T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı
13 Mart 2026, Bangladeş Dışişleri Bakanı Khalilur Rahman’ın Ülkemizi Ziyareti Hk.
Bangladeş Dışişleri Bakanı Khalilur Rahman, 14 Mart 2026 tarihinde ülkemize bir ziyaret gerçekleştirecektir
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The National Interest - The US and Israel Don’t Share the Same Iran War Aims. Here’s How They Differ - March 12, 2026 By: Leon Hadar
The National Interest
The US and Israel Don’t Share the Same Iran War Aims. Here’s How They Differ
March 12, 2026
By: Leon Hadar
Recognizing the divergent interests within the US-Israeli relationship is the first step to ensuring a healthy and realistic partnership.
The conventional wisdom in Washington holds that the United States and Israel share a unified strategic interest in confronting Iran. Politicians on both sides of the aisle recite it like a catechism. The think tanks reinforce it. The defense establishment operationalizes it. But conventional wisdom, particularly in the Middle East, has a remarkable track record of being wrong—and this case is no exception.
Let us be precise about what each party actually wants, because imprecision in foreign policy is not only the cause of intellectual failure but also the expense of blood and treasure.
What Israel wants is the elimination—not the containment, not the negotiated limitation—of Iran’s nuclear program and, increasingly, the weakening or collapse of the Islamic Republic itself. For Israel, this is existential calculus. A nuclear-armed Iran, in the Israeli strategic mind, represents an intolerable threat to its physical survival. Israeli leaders have said this clearly and repeatedly, and there is no reason to doubt their sincerity. They want the United States to fight this war fully, decisively, and at whatever cost is required to finish the job.
What the United States wants—or rather, what American interests dictate, as distinct from what American politicians say—is considerably more modest and considerably more complicated. Washington wants to prevent Iran from acquiring a deliverable nuclear weapon. It wants to preserve the flow of Persian Gulf oil. It wants to avoid another open-ended Middle Eastern military commitment that hollows out its conventional deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific. It wants to keep the global economy from absorbing an oil-price shock that accelerates its own fragmentation. And it wants, if possible, to get back to the business of managing its rivalry with China—the actual defining challenge of this century.
These are obviously not the same objectives. They overlap in places, but they diverge precisely where the pressure is greatest—the question of how far to go.
The history here is instructive, even if Washington prefers not to consult it. Israel has long operated on the premise that its strategic requirements should, by right of alliance and shared values, become American strategic requirements. This conflation has served Israel well. It has served American interests far more ambiguously.
Think back to the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, where the elimination of Saddam Hussein was enthusiastically championed by voices closely aligned with Israeli security priorities. The argument then, as now, was that American power would be wielded to reshape a hostile regional order, producing security dividends that both allies could bank. What followed was a two-decade hemorrhage of American credibility, resources, and strategic attention—and an Iran dramatically strengthened by the removal of its principal Arab rival.
The lesson was available to be learned. It largely wasn’t.
There is also the question of regional ownership. Israel’s neighborhood is, self-evidently, Israel’s primary concern. The Gulf states, the Levant, the nuclear shadow over Jerusalem—these are the coordinates of Israeli strategic thought, as they should be. American interests, by contrast, are global. A military campaign that degrades Iranian capabilities but ignites a regional war, closes the Strait of Hormuz, draws Hezbollah rockets into a generalized conflagration, and requires a greatly expanded and indefinite American garrison in the Gulf might satisfy certain Israeli criteria for success while representing a serious strategic setback for the United States.
The asymmetry matters. Israel, a small state with a focused threat environment, can afford to optimize for one outcome. The United States, as a global power with commitments from the South China Sea to Eastern Europe to its own backyard in the Western Hemisphere, cannot.
None of this is an argument for American indifference to Iranian nuclear ambitions. A nuclear-armed Iran would be genuinely destabilizing, and the United States has legitimate reasons to prevent it. But “preventing Iranian nuclear weapons” and “prosecuting Israeli strategic objectives in the region” are related propositions, not identical ones.
The uncomfortable truth that Washington’s foreign policy establishment reflexively avoids is this: alliances require the honest management of divergent interests, not their ritual denial. Pretending that American and Israeli interests are perfectly aligned doesn’t strengthen the alliance. It distorts American decision-making, insulates Israeli policy from legitimate scrutiny, and ultimately—when the divergence becomes impossible to ignore—produces the kind of strategic confusion that gets people killed.
A serious American foreign policy would say clearly, “We support Israel’s right to defend itself, we share its concern about Iranian nuclear capability, and we will coordinate on a strategy that serves both our interests.” Fulfilling this objective does not mean that the United States should simply hand over the wheel on decisions that carry consequences for American soldiers, American consumers, and America’s position in the world.
That conversation has not happened with sufficient honesty. Until it does, Washington will continue drifting into commitments shaped more by Jerusalem’s threat perception than by any coherent assessment of American national interests.
About the Author: Leon Hadar
Dr. Leon Hadar , a contributing editor with The National Interest, is a former senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and a former research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He has taught international relations, Middle East politics, and communication at American University in Washington, DC, and the University of Maryland, College Park. A columnist and blogger with Haaretz(Israel) and Washington correspondent for The Business Times of Singapore, he is a former United Nations bureau chief for The Jerusalem Post.
FP Why Europe’s Approach to Defending Democracy Is Failing - Bromides about the “center holding” miss the point.- March 13, 2026, 12:01 AM - By Richard Youngs, co-founder of the European Democracy Hub at Carnegie Europe.
FP
Why Europe’s Approach to Defending Democracy Is Failing
Bromides about the “center holding” miss the point.
March 13, 2026, 12:01 AM
By Richard Youngs, co-founder of the European Democracy Hub at Carnegie Europe.
A hand with an EU cufflink is drowning in a tidal pool created by the circular EU Parliament logo.
Sara Gironi Carnevale illustration for Foreign Policy
European democracy is being battered by multiple storms. Far-right parties are surging across the continent, authoritarian powers are menacing the democratic information space, and mainstream governments seem incapable of quelling popular frustration. And the European Union must now also contend with the perplexing oddity of a U.S. administration that is painting its democratic governments as the main global threat to democracy. The United States’ 2025 National Security Strategy unnervingly defended the illiberal parties that most clearly menace democracy, and going into 2026, the Trump administration has become even more unchained in its voracious provocations against Europe’s liberal order.
This roiling sea of troubles has sparked intense political debate about what is needed to make European democracy more resilient. Even if overall levels of democracy in Europe have not worsened significantly over the last decade (Hungary being the one case of clear autocratization), the prospect of a more dramatic democratic collapse in the future is real.
As problems pile up, the EU and individual governments have begun to explore policies to shore up the continent’s increasingly precarious democratic norms and institutions. The European Centre for Democratic Resilience was launched in February, and most European governments have introduced national strategies to defend democracy, as well.
These policy responses have been slow to take shape over the last decade but are now gaining momentum and coming to dominate EU policy agendas. However, emerging European strategies misunderstand what is needed for effective democratic resilience, and their impact is likely to be harmful in many important ways. Europe’s democratic defense policies must not only counter threats coming from autocratic powers and radical right movements, but they must also work to reform and upgrade how democracy itself functions.
Hundreds of people with U.K. and English flags throng in a street beneath gray clouds during a protest. About a dozen have climbed a a statue of a lion, and they wave their flags in the air on top of it.
Protesters during a far-right “Unite The Kingdom” rally in London on Sept. 13, 2025.Christopher Furlong/Getty Images
The unsettling impact of anti-democratic influences has been particularly felt in the online information space, and it is there where European policies have strengthened most significantly. European governments have tightened their focus on foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations. The Centre for Democratic Resilience has a remit that focuses primarily on this issue, and the same is true of national governments’ democracy initiatives—the United Kingdom’s Defending Democracy Taskforce and its recently announced military intelligence body are prominent examples. European countries face the double-whammy challenge of protecting a democratic information space from Russian and Chinese intrusions while also fending off the spiraling U.S. assault on the EU’s digital rules.
However, democratic resilience strategies need to focus on other problems to at least the same intensity. European democracy cannot be comprehensively defended through formal standards and exchanges on best practices for online election standards or internet laws—which is what passes for most democracy strategy at present.
Neither can it be improved simply by asserting tough European autonomy from the United States and other powers, however necessary it might be for other reasons. Due to the geopolitical context, much debate has atrophied into calls for European autonomy. But this line does not help in determining how Europe should use such independence to revive its democracy.
That’s because efforts to control specific types of information manipulation address the symptoms rather than the underlying distortions of information ecosystems. Online controls are necessary, but they cannot tackle the root causes of why certain information flows carry disproportionate and unaccountable power and why citizens are so susceptible to such distorted accounts. If malign online influences have gained traction, then that is a result of democratic corrosion as much as the cause—the very opposite of the logic that is hardwired into current European approaches.
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The EU’s regulatory-oriented pathway amounts to what might be termed “resilience without politics.” It needs to give way to a much more political approach to democratic resistance. Current European approaches downplay the essentially political issues that need addressing if democracy is to work better for all citizens. Properly understood, democratic resilience is not a matter of simply rebuffing threats—whether from Russia, China, or the United States—but about improving democratic practices through qualitative political renewal.
Much of Europe’s democratic malaise is endogenous to democracy, not external.
At root, European democracies are so brittle because of their governments’ own nefarious dysfunctionalities and the structural power imbalances that sustain them. On this score, the EU has registered little progress and even exhibits a certain resistance to contemplating the ambitious change that is needed.
Many emerging policies center on mitigating polarization as the main dynamic that has corroded European democracy. Leaders’ speeches tend to suggest that saving democracy is a matter of rebuilding consensus and “the center holding.” Yet, again, this kind of bromide unduly depoliticizes democratic resilience. While the anti-democratic impact of extremist parties clearly needs to be contained, democracy protection cannot be reduced to consensual centrism. If anything, it requires more open and critical politics.
Polarization germinates in political systems’ failure to prevent a wide enough range of policy options that are fully responsive to citizens’ concerns. This was clear during the eurozone crisis when rival parties offered relatively similar economic templates and new governments often assumed power with negligible change to substantive policies.
Effective democratic resilience ultimately requires a revived spirit of contestation and pluralism. And this needs to be facilitated and supported through very specific and tailored political measures.
As much of the threat to European democracy comes from challenger political parties, EU resilience strategies need to help revive and reshape party systems. However, virtually no European effort or funding goes to this issue. Resilience is a not just a matter of containing radical right parties but of more deeply changing the way that parties interact with citizens and the way that they decide their manifestos and crafting less hierarchical forms of party organization. The same is true of parliaments: They have lost leverage in most European states, but EU policy offers little to redress this trend.
Democracy strategies also need to be aware of the ways in which societies are mobilizing to protest against illiberal regimes and threats. But the EU has refrained from offering unequivocal support to protests in member states like Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, and Slovakia or in candidate states like Serbia and Georgia. Indeed, the EU has generally been ambivalent over these revolts and tends to call blandly for even-handed restraint from regimes and protestors in such cases.
A small group of demonstrators stand on a street at night, with two of them holding a sign with the EU flag logo and the word "Help" at the center of its yellow stars.
A demonstration against the state television network in Budapest, Hungary, on Nov. 4, 2022.Attila Kisbenedek/AFP via Getty Images
This leaves a curious disjuncture. The EU rightly bears down on Russian and Chinese FIMI operations—and indeed those increasingly coming from U.S. illiberal networks—that are designed to turn people against democracy. But when there is ample evidence on the streets that European citizens do believe in democracy and are acting in its name, they get little support from the EU itself. Indeed, national governments have even sought to curtail such popular mobilization in the last several years. This betrays European governments’ tendency to conceive democracy in technocratic terms—as a system to be carefully guided and managed—and to downplay the catalytic role of citizen-led, pluralistic contestation.
The European level of politics also needs to be considered: A pressing source of citizens’ disenfranchisement comes from the transfer of powers from the national to the EU level without commensurate democratic accountability. This structural feature of European integration is as much of a challenge as Russian or MAGA online manipulation. This does not mean slowing or undoing EU integration—indeed, deeper cooperation between governments is clearly essential to defending democracy, and Europeans need to push back more firmly against the Trump administration’s declared hostility to the EU’s very existence. But democratic resilience does require the European project to democratize itself.
The current European framing of democratic resilience almost willfully ignores this factor. The EU and its member states talk ritually about the need to engage citizens but do relatively little to follow through on this. The European Commission and some member states now run citizen panels and assemblies, but the need goes well beyond these valuable initiatives and requires a sweeping effort at more inclusive democracy across many levels and actors. Citizens, community groups, and the many civic organizations working on democratic renewal need tangible influence over policies through processes institutionalized in formal EU decision-making, which is well beyond the cosmetic and heavily curated civil society forums that currently exist. The EU should more wholeheartedly back innovative means of transnational citizen engagement—like pan-European democracy movements and assemblies—that differ from the nation-state template of representative democracy.
An emerging position in EU debates is that liberals need to “fight fire with fire” through hardball tactics against illiberal forces—and especially those driven by U.S.-led MAGA networks. That is, they need to move from defense to offense. Examples include emerging legal actions in several European states, particularly Germany and France, against far-right parties and politicians. Across Europe, there are growing calls for liberal lawfare against illiberal lawfare, tactics to weaken illiberal groups in the same way that illiberal regimes now restrict liberal civil society, and other such confrontational moves.
The EU must strike a balance here. While democratic resilience strategies certainly need to be more assertive against the radical right, they should be cautious in using laws and institutional processes to engineer highly instrumental outcomes. European liberals must not conflate defending democracy with defending their own position against illiberal challengers. Even if the Trump administration’s charges against Europe’s supposedly undemocratic liberalism and free speech restrictions are clearly disingenuous, European democracy strategies do need to speak much more directly to this thorny question. Policies need to clearly define red lines that should not be crossed in the use of illiberal means to defend liberal politics. Democracy’s long-term prospects will suffer if many feel that legal actions against illiberals infringe on due process or that civil society funding rules are biased.
Ursula von der Leyen and leaders from Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia, Portugal, Belgium, and Luxemborg stand around in an otherwise empty meeting room, chatting. Some of them lean against a nearby desk.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (center) stands surrounded by leaders from Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia, Portugal, Belgium, and Luxemborg at an EU Council Informal Leaders’ Meeting in Brussels on June 17, 2024. Pier Marco Tacca/Getty Images
In all this, European responses are still moving too slowly and hesitantly. The Centre for Democratic Resilience is immersed in much technical preparatory work. European countries have been suffering democratic erosion for nearly 20 years. The EU needed a strategy for democratic resilience many years ago. If effective resilience is in part preemptive, then this tardiness augurs ill for future European strategy.
Combined, this all points to the need for a full-spectrum democratic resilience that can turn the tide against the radical right’s disquieting political illiberalism. For now, European attempts at democratic resilience are planted in shallow soil. The shock of U.S. President Donald Trump’s illiberal onslaught catalyzed some modest new EU democracy commitments in 2025, within and beyond Europe. However, much stronger political commitment, boldness, and innovation will be needed if these are to grow into a sturdier approach to defending and deepening European democracy. And this is not a parochial matter: Europe’s experience in democratic resilience will inform and condition efforts in other regions to push back against this era’s illiberal tide.
Richard Youngs is co-founder of the European Democracy Hub at Carnegie Europe.
POLITICO - Germany’s Merz turns against Trump over war in Iran - March 13, 2026 7:38 pm CET By James Angelos and Nette Nöstlinger
POLITICO
Germany’s Merz turns against Trump over war in Iran
Last week, the chancellor told the U.S. president he was fully aligned on toppling the regime in Tehran. But his tone on the war is now souring sharply.
On Friday, during a visit to Norway, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz struck his most critical tone to date. | John MacDougall/AFP via Getty Images
Yazar: Murat Yetkin / 14 Mart 2026, Cumartesi - Özel: İmamoğlu Tahliye Edilmeli, Korkuyorlarsa Ev Hapsi Versinler
Özel: İmamoğlu Tahliye Edilmeli, Korkuyorlarsa Ev Hapsi Versinler
CHP lideri Özel’den sürpriz çıkış: İmamoğlu ve arkadaşlarımız tahliye edilmeli. İmamoğlu’nun sokağa çıkmasından korkuyorlarsa ev hapsi versinler.(Foto: CHP)
CHP lideri Özgür Özel, başta Ekrem İmamoğlu olmak üzere İBB davalarından yargılanan bütün arkadaşlarının tahliye edilerek tutuksuz yargılanması gerektiğini söyleyerek, “Eğer Ekrem Bey’in sokak performansından korkuyorlarsa, en azından ev hapsi versinler” dedi. YetkinReport’un sorularını yanıtlayan CHP lideri, “Tutuklulukların uzamasıyla Ekrem Bey’i sevenlerde öfke biriktiği gibi, iktidardakiler de bu kadar uzun tutukluluğu savunamaz hale geldiler” diye konuştu.
“İç cephe tahkimi, ateş çemberi, siyasi kutuplaşma” diyorlar. “Tahliyeler siyasi tansiyonu düşürür,” diyen Özel, İmamoğlu ve arkadaşlarının tahliyesinin Terörsüz Türkiye’ye kamuoyu desteği bakımından da yardımcı olacağını öne sürdü. Mahkemenin Nisan başı ve sonunda yapacağı tutukluluk değerlendirmelerine dikkat çeken Özel, sorgusu yapılan İBB davasından tutuklu arkadaşlarının tahliyelerinin başlamasıyla Borsanın rekor kıracağını, Türkiye’nin risk priminin düşeceğini de iddia etti.
19 Mart’a Bir Hafta Kala
İmamoğlu’nun gözaltına alındığı 19 Mart 2025’in yıldönümüne bir hafta kala, bir yandan İBB’nin merkezinin bulunduğu Saraçhane’de bir protesto mitingi hazırlığı içindeki Özel’in, özellikle de “ev hapsi” formülü konusundaki sözleri hem Meclis siyasetinde hem de CHP içinde yankılanmaya aday. Siyaseten karşılık bulursa, gerçekten de siyasi “iklimi değiştirip” son olarak ABD ve İsrail’in İran’a saldırmasıyla etrafı savaşlarla çevrilen Türkiye’de iç siyasi gerilimleri azaltma ihtimali var.
Özel’in sorularımıza verdiği yanıtlar şöyle:
– 11 Mart akşamı Pendik mitinginizde “Tutuksuz yargılama bu ülkede tansiyon düşürür” dediniz; “Bu milletin en çok meşgul edildiği konu, arkadaşlarımızın uğradığı iftiralardır” diye eklediniz. Ekrem İmamoğlu ve CHP’li belediyelerin davaları tutuklu kalmadan devam ederse bu siyasi gerilimi nasıl düşürecek? Ne demek istediniz?
– Bir yandan hem Erdoğan hem Bahçeli hem de iktidardan yana yorumcular, efendim, iç cephe tahkimi, etrafımız ateş çemberiyken siyasi kutuplaşmanın Türkiye’yi zorda bırakacağını filan söyleyip bizi suçluyorlar.
“Amaç İmamoğlu’nu Siyaseten Yok Etmek”
– Önceki gün Cumhurbaşkanı Tayyip Erdoğan’ın “selden kütük kapma” ve “Ankara merkezli siyaset” gibi eleştirilerini mi kast ediyorsunuz?
– Evet. Benzer sözleri Bahçeli’den de duyuyoruz.
Bir yandan da partimiz CHP’nin şimdiye dek en önemli çıkışlarından birini yapmış, Erdoğan’a hiç yenilmemiş ve cumhurbaşkanı adaylığını ilan etmiş siyasetçisi tutuklu yargılanıyor, hapiste. Ve var güçleriyle kendisine, ailesine, yakın siyaset arkadaşlarına, toplantılarını düzenleyen özel kalem müdüründen aracını kullanan şoförüne, korumasına dek sert bir saldırı var; çoğu tutuklu.
İmamoğlu’nu siyaseten yok etme, İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi’ni de felç etmek, hizmet üretemez hale getirmek amaçlanıyor.
Şimdi dava başladı. İmamoğlu ve arkadaşları gözaltına alındıktan neredeyse bir yıl sonra hâkim karşısına çıkarıldılar.
Tutuksuz Yargılamada Nisan Eşiği
– Duruşmalar da gergin geçiyor. Tahliye imkânı görüyor musunuz?
– Mahkeme, Nisan başında tutukluluk incelemesi, Nisan sonunda da ara karar ve yine tutukluluk incelemesi yapacağını söyledi.
İç cephe güçlensin, siyasi tansiyon düşsün diyenlere şunu sorayım: tutukluk incelemesinin bayramdan önce yapılmasında, bırakılacağı belli olanların bir bayram daha içeride tutulmasında ne yarar var? Ama yapmayacakları anlaşılıyor
Oysa yapılacak tutukluluk incelemesinde, sorguları yapılan arkadaşların tutuksuz yargılanması kararı çıkarsa, bu siyasi iklimi değiştirebilir, tansiyonu düşürür.
Kimse ‘Beni yargılamayın’ demiyor ki… Adil ve şeffaf yargılama istiyor ve en önemli hakkı olduğu şekilde “Beni tutuksuz yargılayın,” diyor. Çünkü tutuklu yargılama koşulları artık ortadan kalktı.
Tutuksuz yargılama başladığında tansiyon kendiliğinden düşer. Tutuksuz yargılananlar mahkemeye sadece kendilerini ilgilendiren duruşmada gelir. Tutuklu her arkadaşın avukatları, yakınları, parti örgütü filan, herkes her duruşmaya yığılmaz; bu kalabalık olmaz mesela.
Tepkimiz Yargılanmaya Değil
– Siyasi gerilim ilk olarak duruşma salonundan başlar mı diyorsunuz?
– Tepkimiz yargılamaya değil, gereksiz yere tutuklu yargılamaya. Bir de yok gizli tanık, itirafçı kaynaklı iddiaların iftiraların mutlak gerçeklermiş, hatta kesinleşmiş hâkim kararıymış gibi yansıtılmasında.
“Ahtapot” ve saire söylemler, önce iddianamede yer alsa ve sonra bunu Cumhurbaşkanı, Adalet Bakanı söylemiş olsa, beis yok; siyaset dilidir deriz.
Ama önce bu ifadeleri Erdoğan kullanıp ardından iddianamede görünce savcının iddiası siyasete konu olmuyor siyasetçinin söylemi savcı tarafından iddianameyi derç ediliyor. Hele hele gizli yürütülen bir soruşturmada.
Erdoğan ve Akın gürlek biri siyaseten biri de iddianamede aynı ifadeyi kullanarak birbirlerini ihbar etmiş oldular tepkimiz bunadır.
İmamoğlu’na Ev Hapsi Formülü
– İktidar kulislerinde “Tahliye olursa İmamoğlu da çıkar otobüsün üstüne” gibi, “Zafer kazandık derler, sonra bir daha alamayız” gibi söylemler de duyuluyor. Size de geliyordur. Buna ne diyorsunuz?
– Evet, geliyor. Ama zaten buradan da davanın siyasi olduğu belli.
Bir insanın tutukluluğunun gerekçesi ‘serbest kalırsa siyasi kampanya yapar’ olabilir mi?
Hadi onların hukuk tanımaz zeminine ben de ineyim, onlar gibi düşüneyim: eğer Ekrem Bey’den çok korkuyorlarsa, sokak performansından çok korkuyorlarsa hiç değilse ev hapsi versinler.
Tahliyeler Ekonomiye de İyi Gelir
– Çok ilginç bir şey söylediniz. Peki, Ekrem Bey ne diyecek bu ev hapsi formülünüze? İkinci duruşmada “Derdiniz benimle, arkadaşlarımı bırakın, beni yargılayın” demişti.
– Ekrem Bey’in hemen özgürlüğünü istemesi kadar doğal bir şey yok. Ancak inanıyorum ki o da bunu kabul eder. Biz bütün arkadaşlarımızın tutuksuz yargılanmasını istiyoruz, tabii Ekrem Bey’in de. Madem ki sokağa çıkar diye korkuyorlar, ev hapsi versinler. Hiç değilse yüksek güvenlikli cezaevinde, tecrit ortamındaki işkence son bulur.
Tutuklulukların uzamasıyla Ekrem Bey’i sevenlerde öfke biriktiği gibi, iktidardakiler de bu kadar uzun tutukluluğu savunamaz hale geldiler.
Tahliyeler genel olarak tansiyonu düşürür. Bu, ailelere de iyi gelir, bize de iyi gelir ve aslında iktidar farkında değil ama Türkiye’ye de iyi gelir.
Ben inanıyorum ki Ekrem Bey ve arkadaşlarının tahliyesiyle Borsa rekorlar kırar, Türkiye’nin risk primi düşer, tüm dünyadan olumlu yankılar gelir.
İç Cepheyi Tahkim Meselesi
– İç cephenin tahkimi konusuna dönersek, Terörsüz Türkiye süreci önümüzde. Böyle bir tansiyon düşmesinin ona etkisi nasıl olur?
– Terörsüz Türkiye süreci Meclis’ten geçti. Orada parti gruplarının, milletvekillerinin desteği önemliydi. Bundan sonra kamuoyu desteği önemli.
Bakın ben sokakta rakiplerinin beş katı halkla temas eden bir parti genel başkanıyım. Muhalefetin en önemli isimlerinden birisinin hapiste tutulduğu bir süreçte, Terörsüz Türkiye alanında atılacak bazı adımların tartışmaya yol açmasından endişe duyarım.
Geçenlerde Karaman mitingimizde, konuşma öncesinde yaşlıca bir vatandaş yanıma geldi. Terörsüz Türkiye’yle terör örgütü üyeleri serbest kalırken bizim Ekrem içeride mi kalacak? Bunu da söyle dedi.
Sonuçta bir Terörsüz Türkiye sürecinde üzerinize düşeni yaptık, yapıyoruz; Karaman’daki amcayı da ikna etmek lazım.
Yine Patriotlara Muhtaç Olduk
– Cumhurbaşkanının selden kütük kapma suçlamasına ne diyorsunuz?
– Bunu Erdoğan söylüyor. Dış politikada bazı hatalar yapıldı. Rus uçağının düşürülmesi, önce gerilim, sonra barışma stratejisiyle S-400’ler alındı. ABD’da CAATSA’ kapsamına alındık, üreticisi olduğumuz F-35’ten dışlandık. Üretimini yaptığımız F-16’ları modernize edemez hale geldik. Şimdi başkalarından Eurofighter bekliyoruz. Ümidimiz KAAN’da, destekliyoruz. Ama S-400’leri kullanamıyoruz. İran füzelerinde görüldü. Yine Patriotlara muhtaç olduk.
Zafiyet benim bunları söylememde değil ki, Türkiye’nin savunmasını bu hale getirenlerde.
Şehirde elektrik kesilmiş, ben elektrik kesildi deyince keseni değil beni suçluyorlar.
S-400’ler neden kullanılmadı diye sormamıza kızıyor, F-35’te özeleştiri yapacaklarına bizi eleştiriyorlar.
Güçlü hava savunma sistemi olan firkateynler yapılmalı dedik. Yapılsaydı, şimdi Kıbrıs’ın önüne çekerdik. Bunu hazır etmemek mi suç, dile getirmek mi?
Tamam biz selden kütük kapmayalım da bizim kütükler niye suya kapılmış bunu da sormayalım mı?
POLITICO - Europe flails as US launches critical minerals land grab - March 11, 2026 6:00 am CET By Carlo Martuscelli, Frida Preuß and Jacopo Barigazzi
POLITICO
Europe flails as US launches critical minerals land grab
A joint initiative to break dependence on China could result in Europe overpaying to ensure security of supply for the Americans.
As the two sides find some common ground after a rocky period culminating in Donald Trump’s threats at the turn of the year to annex Greenland — an agreement risks cementing an unequal partnership dominated by Washington. | Ina Fassbender/AFP via Getty Images
Talk shop
The two sides have been in negotiations since Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted a high-level ministerial meeting on Feb. 4 in Washington to launch a critical minerals alliance spanning more than 50 countries.
At the meeting, Rubio warned that the minerals were “heavily concentrated in the hands of one country” and had become a “tool of leverage in geopolitics.” He was referring to China, which last October forced Trump to back down on a massive tariff package by threatening to throttle exports of critical minerals.
During Industry Commissioner Stéphane Séjourné’s trip to Washington, the two sides announced they would sign a memorandum of understanding on critical raw materials within 30 days. By working together they could avoid bidding up prices, while creating a bigger, more secure market for non-Chinese sellers.
So far, no deal has materialized, but European Commission spokesperson Siobhan McGarry said that “discussions are well advanced.”
U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said during the February meeting that Washington might try to establish price floors for critical minerals with friendly countries. The idea would be to ensure that Chinese firms, backed by the state, couldn’t undercut Western producers and drive them out of business.
A Commission official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Brussels was looking at that option, but that any price floor would have to be carefully targeted — and was outside the scope of the memorandum regardless.
The U.S. Export-Import Bank last October announced $2.2 billion in potential investment in critical minerals projects in Australia. In November, U.S. firm Cove Capital entered into a joint venture with Kazakhstan’s Tau-Ken Samruk for a tungsten mine — again with U.S. government backing.
Congolese state miner Gécamines then said it would ship 100,000 metric tons of copper to the U.S. market, based on a minerals partnership agreement signed between the two countries.
Speaking to POLITICO after the Munich Security Conference last month, DRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner said Europe was welcome to participate in her country’s resources — but had yet to fully engage.
“We’re happy to work with different partners, different investors, including the European Union. So, the fact that we have signed an agreement with the U.S. doesn’t mean that it’s only going to be the U.S. and no one else,” Kayikwamba Wagner said.
But “we have yet to see massive mobilization from the European Union ... as we’ve seen from other countries.” She added the EU “is still beyond the U.S. and China.”
Show me the money
There is also a financial disparity. The Trump administration’s $12 billion critical minerals stockpiling initiative dwarfs the EU’s €3 billion plan.
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