became independent States almost by default. […] The fracturing of the state is likely to be chaotic, prolonged, sequential, conflictive and, increasingly, violent. It can result in the full separation of some federal units and the amalgamation of others into new federal or confederal arrangements.”.


In short, the collapse of the Russian empire would look more like 1917 than 1991. As with the Ottoman Empire at the time, “the sick man of Eurasia” would undoubtedly cause new conflicts.


In short, the collapse of the Russian empire would look more like 1917 than 1991. As with the Ottoman Empire at the time, “the sick man of Eurasia” would undoubtedly cause new conflicts. In the absence of a watchdog, it would be coveted by neighboring powers, especially  China and… Turkey. And what would become of Belarus in this case? Would Moscow accept its independence? Or would it want to keep the rest of the Soviet Union at all cost, like Serbia and Montenegro after the disappearance of the Yugoslav federation – but perhaps at the price of a new bloodbath? 


“Russia is the nightmare machine of the West,” says the main character of the Wizard of the Kremlin. The only good news in the scenario outlined in this piece: the nuclear issue would probably not be as serious as it was in the case of the Soviet Union. At the time, nearly 7,000 weapons were stationed outside Russia… Today, except for naval bases, the country’s nuclear forces are mostly located in the heart of the Federation, in the south and along major communication routes well controlled by the central government (though sometimes too close to the borders not to raise major concerns about their fate in the event of severe  disruption). In the 1970s, the Soviet Union was described as “Upper Volta with rockets.” By the 2000s, it was “Mexico with nuclear weapons.” In the 2010s: “a gas station with nuclear weapons.” Will it become a “Somalia with nuclear weapons?”


The empire’s collapse would not be irreversible. Russia always ends up rebuilding itself, as it did in the late 1910s. In an optimistic scenario, this could eventually be done as part of a new, more egalitarian federation. Otherwise, chaos could pave the way for a genuinely totalitarian regime.


While the scenario outlined here remains very unlikely, it cannot be overlooked. This is something we must reflect upon. But should we wish for it to happen? In 1991, two positions emerged in Washington. The first, embodied by US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, saw the breakup of the Soviet Union as a historic opportunity for the West to free itself from the  Russian threat. The other, backed by US Secretary of State Jim Baker, argued for caution, focusing on the risks involved in the disintegration of a superpower, especially a nuclear one. As is well known, the latter position was the one adopted by President George H.W. Bush. He actually ended up going to Kyiv and asked the Ukrainians not to leave the Union – as had been recommended by George Kennan who is considered to be the “father” of “containment” and revered in some Washington circles, as early as 1948. We would undoubtedly see the same debate break out in Western countries, and probably witness the same caution exercised by the White House. America would consider a Russian descent into chaos all the more unfavorably because it would distance it still more from its main project: the pivot to Asia.


China itself would hardly be favorable to Russian disintegration. Admittedly, it could win in the long run: a Russian Far East emptied of its inhabitants could become the Congo of the 2000s – an ungoverned territory open to all predatory approaches –  with Russia becoming a “space” more than an “actor,” and with China aiming to control the Northern Maritime Route and the resources of a territory that stands to be severely disrupted by the melting permafrost (60 percent of the territory). But Beijing is not fond of chaos.


China itself would hardly be favorable to Russian disintegration. Admittedly, it could win in the long run [...]. But Beijing is not fond of chaos.


At any rate, it would be counterproductive to publicly hope for the empire’s collapse. Russian paranoia is already high. Some analysts even believe – though obviously mistakenly – that “The strategic decision to try and dismantle Russia may have already been made in Washington and London. (...) Paris, Berlin and Rome may not like this decision, but they will have to go along with their senior Anglosphere allies.” Let’s not entertain that prospect. We may wish to “end the Russian military threat” as we did with Germany in 1918 or in 1945, but not “do away with Russia.” It is understandable for one of Ukraine’s top officials to say that “Ukraine’s national interest is Russia’s disintegration.” But we are not obliged to share that position.


On the other hand, we should consider the  consequences of this scenario should it happen. The historian Michael Khodarkovsky already said so in 2016: “We should not be taken by surprise if one day Russia itself implodes, as the [USSR] did.” This is the position today of some Republican analysts in the US who worked on the subject, such as Janusz Bugajski (Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture) or Luke Coffey (Preparing for the Final Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Dissolution of the Russian Federation.)


Our first duty would be the lockdown of Russia in the pandemic-related sense of the word. It would be to avoid the overflow of violence and trafficking and any other collateral effects. In other words, to help ensure that the implosion does not become an explosion. “Ensure that this swamp does not decompose by releasing mushroom clouds”. And thus invalidate Bill Clinton’s gloomy prediction in 1999: “If Russia is not stable, Russia will know misery”. But we must also be ready to help, if need be, those forces ready to transform the country politically in a way that would serve our own interests and values.


Instıtut Montaigne 


Instıtut Montaigne : Europe in the New World of Export Controls ANALYSES - 15 FEBRUARY 2023 By Mathieu Duchâtel

 




Europe in the New World of Export Controls

ANALYSES - 15 FEBRUARY 2023


By Mathieu Duchâtel

DIRECTOR OF THE ASIA PROGRAM


When Japan and the Netherlands struck a deal with the US to align with restrictions the Biden administration imposed in October on semiconductor technology transfers to China, the trilateral agreement drew sharp criticism in certain European circles. Details of the agreement have not been made public. The Netherlands has been accused of acting outside the framework of the European Union given that the bloc has exclusive competence in external trade. The Dutch were also slammed for undermining the legitimate objective of export controls — which are only intended to target products used for military purposes — by backing a US policy that goes much further than military applications. Indeed, Washington has made it clear that its goal is to turn the screws on China’s ability to catch up in the chip race and establish itself as a global tech leader. Both criticisms are unfounded.


Let's start by debunking the simpler of the two. EU member states have several prerogatives in the sphere of export controls. The granting of export licenses is a national competence, including for items on the EU’s common list of dual-use items and technologies (i.e. goods that can be used for both military and civilian applications). Even more significantly, according to Article 4 of European Regulation No. 428/2009 (setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items), "Member State[s] may adopt or maintain national legislation imposing an authorisation requirement on the export of dual-use items" that are not included in the EU's common list if there are grounds for suspecting that those items may be used for military purposes (the only caveat being that the member state must notify the European Commission and other member states of the dual-use items in question). The Hague is therefore not required to coordinate with the rest of the Union to establish sovereign export controls on technologies that are built into goods produced on Dutch soil. 


The question is whether the semiconductor technologies targeted by the latest US restrictions are about military competition with China or about more than that. Political noise has led to some confusion on this matter. According to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, the newly announced rules are necessary to achieve Washington's goal of maintaining "as large of a lead as possible" over the Chinese semiconductor industry.


The controls were not just designed to weaken China's defense industry but also seek to hobble the country's digital transformation across all civilian commercial applications. 


This suggests that the controls were not just designed to weaken China's defense industry but also seek to hobble the country's digital transformation across all civilian commercial applications. Through the lens of European industry, Washington's use of export controls often disguises an attempt to gain a commercial advantage over competitors (in Europe and elsewhere) as being necessary to slow Beijing's military modernization. There is a strong case to be made for this interpretation given Mr. Sullivan's recent statement coupled with the nature of some of the new measures which, for example, now target memory chips for the first time.


The statements made by Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte suggest an endorsement of this US strategy to maintain a technological edge over China. This would be problematic given that export control mechanisms in Europe are designed to only be imposed for dual-use items and target military end-users.


Yet, military competition with China is by no means a secondary consideration for the US. It lies at the heart of its measures. Above all, there is nothing to suggest that the Netherlands will not slap controls on semiconductor technology exports to China from a dual-use perspective. Quite the contrary, this is by far the most likely scenario...so likely that it is a virtual certainty. In reality, the entire semiconductor industry could potentially play a part in advancing military programs. Although the most advanced generations of logic chips are not currently built into weapons systems, they are used by supercomputers to design these weapons. And while chips with artificial intelligence capabilities are essential for Alibaba Cloud's servers, they also allow supercomputers to process enough data to simulate-and therefore plan-military action in any given theater of operations. Accordingly, the trilateral deal can be summed up as an agreement that takes aim at the military applications of artificial intelligence. And owing to the specificities of Chinese state capitalism and the country's national strategy of "civil-military integration", Beijing's end use of a technology is neither guaranteed nor verifiable. Thus, even if military applications represented only 5% of the artificial intelligence sector in China, the risk would still exist that the remaining 95% of civilian applications of the AI sector could be repurposed for military ambitions. 


Will the Dutch attempt to Europeanize this facet of their export controls policy? They certainly have the legal wherewithal to do so ever since the European regulation on dual-use items was amended in 2020. EU member states may now initiate a procedure to update the common list of dual-use items to include an item that they control at the national level.


To not Europeanize export controls would leave the Dutch vulnerable to retaliation from China, a risk that they would have to face alone. In addition, taking extreme ultraviolet lithography as an example (a key European strength in the semiconductor value chain, for which the Netherlands is the world’s leader), it is difficult to imagine an exclusively national approach since the supply chain for this technology is predominantly European and backed by a network of subcontractors on the continent, notably in Germany. Will the Netherlands choose to go down this path? At this stage, nothing seems to indicate that they will.


Most importantly for Europe, the trilateral agreement between the US, Japan and the Netherlands signals the dawn of a new world for export controls. 


On the contrary, the Netherlands behave as if their main consideration was to remain as low-key as possible on this matter. In that respect, it is notable that all the leaks regarding the negotiations come from the US. 


Most importantly for Europe, the trilateral agreement between the US, Japan and the Netherlands signals the dawn of a new world for export controls. They have become the weapon of choice in US policy towards China, in a larger toolbox targeting Chinese access to foreign technology. In turn, they have also risen in importance in Europe's foreign policy, as demonstrated in the response to Russia’s war against Ukraine. The fact remains, however, that Europe finds itself on the sidelines of the tech war between the US and China. It is constantly forced to react and adjust rather than pursuing its own initiatives in the era of technology security. Europe needs a strategic perspective on the use of export controls for foreign policy purposes. Going forward, it is vital to build awareness on this critical issue and take action. The importance of export controls in international relations will continue to grow, including for chips used in quantum computing and artificial intelligence, two fields for which the ambiguity surrounding dual use is absolute given how much scientific advances and breakthroughs can drive defense innovation. 


 Instıtut Montaigne


 


U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations 02/28/2023 10:56 AM EST

 

02/28/2023 10:56 AM EST

Office of the Spokesperson

Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1992, the United States and Uzbekistan have developed a broad-based relationship, cooperating in such areas as border and regional security programs, economic relations, political and civil society issues, and English language training. Uzbekistan is important to U.S. interests in ensuring stability, prosperity, and security in the broader Central Asian region. Regional threats include illegal narcotics, trafficking in persons, terrorism, and violent extremism. Uzbekistan is a key partner in the provision of international humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, and it continues to support the country through provision of electricity, economic assistance, and infrastructure development.

Bilateral Economic Relations

Uzbekistan has signed a trade and investment framework agreement with the United States and other Central Asian countries, establishing a regional forum to discuss ways to improve investment climates and expand trade within Central Asia. Uzbekistan’s trade with the United States grew from $277 million in 2020 to $424.6 million in 2021, making the United States Uzbekistan’s 16th largest trade partner.

U.S. Assistance to Uzbekistan

Since 1992, the U.S. has provided approximately $1.8 billion in foreign assistance to Uzbekistan.U.S. assistance in Uzbekistan improves livelihoods of citizens through support to enhance overall economic conditions and boost investment in key sectors, adds value to horticulture products, diversifies economic markets, and addresses the threats of infectious disease and transnational crime. Assistance also targets at increasing citizen access to justice and government decision-making, promoting the rule of law, public education reform, defense cooperation, and encouraging government efforts that ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Uzbekistan’s Membership in International Organizations

The United States and Uzbekistan cooperate in the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and through the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Uzbekistan is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Partnership for Peace and an observer to the World Trade Organization, which it is now preparing to join.