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Thursday, May 7, 2026
EURACTIV - The Brief your daly wrap-up - 6 may 2026 - Ursula von der Leyen’s ‘wolf warrior‘ press brigade (Ursula von der Leyen'in basınla ilişkileri hk. eleştiri)
Wednesday, May 6, 2026
EURONEWS Health Health news - Hantavirus outbreak: Medical aircraft travelling to the Netherlands with all infected patients - By Rafael Salido & Maria Muñoz Morillo Published on 06/05/2026 - 9:58 GMT+2•Updated 19:08
EURONEWS
Hantavirus outbreak: Medical aircraft travelling to the Netherlands with all infected patients
All those infected with hantavirus from the MV Hondius cruise ship are being evacuated from Cabo Verde to the Netherlands aboard medical aircraft.
Three patients with suspected hantavirus from the cruise ship MV Hondius are being evacuated to the Netherlands, as international authorities respond to an outbreak on board.
The head of the World Health Organization (WHO), Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, said the patients are already on their way. “At this stage, the overall public health risk remains low,” he wrote on his X account.
Among those evacuated is the ship’s doctor, Spain’s health ministry said. The ministry added that the doctor, who had initially been due to be flown to the Canary Islands in serious condition, is now being transported directly to the Netherlands "after his health had improved."
The Hondius, which departed from Argentina, is currently in the waters of Cape Verde, where it diverted after several cases of hantavirus were detected during its Atlantic crossing.
As of 6 May, the WHO has identified eight cases of passengers from the vessel, including three deaths, one critically ill patient, and three individuals reporting mild symptoms.
According to the international agency, the first symptoms appeared between 6 and 28 April and were characterised by fever and gastrointestinal disorders, with a rapid progression in some cases to pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, and shock.
The remaining passengers, who show no symptoms, are scheduled to disembark this Saturday in Tenerife, where the European evacuation and repatriation mechanism will be activated. The vessel will dock at the port of Granadilla de Abona, from where foreign travelers will return to their home countries and the 14 Spanish nationals will be transferred to Madrid.
Apart from those with symptoms, the remaining passengers and crew will be examined and treated according to a common protocol developed by the WHO and the ECDC, once the ship arrives in the archipelago in an estimated three to four days.
This procedure includes specific health and transport circuits, "avoiding all contact with the local population and guaranteeing the safety of health personnel at all times", according to an official statement from the Ministry of Health.
The government has stressed that it will provide timely information on the details of the protocol and its implementation. The operation also includes the subsequent repatriation of passengers and crew members to their countries of origin, including several Spanish citizens, once the medical and epidemiological evaluations have been completed.
Tracking of a hantavirus-contacted flight
The WHO is tracing more than 80 passengers following a case of hantavirus on a flightto Johannesburg that included a woman who subsequently died from hantavirus. The victim, a Dutch national, had previously been evacuated from the island of St Helena after developing symptoms.
The international health agency confirmed that the 69-year-old woman was flown on 25 April on a plane operated by Airlink, carrying 82 passengers and six crew members. She died the next day in hospital, her infection with the virus was confirmed days later.
How is hantavirus transmitted?
Hantavirus is a group of viruses carried by rodents and transmitted to humans mainly by inhalation of particles from dried droppings, urine, or saliva. The risk increases when these materials are stirred up and become airborne or by direct contact with infected animals.
Infection can lead to hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, which starts with symptoms such as fever, headache, muscle aches, dizziness, chills, and gastrointestinal disorders. In later stages, it can progress to severe respiratory distress and hypotension, making severe cases a medical emergency.
The incubation period is usually between two and four weeks after exposure, but can range from one week to eight weeks.
There is no specific treatment and the virus can occur in different variants, with the American variant being the most severe. Human-to-human transmission is very rare and, when it has been described, requires very close and prolonged contact.
U.S. DEPARTMENT of STATE - Reaffirming the United States’ Commitment to Humanitarian Assistance in our Hemisphere 05/06/2026 12:39 PM EDT
CHATHAM HOUSE How the Iran war is reshaping Saudi strategy: From Hormuz and Houthis to the UAE’s OPEC exit The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has revealed a key threat to Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 strategy and plans for economic transformation. Expert comment Published 1 May 2026 Updated 5 May 2026
CHATHAM HOUSE
How the Iran war is reshaping Saudi strategy: From Hormuz and Houthis to the UAE’s OPEC exit
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has revealed a key threat to Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 strategy and plans for economic transformation.
Expert comment
Published 1 May 2026
Updated 5 May 2026 —
4 minute READ
Image — Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman during a meeting with US President Donald Trump (not pictured) in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC on 18 November 2025. Photo: BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP via Getty Images.
Dr Neil Quilliam
Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
The US–Israel war against Iran has presented many challenges for Saudi Arabia, including the Strait of Hormuz closure, a deepening rift with the UAE, and the latter’s exit from the oil cartel OPEC. The war has also given Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, pause for thought.
Before MBS, Saudi policy was slow and consensus driven – and largely predictable. The crown prince energized the domestic environment and pursued a far more assertive and, at times, unpredictable foreign policy that got Saudi Arabia into hot water.
However, the Iran war has once again slowed the kingdom’s decision making process as the leadership reassesses its long-term strategy. It is acutely aware that whatever the outcome of the conflict, it will determine the region’s future for at least the next two decades.
How to keep the Strait of Hormuz open in the long term
Unsurprisingly, Saudi Arabia’s reassessment now centres on the Strait of Hormuz, through which most of its oil exports and other goods pass. Although the kingdom has long recognized its exposure to disruption at this chokepoint, a sustained closure was historically viewed as highly unlikely. The closure has revealed a key vulnerability not only for trade, but also for the success of the country’s Vision 2030 strategy.
Now that Hormuz has been closed once, there will always be the risk that it could happen again. This poses a long term threat to Saudi Arabia’s trade flows and economic transformation plans. Repeated or prolonged disruption would weigh on revenues, investor confidence, and the kingdom’s ability to present itself as a stable hub for trade, logistics and finance. The ambitions of Vision 2030 and its successor frameworks depend on predictable energy – and revenue – flows and a secure maritime environment.
Hence, the kingdom is beginning to reassess its economic geography, reducing its dependence on Hormuz and reorienting policy towards the Red Sea. Projects along Saudi Arabia’s western coastline, including ports, industrial zones and tourism developments, will now become key priorities. The country’s two coastlines give it a significant geographical advantage over its neighbours, which it will look to capitalize on to distinguish itself – especially from the UAE – as the region’s main export and logistics hub.
Its westward shift means the national oil company Saudi Aramco will need to reorient crude exports to the Red Sea or at least build capacity to convey 7 million barrels a day to match pre-war exports. It is currently transporting around 4 million barrels per day of crude by pipeline from east to west and exporting it via the Yanbu terminal on the Red Sea. While current exports are lower, Saudi Arabia is in a stronger position than many of its Gulf neighbours, whose exports remain locked into the Gulf. With oil prices at around $120 per barrel, roughly double pre war levels, Riyadh retains a degree of financial resilience.
However, significant long-term investment will be needed in infrastructure that allows goods – especially oil – to move between the Red Sea and major urban centres across the Gulf if Saudi Arabia is to establish itself as a regional trading hub. Longer timelines and higher costs will be unavoidable, but the structural nature of the Hormuz problem leaves Saudi Arabia with little choice.
But rerouting away from Hormuz will not eliminate risk, only relocate it. Attacks on Red Sea shipping by the Iran-aligned Houthis show that maritime insecurity will become a central constraint on Saudi Arabia’s westward reorientation, not a secondary concern.
Iran and Gaza conflicts teach Gulf states a hard-power lesson
The threat of maritime insecurity to its Red Sea ambitions helps explain Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to engage directly in the war against Iran and its lobbying against further escalation. The leadership recognizes that a kinetic response to Iranian strikes would not only increase risks to its energy assets and critical infrastructure but could also draw the Houthis more directly into the conflict. That, in turn, would place Saudi Arabia’s alternative export routes under threat, undermining its essential diversification away from Hormuz.
This also helps explain the different positions taken by Saudi Arabia and the UAE towards the war, and the growing tensions between them. Abu Dhabi has taken a strong line against Iran, with a position much closer to the US and Israel than to its Gulf neighbours. Senior Emirati officials have criticized both the Iranian leadership for striking targets on UAE soil and regional partners for failing to respond more forcefully or show greater support.
Saudi Arabia has come to view Israel and its actions as a threat to regional security and therefore sees the UAE’s alignment with it in a poor light. As a result, the UAE’s posture has become a growing source of frustration for Riyadh. Abu Dhabi’s decision to leave OPEC, though not wholly unexpected, is another blow for the kingdom. Although Saudi Arabia will still be the dominant player in OPEC, it will be the only major producer with significant spare capacity and may be forced to cut its production and exports in the future to compensate for increases by the UAE.
Most importantly, their competition for influence in the Red Sea is set to sharpen. Control over access, routes and security along the waterway will become increasingly central to Saudi Arabia’s economic and strategic calculations. Meanwhile, the UAE is building a strategic network of ports and military bases across the Red Sea and Horn of Africa to secure global trade routes and project economic influence.
A strategic rethink
The Saudi leadership is also using the war to reprioritize its spending under the cover of crisis. A re-evaluation of its mega projects was already underway pre-conflict and the war with Iran provides a justifiable reason to make further, significant changes to its investment strategy, without risking judgement of failure.
There is a renewed focus on domestic industries essential to its national development and economic security. Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund PIF has begun pulling back from high profile overseas commitments, including LIV Golf and its sponsorship and partnerships linked to the Metropolitan Opera in New York. It has also agreed the partial sale of a major stake in Al Hilal, one of the kingdom’s flagship football clubs. Three others – Al Nassr, Al Ahli and Al Ittihad – are up next. This signals a move towards more cautious spending and tighter capital discipline – and away from vanity projects.
MBS learned two painful lessons over the Saudi intervention in Yemen: one, there is a cost to impulsive decision-making; two, there is no such thing as a quick war. This might explain his reluctance to participate in the war against Iran or even cheerlead for it. Instead, Saudi Arabia has almost reverted to form, favouring caution, patience and long-term positioning over short-term gains.
Foreign Affairs The Iran War’s Threat to Turkey Even on the Sidelines, Ankara Faces Blowback Asli Aydintasbas April 27, 2026
Foreign Affairs
The Iran War’s Threat to Turkey
Even on the Sidelines, Ankara Faces Blowback
Asli Aydintasbas
April 27, 2026
ASLI AYDINTASBAS is a Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Director of its Turkey Project.
Turkey has tried its best to stay out of the Iran war, studiously maintaining its neutrality. In this effort, it can point to precedent from its own history. Generations of Turkish policymakers cite the high-stakes balancing act Ankara performed during World War II as one of the golden chapters of Turkish diplomacy. At the time, Turkey’s leaders were acutely aware of the young republic’s geopolitical isolation and military vulnerability—and determined not to repeat the error of their Ottoman predecessors, who picked the wrong side in the previous world war, bringing about the collapse of the empire. As war raged at its borders, Turkey negotiated with both the Allies and Germany, and its ultimate achievement was preserving its neutrality despite the pressure of surrounding belligerents.
The war in Iran has required a similar calculation. Unlike in the 1930s and 1940s, Turkey today has sought a larger role on the world stage. The fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at the hands of Turkish-backed militant groups and other factions in late 2024 seemed to leave Ankara confident that it was becoming a more influential regional power. But Turkey does not yet possess the economic or military muscle to shape events on its own terms. Its relationships with major players in the region are delicate at best; it is still in the early stages of a reset with the United States, and its relations with Israel have soured considerably in recent years. Turkey remains dependent on others to defend its territory, too. Its 2019 purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, which triggered U.S. sanctions and resulted in Turkey’s exclusion from critical NATO programs, made it harder for Turkey to maintain some of its sophisticated military hardware; it has not activated the S-400 system and lacks the air defense capabilities to shield itself fully from the Iranian ballistic missiles that began entering Turkish airspace in March. NATO interceptors, not Turkish weapons, took down the four Iranian missiles that targeted a NATO radar system and the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey, where U.S. forces are stationed.
Nonetheless, Turkey has been keen to stay out of the fray. It hasn’t supported the U.S.-Israeli campaign, as some Gulf Arab states have, and it has not allowed the United States or Israel to use its airspace for strikes against Iran. That is because Turkey has a complicated but stable relationship with Iran that spans centuries. Although Iran is a historic rival, Ankara never wanted this war to start and spent the first months of 2026 helping lead regional efforts to persuade Tehran and the Trump administration to give nuclear talks one more chance. After all, a war across the border in Iran could send refugees flooding into Turkey, disrupt the country’s economy, and roil its domestic politics.
But much to Turkey’s chagrin, the United States and Israel did end up attacking Iran. Ankara is now doing its best to avoid getting sucked into the war’s vortex. But its posture of neutrality is unlikely to insulate Turkey from the unfavorable outcomes of the war. The conflict threatens Ankara in several ways: it could upset the uneasy balance in its relationship with Tehran, disrupt the Kurdish peace process underway at home, and leave Israel, Turkey’s top strategic rival, more dominant in the region than before. Ankara cannot control the course of the war, but merely avoiding conflict is no longer its best means of advancing its interests in a volatile neighborhood. It need not enter the war, but it should move proactively in several areas to ensure that it emerges from the current maelstrom not just unscathed but also in a stronger position.
HISTORIC FRENEMIES
Turkey has long chosen to manage frictions with an assertive Iran rather than confront its neighbor. The relationship between the two countries is one of neither friendship nor outright enmity, but a kind of competitive coexistence. This dynamic predated the founding of the modern republics. For centuries, the Ottoman and Safavid empires—the former the historic seat of Sunni imperial power, the latter the preeminent Shiite polity—competed for regional influence. After more than a century of on-and-off warfare, they established a modus vivendi through the 1639 Qasr-e Shirin agreement, delineating a frontier along the Zagros Mountains and codifying an understanding that still shapes Iranian-Turkish relations: no direct war and no interference in each other’s internal affairs.
Today, Turkey and Iran mistrust each other deeply and have backed opposing camps in wars and political disputes in Iraq, Syria, and the South Caucasus. Yet unlike some of the United States’ Gulf partners, Turkey does not want to see a resounding Iranian defeat. Although it has long been concerned about Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and certainly does not want Iran to become stronger, Turkey also fears an Iran that splinters or falls into disorder. A shattered Iran could send refugees into Turkey, fuel calls for separatism among Kurdish groups across the region, and generally make Turkey’s eastern neighborhood far more combustible. That chaos is more dangerous in Ankara’s eyes than the survival of an antagonistic Iranian regime.
Turkey has thus been wary of supporting the war or getting involved in recent upheavals in Iran. When street protests shook Iran in January, Turkish leaders pointedly withheld criticism of the regime’s crackdown and did not publicly support the aspirations of the demonstrators. Once the war began at the end of February, Turkish officials urged the United States to find an off-ramp before the Iranian state imploded.
At this stage, Turkey is likely glad that its worst fear—state collapse in Iran—has not materialized. It will not be lamenting the battering of Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities, and proxy network under sustained U.S.-Israeli bombardment. But Ankara still has great reason for concern: the surviving regime of the Islamic Republic has hardened and moved further into the grip of the Revolutionary Guards, with even less room for clerical pragmatism and political flexibility than before.
What it would prefer at this stage is a stable but constrained Iran boxed in by a durable agreement of the sort Turkey has long favored—an arrangement closer in spirit and substance to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal than to U.S. President Donald Trump’s improvisational and inconsistent diplomacy—with verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear program and regional reach. Such an outcome would better serve Turkey’s own priorities: preventing renewed war, limiting Iranian influence in the Caucasus, and opening more space for trade through the South Caucasus and into Central Asia. Any gradual easing of sanctions on Tehran would also position Turkey as a leading trading partner for Iran and as the region’s economic powerhouse.
THE KURDISH FRONT
The war in Iran has also underscored the fragility of Ankara’s peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a militant group that fought a decades-long insurgency against the Turkish state. That process, which received a boost in 2025 after the imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan called for a cease-fire, would result in the eventual dissolution of the PKK. But it is hardly a sure thing, with Ankara slow-walking necessary legal reforms and the region in the grip of turbulence. All sides remain at the negotiating table to prevent renewed open-ended conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state. For Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, calm on the Kurdish front is also a political necessity: he has reached his constitutional term limit and needs the support of the pro-Kurdish party in parliament if he is to change the law to allow him to run again in Turkey’s next elections.
War on Turkey’s eastern border, however, could torpedo the entire endeavor. Ankara was alarmed when, soon after the initial U.S. and Israeli strikes, Trump briefly floated the idea of using Iranian Kurdish forces to help ignite an uprising inside Iran. Turkey saw that as a possible step toward Kurdish self-rule and a move that could drag U.S.-Turkish relations back to the period of bitter contention, roughly a decade ago, when Washington armed Syrian Kurdish forces linked to the PKK and dispatched U.S. troops to fight alongside them against the Islamic State in Syria. Behind closed doors, Turkish officials worried that any outside attempt to arm Iranian Kurds, including those with ties to the PKK, would make the entire movement less willing to lay down arms and strike a grand bargain with Turkey. A new U.S.-Kurdish alliance would encourage Kurds throughout the region to dream of independence, derailing the fragile peace track with the PKK and complicating the tricky process of integrating the Syrian Kurds into the new Syrian regime. In a nightmare scenario, it could lead to a U.S.-backed PKK statelet on Turkey’s border.
For the time being, those fears have abated. Trump backed away from the idea of opening a Kurdish front inside Iran. A senior Turkish official told me that “the Kurds have made a strategic choice” not to enter the war. A PKK affiliate in Iran that also happened to be the strongest Kurdish faction inside the country opted not to take up arms or accept U.S. and Israeli backing. Yet the episode still revealed Turkey’s vulnerability: forces beyond Ankara’s control can quickly reopen the Kurdish question. The only reliable hedge against that risk is a durable settlement with the PKK.
IMBALANCE OF POWER
Ankara is also worried about Israel’s expanding regional role and influence in Washington. Turkey and Israel were close partners in the 1990s and early 2000s, when they shared intelligence and conducted joint military exercises and when Turkey bought Israeli arms to upgrade its military. Now, they clash openly and increasingly see each other as threats. The war in Gaza, which Turkey opposed volubly, produced an undeniable rupture and led to the suspension of trade ties. But Turkey grew especially uneasy as Israel made repeated shows of force in Lebanon and in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime, establishing itself as a dominant military power in the region.
From Ankara’s perspective, Israel’s war against Iran is not an isolated military campaign but part of a broader effort to reshape the region by force. Many commentators and politicians in Turkey now see that strategy, at least in part, as an effort to encircle and contain Turkey. Israel has struck air bases in Syria that Turkey was considering for use. It has deepened defense cooperation with Greece and Cyprus in ways explicitly meant to challenge Turkey. Israeli commentators have also increasingly cast Turkey as a long-term threat, irking Turkish observers. Turkish officials fear that if the war ends with Israel stronger and emboldened and Iran badly weakened, Turkey could find itself encircled, with less room to shape the new order in Syria; less leverage in the eastern Mediterranean, where competition for hydrocarbons is heating up; and fewer ways to reboot relations with Washington.
All of this has left Erdogan in a difficult position. Ankara does not want Iran to dominate the region, but neither does it want a postwar order defined by Israeli preeminence and American unpredictability. Staying out of the war buys Turkey some time to use diplomacy to try to persuade Washington to commit to a negotiated settlement that would constrain Iran’s nuclear and missile programs without collapsing the Iranian state. Ankara is also trying to persuade the United States that Israel’s more assertive regional agenda in Syria and Lebanon is potentially inimical to U.S. interests and risks dragging the United States into longer-term conflicts. Turkey has backed the Pakistani mediation of negotiations between Iran and the United States.
Turkey and Israel have now established a communications channel in Syria, brokered by the United States, to reduce the risk of accidental clashes as both sides expand their military footprints there. But those talks are explicitly technical and don’t mark a step toward normalization. Under Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Erdogan, such a reset is highly unlikely, especially in an election year in Israel. Even if the Iran war subsides, the Israeli-Turkish rivalry will not. A longer-term strategic hostility will persist.
A THIRD FOUNDATIONAL WAR
In the past, the Turkish state has been redefined by major wars among great powers and their regional clients. World War I destroyed the Ottoman Empire, stripped it of much of its Middle Eastern territory, and gave birth to the modern Turkish republic. Turkish neutrality in World War II helped sustain an authoritarian government at home, but the war ultimately hitched Turkey to the victorious West, setting it on the path to membership in NATO and the transatlantic community. The latest war might prove similarly consequential: it could produce a regional order in which Turkey is either more secure or more exposed than before.
In this light, standing still could lead to disaster: to navigate the current period of turbulence, Ankara can’t just rely on tactical hedging. It may not be able to control regional turmoil, but it can minimize the risks to itself. First, it will need to advance the peace process with the Kurds, negotiations that have ramifications for conflict zones in Turkey as well as in Iraq and Syria. Settling the Kurdish issue will mean that no external conflict can reopen Turkey’s most dangerous internal fault line. Turkey’s parliament could begin by passing a long-debated law that would allow PKK members to lay down arms and return to Turkey. Ankara could widen the space for Kurds by allowing Ocalan to enter Turkish political life as a legitimate actor, devolving power and certain responsibilities to Kurdish municipalities, and releasing political prisoners. All of this would signal that the peace process will continue regardless of what happens in the region.
Turkey must also work to bring stability to places where it holds sway and perform diplomatic outreach where it can. It should do everything possible to help the governments of Iraq and Syria weather the current storms. In Syria, that means supporting the effort to reintegrate the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces into the new state, helping Damascus in postwar governance, and keeping open the communications channel with Israel so that Syria does not become the site of direct clashes between Turkish and Israeli forces. In Iraq, it means deepening security coordination with Baghdad against the Islamic State (or ISIS), competing with Iran for political influence in the country, and protecting the trade, energy, and transit routes that connect Turkey to the Gulf. A more stable Iraq and Syria would calm Turkey’s borderlands and strengthen Ankara’s hand in whatever postwar regional order emerges. Eventually, Ankara will need to open a dialogue with Israel to discuss regional security and negotiate the future of Syria.
Turkey’s worst fear is state collapse in Iran
Opening the border with Armenia can strengthen the so-called Middle Corridor through the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Such a move would reduce Ankara’s dependence on more volatile southern trade routes at a time of acute energy and shipping disruption in the region. Creating stability on its immediate borders can help make Turkey an important commercial hub and give it a greater stake in a postwar order defined by trade and connections, not permanent crisis.
Resolving Turkey’s remaining disputes with the United States would, in theory, also help by easing sanctions and reopening access to defense cooperation. The core disputes are well known: U.S. sanctions over Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Russia, particularly Turkey’s exclusion from the NATO F-35 fighter program, and the growing Turkish hostility toward Israel, a key U.S. ally. But given Trump’s penchant for making grand promises and then neglecting the sustained, painstaking work required to see them through, a full normalization with the United States may not be in the cards for the time being. The more prudent course would be for Turkey to lean more on NATO and Europe while bolstering its own air and missile defenses. In the long run, Turkey has no other option but to become self-reliant in defense industrial policy.
In short, Turkey needs a coherent strategy that will enable it to preserve domestic stability with the Kurds, secure its borders, and emerge as a hub for regional connectivity in energy and trade. This means maneuvering through the ups and downs of war and great-power rivalry—but not settling for better relations with Washington alone. Declaring neutrality in a conflict may seem the right decision for a country in Turkey’s position. But if Turkey is to emerge from a period of regional turmoil more secure rather than more vulnerable, it cannot remain entirely on the sidelines.
Topics & Regions: Turkey Israel Iran Diplomacy Geopolitics Foreign Policy Security War in Iran World War II
Yazar: Murat Yetkin / 05 Mayıs 2026, Salı - Bahçeli’nin “Öcalan Barış Süreci Koordinatörü olsun” önerisinin perde arkası
Bahçeli’nin “Öcalan Barış Süreci Koordinatörü olsun” önerisinin perde arkası
MHP lideri Bahçeli’nin PKK lideri Öcalan’ın “Barış Süreci
Koordinatörü” olması önerisi, Kandil’den yapılan açıklamayla
“eşzamanlı” görünüyor. (Foto: X/MHP)
MHP lideri Devlet Bahçeli, 5 Mayıs’ta TBMM Grubu’na hitabında, “terörsüz Türkiye” sürecinin ilerlemesi için, DEM’in istediği, PKK lideri Abdullah Öcalan’a istediği “statü” verilmesini destekledi, sıfatının “Barış Süreci ve Siyasallaşma Koordinatörü” olmasını önerdi.
Birkaç yıl önce “bebek katili” dediği Öcalan’ı asmak için Cumhurbaşkanı Tayyip Erdoğan’dan ölüm cezasını geri getirmeyi talep eden MHP lideri, şimdi Erdoğan’a kanlı bir silahlı mücadeleyle on binlerce insanın canını alan bir silahlı mücadeleyi yürüten Öcalan’ın “Barış Koordinatörü” olmasını öneriyordu.
MHP-DEM paslaşması
Öneri, MHP grup toplantısından bir saat kadar sonra toplanan DEM Parti Meclis grubunda heyecanla karşılandı. Eş Genel Başkan Tuncer Bakırhan, Bahçeli’nin önerisinin altına imzalarını attıklarını söyledi. Bakırhan bir adım daha ileri gitti: TBMM’de bir “Barış İzleme ve Takip Kurulu” kurulmasını önerdi; hemen bir yasa hazırlanıp bir haftada Meclis’ten geçirilmeliydi.
Bakırhan o arada demokrasiden ve siyasi tutukluların serbest bırakılmasından söz ederek, kendilerinden sonra Meclis grubunu toplayacak olan CHP lideri Özgür Özel’e adeta pas attı. Zaten Bahçeli de konuşmasında CHP’de Özal yönetimin başındaki “mutlak butlan” davasına değinip, işe “partiyi karıştırmanın yanlış” olacağını söylemişti.
Özel pası aldı: hem PKK’yı silahsızlaştıracak hem de Türkiye’deki “iç sorunu” halledip demokrasiyi güçlendirecek projeye attıkları imzaya sahip çıktı.
Daha iki hafta önce 23 Nisan resepsiyonunda -Erdoğan hariç- “tıkandığından” söz edilen süreç, 5 Mayıs’ta artık “terörsüz Türkiye” değil, MHP ve DEM’in ortaklaştığı lisan ile “barış süreci” olarak hayata dönmüştü.
Aradan geçen sürede ne değişmişti?
“Apocu Hareket” Ayrıntısı
O resepsiyonda Bahçeli, adını vermeden TBMM Başkanı Numan Kurtulmuş’a görev düştüğünü söyleyerek, yasal çalışmanın “en yakın tarihte” başlaması gerektiğini söylerken DEM Partili TBMM Başkanvekili ve İmralı heyetinin kıdemli üyesi Pervin Buldan sürecin artık “senkronik” olması gerektiğini vurgulamıştı. Süreç için ilk defa bu sözcüğü Buldan kullanıyordu: “eşzamanlı” demekti.
Ne anlama geldiğini 5 Mayıs’ta DEM’in öteden beri kullandığı ifadeyle “barış süreci” olarak karşımıza çıkmasında anlıyoruz.
5 Mayıs, bir yıl önce, PKK’nın “Fesih Kongresi” olarak da adlandırılan 12’nci Kongresi’ni topladığı tarihti. Bu vesileyle bir tören düzenleyen PKK lider kadrosu, sürecin işlemesi için “acil” koşulun Öcalan’a statü verilmesi olduğunu söylemiş ve Ankara’nın duymak istemediği bir şeyi söylememişti. PKK yöneticileri uzun yıllardan sonra açıklamalarını PKK ya da KCK ya da herhangi bir örgüt adıyla değil, “Apocu Hareket Yönetimi” olarak imzalamıştı. Kurulduğu ilk yıllardaki adıyla “Apocular”, böylelikle PKK’nın fesih süreçlerinin başladığını ilan ediyordu.
Barış Koordinatörü Önerisi ve MİT
Bu açıklama Fırat Haber Ajansı’nca (ANF) sabah 10.30 sıralarında yayınlandı. MHP Grup toplantısı 10.45’te başladı. Bahçeli bu haberi alıp Öcalan’a “Barış Koordinatörlüğü” önerdi demek istemiyorum ama bir perde arkası koordinasyonundan söz edebiliriz.
Bu koordinasyonun MİT ve DEM arasında yürütüldüğünü varsaymak mümkün; Pervin Buldan’ın bir bildiği vardı sanırım.
Perde arkasını biraz daha aralayabiliriz.
Erdoğan ve Bahçeli 1 Mayıs’ta yüz yüze görüştüler. İstisnasız, şimdiye dek her görüşmenin ardından önemli kararlar ortaya çıktı. Bu görüşmeden iki gün sonra, 3 Mayıs’ta Türkiye gazetesinde AK Parti kaynaklarına dayandırılan bir haber çıktı. Buna göre “geçtiğimiz günlerde” MİT Başkanı İbrahim Kalın AK Parti yönetimine bilgi vererek, PKK’lıların silah bırakması konusunda bir “doğrulama mekanizması” kurulduğunu söylemişti.
AK Parti’nin son MYK’sı 28 Nisan’da yapılmıştı. Ama bilgilendirmenin Erdoğan-Bahçeli görüşmesinin ardından daha dar bir kadroya yapılmış olma ihtimali de vardı.
Sırada Ne Var?
Her hâlükârda 5 Mayıs’ta PKK şefleri ve MHP lideri tarafından hemen hemen aynı saat içinde, eşzamanlı yapılan açıklamalar öncesinde yoğun bir perde arkası trafiğinin yaşandığı anlaşılıyordu.
Son yapılan kamuoyu araştırmalarında toplumun sürece yüzde 55 ile 58 arasında “temkinli destek” verdiği görülüyor. Meclis’te grubu bulunan partiler arasında sürece açıktan karşı çıkan tek parti olan İYİ Parti’nin oy potansiyelinde belirgin bir artış gözlenmiyor. Ancak Öcalan’a “barış koordinatörü” sıfatı önerilmesine toplumun, DEM tabanındaki memnuniyet hariç, nasıl tepki vereceği önem taşıyor.
Bu durum AK Partiyi iktidar sorumluluğunun da ötesinde bütün sürecin kilit partisi haline getiriyor. Neticede bu karara yıllardır “bebek katili” söylemiyle şartlandırdıkları milliyetçi-muhafazakâr seçmeni ikna etmek MHP’den de çok onlara düşecek.
Ama Erdoğan gerçekten Türkiye’nin ekonomik çıkarlarını Avrupa Birliği ile yakınlaşmada görüyorsa, hukuk devleti ve demokratikleşme adımları atmak gereğini de görüyordur mutlaka. Mayıs-Haziran siyaseten çok sıcak olacak. Dokuz günlük Kurban Bayramı tatili de sessiz sedasız perde arkası çalışmaları için gayet uygun.
Yazar: Murat Yetkin / 05 Mayıs 2026, Salı - - Türkiye-AB geriliminde Temmuz eşiği. Erdoğan aslında ne dedi, ne yapmalı?
Türkiye-AB geriliminde Temmuz eşiği. Erdoğan aslında ne dedi, ne yapmalı?
Ankara, Türkiye’nin savaş sonrası güçlenmesini görerek Türkiye-AB ilişkilerine önleyici vuruş yapanlara karşı “Birlikte kazanabiliriz” diyor. Fotoğraf, Türkiye’yi Cumhurbaşkanı Yardımcısı Cevdet Yılmaz’ın temsil ettiği 4 Mayıs Avrupa Siyasi Topluluğu Zirvesi’nden. (Foto: AA)
Cumhurbaşkanı Yardımcısı Cevdet Yılmaz’ın 4 Mayıs’ta Erivan’da Ermenistan Başbakanı Nikol Paşinyan ile tarihi Ani Köprüsü’nün restorasyonu anlaşmasını imzalamasının Cumhurbaşkanı Tayyip Erdoğan’ın Türkiye Avrupa Birliği konusundaki yeni çıkışıyla aynı güne denk getirilmesi tesadüf değildi. Ankara, Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinde artık gizlenemeyen gerilimin yeni bir aşamaya geldiğini saptıyor ve bunun aşılması isteğini somut bir adımla gösteriyor.
Erdoğan’ın Kabine toplantısı ardından Türkiye-AB ilişkileri üzerine söylediklerinden öne çıkan şu cümlelerdi:
• “Bugün Avrupa’nın Türkiye’ye duyduğu ihtiyaç, Türkiye’nin Avrupa’ya olan ihtiyacından daha fazladır. Yarın bu ihtiyaç daha da artacaktır.
• “Avrupa bir yol ayrımındadır. Ya Türkiye’nin büyüyen gücünü ve küresel ağırlığını birliğin darboğazdan çıkışı için bir fırsat olarak görecekler ya da dışlayıcı söylemlerin Avrupa’nın geleceğini karartmasına müsaade edecekler.
• “Bizim temennimiz Avrupa’daki karar alıcıların siyasi ve tarihî önyargılarını artık terk ederek Türkiye ile samimi, sahici ve göz hizasında ilişkiler geliştirmeye odaklanmalarıdır. Böyle bir ilişkinin kazananı, Türkiye’nin de ayrılmaz parçası olduğu Avrupa Kıtası olacaktır.”
Gergin Türkiye-AB Soruları
Medyada Erdoğan’ın daha önce defalarca söylediği, Türk iş dünyasının da kullandığı “Daha fazla ihtiyaç” sözleri öne çıkarıldı.
Oysa Erdoğan’ın bu sözleri Erivan’daki Avrupa Siyasi Topluluğu zirvesi açılışı sırasında konuşan (ve artık Türkiye alerjisini saklamaya gerek duymayan) AB Komisyonu Başkanı Ursula Von der Leyen’in 4 Mayıs sabah saatlerinde X hesabında da yayınladığı mesajıyla birlikte okunmalı. Şunları söylüyordu:
• “Burada Ermenistan’dayız ki Avrupa’nın tek, büyük ve geniş bir aile olduğunu gösterelim. Aynı çıkarlarla bağlı, aynı zorluklarla karşı karşıya. Bugün Avrupa’nın bağımsızlığının temel sütunları üzerinde çalışacağız.
– Enerji.
– Savunma
– Ve Bağlantısallık.
Ankara doğal olarak şu soruyu soruyor: AB Komisyonu Başkanı Ermenistan veya Ukrayna Hristiyan olduğu için mi “geniş ailenin” bir parçası olarak görüyor? Devamında, Türkiye’yi aday üye olduğu halde Müslüman olduğu için mi sadece askeri gücüne ihtiyaç duyulduğunda kapısı çalınmak zorunda kalınan istenmeyen komşu mu sayıyor?
Erdoğan’ın sözlerindeki “siyasi ve tarihi önyargılar” gibi, “sahici ve göz hizasında ilişkiler” gibi ifadeler bunu gösteriyor.
Aslında Ne Dedi?
Türkiye’nin tuttuğu coğrafya, yani jeopolitik potansiyeli ortadayken, AB’nin Doğu Akdeniz, Orta Doğu, Karadeniz, Kafkaslar ve ötesinde Türkiye’yi sadece askeri bir güç olarak görerek “enerji ve bağlantısallık” alanlarında güçlenme hedefi biraz hayalciliğe kaçıyor.
Erdoğan’ın söylediklerinin satır aralarında şu saptamalar bulunuyor:
• İsrail ve Yunanistan’ın ortak kaygıları, Türkiye’nin Ukrayna’dan sonra İran savaşından da uzak durarak savaş sonrası konumunu güçlendireceğini görmeleri. Güney Kıbrıs’ın 2026 ocak ayında altı aylık AB dönem başkanlığını devralmasından önce Aralık 2025’te Kudüs’teki üçlü ittifak Türkiye’ye yönelik bir önleyici atış niteliğindeydi.
• Türkiye’nin İspanya ve İtalya ile yakınlaşmasından zaten rahatsız olan Fransa, bu ittifakın hâmisi oldu ve Kıbrıs ile Ege Adaları’nın Lozan Anlaşması’na aykırı silahlandırılmasını hâmiliğine soyundu. Ankara, Fransa Cumhurbaşkanı Emmanuel Macron’un Ermenistan’daki şovunu da buna bağlıyor. (Ani Köprüsü’nü hatırlayalım.)
• Ankara, Türkiye-AB ilişkilerini askeri boyuta indirgeyerek AB’nin siyasi etki ve enerji dahil ticaret yolları alanlarında da güçlenemeyeceğini söylüyor. Bir yerde, “Beni baltalayabilirsin ama sen de istediğini yapamazsın” diyor.
NATO, AB, Türkiye
Kıbrıs Rum takviyeli İsrail-Yunanistan ittifakının ne sonuçlar doğurabileceğini en son Gazze’ye insani yardım için SUMUD filosunun Girit açıklarında İsrail komandolarınca basılması olayında gördük. Birleşmiş Milletler’in Filistin Raportörü, İtalyan hukukçu Francesca Albanese, Yunanistan’ı Türkiye korkusunu istismar eden İsrail’e kullandırmasını “stratejik hata” olarak niteliyor; Avrupa’nın “İsrailleştirilmesi” niyetinin parçası sayıyor.
Bu arada, hem İsrail hem Yunanistan hem de Fransa’nın yaman çelişkisi, İran’dan Türkiye’ye atılan füzelerin NATO ortak savunmasıyla engellenmesi oldu. İsrail Başbakanı Binyamin Netanyahu, Türkiye buna karşılık vermediği için Türk halkını neredeyse Erdoğan’a ayaklanmaya çağırdı; muhalefetten de “Başka kapıya” yanıtını aldı.
Temmuz Kritik eşik olacak
Temmuz sonrası Türkiye-AB ilişkilerine önleyici vuruşlar cephesi için işler zorlaşacak. 30 Haziran’da Güney Kıbrıs’ın AB dönem başkanlığı sona eriyor. 1 Temmuz’dan sonra başkanlığı, Gazze ve İran konularında İspanya, İsveç gibi vicdanlı davranan AB üyesi İrlanda devralacak.
2 Temmuz’da Hazine ve Maliye Bakanı Mehmet Şimşek, Yüksek Düzeyli Ekonomik Diyalog kapsamında İstanbul’da AB’nin Genişleme Sorumlusu Marta Kos ile görüşecek.
5-7 Temmuz’da Ankara’da NATO Zirvesi yapılacak.
Trump’ın bu zirveye gelip gelmeyeceği henüz belli değil ama Kasım 2026’daki ABD ara seçimlerine doğru geri sayım başlamış olacak.
Ankara bir yandan ABD ve İngiltere ile daha yakın işbirliği ihtimallerini açık tutarak Brüksel’deki “Türkiyesiz yapalım” lobisine karşı “Birlikte yapabiliriz” diyor.
Türkiye’nin Yapması Gerekenler
Öte yandan Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan yönetiminin sadece Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin gelişmesi için değil, kendi ekonomik ve demokratik standartlarını yükseltmesi için yapılması gerekenlerde santim kıpırdama yok.
Dışişleri Bakanı Hakan Fidan geçenlerde, AB’den bunları yaptığımızda üye alınacağımız işareti gelse, yaparız anlamında konuştu.
Oysa Anayasa Mahkemesi kararlarına uymak, Anayasa’nın 90’ıncı maddesi uyarınca AİHM kararlarını uygulamak, seçilmiş belediye başkanlarının yerine devlet memurlarını atamak Türkiye-AB şartına bağlanmamalı.
İmamoğlu Vakası nedeniyle siyaset-yargı tartışmalarının odağında yer alan Adalet Bakanı Akın Gürlek dahi geçenlerde MÜSİAD toplantısında yatırım çekmek için Erdoğan’ın dışarıdan gelecek parayı teşvik için açıkladığı ekonomik paketin yetmeyeceğini, bağımsız yargı güvencesinin gerektiğini söyledi.
Türkiye-AB ilişkilerini geliştirmenin yolu da Türkiye’nin ekonomik ve demokratik standartlarını yükseltmenin yolu da aslında adalet dağıtabilen yargı sistemini kurmaktan geçiyor. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan bunu görüyorsa ve gereğini yapmaya karar veriyorsa, sorun yok demektir. Aksi halde Türkiye de AB de kaybeder; kimin ne kadar kaybedeceği ayrıntıda kalır