Wednesday, July 1, 2026

FOX NEWS - Trump's Turkey arms sale proposal sparks congressional questions before NATO summit - By Chris Massaro Fox News Published June 30, 2026 9:32am EDT

 FOX NEWS 

Trump's Turkey arms sale proposal sparks congressional questions before NATO summit

The package is seen as a major foreign policy win for President Erdogan ahead of the 2026 NATO summit in Ankara

By Chris Massaro Fox News

Published June 30, 2026 9:32am EDT



New report examines Turkey’s ties to Muslim Brotherhood, implications for NATO


FDD Senior fellow Sinan Ciddi explains why he believes Ankara’s policies are reshaping how terrorism is defined and raising concerns inside NATO.



The Trump administration is moving forward with a controversial arms sale worth $700 million to NATO ally Turkey despite apprehension over Ankara’s closeness with Russia and terrorist groups in the Middle East.


Rep. Gregory Meeks, D-N.Y., ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the administration notified him of the State Department’s decision to bypass Congress and send Turkey the $700 million in defense articles, mostly fighter jet parts.


"In this case, the State Department did not even attempt to justify its decision. It did not invoke any emergency authority, did not present a written rationale, and for months refused to make a good-faith effort to brief me on implications of the sale for the U.S.-Turkey relationship, Turkey’s continued possession of the Russian S-400 system, and other regional security concerns," Rep. Meeks said in a statement shared with Fox News Digital.



TURKEY DETAINS OVER 200 SUSPECTS, INCLUDING ALLEGED ISIS MILITANTS, IN SWEEPING RAID AHEAD OF NATO SUMMIT


Erdogan

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan observes a military exercise in Izmir, Turkey, on June 9, 2022. (Xinhua via Getty Images)



Turkey signed a deal with Moscow in 2017 to purchase the Russian S-400 air defense system and acquired it in 2019, causing alarm within the NATO alliance. The U.S. and NATO considered the move an intelligence threat that undermines NATO cohesion and readiness.


The S-400 is designed to detect, track, and exploit stealth aircraft like the F-35.


"Turkey’s possession of both the S-400 and the F-35 is so dangerous because the two systems operating in proximity or networking together could give Moscow valuable intelligence for shooting down F-35s flown by Americans and our allies," according to a report from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.


The U.S. sanctioned Turkey in 2019 for the purchase and excluded Ankara from the F-35 fighter jet program. Congress also passed a law banning Turkey from the F-35 program while it continues to possess the S-400 air system.


The State Department dismissed concerns about the U.S.' arms sales and Turkey’s possession of Russian-made air defense systems.


TRUMP SQUEEZED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND TURKEY AS NETANYAHU, ERDOGAN ESCALATE FEUD



Helicopter during a military exercise

A military helicopter takes part in the press stage of Turkey's military exercise Sea Wolf (Denizkurdu) in Mugla, Turkey, on Jan. 12, 2024. The exercise, supervised by the Turkish navy, was conducted in the eastern Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Sea. (Orhan Cicek/Anadolu via Getty Images)


"The president has been clear; Türkiye is a strong member of NATO. Türkiye is a significant contributor to Alliance operations and missions," a State Department spokesperson told Fox News Digital.


The package is a major boon for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as he prepares to host the 2026 NATO summit in Ankara.


"The U.S. engine sale is critical for Turkey’s most important defense project, the KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet. Turkey is developing its own engine, but it won’t be ready for several more years. Without U.S.-made GE engines, KAAN would struggle to move from a prototype to a serially produced combat aircraft," Gonul Tol, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, told Fox News Digital.


Tol, who’s in Ankara for the NATO summit, said the deal is more meaningful than just a defense sale for President Erdogan, it’s a cornerstone of his foreign policy and a major source of domestic political legitimacy.



President Donald Trump and Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan

President Donald Trump greets Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a summit to support ending the more than two-year Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, Oct. 13, 2025, in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt. (Evan Vucci AP Photo/ Pool)



"If the aircraft succeeds, Ankara believes it will not only expand Turkey’s defense exports but also strengthen NATO’s overall industrial capacity and reinforce Turkey’s strategic importance within the alliance," Tol said.


President Erdogan, who has a warm relationship and receives frequent praise from President Trump, has continued to aggressively lobby the United States to readmit Turkey to the F-35 program, despite pushback from Congress.


On Monday, four Republican allies of President Trump — Reps. Jimmy Patronis, R-Fla., Gus Bilirakis, R-Fla., Mike Haridopolos, R-Fla., and Nicole Malliotakis, R-N.Y., — released a joint statement over the proposed sales. "As Greek American Members of Congress, we are deeply concerned regarding reports of a proposed military sale of jet engines to Turkey. Turkey continues to be a destabilizing force in the region through its expansive and disputed maritime claims, continued illegal occupation of Cyprus, and rhetorical demonization of Israel."


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The statement continued, "The Eastern Mediterranean region holds significant potential to become a beacon of commercial opportunity, energy cooperation, and regional security, an effort we have actively supported through legislation and engagement, but Turkey’s rhetoric and actions increasingly threaten these efforts, key American allies, and regional stability. For example, Turkey's harboring of Hamas and position as the only NATO member to refuse sanctions against Russia is deeply troubling. We are actively engaging with the Administration and House leadership to obtain additional information regarding this reported sale and to express our strong opposition to any prospect of Turkey’s reintegration into the F-35 program without complete compliance with CAATSA requirements," their statement said.


A spokesperson for the Turkish government did not reply to a request for comment.


Yetkin Report - Yazar: Selim Yenel - 01 Temmuz 2026 - Türkiye Avrupa Birliği Genişlemesiyle Hâlâ İlgileniyor mu?

 

Türkiye Avrupa Birliği Genişlemesiyle Hâlâ İlgileniyor mu?

/ / Siyaset

 

Ankara Türkiye’nin savunma ve güvenlik alanındaki stratejik önemini

 vurgulamaya devam ederken, Brüksel daha ziyade yasa dışı göç 

penceresinden bakıyor. Dış İlişkilerden sorumlu Komiser Kaja Kallas, 

Genişlemeden sorumlu Komiser Marta Kos ve Göçten sorumlu Komiser Magnus 

Brunner Ankara’ya yaptıkları son ziyarette Dışişleri Bakanı Fidan ile

 görülüyor. (Foto: TC_Disisleri)



Geçtiğimiz ayın başında Almanya ve Fransa’nın Avrupa Birliği’nin genişlemesine ilişkin ortak önerileri basınımızda pek yankı bulmadı. Bunun başlıca nedeni, Rusya’nın Ukrayna’ya saldırmasının ardından Kiev’in AB üyeliğine başvurması ve kısa süre içinde aday ülke statüsü kazanmasıydı. Ancak AB, bundan sonraki genişleme sürecini nasıl yöneteceği konusunda hâlâ net bir yol haritası oluşturabilmiş değil.

Avrupa Birliği’nin genişlemesi uzun süre Brüksel’in çok başarılı bir dış politika aracı olarak anılmaktaydı. Ancak genişleme şu anda çözümlenmesi gereken bir mesele olarak görülüyor. Daha önce en fazla dokuz yıl aralıklarla yeni üyeler kabul eden Avrupa Birliği, Hırvatistan’ın 2013 yılında üye olmasından sonra on üç yıldır genişlemedi. Bilakis Birleşik Krallığın ayrılmasıyla daraldı dahi diyebiliriz.

Avrupa’nın Güney Doğusunu kapsayan Balkan ülkelerinin hepsi uzun süredir adaylık kapısında bekliyorlar. Bu durum, “genişleme yorgunluğu” kavramının ortaya çıkmasına yol açtı. 2004’teki büyük genişlemeden üye olan Merkezi ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinin zaman zaman Birlik içinde ortak tutumu zorlayan politikaları, Brüksel’i yeni genişlemeler konusunda daha temkinli davranmaya yöneltti. Bundan dolayı örneğin üyelik müzakerelerinde en ileri safhada bulunan Karadağ bir türlü üye olamadı. Şu anda on ülke aday konumundadır.

Adaylar uzun süredir beklemede

Ülkemizi saymazsak en çok uzun süre bekleyen Kuzey Makedonya yirmi iki yıl önce üyelik başvurusunda bulundu. Kuzey Makedonya önce Yunanistan’ın sonra da Bulgaristan’ın sırasıyla isim ve azınlıklarla ilgili engellemeleri ile karşılaştı. Karadağ da 2008’de üyelik için başvurmuştu ve 2028’de müzakereleri bitirmeyi amaçlıyor. Bu durumda Katılım Antlaşmasının imzalanıp tüm üyelerin onay süreçlerinin tamamlanmasından sonra üyelik 2030’da gerçekleşebilir.

Diğer adaylardan Arnavutluk ve Sırbistan 2009’da üyelik için başvurdular. Bosna – Hersek ise on yıl önce girişimde bulundu. Kosova bile dört yıl önce başvuruda bulundu ama henüz adaylığı kabul edilmedi zira AB içinde beş ülke Kosova’yı tanımıyor.

AB bu ülkelerle zaman zaman Zirveler yapıp bir araya geliyor ve ağızlarına deyim yerindeyse bir parmak bal çalıp bırakıyor.

AB’nin yeni arayışları

AB’nin bu konuda silkinmesi ve yeni arayışlara yönelik çabaları Rusya’nın Ukrayna’yı işgale kalkışması ile gerçekleşti. Ukrayna Moskova’nın bu girişiminden hemen sonra AB’ye üyelik için başvurdu ve bunun bir hafta sonra Gürcistan ve Moldova takip etti. Bu durum AB’yi çıkmaza soktu. Bir yandan Ukrayna’ya yardım etmek istese de üyelik için hiçbir açıdan hazır olmadığını biliyor. Ama buna rağmen bazı fasıllarda müzakerelere geçildi. Mesele elbette siyasi.

Genelde bu gibi açmazlarda Fransa kapsayıcı önerilerde bulunur. Nitekim Belarus ve Rusya dışındaki tüm Avrupa ülkelerini içerecek şekilde 2022’de “Avrupa Siyasi Topluluğu” önerisini ortaya attı. Son toplantısı geçen ay Erivan’da yapılan bu oluşum liderlerin altı ayda bir araya gelmesini sağlamanın ötesinde somut bir işlev kazanabilmiş değildir.

Brüksel genişleme sürecini bilinçli bir şekilde yavaşlattı. 2004 yılındaki genişleme öncesinde adaylara belli bir tarih verilmiş ve ülkeler buna göre çabalarını artırmışlardı. Şimdi Arnavutluk gibi  2030 tarihi için bastıran ülkeler olmasına rağmen Brüksel buna yanaşmamaktadır.

Öte yandan, üyelik koşulları zaman içinde hem artmış hem de ülkeden ülkeye farklılık göstermeye başlamıştır. Demokrasi, hukukun üstünlüğü ve temel haklar gibi alanlar, diğer müzakere başlıklarında ilerlemenin ön koşulu haline gelmiştir.

Üyelik sürecinde farklı modeller

Bugün Avrupa Birliği’nin içinde bulunduğu tablo daha da karmaşıktır. Bir yandan aday ülke sayısı artarken, diğer yandan Rusya’nın Ukrayna’ya yönelik saldırısı, genişleme konusunu yeniden stratejik bir çerçevede gündeme taşımıştır.

Bu çerçevede, Avrupa Birliği içinde farklı genişleme modelleri de tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Bu fikirler yeni değildir. Son kırk yıldır AB çevrelerinde farklı biçimlerde gündeme gelmektedir. AB zaman içinde bir çok konuda nitelikli oy sistemine geçse de üyelik hakkında karar almak için kimse oy birliğinden, diğer bir deyişle veto hakkından vazgeçmeye niyetli değildir.

Aday ülkelerin Birliğin bazı alanlarına kademeli olarak dahil edilmesi ve belirli koşulları yerine getirdikçe üyeliğe geçmeleri gibi öneriler gündeme gelmektedir. Bu yönde AB’nin kurucu antlaşmalarında değişikliklerinin gerekip gerekmediği de tartışma konusudur. Ancak antlaşma değişikliğinin bazı ülkelerde referandumları zorunlu kılacak olması AB’yi daha pragmatik yollar aramaya itmektedir.

Avrupa Birliği’nin öncelikleri arasında Batı Balkan ülkelerinin Birliğe bağlanması yer almaktadır. Ancak bu ülkeler için net bir takvim ortaya konulamaması, sürecin inandırıcılığını zedelemekte ve alternatif arayışları güçlendirmektedir.

Bütün bunlara rağmen Komisyon ve bazı üye yetkilileri Balkan ülkeleri üzerinde Çin, Rusya ve hatta Türkiye’nin etkisinden endişe ile söz edebilmektedir. Ayrıca sadece Ukrayna’ya bazı kapıların kısa sürede açılması halinde iki yüzlülükle suçlanacaklarını biliyorlar. Kısacası AB bir açmaz içindedir.

Alman – Fransız önerisi

İşte bu noktada Alman – Fransız önerisi ortaya çıktı. Buna göre “aday ülkeleri daha yapılandırılmış bir kademeli entegrasyon yoluyla fiilen AB’ye daha fazla yaklaştıracak ve böylece reformlar için ilave teşvikler sağlayacak çeşitli araçlardan oluşan bir katılım öncesi strateji” önerilmektedir. Devam edelim:

“Bu araçlar, katılım müzakerelerinde kaydedilen ilerleme üzerine inşa edilmeli ve ilgili aday ülkenin reform sürecinde geriye gitmesi veya AB’nin temel değer ve ilkelerinden uzaklaşması halinde geri alınabilir nitelikte olmalıdır.

Her aday ülke için ihtiyaçlarına uygun, özel olarak tasarlanmış bir yaklaşım benimsenmekle birlikte, yeni yaklaşım tüm aday ülkelere derhal ve somut ilerleme imkânı sunacaktır.

Tam üyelik hedefi değişmeden devam etmektedir. Amacımız ne tam üyeliğin yerine başka bir model koymak ne de üyeliğe giden yolu uzatmaktır. Tam tersine, bu yolda daha hızlı ilerlemeyi teşvik edecek yeni özendirici unsurlar oluşturmak istiyoruz.

Bu çerçevede Komisyonu, aday ülkelerin AB’ye katılım yolunda kademeli entegrasyonunu kolaylaştıracak öneriler hazırlamaya davet ediyoruz.

Bu öneriler, özellikle müzakerelerde kaydedilen somut ilerlemeye bağlı olarak İç Pazara ayrıcalıklı erişim ile AB’nin günlük karar alma süreçlerinde Avrupa kurumlarıyla daha yakın bağlar kurulmasını kapsamalıdır. Örneğin, AB’nin karar alma özerkliğine halel getirmeyecek koşullar altında aday ülkelere AB kurumlarının toplantılarında kademeli olarak gözlemci statüsü verilmesi değerlendirilebilir.”

Türkiye’nin Adının Geçmediği Belge

Ayrıntılı olarak değerlendirildiğinde bunun aslında “ara formül”den çok, üyelik öncesi aşamalı entegrasyon modeli olduğu yönünde. Ancak iki nokta dikkat çekiyor.

Birincisi, belgede sürekli “tam üyelik hedefi değişmemektedir” denmesine rağmen önerilen en ileri aşama Avrupa Ekonomik Alanı modeliyle Tek Pazara tam katılım. Bu, ekonomik açıdan üyeliğin en büyük kazanımlarından birini üyelik gerçekleşmeden sunuyor. Bu nedenle Batı Balkan ülkelerinin “Üyelik yerine yeni bir bekleme odası mı oluşturuluyor?” diye sormaları şaşırtıcı olmaz. Nitekim ülkemizin AB ile 30 yıl önce gerçekleştirdiği Gümrük Birliği bazı AB ülkelerince ilişkilerdeki en ileri safha olarak görülmüyor muydu?

İkincisi belgede Türkiye’nin adı hiç geçmiyor. Zaten belge yalnızca Batı Balkanlar ve Moldova’yı örnek gösteriyor.

Bunun tesadüf olduğu söylenemez. Önerilen araçların büyük bölümü –SEPA, Dijital Tek Pazar, enerji piyasası, Horizon Europe, Erasmus+, siber güvenlik ve savunma iş birliği gibi– teknik açıdan Türkiye’ye de uygulanabilecek niteliktedir. Buna rağmen Türkiye’nin belgede yer almaması, AB’nin iki büyük ülkesinin Ankara’yı genişleme politikasının dışında değerlendirdiğini göstermesi bakımından dikkat çekicidir.

AB, genişleme politikasında yeni bir “kademeli entegrasyon” modeli geliştirmektedir. Ancak bu modelin bütün aday ülkelere eşit şekilde uygulanıp uygulanmayacağı ve özellikle Türkiye’yi kapsayıp kapsamayacağı belirsizliğini korumaktadır. Ancak mevcut siyasi atmosfer dikkate alındığında, bu modelin Türkiye’ye uygulanmasını beklemek gerçekçi görünmemektedir. Türkiye resmen aday olsa da AB çevrelerinde farklı değerlendirilmektedir.

Şimdi Komisyonun resmen bir öneri ile gelmesi beklenmektedir.

Türkiye’nin AB ile ilişkilerinde gelişme bekleyemeyiz

Birçok kere yazıldığı gibi Türkiye – AB ilişkileri bırakın üyeliği, Gümrük Birliği’nin güncellenmesi veya vize muafiyeti gibi temel unsurlardan arınmış bir şekilde farklı ele alınmaktadır. Ankara Türkiye’nin savunma ve güvenlik alanındaki stratejik önemini vurgulamaya devam ederken, Brüksel daha ziyade yasa dışı göç penceresinden bakıyor. Ankara’yı bugünlerde ziyaret etmekte olan Dış İlişkilerden sorumlu Komiser Kaja Kallas, Genişlemeden sorumlu Komiser Marta Kos ve Göçten sorumlu Komiser Magnus Brunner daha ziyade kendi önceliklerini ele alırken ilişkilerin diğer alanlarda düzelmesi için hukukun üstünlüğü ve ifade özgürlüğü gibi gerekli koşulların sağlanması gerektiğini tekrar edeceklerdir.

Gerçekten de son yıllarda hukukun üstünlüğü, yargı bağımsızlığı ve temel haklar alanlarında yaşanan gerileme, Türkiye’nin üyelik perspektifini zayıflatan başlıca unsurlardan biri olmuştur. Dolayısıyla bugün yaşanan tıkanıklığı yalnızca AB’nin siyasi tercihleriyle açıklamak mümkün değildir; iki tarafın da bu tablodaki sorumluluğunu görmek gerekir.

Avrupa Parlamentosunun son aldığı tavsiye kararında bunlar daha sert bir şekilde vurgulanıyor. Değerli meslektaşım Büyükelçi Selim Kuneralp bunu ayrıntılı bir şekilde izah etti. Komiserler bunları makamlarımıza daha kibarca ifade edeceklerdir ancak sözünü sakınmayan ve bir bakıma Komisyonun aynasını oluşturan Avrupa Parlamentosunun çoğunluğu gibi düşündüklerini bilmemizde fayda var.

Bu konuyu diğer meslektaşlarım ve uzmanlarla defalarca yazdık. Ne Brüksel ne de Ankara mevcut tabloyu değiştirecek siyasi iradeyi ortaya koymaktadır. Bu nedenle ilişkiler, stratejik önemi inkâr edilemeyen ancak üyelik perspektifi giderek silikleşen tuhaf bir denge içinde sürdürülmektedir. Tarafların bu durumu değiştirmek üzere harekete geçmemeleri halinde uzun bir süre daha devam edeceği anlaşılmaktadır.

Önümüzdeki aylarda Komisyonun hazırlayacağı öneriler, AB’nin genişleme konusunda gerçekten yeni bir sayfa açıp açmayacağını gösterecektir. Ancak bugünkü tablo, Türkiye açısından yeni modellerin dahi siyasi engellerden bağımsız değerlendirilmeyeceğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Yetkin Report - Muharrem Sarıkaya - 30 Haziran 2026 - Yeni partinin kuruluşu Kıbrıs veya Lozan’ın yıldönümünde

 

Yeni partinin kuruluşu Kıbrıs veya Lozan’ın yıldönümünde

/ / Siyaset


İstinaf mahkemesinin butlan kararı ile yönetimden uzaklaştırılan Özgür Özel ve arkadaşlarının üç ayaklı yol haritası kesinleşirken, yeni partinin kuruluşuna ilişkin süreç de netleşiyor.
İçinde “Özgürlük…” kelimesinin geçmesi muhtemel partinin adı ise gelecek hafta kesinleşecek. Partinin kuruluşu için de iki tarih belirlendi: Türkiye’nin emperyalizme karşı mücadelesinin ve CHP’nin simge iki tarihi olan 1974 Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı’nın başlangıç günü olan 20 Temmuz veya 1923 Lozan Antlaşması’nın imzalandığı 24 Temmuz.
Yeni partinin kurucular kurulu ile birlikte kuruluş dilekçesinin 20 Temmuz Pazartesi veya 24 Temmuz Cuma gününden birinde İçişleri Bakanlığı’na sunulması hedefleniyor.

Bülent Tezcan: 26 Temmuz’dan önce olmalı

Bu tarihlerin seçilmiş olmasının nedenini Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu yönetiminin kaldırdığı Cumhurbaşkanlığı Aday Ofisi Koordinatörü Bülent Tezcan sorum üzerine şöyle dile getirdi:


• “Evet, sözünü ettiğiniz o iki tarihi belirledik. Nedeni de Türkiye’nin emperyalizme karşı mücadelesinin en önemli simgesi olan iki tarih olması. Mücadelenin de CHP hükümetlerinin öncülüğünde gerçekleşmesi.


• “Zorlayıcı neden ise 26 Temmuz Pazar günü CHP’nin kurultay yapması için zorunlu olan altı yıllık sürenin dolması. Bu tarihten sonra CHP’nin seçime girme yeterliliğini kaybettiği konusunda Erdoğan’ın eline güçlü bir koz verilmiş olur.


• “Kurultayını 6 yıl içinde yapmadığı için CHP’nin seçime gireme hakkını kaybettiği hükmedilebilir. Dolayısıyla butlan yönetimi bu tarihten önce kurultay kararı almazsa süreç bitmiş olacak.”


Tezcan, mahkeme 2023 kurultayını mutlak butlan, tümden hükümsüz saydığı için, ondan önceki CHP kurultayı olan 24-25 Temmuz 2020 tarihine dikkat çekiyor; 6 yıl hesabı oradan kaynaklanıyor.


20 ve 24 Temmuz’un önemi

Özel ve arkadaşlarının yeni partinin kuruluş dilekçesini İçişleri Bakanlığı’na sunmak için tercih ettiği 20 veya 24 Temmuz tarihleri Türkiye siyasi tarihinde iki dönüm noktasını oluşturuyor.
Türkiye’nin Mustafa Kemal Atatürk önderliğinde verdiği Kurtuluş Savaşı’nı bitirip 29 Ekim 1923’te Cumhuriyet olarak yeniden kuruluşunun teminatı olan Lozan Antlaşması İsmet İnönü tarafından 24 Temmuz 1923’te imzalanmıştı.
20 Temmuz 1974 Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı da hem Türkiye hem CHP tarihinde de önemli bir yere sahip.
Çünkü Barış Harekâtı emrini dönemin başbakanı ve CHP lideri olan Bülent Ecevit vermişti. Kıbrıs’taki EOKA darbesinin ardından Kıbrıs Türklerinin can güvenliğini korumak için CHP lideri Bülent Ecevit ve RP lideri Necmettin Erbakan’ın koalisyon hükümeti askeri müdahale kararı almış, bunun devamında KKTC kurulmuştu.

Yargıtay ve adli tatil

Tezcan, bir diğer zorlayıcı nedenin ise 20 Temmuz’da başlayacak Adli Tatil olduğunu vurguluyor.
Özgür Özel’in, İstinaf Mahkemesi’nin butlan kararına karşı Yargıtay’da açtığı dava, 20 Temmuz’a kadar sonlanmazsa Adli Tatil sonrasına kalacağı anlamına geliyor.
Tezcan da bu duruma dikkat çekip devam etti:
• “Yargıtay Adli Tatil öncesi kararını vermemesi demek, tatil sonrasına bıraktığı anlamına gelir. Bu da kurultayın 6 yıldır yapılmadığı anlamına gelen 26 Temmuz sınırının sonrasına kalacağına işaret eder. O nedenle biz partiyi bunun öncesinde kurma kararlılığındayız.”
Tezcan, yeni partinin kurucuları arasında milletvekillerinin bulunup bulunmayacağına ilişkin kararın da adı gibi gelecek hafta kesinleşeceğini söyledi.
Özel’in kurmay ekibinden bir ismin aktardığına göre, bu konuda iki farklı görüş var.
İlki, yeni partinin kurucuları arasında mevcut siyasilerden hiç kimsenin bulunmaması; tamamen yeni isimlerden oluşması.
Hatta milletvekillerinin de ilk aşamada geçişlerinin olmaması, sürecin beklenmesi yönünde.

Mevcut parti yedeklemesi

Tezcan’ın aktardığına göre süreç sadece yeni parti kurmakla da kalmayacak.
CHP’nin iptal edilen 2023’teki 38’inci kurultayı kapsamında yaşananların burada da tekrar etme olasılığı dikkate alınarak, örgütlenme sürecini tamamlamış, seçime girmeye hak kazanmış bir parti de yedekte tutuluyor.
Adı henüz açıklanmayan o partinin illerdeki örgütlerinin güçlendirilmesi sağlanacak. Siyasi Partiler Yasasına göre yeni kurulan bir partinin seçime girebilmesi için il sayısının yarısından fazlası, yani en az 41 ilde kongrelerini tamamlaması yetmiyor, bu illerin merkez ilçe dahil üçte birinde de kongrelerini bitirmiş olma şartını koşuyor.
Özel’in yakın çevresi o partinin bugüne dek medyada adı geçenlerden biri olmadığını belirtiyor. Özel bir süre önce yaptığı açıklamada ismi geçen partilerle bir temaslarının olmadığını belirtmişti.

“Sosyal demokratlar seçime girmeli”

Özel’in hukuk ekibinden Gül Çiftçi ise, bu düzenlemelerin sosyal demokratların mutlaka bir sonraki seçime katılabilmesini sağlama amacına yönelik olduğuna dikkat çekiyor. Çiftçi, dünkü konuşmamızda şunları söyledi:
• “20 Temmuz Adli Tatilin başlangıcı; dolayısıyla bu tarihten sonra Yargıtay karar almadıysa, partideki butlan yönetimi de olağanüstü kurultay ile ilgili adım atmadıysa, sosyal demokrasinin seçime girmesi için başka yol kalmıyor.
• “Biz sosyal demokrasinin seçim dışı kalmasını engellemek için adım atmak zorundayız. Çünkü başka çare kalmamış olacak. Bir yeni parti, iki kurulmuş partiyle yola devam edeceğiz.’’

DEM Parti DBP örneği

Bir diğer görüş ise yeni partiye, iki milletvekilinin temsili ile TBMM’de yer bulan Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi’ne (DBP) benzer bir yapılanmanın sağlanması.
DBP, DEM Parti’nin yedeği işlevi görüyor. Milletvekilleri de zaten kendilerini geçmişten bu yana süregelen DEP, HEP, HDP’nin devamı olarak görüyor.
Yeni partinin isminin kamuoyuna yerleşmesini sağlamak için hakkında dokunulmazlık dosyası bulunmayan en az iki olmak üzere toplamı 5’i geçmeyecek sayıda milletvekilinin geçişinin sağlanması. Bu konu hakkında da gelecek hafta karara varılması amaçlanıyor.

New statement dated today ( 30 June 2026) this time regarding Cyprus- by Türkiye's enemy and propagandist for Israel, Michael Rubin, submitted to the House of Representatives bipartisan Ton Lantos Human Rishts Commission

 New statement dated today ( 30 June 2026) this time regarding Cyprus- by Türkiye's enemy and propagandist for Israel, Michael Rubin, submitted to the House of Representatives bipartisan Ton Lantos Human Rishts Commission 

 https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Human-Rights-in-Turkish-Occupied-Cyprus.pdf?x97961


Chairman Smith, Chairman McGovern, and honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

Less than one month ago, I testified before you about human rights in Turkey. The problems Cyprus today faces are inexorably linked to Turkey and its more than six-decade occupation. 

For those who justify or apologize for Turkey’s invasion, the narrative is simple: Turkey invaded to protect Cypriot Muslims from ethnic violence if not genocide at the hands of the Greeks. To justify the occupation of Cyprus, however, would be by analogy to accept not only Nazi Germany’s 1938 Anschluss of Austria, but also the annexation of Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland. More recently, Russia’s 2014 invasion and annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea to protect ethnic Russians rested on nearly identical arguments and false claims as Turkey had used in Cyprus four decades previously. Put simply, the notion that human rights or a desire to protect the Cypriot Muslim community motivates let alone justified the Turkish occupation is a historical nonsense. 

The Background to a Crisis 

History matters, if only to show the emptiness of a narrative that Turkish school books indoctrinate and Turkish diplomats continue to embrace. The roots of the conflict date back nearly a century before the Turkish landgrab. The British had occupied Cyprus in 1878 after the Russo-Turkish War and formally incorporated it as a crown colony in 1925. At the time of the British occupation, Cyprus was more than two-thirds Greek and one third Muslim. This should not surprise as, in the years before the Armenian and Pontic Greek genocides, many of the towns and cities along the Anatolian coast were also Christian.  

Indeed, while Cypriot nationalists may resent the British occupation of Cyprus and the island’s consolidation as a unit separate from Greece, the fact that the United Kingdom was the suzerain in the early 20th century likely saved its population from suffering the same fate as the Armenians and the Greeks of Smyrna, neither of whom had a foreign power to protect them from the predations of the Young Turks.  

Still, as decolonization swept the globe, many Greeks embraced the idea of enosis to unify Greece and Cyprus. Most Greeks and Cypriots envisioned achieving that unity peacefully, but some quarters were impatient. Beginning in the early 1960s, politicians and nationalist movements in both Athens and Ankara instigated communal violence on Cyprus. While some Greek Cypriots advocated enosis, Turkey encouraged the taksim movement which envisioned Turkish annexation of the island. For some Cypriot Turks, it was an alluring movement: After all, if they suddenly became a Turkish possession, the Cypriot Muslim minority might instantly transform into part of a supermajority that could impose their will on a dhimmi community.   

Enter the military junta that had seized power in Athens in 1967. It was conservative, nationalist, antiCommunist, punished dissent and was brutal in its suppression of student unrest. It was not monolithic, however. As Georgios Papadopoulos, one of the coup leaders eventually sought to liberalize and reform the junta’s rule, disgruntled hardliners led by Dimitrios Ioannidis staged an internal coup to re-establish hardline rule.  

On July 15, 1974, Ioannidis instigated a Cypriot National Guard coup against Archbishop Makarios III, Cyprus’ democratically-elected president, and the installation of Nikos Sampson whom Ioannidis intended to use to achieve enosis. Five days later, the Turkish Army invaded, ostensibly to protect Cypriot Muslims under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. This is traditionally where Turks and their apologists in universities and various think tanks end their narrative. They both disregard what happened next and ignore that under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey should have restored the constitutional order, not kicked off an occupation lasting more than half a century. 

Regardless, on July 24, 1974, the junta in Greece collapsed. Greece returned to democracy and forfeited its claims to Cyprus. It was only then, as peace talks continued in Geneva to compel withdrawal, that Turkey invaded again in a blatant land grab, this time absent any casus belli. Turkish troops seized and ethnically cleansed a third of the country; the occupation continues to the present. 

At the time, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger sided with the Turks. “There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus,” he told President Gerald Ford. 

“The Turkish tactics are right — grab what they want and then negotiate on the basis of possession.” 

Kissinger, perhaps like U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Envoy Tom Barrack today, also embrace cynical realism to justify aggression.  

Kissinger’s realpolitik have not stood the test of history. Today, Greece and Cyprus are America’s most reliable allies in the Eastern Mediterranean. From Libya to Gaza and from Syria to Somalia, Turkey is a source of instability. While Kissinger conflated cynicism with sophistication, he never understood the weakness of his realism: While short-term deals might appeal alluring, their long-term consequence could devastate not only human rights but also American interests. President Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan’s government currently poses more of a danger to Cypriots and democracy than the junta ever did. 

The U.S. State Department, though, does U.S. policy no favors when it continues a policy to avoid deeming northern Cyprus “occupied.” Fear of moral clarity and a failure to recognize international law does not encourage peace-making; rather, it rewards aggression. If Secretary of State Marco Rubio worries that Barrack and Turkish officials might complain at such a stark description of northern Cyprus’ condition, then the proper response is not word play, but a clear message: End the occupation. 

Cypriot Muslims Face a Cultural Genocide Perpetrated by Turkey, Not Greece 

Whereas successive U.S. administrations have been content to consider Turkey’s occupation a frozen conflict and to abandon the idea for all practical purposes of ending the island’s de facto division, that status quo neither serves the interests of Cypriot Muslims nor does is it even tenable. 

Shortly after the Turkish invasion, Turkey began transferring settlers into its occupied zone. To bolster the numbers of ethnic Turks and Muslims on the island, successive governments in Turkey encouraged the migration. For poor agricultural workers and low wage urban workers, often conservative Muslims, the economic benefit was clear, as they left ramshackle shacks and shantytowns to move into the houses from which advancing Turkish troops had expelled Greek Cypriots. 

The lack of credible international response has consequence, as in March 2018, Turkish forces and their proxies invade the Syrian canton of Afrin, ethnically cleansing Kurds and expelling Christians and Yazidis, taking control over their property. Turkey has since expanded that model across northern and northeastern Syria as it has sought to change the demographic balance. 

European diplomats, State Department officials, and self-described human rights activists often focus on Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank, but the two issues are not analogous. The West Bank is technically disputed territory without clearcut sovereignty, as there was no recognized, independent Palestine at the time Israel took military possession from Jordan in 1967. Cyprus, however, was a sovereign country when Turks invaded 14 years after its independence.  

There has been no scientific census in Turkish-occupied Cyprus but estimates now place the number of Turkish settlers and their offspring at more than half the population of the Turkish-occupied zone. Settlers likely outnumber true Turkish Cypriots. There has been a surge in settlement since Erdoǧan came to power. 

Between 2013 and 2023, for example, the population of the occupied zone increased by more than a third. 

The reason for the acceleration of settlement, Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions notwithstanding, appears a deliberate decision by Erdoğan to drown out Turkish Cypriots. What Turkey now does to the native Cypriot Muslims is not far different from what the Han Chinese do in East Turkestan, the Uyghur-region China’s communist government refers to as Xinjiang.  

While Turks and occupation authorities in Cyprus hide the true numbers at play in northern Cyprus, the State Planning Organization of the Turkish entity on the island places the population of the occupied zone is just shy of 500,000. Of these, Cypriots Muslims who can document family lineage to Cyprus before 1974 number only around 230,000. 

Too often, American policymakers assume that all ethnic Turks or Turkish Muslims are the same. This is wrong. Turkey traditionally had a diverse sectarian landscape, even among Muslims. Up to 20 percent of the Turkey’s Muslim population are Alevi, with a higher percentage among Turkey’s Kurds. Of Turkey’s Sunni Muslims, most are traditionally moderate, influenced by Anatolian Sufism. Erdoǧan, however, follows a more austere exegesis influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood.  

In Cyprus, meanwhile, as in many island nations, Muslims were traditionally cosmopolitan and tolerant. 

Turkey’s flood of settlers, especially under Erdoǧan, were the opposite: Austere, conservative, and intolerant not only of Christians, but also of Muslims who were not as observant. The longer the occupation continues, the more Cypriot Muslim culture and the promise it holds for healing and peace, withers.  

From Real Estate to Weaponry, Erdoǧan Shreds the Status Quo 

While the United States, Europe, and perhaps even the United Nations continue to approach Cyprus as a frozen conflict, Erdoǧan has systematically shredded that understanding. 

Prior to the Turkish invasion, Famagusta—and its southern Varosha quarter—was a major tourist hub that attracted European and Western glitterati to its pristine beaches and resorts, earning it the nickname of “the Cannes of the Eastern Mediterranean.” In 1974, Turkey first bombed the city to force residents to flee, and then occupied it, refusing to allow its residents to return, even after establishing the ceasefire. Varosha became a ghost town. Billions of dollars of real estate sat fenced off and empty. 

Diplomats have long expected the return of its residents to Famagusta to be the key step in any negotiated peace. That Varosha remained vacant gave Cypriots, Western Europe, and UN diplomats hope that Ankara was still interested in a resolution to the Cypriot conflict. Now, however, Erdoğan signals that Turkey may act unilaterally to populate and develop Varosha. In 2020 and 2021, the Turkish forces removed fences to allow tourists and visitors to re-enter the neighborhood. The fear now is that Erdoǧan, perhaps with the backing of Barrack, will seek to redevelop the beach town, prospect that could net investors billions of dollars. This, of course, would violate UN Security Council resolutions that state that Varosha’s residents must first return to their documented property, especially of Turkish redevelopment tore down old structures. 

Resort development and beach front construction may make certain individuals wealthy, but it would be tragic for human rights, Cypriot peace, and U.S. reputation if individual enrichment trumped international law and U.S. national interests.  

Some violations of the status quo are even more dangerous. Cyprus has a National Guard combining ground, maritime units, and helicopters, but it does not have a formal military as many other European states do. Balance is crucial. 

That balance is now in jeopardy. President Donald Trump now makes headlines for his proposal both to sell F110 Turbofan Engines to Turkey prior to the July 7-8, 2026 NATO Summit in Ankara and to welcome Turkey back into the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. Both moves would privilege Turkey’s own defense industry over America’s given Ankara’s desire to reverse engineer American technology to utilize in Turkey’s own Kaan jet fighter program. NATO member or not, from the perspective of intellectual property, transferring cutting-edge military technology to Turkey is as dangerous as providing America’s military technology and trade secrets to China.  

That such sales would move forward after Turkey betrayed its previous understandings by redeploying U.S.-provided F-16s to occupied northern Cyprus should generate bipartisan outrage in Congress and end forever the notion that Turkey seeks American aircraft for NATO defense. On March 9, 2026, as Trump focused on the ongoing war in Iran, Erdoǧan ordered the deployment of six F-16s to occupied northern Cyprus, a blatant attempt to change the status quo and, also, for the Turkish audience, to make Erdoǧan appear strong and Trump impotent.  

The Turkish F-16s now based in Turkey serve no military purpose; after all, the İncirlik is only 150 miles away in mainland Turkey. Cruising, that represents a 15-minute flight, but at its top speed, an F-16 could cover that distance in just six minutes. Rather, the sole purpose of Erdoǧan’s move was to obstruct diplomacy and make Turkey’s landgrab permanent. In August 1990, after overrunning Kuwait, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein deployed Iraq’s Soviet MiG-29s, Su-22s, and French Mirage F1s at captured Kuwaiti airfields as he sought to consolidate his gains. The United States must see Erdoǧan’s recent moves in the same light. 

Turkey’s Drone Base in Occupied Cyprus Endangers the Region 

Too often, U.S. presidents, be they Republican or Democrat, believe they enter the Oval Office with a blank slate. History does not restart every four or eight years, however. Precedents matter. It is doubtful Erdoǧan would have sent F-16s to occupied Cyprus had the United States not earlier gone silent when Turkey altered the military balance by transforming an occupied airport in northern Cyprus into a drone base.  

On December 16, 2019, İsmail Demir, the head of Turkey’s Defence Industry Directorate, reported that Turkey had flown drones to Lefkoniko Airport, which it restyled Geçitkale Air Base. Turkey has now transformed Lefkoniko into perhaps the Eastern Mediterranean’s largest drone base.  As Erdoǧan explained in May 2021, “There are two airports in Cyprus. One is Ercan which our citizens in Turkey know, and another one that was there before but which now has a new name to which we transfer our unmanned aerial vehicles.” 

Almost immediately, Turkey used its drone base to undermine peace and security in Cyprus It launched surveillance drones to monitor vessels exploring offshore waters for gas and oil before harassing ships from NATO states such as Italy. It subsequently moved attack drones such as the Bayraktar-TB2 onto the base, posing a threat to countries ranging from Libya to Israel. Just as Trump and Barrack do now, so too did Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman when she visited Ankara on May 28, 2021. In an interview with Hürriyet, she declared, “The relationship with Turkey is a very critical one to the U.S. Turkey is a NATO partner, a strategic ally, a force in the world….” Rather than creating diplomatic space, her praise convinced Erdogan that the United States was weak and would bend to further aggression. Had the Biden administration stood up to Erdoǧan’s assault on the status quo and compelled the withdrawal of the drones and the shuttering of the airfield through any number of means, it is doubtful Erdoǧan would have later redeployed the F-16s.  In a quip commonly misattributed to Mark Twain, Insanity is “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” By such a definition, U.S. policy is pure craziness.  

Northern Cypriot Money Laundering Endangers Human Rights and Regional Security 

About two million tourists visit northern Cyprus each year, almost 80 percent of whom come from Turkey explicitly to take advantage of its beaches and unregulated economy. Russians and Iranians also flood the territory, while other European take advantage of the cheap deals and the unregulated economy without recognizing that they are profiting off the systematic Turkish looting of a European Union member state.  

Like other unrecognized states—Russian puppets Abkhazia and Transnistria, for example—northern Cyprus has become a hub for money laundering and other illicit activity. While Transparency International ranks Cyprus as cleaner than Italy, Spain, and Poland, the Turkish-occupied zone is a sector where criminality thrives—and deliberately so.  

Both casinos and universities have become hubs for money laundering. In recent years, the casino industry has thrived in northern Cyprus. While the United States and Europe regulate big-name outlets that operate in their territory, there is no such regulation or transparency in northern Cyprus, which now boasts 25 casinos, or roughly one per every 20,000 residents, roughly the proportion of casinos per resident in Nevada. 

Only Erdoǧan and the Turkish intelligence service—not even the political leadership of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—know where the casino profits go, though some likely ends with cash transfers to Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Shabaab, various Al Qaeda affiliates, and other Islamist projects. 

Both Edi Rama’s Albania and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus are today hubs for drug smuggling into Europe. 

The nearly two dozen universities that operate in northern Cyprus represent another organized crime scheme. The diplomas they issue are as fraudulent as the one Erdoǧan himself showed to prove college acceptance. While Erdoǧan was motivated by academic fraud and the desire to bypass the prohibition of non-university graduates rising to the premiership and presidency, the northern Cypriot scheme is simply to collect money from and help organizations like Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanon’s Hezbollah place their operatives under cover in Europe. Because Cyprus is a European Union member, many rogue elements and terrorist rightly believe that the occupied north can be a useful beachhead to infiltrate operatives further into Europe. The universities also provide cover for human traffickers to attract and exploit desperate Iranians, Afghans, and Syrians. Occupation, even in frozen conflicts, can have a tremendous and deleterious impact on human rights. 

U.S. Policy Moving Forward 

Too often, when diaspora activists complain, be they Greeks, Armenians, Uyghurs, Kurds, or Biafrans, policymakers dismiss their concerns as exaggerated or, when they do recognize them as representing real human rights abuses, they like Kissinger, create a firewall between justice and U.S. national interest. In almost every case, the passage of time shows what one generation saw as sophisticated and a necessary sacrifice of human liberty, the next generations recognized as a cynical own-goal not only to America’s image, but also to its national interests. This has certainly been the case with the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. 

In the partisan meatgrinder of Washington, however, Cyprus also could be the exception to the rule. Beyond the White House, Democrats and Republicans broadly recognize the value and importance of ending the conflict in Cyprus and rolling back Turkish aggression and occupation. There simply put is no difference between what Turkey seeks in terms of independence for the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and what Russia had tried to achieve with the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic. Erdoǧan and the diplomats he purchases may talk about a binational Cyprus, but what Turks seek is taksim. Put another way, Erdoǧan today is no different than Ioannidis. Like Ioannidis, Erdoǧan should face prison for his crimes.  

Between 1940 and 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull recognized Vichy France; it was a mistake that the United States should not repeat. The State Department should no more ascribe legitimacy to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus than it does for Russia’s puppet-states carved out of the territory of independent neighbors like Moldova, Georgia, or Ukraine.  

Such a policy would require two changes. First, Rubio should direct the U.S. ambassador or chargé d’affaires in Cyprus, as well as all U.S. diplomats to state handling Cyprus issues to state clearly that Turkey illegally occupies Cyprus. Second, the State Department must only grant Turkish Cypriots visas to the United States on Cypriot passports. For Turkish Cypriot politicians to attend the United Nations General Assembly for sidebar meetings with U.S. officials and other world leaders with U.S. visas issued on Turkish passports undermines recognition of Cypriot sovereignty. The State Department should further shutter any Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus offices in the United States.  Europeans should not treat an occupation and human rights tragedy as an opportunity for a cheap vacation. 

Just as the Trump administration requires special visa scrutiny for those who have traveled to Iran or Iraq and seek to visit the United States, so too should the same procedure apply to Germans, French, and Scandinavians who despite their rhetoric of human rights, contribute to the Turkish occupation machinery by booking vacations in occupied Cyprus. No airline that services the occupied zone should have overflight or landing rights in the United States. 

The U.S. State Department and the Department of the Treasury should further support adding Turkey to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist for its involvement in money laundering in occupied northern Cyprus. Even for those who consider Turkey an ally, there is precedent. The United States, for example, once listed both Israel and South Korea respectively on its Tier 3 and Tier 2 blacklists for their failure to counter human trafficking. In both cases, the governments responded by working with U.S. authorities to reform and rectify the problem. Washington should always make such designations on objective criteria, rather than bend standards to assuage diplomatic umbrage. If Turkey wishes to win U.S. support to remove any blacklisting, it should simply stop its criminality.  

Cyprus’ own case is also instructive. For decades, concerns about Cypriot financial dealings, especially regarding Russia, overshadowed U.S.-Cypriot relations. Beginning around 2004, however, Cyprus began working actively in partnership with the United States to resolve concerns. This was especially true after Cyprus’ 2012-2013 financial crisis, after which Cyprus’ extraordinary effort enabled the country to make the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) whitelist. The 2019 Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 which passed with true bipartisan support, included a condition that the State Department had to certify that Cyprus remain committed to anti-money laundering efforts, a condition that it has repeatedly fulfilled.  

In short, failure to hold Turkey to an account for financial irregularities and money laundering in northern Cyprus does not represent standard or realist diplomatic practice but runs counter to how the United States treats its allies and to best diplomatic practice consensus.  

Finally, and most radically, the United States should consider pressuring the United Kingdom to abandon its Sovereign Base Area in Cyprus. London granted Cyprus independence on August 16, 1960, but retained sovereign control over Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Article 1 of the Treaty between the United Kingdom and Cyprus recognizing Cypriot independence declared, “The territory of the Republic of Cyprus shall comprise 

the Island of Cyprus, together with the islands lying off its coast, with the exception of the two areas… referred to as the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area. The base area represents approximately three percent of Cypriot territory that essentially remains a colonial possession. 

While the Cypriots were unhappy at the British conditionally independence upon their continued presence, they did not want to obstruct the broader goal of independence.  

Britain justified its presence as a sign it would protect Cyprus. But after a Turkish invasion and more than five decades of occupation, it is clear British authorities simply lied. After Brexit and with Britain’s ability to project force in decline, it is time for the United Kingdom to go home, and to transfer sovereignty fully back to Cyprus. 

The Cypriot government might then lease the military portion of the bases—a tiny fraction of the Sovereign Base Area’s total territory—to the United States. The logic here is simple: Turkey seeks to bully Cyprus and through Cyprus, the European Union. The United Nations has been at best ineffective and at worst deleterious as it has allowed time to launder Turkey’s occupation. The 2004 Annan Plan, rightly rejected by Greek Cypriots, exposed the emptiness of UN officials since it would have rewarded aggression but impose no consequences should the Turks continue their occupation. A deployment of U.S. forces, including F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, electronic warfare planes, anti-drone and anti-ballistic missile defenses would not only augment sovereign Cyprus’ qualitative military edge and show Turkey that its salami-slicing aggression will not succeed, but it would also relieve the Pentagon from Turkish extortion over the use of Incirlik.  

The best diplomacy is bipartisan, rooted in moral clarity and respect for human rights and backed, when necessary, by force. It is time to make ending Turkey’s illegal occupation of Cyprus and, for that matter, portions of Syria and Iraq, core components of U.S. foreign policy. 


Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission hk. bilgi :

The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission is a unique body in the House of Representatives, and its function as established in the resolution is notably different from other commissions in the United States Congress, such as the Congressional-Executive Commission on China or the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Though the resolution states that the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission must collaborate with the Senate and the Executive branch, the Commission itself is composed only of Members of the House of Representatives. Members are not appointed to the Commission, but are able to join by request at any time, similar to a caucus. The Commission also does not compile an annual report. It is the only body in the House of Representatives that is intended to frame all issues through the lens of international human rights norms.


Similarly, there are significant differences between the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission and committees in the House of Representatives. Most notably, the nonpartisan structure of the Commission grants both parties equal power within the Commission, regardless of which side is in the majority or minority. Unlike a committee which has a Chair from the majority and a Ranking Member from the minority, the Commission is led by two Co-Chairs who have equal say. The leadership of the Commission is composed of one Co-Chair and four Executive Committee Members from each party. The two Co-Chairs and eight Members of the Executive Committee are appointed by the Speaker and Minority Leader.[1]


Tuesday, June 30, 2026

FP - Argument There Are Only Four Great Powers An era of great-power competition has started—but not all would-be competitors qualify. June 2, 2026, 4:28 AM By Brendan Simms

 FP - Argument

There Are Only Four Great Powers

An era of great-power competition has started—but not all would-be competitors qualify.

June 2, 2026, 4:28 AM

By Brendan Simms, the director of the Centre for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge and the author of The Return of the Great Powers.



A stylized grid composition of 12 squares in a three-by-four layout, alternating with solid red and blue blocks, split photographic images, and flags. On the left, parts of a dark flag fly against a red and blue background. In the center columns, a close-up black-and-white portrait of a man's face is split horizontally across two squares, and a profile view of another man in a collared shirt looks to the right against a red backdrop. On the far right, a close-up black-and-white portrait shows a man looking directly forward.


A stylized grid composition of 12 squares in a three-by-four layout, alternating with solid red and blue blocks, split photographic images, and flags. On the left, parts of a dark flag fly against a red and blue background. In the center columns, a close-up black-and-white portrait of a man's face is split horizontally across two squares, and a profile view of another man in a collared shirt looks to the right against a red backdrop. On the far right, a close-up black-and-white portrait shows a man looking directly forward.


In our new era of great-power competition, it’s important to identify the competitors. But it has always been easier to speak about the great powers than to define them. Disagreement over great-power status, and especially over which power is the “greatest,” characterizes today’s system, as it did in times past. There is neither a commonly accepted definition of what constitutes a great power, nor any consensus over such basic questions as how many powers there are.


Nevertheless, we can distinguish the great powers by a set of common characteristics, which reveal that there are only four great powers that exist today—and they are not necessarily the ones you would expect.


Great powers, first of all, have a set of behaviors in common. They always expect to shape or at least be consulted on the main global issues of the day. They make their presence felt, and their absence creates a vacuum to be filled. Often, great powers will insist on their own absolute sovereignty but admit only the qualified sovereignty of lesser powers, especially if they are nearby. In extremis, they reserve the right to change regimes that threaten or displease them but are able to deny any such right with respect to themselves.


At times, the great powers will claim to be above international law. At other times, they will make a virtue of vindicating that law or claim to defend international norms. In other words, the great powers have the power to make the rules and to break them; they are never just rule-takers. They are the orderers, not the ordered.


What enables the great powers to behave this way are their superior capabilities compared to the middling and smaller states. The first such capability is resources. Does the state in question have the military capacity to impose its will or to resist that of others? There is no entirely satisfactory way of assessing military strength, but how much the state spends on its military and how effectively is a rough measure of its defense capabilities.


Deployable nuclear weapons are also an indispensable component of great-power status today. The guaranteed ability to deliver an atomic bomb and thus to deter a nuclear attack gives a state a special position in the world. This is why the great powers take on the immense burdens of planning, researching, maintaining, storing, training, and safeguarding associated with those weapons. Not all nuclear powers are great powers, but all great powers are nuclear.


Then there is the economy. Is the state strong enough to survive the financial headwinds of geopolitical competition and to sustain a substantial military effort? Usually, economic strength is measured by GDP, which covers everything produced within a state’s borders. The alternative metric of purchasing power parity takes into account how far a sum of money goes in the domestic economy. It privileges non-Western countries with lower standards of living and production costs.


Very important—and difficult to assess—is the question how national these resources are. Peacetime GDP, GDP in a conflictual situation, and wartime GDP are three very different things. Cut a state off from its markets, sources of credit, raw materials, and food supply through tariffs, sanctions, or a blockade, and its economy will soon take on a completely different aspect. This is where command of the global commons outside the jurisdiction of any one state—particularly the world’s sea lanes—is so important to determining great-power status, or at least the hierarchy among the great powers.


A low-angle shot looking up past the backs of several individuals dressed in formal white military uniforms. They are looking up at a cloudy gray sky, where six dark fighter jets fly in a tight delta formation, leaving faint white vapor trails behind them.


A side view profile of a long, precise row of military personnel standing at attention in uniforms with gold accents, white gloves, and peaked caps, each holding a rifle vertically. In the background, a single officer in a green uniform is captured midstride running along the asphalt in front of them.


Left: U.S. Naval Academy graduates watch as the Blue Angels do a flyover salute during a graduation and commissioning ceremony in Annapolis, Maryland, on May 22. Heather Diehl/Getty Images   Right: An officer runs back to his position after correcting soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army during practice for a military parade in Beijing on Aug. 20, 2025. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images


Economic power is thus important, but it is not conclusive in determining great-power status. The strongest militaries of the world measured in terms of capabilities and spending over the past 20 years are the United States, which comfortably leads the pack, and China, followed at some distance by the United Kingdom and Russia. The first three are also among the five or six largest economies in the world. Russia, which is economically weaker, makes the grade on the strength of its outsize nuclear arsenal—the largest in the world.


The second criterion of great-power status is reach. Is the state a global power or merely a regional power, and how willing and able is it to deploy force far from home? Does it have a recognized geographical sphere of influence? Can that state draw on a global network of bases? Does it control key transport nodes and chokepoints? Can its intelligence agencies provide top-quality information on most parts of the world, as well as for cyberspace and space? Does it have a large and sophisticated diplomatic service? Has it a large overseas aid budget?


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Reach can be both geographic and virtual. A great power will have the capacity to make its presence felt well beyond its own region, but it will also have the capacity to influence or even coopt global institutions such as the United Nations, the markets, or other fora.


Today, reach is very unevenly distributed among powers. The United States stands out through its sprawling network of military bases. Britain does not enjoy remotely the same global position it once did, but it still maintains important sovereign bases worldwide, including Gibraltar, Cyprus, and the Falkland Islands; it also has a presence in places such as Duqm in Oman on the Indian Ocean. Russia claims a sphere of influence in its near-abroad, though it has recently lost ground in Africa and the Middle East. Russia also enjoys global reach in the fields of propaganda, disinformation, and disruptive digital activity.


China may yet become a major global military player, with a base in Djibouti and a large paramilitary presence protecting infrastructure projects across the world. Its real global reach, though, lies in its partial control of the world’s supply chains and critical minerals (such as lithium) needed to power the technological and green revolutions.


A wide, symmetrical view looking down a grand tree-lined boulevard decorated with large, alternating U.K. and Japanese national flags on tall poles. A formal procession of mounted police or military guards on horseback advances down the center of the road, led by officers on white horses in the front row, followed by others on dark horses.


Mounted police officers lead the horse-drawn carriage procession of Britain’s King Charles III and Japan’s Emperor Naruhito as they make their way along the Mall in London on June 25, 2024, during a three-day state visit. Paul Ellis/AFP via Getty Images


The third criterion is reputation. Is the state considered a great power by others, especially other great powers, and almost as importantly, does it consider itself a great power? Few doubt that the United States and China are great powers today and many consider Russia so on account of its military capacity to shape or at least disrupt the global order. Though the status of the United Kingdom is disputed, most Europeans still consider it a major power.


Finland and Sweden, for example, sought a bilateral security guarantee from the U.K. in 2022 before NATO’s kicked in; the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force contributes heavily to the security of the Baltic and High North. The United Kingdom is also prized as an ally by important actors in Asia, such as Japan, as well as in the Levant and Persian Gulf. Besides, if the United States withdraws from Europe and Asia, Britain’s much more limited capabilities will gain in importance.


Moreover, a great power always stands for something beyond brute force. Its greatness is also cultural and ideological. Today, the United Kingdom and other Western powers stand for a liberal international order based on democratic principles and free trade. Britain reinforced that image, proving that it is not the “poodle” of the United States, by refusing to join U.S. President Donald Trump’s attack on Iran. Other powers have positioned themselves in more civilizational terms.


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Putin, in a dark suit and tie, sits alone at a large, curved white conference table with a hollow center inside an official room with wood-paneled walls, a flag, and an emblem. Embedded in the surface of the desk in the foreground is a video screen showing the face of a military official during a conference call.

A photo distributed by Russian state-owned agency Sputnik shows President Vladimir Putin overseeing a nuclear training exercise via a video link in Moscow on Oct. 25, 2023. Gavriil Grigoroov/AFP via Getty Images


For example, Chinese President Xi Jinping has said that China, as a “major country,” should conduct a “distinctive” diplomacy marked by a “salient Chinese feature and a Chinese vision.” Even Russia, perhaps the most brutal of the great powers and one that constantly emphasizes its military and nuclear might, claims that it represents Christian and family values globally against the “soulless” West. What exactly the United States, once the mainstay of the rules-based international order, stands for after the second coming of Trump is not yet clear.


Reputation rests in part on a state’s position in the architecture of global governance. The United States plays a major role—some would say dominates—economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It is also a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, along with a Russia, China, Britain and France. All five powers thereby enjoy significant privileges in the international system, and while these are frequently challenged, reform of the U.N. is as far away as it ever was.


The fourth criterion for great-power status, resilience, concerns how much pain a society and its economy can absorb. Historical performance plays an important role. In the past, victory has not always gone to those who can inflict the most, but sometimes to those who can suffer the most. Past great powers, such as the Habsburg Empire, showed enormous staying power in adversity. Losing and recovering is as critical as winning. A state may command extensive resources and enjoy an impressive reach and reputation yet fall short as a great power if it lacks resilience.


The most resilient powers over time have been Britain and the United States. They have proved able to maintain long contests and to recover from serious defeats, such as the loss of the American colonies or the war in Vietnam. Though both countries are in domestic crisis today in different ways, they can be expected to recover relatively quickly. Russia and China, by contrast, are relatively young powers in their current form, and both have recent memory of political trauma and fragmentation. Like so much else, resilience is rooted in history and especially in the development of social cohesion over time.


A medium shot of three people in business attire. In the center, Takaichi is viewed from behind as she stands with arms wide open. To the left, Meloni, a blonde woman in a dark pantsuit, reacts with a wide-eyed, surprised facial expression and open hands. To the right, Macron, a man in a dark suit watches with a neutral expression.


Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni (left) greets Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi as French President Emmanuel Macron stands nearby at the G-20 summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, on Nov. 22, 2025. Leon Neal/Getty Images


According to these criteria, several great-power contenders can be discounted. Some economically significant actors such as Germany and Japan lack the military capabilities, especially nuclear weapons, to be great powers.


When it comes to reach, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and Indonesia have largely regional military capabilities; some of them enjoy considerable global influence through their diplomatic services and overseas aid policies. Germany and Japan have substantial soft power, but Brazil and Indonesia do not. All four have shown themselves to be brittle in the past and thus lack the necessary resilience.


Despite the endorsement of many, India does not meet most of the criteria either. It has nuclear weapons and the world’s fifth- or sixth-largest economy, but New Delhi’s military reach is largely regional. India claims a reputation as a “world teacher,” but it understands this role in non-great-power terms. Given the country’s relative youth in its modern form, India’s resilience is hard to measure—but its propensity to suffer terrorist and communal violence and its persisting poverty suggests vulnerabilities.


France is hard to assess. It is a large economy and commands a nuclear arsenal more independent than that of Britain, but it has lost important parts of its sovereignty, such as control over its own borders and currency, to the European Union. Paris still enjoys a lot of influence in Africa and has a significant presence in the Indo-Pacific, but it is on the retreat in the former and challenged by anticolonial movements in the latter. France also enjoys a global brand distinct from the Anglo-Saxons, China, and Russia.


In terms of resilience, though, France has repeatedly experienced state collapse in the 19th and 20th centuries, most notably when it was overrun by Germany in 1940 and had to be re-constituted by the Anglo-Americans after the war. It is much more brittle than the United Kingdom.


What is clear is that the extent to which the great powers enjoy resources, reach, reputation and resilience, and the balance between these capabilities, varies considerably. No great power is configured quite like any other, and they differ considerably in capacity and vulnerabilities. It has always been thus. In the past, none of the great powers were exactly as strong as any other, and some were considerably weaker—for example, 18th-century Prussia and late 19th-century Austria-Hungary.


Likewise, the great powers of today differ considerably from each other both in terms of individual strengths and overall strength. Though the United States and China are economically and militarily far ahead of Russia and the United Kingdom, all four states have attributes that mark them out from the next rung of major actors on the world scene. There is also one country, France, whose great-power status is unclear.


This list—those it includes and those it leaves off—may take some by surprise. Seen historically, however, its consistency is remarkable. Although the balance between the actors has shifted considerably, this configuration of great powers would have been recognizable not merely to our grandparents but our great-grandparents. In all likelihood, it will remain so to our children and grandchildren.


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Brendan Simms is the director of the Centre for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge and the author of The Return of the Great Powers.