BROOKINGS
What price for peace in Ukraine?
Four years since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Brookings experts answer questions about prospects for an end to the war, support for Ukraine, and the country’s future
Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Pavel K. Baev, Mariana Budjeryn, Philip H. Gordon, Anna Grzymała-Busse, Daniel S. Hamilton, Mara Karlin, Steven Pifer, Melanie W. Sisson, Constanze Stelzenmüller, and Thomas Wright
February 17, 2026
Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Four years and at least a million casualties later, fighting continues with Russia occupying less than a fifth of Ukrainian territory and bombing the rest of the country amidst halting peace negotiations led by the Trump administration. Eleven Brookings scholars answer questions about Ukraine, Russia, Europe, the United States, and the prospects for peace.
Aslı Aydıntaşbaş
Is a diplomatic breakthrough to end the war this year likely/possible, and might Turkey be able to facilitate that?
There is no doubt that Ankara and the Trump administration see eye-to-eye on the urgency of ending the war in Ukraine through a negotiated settlement.
Turkey’s relationship with Russia is complicated. Ankara is wary of Moscow and has been on the receiving end of Russian aggression in its neighborhood. Yet Turkish officials have long grown doubtful of Ukraine’s ability to roll Russia back from the east and increasingly view a negotiated settlement—even at the price of territorial concessions—as the only realistic way for Kyiv to cut its losses. On that, there is a clear meeting of minds between Ankara and Washington.
But there are also differences. The Trump administration’s easygoing attitude to dealmaking is in contrast with the painstakingly detail-oriented Turkish diplomacy. Turks do not believe Russian President Vladimir Putin could be tempted by economic rewards, partly because they never thought he was bluffing about the “root causes” of the conflict. Ankara has long assumed that the conflict would end when the United States and Russia finally reach an agreement on the contours of a European security architecture that includes Russia. The Trump administration has not been focused and organized enough—especially in managing intra-NATO dynamics—to pull off such a monumental task.
A ceasefire deal could conceivably emerge by this summer, in time for the July 7-8 NATO summit in Ankara, but it is unlikely to be brokered by Turkey. Much will hinge on how far Putin is willing to go in accepting the postwar security arrangements between Ukraine and the West. Territory also matters, of course. Russia’s slow advance in Donetsk can also allow Putin to claim some form of pyrrhic victory. After having ruined and conquered many of the major population centers in Donbas in a grinding war that has already cost too many lives, Moscow may conclude it is time to talk.
The war has exhausted everyone—most of all Ukrainians. But Russia, too, is beginning to feel the strain.
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Pavel K. Baev
Could Russia’s political and economic constraints change Putin’s approach to the war?
Russia’s inability to win the war of attrition against Ukraine primarily stems from shortages of economic and human resources, much like its failure to win the war of maneuver in the invasion’s first few weeks reflected a shortage in military capabilities necessary for executing the strategic plan based on many unrealistic assumptions. The first sign of Russia’s domestic constraints was the public backlash to the partial mobilization in autumn 2022. Since then, Putin has refrained from ordering another one, despite senior military leaders’ requests for more manpower. Commercial recruitment has until recently yielded just enough soldiers to compensate for the staggering losses, estimated at up to 35,000 monthly this winter, but this tenuous balance depends on funding that is increasingly squeezed.
The Russian economy’s troubles are deepening, and unlike the victory-promising generals, the government’s economists are delivering sober assessments to the Kremlin. State expenditures were reduced in 2025 and are set to be cut further, but the budget deficit is still vast, driven primarily by the decline in oil revenues. The war machine grinds on but cannot accelerate, while many civilian industries are in protracted recession. Concerns about falling incomes and rising taxes are reinforcing the public’s strong preference for hostilities to end. However, this discontent is unlikely to erupt in mass protests, and the economic decline will probably remain manageable. Yet, the stream of men ready to sign contracts to fight in the Donbas “kill zone” may dry out. Russians are tired of the war, and Putin won’t want to be seen as the main obstacle to ending it.
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Mariana Budjeryn
What is the current state of Ukraine’s politics and how could this affect a peace deal?
Over the past three decades, Ukraine’s political system has evolved in sharp contrast to Russia’s. Power in Ukraine has been dispersed rather than centralized and shared among multiple stakeholders, including a diverse and flourishing civil society. Ukraine’s capacity for societal mobilization and self-organization proved critical in repelling the initial thrust of Russia’s full-scale invasion and in continuing to support the defense effort. At the same time, the necessary centralization of decision making in the hands of the executive, the marginalization of the legislature, and the suspension of peacetime democratic procedures, such as elections, in wartime, put unprecedented pressure on Ukrainian society to maintain cohesion while finding alternative ways to keep its officials accountable.
Ukraine’s society has proved it can and will mobilize around political issues, with the fight against corruption in the halls of state power first among them. Last summer, attempts by the Zelenskyy government to curtail the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions were halted by widespread popular protests—the first significant expression of public disapproval since February 2022. With their autonomy preserved, the anti-corruption institutions continued their investigations and exposed a massive corruption scheme, prompting important personnel changes in the office of the president, including the removal of Andriy Yermak, the powerful head of the presidential office.
Ukraine’s friends and foes would do well to keep this aspect of Ukraine’s political system in mind, especially in the context of ongoing negotiations over a peace deal. It is unnecessary and patronizing to push the issue of presidential elections in Ukraine in these peace talks—Ukrainians will insist on the elections themselves the moment security situation in the country allows, and President Zelenskyy has already pledged as much. Whatever is agreed by a handful of men in Abu Dhabi or elsewhere will have to find broad-based support among the Ukrainians, who, bled and exhausted though they are, are determined to safeguard their dignity and liberty from internal and external threats alike.
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Philip H. Gordon
What are the prospects for a durable American security guarantee for Ukraine?
U.S. “security guarantees” for Ukraine have emerged as a key—perhaps the key—issue in efforts to end the war in Ukraine. As Ukraine contemplates the difficult territorial compromises it would likely have to make to win Russia’s agreement to a peace deal, it has focused on attaining reliable U.S. guarantees to come to its assistance if Russia were to attack again after a deal was reached. This would not only give Ukraine confidence that it would remain secure in the postwar period, but would help President Volodymyr Zelenskyy justify such painful compromises to his people.
The problem with his approach, however, is that there is little reason to believe any guarantees offered by the Trump administration would in fact be credible. President Donald Trump has questioned even NATO’s formal Article 5 mutual defense guarantee, saying it “has many definitions” and only applies to allies that “pay their bills.” He has a long history, as a businessman and as president, of reneging on or seeking to negotiate past contracts and agreements. If he’s unwilling to confront Russia now while it is committing ongoing military aggression against Ukraine, it is difficult to imagine him doing so—let alone using force against Russia—to enforce a paper agreement down the road.
With no consensus to support actual NATO membership for Ukraine, some have talked about “NATO-like” guarantees for Ukraine, but the guarantees in question are not “like” NATO’s Article 5, which is backed up by a treaty, an integrated military command, forward-deployed U.S. troops, and a long history. Credible U.S. security guarantees from Trump are not really on the table. The best way to make Ukraine secure is to help it build and maintain credible deterrent forces of its own, not to pretend that vague Trump pledges to come to its aid in the future are worth more than the paper they are written on.
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Anna Grzymała-Busse
How do the members of the European Union and NATO in Central and Eastern Europe view the Russia-Ukraine war, the threat from Russia to their own security, and the reliability of the United States four years after the full-scale invasion?
While their views differ on aid to Ukraine and the extent of the Russia threat, Eastern and Central Europe states agree that the United States is an indispensable partner, even if an increasingly unstable (and even infuriating) one. NATO, led by the United States, remains the only game in town.
Poland continues to be a steadfast supporter of Ukraine, providing continued military and humanitarian aid. Despite the rise of parties that are more critical of Ukraine, such as Konfederacja, Russia remains seen as an extremely hostile and aggressive power on Poland’s doorstep.
Conversely, Viktor Orbán continues to try to stymie European efforts regarding Ukraine. The Hungarian leader has tried to organize an anti-Ukraine coalition within Europe, comprised of Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia. In the run-up to the April 2026 elections, Orbán has accused his increasingly popular opponent Péter Magyar of conspiring with Ukraine, and the EU of electoral interference. Yet for all his braggadocio and obstructionism, Orbán has made no move to exit NATO or the EU.
In both Slovakia and Czechia, policies contradict each other. Prime Minister Robert Fico of Slovakia, an ally of Orbán, has relied on Russian energy exports. Accordingly, Fico opposed direct lethal aid to Ukraine in 2025, advocated for Slovak neutrality, and criticized calls for increased NATO spending. Yet a few months later, he requested that NATO strengthen Slovak air defenses.
Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has been decidedly cool on helping Ukraine since his election in 2025. While the current ruling coalition parties in Czechia ran on anti-Ukrainian stances, they continued arms transfers once in government. Czech and Polish public fundraisers are helping Ukrainians stay warm this winter, sending money and hundreds of generators.
There is much greater agreement about the United States (unstable) and NATO (indispensable). Trump himself is seen as erratic: after meeting Trump in January 2026, Fico was apparently alarmed. Yet despite the seething criticisms and anxiety about American reliability and trustworthiness, no alternative exists for the foreseeable future.
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Daniel S. Hamilton
Will Ukraine become a member of the European Union in the next decade?
Integrating Ukraine into the European Union (EU) is a generational task that could strengthen both sides, but will require each to fundamentally change. Neither has yet made the tough choices needed.
Ukraine is readying itself for membership while fighting a Russian aggressor who has killed over 100,000 of its people, seized a fifth of its territory, and is pounding its infrastructure. No EU candidate has ever faced such pressure as it works to adopt the formidable acquis communautaire—more than 170,000 pages of EU treaties, legislation, and court decisions accumulated over seven decades. Kyiv is making progress, but it has yet to truly tackle the systemic corruption that plagues the country. It must do much more to ensure an independent judiciary and meet EU standards in areas ranging from public procurement to competition policy.
Ukraine’s higher hurdle is that the EU isn’t yet ready to accept it. Accession negotiations haven’t even begun, thanks to Hungary’s veto. Once a member, Ukraine would have a major claim on EU agricultural support and regional cohesion funds. That would divert monies from French and Polish farmers and poor Romanian, Italian, and Spanish regions unless EU members expand their seven-year budget that begins in 2028. Either path is politically explosive.
Moreover, Ukraine is unlikely to join alone; countries like Albania, Montenegro, and Moldova could also accede. EU decisionmaking processes, already unwieldy, must be reformed to accommodate 30-plus members. Ukraine’s accession would also obligate EU members to come to its assistance in case of further military aggression under the Lisbon Treaty’s Article 42.7. This type of security guarantee is considered essential to current peace plan efforts, but it is questionable whether EU members would follow through.
Kyiv says it will be ready for membership by 2027. Sympathetic EU partners are helping the Ukrainians finalize the six clusters of the acquis without calling those discussions “negotiations,” thus working around Budapest’s veto. They are floating the idea of staged accession, with full membership rights phased in over time. Such initiatives could shorten Ukraine’s path, but it remains a winding road.
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Mara Karlin
What are the primary lessons for the U.S. military from the Russia-Ukraine war?
From the very beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, observers have mined it for insights on how the character of war is changing, and the implications for their own militaries. Confident assertions were made of lessons learned: tanks are now irrelevant, drones have made it impossible to hide people and platforms, Russia’s defense industrial base is sluggish, to name just a few. They have been subsequently unlearned as the war has continued.
For the U.S. military, five key lessons stand out.
First, this war is a reminder that supposed losers learn. The Russian military was quickly thrown onto its back foot days into the conflict, but within months, it was innovating and has continued to do so.
Second, having the latest technology is valuable for a military, but fundamentally, technology has its limits as opponents adapt to the effects a system creates. The rapidly evolving employment of drones in this war has demonstrated both their use and ways to counter them.
Third, solid intelligence paired with strategic planning can enable transformational operations. This was demonstrated by Operation Spider Web, in which 18 months of careful planning by the Ukrainian military resulted in a covert drone operation that destroyed a number of Russian aircraft, including hard-to-replace long-range bombers.
Fourth, warfare operates across domains, and the most successful efforts knit together systems across multiple domains, including ground, air, maritime, space, and cyber. For example, Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the war have used a combination of airpower and cyber capabilities.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, short and sharp conflicts often give way to thorny and protracted wars. Russia invaded Ukraine in the hopes of quickly capturing the bulk of the country. Yet, four years later, it has suffered at least a million casualties and controls less than one-fifth of Ukrainian territory.
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Steven Pifer
What are the risks of Russian nuclear escalation over Ukraine?
Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has repeatedly attempted to use the threat of nuclear weapons to intimidate Kyiv and the West. Concern about possible nuclear use slowed but did not stop Western decisions on assisting Kyiv, and the threats seem increasingly implausible.
Considerable apprehension arose in September 2022, when Russia claimed to annex four Ukrainian oblasts (provinces). Putin said Russia would defend them with “all means.” Some U.S. government analysts reportedly placed the odds of use of tactical nuclear weapons at 50%.
Kyiv did not back down. The West continued to provide arms, and Washington warned Moscow of “catastrophic” consequences. China reportedly cautioned the Kremlin privately, and President Xi Jinping later publicly called for rejecting “the threat of nuclear weapons.”
What did Putin do? In late October 2022, he said, “We have never said anything proactively about Russia potentially using nuclear weapons.” A few days later, the Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement on the inadmissibility of nuclear war. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov then agreed to a G20 statement including “The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.”
Putin thereafter moderated his rhetoric, though he announced changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine in September 2024. While the 2020 doctrine said Russia might use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack that put the existence of the Russian state in jeopardy, he suggested Russia could also use nuclear arms if there was a “critical threat to our sovereignty.”
That change made Russian doctrine ambiguous and less credible—especially as it came when Ukrainian forces occupied part of Russia’s Kursk region and regularly conducted drone strikes deep into Russia.
Ukraine and the West cannot ignore Putin’s nuclear threats. However, they should bear in mind that he does not want nuclear war. He just wants to suggest he is prepared to risk it to intimidate Kyiv and Western capitals. They can choose not to be intimidated.
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Melanie W. Sisson
What is the American interest in the Russia-Ukraine conflict at this point?
The United States is accustomed to articulating its national interests in terms of what it wants to achieve. Four years into the Russia-Ukraine war, America’s interests are instead defined by what it needs to avoid: outright Russian victory, direct attack on a NATO ally, and nuclear escalation.
Full Russian capture of Ukraine—territorial or political—would not only encourage Moscow to learn all the wrong lessons but would also be a neon sign flashing the limits of U.S. coercive power. An attack on a member of NATO would do the same and then some: It would also ask Washington a question—whether the United States would come to its ally’s defense—to which neither it nor the alliance presently appears to know the answer. Russian use of a nuclear weapon, of any dimension, does all the above, with the highest possible stakes.
The only way to prevent this unhappy triumvirate of catastrophic events is to end the war as soon as possible on terms that convince both sides they have more to lose than to gain from near-term noncompliance. For Ukraine, this will mean sovereignty and a defense capability sufficient to confront Russia, should it again consider aggression. For Russia, it will mean the closure of a Ukrainian road into NATO and an opening of its own, conditional, path toward sanctions relief. For both, it will require abandoning territorial maximalism.
Many will find such an approach hollow. But achieving an unsatisfying compromise serves U.S. interests far better than prolonging a brutal war in pursuit of moral victory.
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Constanze Stelzenmüller
How do increased European threat perceptions regarding the United States itself affect the transatlantic alliance amidst continuing efforts to support Ukraine’s self-defense?
Last fall, Europeans thought they had achieved a deal of sorts with the Trump administration. In exchange for increased defense spending, buying U.S. weapons for Ukraine, and forgoing trade countermeasures against Washington, they would continue to be protected by U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and strategic enablers.
Since then, a series of documents, events, and presidential speeches have chipped away at Europeans’ optimism about their ability to keep America on Ukraine’s side. In fact, it increasingly feels as though they themselves are now in the crosshairs as well: the 2025 National Security Strategy’s emphasis on Europe’s “civilizational decline”; the 2026 National Defense Strategy’s failure to commit explicitly to extended nuclear deterrence; the predatory grab for Greenland; ceasefire negotiations with Russia and Ukraine that appear to favor the Kremlin; and most recently, the announcement that the United States will hand over NATO commands in Norfolk and Naples to European allies and cut 200 staff from others.
“Keep dreaming,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte tersely responded to recent calls for a “European Army” by Spanish Defense Minister José Manuel Albares and Lithuanian EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius. Rutte is right that standing up an all-European armed force is an unattainable goal, for both political and military reasons. A Europeanized NATO (with a guest room for the Americans?) remains the best forum for Europeans to organize the defense of Ukraine as well as their own.
Yet it is equally true that the shock waves created by the chillingly generalized threat of Trump’s Davos speech— “You can say ‘yes’ and we will be very appreciative, or you can say ‘no’ and we will remember”— continue to reverberate. At a recent conference in Europe, a senior diplomat from a country not known for anti-Americanism mused: “We thought we had to defend Europe without the United States; but what if we have to defend against the United States?” Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s reframing of the transatlantic alliance as based on Christian ethnonationalism and national interest—including a loud dogwhistle to the German right (“we do not want allies to be shackled by guilt and shame”)—at the Munich Security Conference, followed by visits to authoritarian leaders in Slovakia and Hungary, did little to assuage those concerns.
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Thomas Wright
Are Ukraine’s European allies meeting the moment, and what more should they do?
Since Trump returned to office in January 2025, European governments have taken crucial steps to help Ukraine. They have maneuvered behind the scenes to prevent the Trump administration from fully withdrawing support for Ukraine and to ensure that U.S. peace initiatives are more balanced than U.S. officials like Steve Witkoff would like. To keep Washington engaged, Europe effectively paid to play, fully funding U.S. weapons transfers and accepting unfavorable trade terms in a bilateral U.S.-EU trade deal.
Simultaneously, the continent ramped up its own contributions. In early 2026, EU states ratified a $90 billion multiyear loan package for Ukraine. Germany also loosened its constitutional “debt brake,” which was an important and necessary step to ramping up its military spending. European governments continued to provide Ukraine with arms from their own stockpiles and from their production lines. And Europe’s largest powers began serious deliberations on postwar security guarantees, including considering putting troops on the ground, to deter future Russian aggression.
Yet, from Kyiv’s perspective, Europe remains a step behind the curve. In a biting speech at the 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos, Zelenskyy opened by saying that last year at Davos, “I ended my speech with the words, Europe needs to know how to defend itself. A year has passed and nothing has changed”—a situation he compared to the film “Groundhog Day.” “Europe loves to discuss the future, but avoids taking action today, action that defines what kind of future we will have.”
It is surely true that there is more that Europe could do, particularly in helping Ukraine improve its position on the battlefield or at least to hold the line. It has also been unfortunately marginalized in negotiations, largely because of the Trump administration’s preference to engage with Russia and pile pressure on Ukraine. However, Europe has done a lot and it also faces real constraints—not all governments see the challenge the same way, many have fiscal challenges, and their military buildup will take time to bear fruit. With all that in mind, Europe has been a ray of hope for Ukraine in an otherwise dark moment.
Authors
Aslı Aydıntaşbaş
Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Director - The Turkey Project
@asliaydintasbas
Pavel K. Baev
Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
Mariana Budjeryn
Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
@mbudjeryn
Philip H. Gordon
Sydney Stein, Jr. Scholar - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
@PhilGordonDC
Anna Grzymała-Busse
Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
@annagbusse
Daniel S. Hamilton
Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
@DanSHamilton
Mara Karlin
Visiting Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Steven Pifer
Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative
@steven_pifer
Melanie W. Sisson
Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
@MWSBrookingsFP
Constanze Stelzenmüller
Director - Center on the United States and Europe, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Fritz Stern Chair on Germany and Transatlantic Relations
@ConStelz
Thomas Wright
Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
@thomaswright08
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