Wednesday, July 22, 2026

FP - Analysis Trump’s Epic Fury Can’t Resolve His Iran Quagmire - The clock is ticking for global oil markets, and Iran has the time. - By Keith Johnson, a staff writer at Foreign Policy covering geoeconomics and energy.

 FP  -  Analysis

Trump’s Epic Fury Can’t Resolve His Iran Quagmire

The clock is ticking for global oil markets, and Iran has the time.

By Keith Johnson, a staff writer at Foreign Policy covering geoeconomics and energy.


U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth testifies during a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on Capitol Hill in Washington on July 21. Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

July 22, 2026, 1:25 PM


Whatever the real goal of the ramped-up U.S. offensive on Iran, with 11 straight days of airstrikes on Iranian infrastructure, ports, and military installations after a brief cease-fire, it does nothing to address the ticking clock that threatens to scuttle the Trump administration’s entire approach: rapidly rising oil prices and rapidly falling global oil stockpiles.

Iran War

Analysis and news.

The Pentagon says that the renewed U.S. air offensive, if not necessarily prelude to a ground invasion, is “designed to continue degrading Iran’s ability to threaten commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.” Iranian military capacity was already destroyed four months ago, according to the Pentagon, but Iran has shown a surprising ability to continue firing missiles and drones at ships passing through Hormuz, at the critical infrastructure of U.S.-allied countries in the region, and at U.S. military bases in the region. 

“What are we trying to do? Escalate the pain on Iran to change its red lines. Tactically, we are trying to degrade their ability to interdict the Gulf, and to isolate the strait of Bab el-Mandeb, and also showing a little leg on escalation, such as the attacks on [an Iranian missile complex in] Tabriz,” said Alan Eyre, a former U.S. State Department official who worked on Iran issues for decades.

“A lot of this is just the reptile brain response of [U.S. President] Donald Trump,” he said. “He is like a pianist with one key, and that key is military strength,” said Eyre, who is now at the Middle East Institute.

The renewed U.S. offensive is not working. Traffic through Hormuz is back to bare minimums, with single-digit transits now again the norm (and few of them tankers). Iran has targeted three different ships running the gauntlet in the last day or so. Oil analysts now expect the strait will remain choked, likely for the remainder of the year at least, if not longer. 

The result is higher oil prices. Benchmark Brent crude has gone back to the mid-$90s-a-barrel range, after a brief lark near $70 a barrel just weeks ago when it seemed that the United States and Iran had actually reached an understanding. U.S. gasoline prices are back above $4 a gallon just months ahead of midterm elections. Prices that really matter, such as the cost of diesel fuel, are even worse, creating headaches for industry and agriculture across multiple continents. 

That sounds like the situation this spring, when oil prices soared, and conflict in the Persian Gulf raised the specter of widespread economic disruption. The difference this time is that the shock absorbers are gone, or nearly so. The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is getting so dangerously low that there are only a little over a month’s worth of stocks left to compensate for missing barrels from the Middle East. The situation is so bad that the U.S. Department of Energy decided last week to redefine where the bottom of the barrel is for the SPR, storage-wise, far below levels that oil-industry professionals think is wise. 

“It’s a two-clocks issue. That is, will Iran capitulate due to mounting economic pressure before Trump does?” Eyre asked. Both sides got a reset during the recent cease-fire, with the world briefly enjoying lower oil prices and Iran briefly enjoying sanctions relief and a $6 billion export boom for its previously banned cargoes. That breather allowed it to empty its storage tanks, make money, and start fresh for another battle of economic attrition.

“The two-clocks issue works in favor of Iran. We are running out of stocks,” Eyre said.

Things could get worse if Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen make good on their threats to attack shipping, especially Saudi shipping, in the Red Sea (the other regional maritime choke point), which has been a safety valve for a good portion of the previously trapped volumes of crude oil from the Persian Gulf. 

In the meantime, Iran has not let up on its assault on shipping through what it considers unauthorized lanes in the Strait of Hormuz, which further discourages shipping lines from returning to anything like business as usual. Lloyd’s of London estimates that total traffic is down 90 percent year-on-year despite U.S. assurances that it controls passage through Hormuz. 

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Boats are anchored off Oman’s northern Musandam Peninsula near the Strait of Hormuz on June 27.

Boats are anchored off Oman’s northern Musandam Peninsula near the Strait of Hormuz on June 27.

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Iran’s military reprisals aren’t limited to the strait, either. Iranian strikes over the past week severely damaged a desalination plant in Kuwait, a U.S. ally that is 90 percent reliant on such plants for its drinking water. 

And despite months of “degrading” of Iran’s offensive capability, U.S. military bases in the region remain in the crosshairs, with the most recent lethal attack coming on a Jordanian base that hosts U.S. forces. 

The few levers the United States seems to have at its disposal—more airstrikes, more sanctions, or more tariffs—are unlikely to address the underlying problem, which is that Iran has new red lines and new leverage it never had before this war began. Trump’s dismissal this week of even the nascent shoots of a renewed try for a negotiated solution speaks to the impasse.

This administration doesn’t do diplomacy. They do pain and threats and tariffs. It’s not going to work with Iran,” Eyre said. 


This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage. Read more here.

Keith Johnson is a staff writer at Foreign Policy covering geoeconomics and energy. Bluesky: @kfj-fp.bsky.social X: @KFJ_FP

Read More On Iran | Kuwait | Oil | Saudi Arabia | War | Yemen


FP Essay - America, the Once Global Nation At 250, the country is struggling to come to terms with the world it created. -- July 2, 2026, 12:30 PM

 FP

Essay

America, the Once Global Nation

At 250, the country is struggling to come to terms with the world it created.

July 2, 2026, 12:30 PM


By Odd Arne Westad, a professor of history and global affairs at Yale University and the director of Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center.

An illustration of a vintage-style map featuring North America and parts of Europe and Africa. Overlaid on the map are 3D red brick walls shaped exactly like the borders of the contiguous United States and Alaska, casting long shadows to the right.

Pep Montserrat illustration for Foreign Policy

Ever since its inception, the United States has been remaking the world in its image. Driven by relatively high economic growth rates, increasing predominance in its own hemisphere, and a peculiar knack for making useful innovations, the country has become not only powerful, but an object of emulation for many others. The expanding global influence of the United States was created not just by its own power in military and diplomatic terms, but by its economic, social, and cultural influence.


By the 20th century, the U.S. position in the world was unique. Not only was it powerful enough to act on its own inclinations, it was attractive and popular on a global scale in ways that many Americans have never fully understood.


An illustration with a weathered, textured look on a beige background. In the center is a blue, sketch-style globe showing the Western Hemisphere, primarily focusing on North and South America. A stylized red eagle with its wings spread is flying across the upper right portion of the globe, facing toward the right. The words "America Retold" are at left.

America Retold: 250 years of the United States and the world. Read more from the series.


The United States is, in many ways, the first empire that is also a global nation. Founded by European settlers, it has had close to 85 million immigrants arrive since 1870. Of its current population, roughly 51 million are immigrants, and close to half the U.S. population has at least one foreign-born grandparent.


Immigration has been America’s greatest strength and attraction.  But it has also been politically troublesome at home. Americans have constantly worried about what new waves of immigrants were doing to the country—even if those doing the worrying only arrived on a slightly earlier boat.


A historic black-and-white photograph showing a group of immigrants, mostly women and children wearing headscarves and heavy coats, walking down a wooden gangplank from a ferry. A man in a cap stands at the bottom of the ramp next to them, with a large brick building in the background across the water.


Immigrants arrive to Ellis Island in New York circa 1880. Fotosearch/Getty Images


For the world at large, America’s openness has been its most significant appeal. Anyone could become an American, whether through consumption, culture, or migration. Someone growing up in India could aspire to one day, through hard work, become a U.S. citizen. Someone at school in Lebanon could form a band playing music by Americans and imagine themselves in Los Angeles or Nashville.


The U.S. remaking of the world has been as much about these values as it has been about economic or military power. Moreover, no other country has had even close to this kind of appeal, at least not in modern times.


Of course, the United States has also intervened abroad in far more direct ways. U.S. presidents generally did so in what they viewed as the cause of freedom, however contested that concept may be both at home and elsewhere. The major U.S. interventions were against trade restrictions, authoritarianism, and expansionism—against Germany (twice), against Japan, and against the Soviet Union in the Cold War. World War I was a dividing line. It was the first time the United States sent its own soldiers to fight other major powers overseas. Even though the number of casualties were light compared to other powers—just over 300,000, compared to nearly 3 million Brits and over 7 million Russians—the psychological impact at home was severe, splitting the country between interventionists and anti-interventionists for almost a generation.


The combination of World War II and the Cold War that followed proved significantly more deadly. These conflicts saw about a million American dead and wounded in the world war and more than 300,000 in the Cold War, mainly in Korea and Vietnam.


America Retold: 250 years of the United States and the world



An illustration in a detailed woodcut style depicts a large tornado swirling violently under a dark, heavy blanket of storm clouds. Caught in the outer winds of the vortex are two historical flags on broken poles: a Confederate battle flag on the left and a historical American flag with a circle of stars on the right. Swirling in the debris field below the flags are several silhouettes of rifles and pistols scattered by the force of the storm against a light tan background.

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An illustration on a textured red background featuring the dark silhouette of a person with a long braided ponytail. Three disembodied hands in suits interact with the silhouette: one hand places a string of blue and white beads around the neck, another hand rests on top of the head, and a third hand pins a small American flag to the torso.

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A vintage-style woodcut illustration of a cracked bronze bell suspended from a wooden beam against a background of swirling, engraved clouds.

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An illustration in an engraved, woodcut style portrays a landscape scene divided by water under a sepia-toned sky. In the left foreground, a prominent flagpole holds a waving American flag over a grassy shoreline. Attached to the base of the flagpole is a heavy metal chain that stretches across the dirt path but ends abruptly with an open, broken link. Across a body of water in the distance, low rolling hills are visible. On the right side, a second flagpole flies the Mexican flag. Next to it, a small silhouette of a person stands looking toward a large, stylized sun with a human face that radiates beams of light across the sky.


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An illustration in a woodcut engraving style showing a large brown American bison standing on a stylized, vintage map of the United States. Dark, heavy smoke billows out from an oil pumpjack and a drilling derrick on the map, enveloping the bison and filling the upper sky.


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J.R. McNeill

.


An illustration in a detailed woodcut or engraved style depicts a vintage brown leather suitcase adorned with several international travel stickers. The stickers include a Mexican flag, an "Aeronaves de Mexico" airline logo, an "Italia" shield sticker, a "Sicilia" sticker next to an Italian flag, a French flag, and vintage hotel labels from Paris and Marseille. Resting on the top right corner of the suitcase is a grey fedora hat turned upside down. Inside the hat, an American flag pattern lines the interior, and a black revolver rests tucked into the brim with its handle protruding out. The background is a textured tan color.

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Ryan Gingeras

The Cold War and its aftermath made the United States into the world’s hegemon. It was a global empire in all but name, with alliances, interests, and preoccupations spread across the world. The successful rebuilding of Europe and Japan, and their integration into a U.S.-led economic and political world order, formed the center of this enterprise, contributing to a rapidly globalizing, or Americanizing, international system.


Since at least the start of the 20th century, United States has wrestled with the question of how to employ its global power and attraction. Some of the answers were, if not given, then at least over-determined by America’s own historical experience. Spreading capitalism and consumerism reflected the 19th century U.S. experience—while also advancing U.S. economic interests abroad.


Promoting trade also fit with America’s experience and interests. U.S. leaders consistently pushed for access to foreign markets, opening the doors (sometimes by force) to countries and regions that had not previously been fully available to foreign commerce. Ironically, America only proved willing to open its own markets much later, starting in the 1930s. Despite Washington’s recommendations to others, the United States itself arguably did not truly practice free trade until the Reagan administration in the 1980s.


Some other elements of the U.S. approach to the world were more contingent, though here too there was a strong connection to the country’s own historical experience. U.S. foreign policy showed a consistent tendency to fear and oppose social revolution. At the end of the 1700s, many U.S. leaders saw the French Revolution, with its emphasis on equality and social justice, as the evil twin of their own revolution. A century or more later, their successors viewed socialism in Europe or the developing world as the antithesis of Americanism. For Americans, an emphasis on individual liberty trumped social improvements. They often viewed systematic attempts at abating poverty and inequality as threats to the existence of freedom everywhere. Certainly, 20th century revolutionaries provided more than enough crimes and atrocities to turn people against them, not just in the United States. But the U.S. resistance to revolution was more instinctive, not just based on the terrible experience of some radical experiments.


A bright, outdoor close-up shot of a smiling woman sitting in a stadium crowd, holding a young toddler who is waving a small American flag. In the foreground, the blurred profile of a man wearing a blue military uniform cap is visible, looking back toward them.


U.S. Air Force Airman Michael Drah, originally from Ghana, smiles with his wife, Akosua Yeboah-Drah, and daughter Rashana Drah before his naturalization ceremony in Los Angeles on Aug. 29, 2022.Mario Tama/Getty Images


Another preoccupation of U.S. foreign policy, rooted in the country’s own history, has been race. America’s founding contradiction, between freedom and slavery, has proven remarkably persistent, even after Americans began to seriously confront their own past in the latter part of the 20th century. The legacy of racism, alongside the resistance against social revolution, made the United States reluctant to support the anti-colonial struggles that in many ways defined the past 100 years. This shortfall helped tarnish the United States in the eyes of many post-colonial leaders, with consequences that are still in place today.


At the same time, America’s history of interventionism has produced a counter-reaction at home as well. This is not isolationism, but a widespread disengagement from overall currents in the world at large. Americans are not just tired of their country’s global role, which a significant number believe has brought little but forever wars, unfair competition, job losses, and unwanted immigration. They are also in many ways rebelling against the global system that the United States itself has put in place.


Read More


Republican presidential nominee, former President Donald Trump pumps his fist as he walks off stage at the end of a campaign rally at the Santander Arena on November 04, 2024 in Reading, Pennsylvania.


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A man in a uniform carries an American flag along a beach.

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On matters ranging from security to trade to climate change and pandemics, the opinions of a large number of Americans—and a thumping majority among those who support the current administration—are out of whack with those in other countries. Less than one-third of Republican voters believe in human-driven climate change, or in electric vehicles, or in lowering tariffs. What’s more, relatively few believe that social inequality, whether at home or abroad, is a problem. On a global scale, an average of close to 80 percent see inequality as a “very big” or “moderately big” issue.


In addition to these many divergences, the question of race has again come to the fore. The United States made remarkable progress in how it was perceived abroad on matters of racial equality during the late Cold War and after. However, the current president is widely viewed as unapologetically racist, due in large part to his approach toward immigration. At a December 2025 rally, President Donald Trump elaborated on what he first said in 2018: “Why is it we only take people from shithole countries[?] Why can’t we have some people from Norway, Sweden, just a few? Let us have a few from Denmark. … We always take people from Somalia, [places that] are filthy, dirty, disgusting.”


Trump’s prioritization of white South Africans as refugees has also produced a unique degree of global disgust. Of the small number of refugees resettled in the United States between October 2025 and April 2026, 99 percent were from South Africa, a country where whites control the vast majority of the national wealth. Only three refugees were admitted from Afghanistan, a country where the United States fought a war for 20 years.


A low-angle shot of several law enforcement officers in tactical gear, vests labeled "ERO," and face coverings standing in the foreground. Behind them is a tall chain-link fence topped with multiple rows of coiled razor wire against a blue sky with light clouds.


U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents gather outside the federal immigration center at Delaney Hall in Newark, New Jersey, on May 28.Spencer Platt/Getty Images


These changing attitudes and policies should be understood in relation to the way the world is changing. For the first time since 1945, the United States has real rivals both in economic and strategic terms. As a result, U.S. power to shape the world is becoming increasingly limited. The country’s ever narrower fixation on pet issues, often informed by domestic policy divides or personal resentments, is characteristic of great powers that see their positions as under threat.


What is most curious about the current administration’s policies is that they do constitute a revolution of sorts, a symbolic rebellion against the world that the United States has created. Trump has forged a policy based on the performance of grievance. It is intended to deliver instantaneous gratification to partisan positions at home, with little or no strategic cohesion.


The country, of course, remains very divided on the president’s approach, with Trump’s current approval rating at around 36 percent. This makes it increasingly likely that the Democrats will soon return to power. More long term, the country will undoubtedly recover from its current division and crisis. But when it does so, the world will be fundamentally transformed, with increasing economic diversity and great power multipolarity.


Ironically, this will also be a world that the United States helped bring into being—by denial and omission more than design.


This post appeared in FP's The Reading List newsletter. Sign up here.


Odd Arne Westad is a professor of history and global affairs at Yale University and the director of Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. His most recent book is The Coming Storm: Power, Conflict, and Warnings From History.

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FP - The End of America’s Soft Power The United States has given up on one of its core international strengths. By Stephen M. Walt,

 Argument

An expert’s point of view on a current event.

The End of America’s Soft Power

The United States has given up on one of its core international strengths.

Walt-Steve-foreign-policy-columnist20
Walt-Steve-foreign-policy-columnist20
Stephen M. Walt
By , a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
Republican presidential nominee, former President Donald Trump pumps his fist as he walks off stage at the end of a campaign rally at the Santander Arena on November 04, 2024 in Reading, Pennsylvania.
Republican presidential nominee, former President Donald Trump pumps his fist as he walks off stage at the end of a campaign rally at the Santander Arena on November 04, 2024 in Reading, Pennsylvania.
Republican presidential nominee, former President Donald Trump pumps his fist as he walks off stage at the end of a campaign rally at the Santander Arena on November 04, 2024 in Reading, Pennsylvania. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

One of the more striking features of the Trump administration’s approach to foreign policy—not the chosen ends, but its preferred means—is its absolute confidence in America’s hard power and its near-total disdain for what my late colleague Joseph Nye called “soft power.” Nye defined the latter as “the power of attraction,” as a nation’s ability to get others to do what it wanted because it possessed qualities that made others want to emulate it, associate with it, and follow its lead. States with a lot of hard power could compel others through force and intimidation or by offering aid or protection; states with an abundance of soft power enjoyed greater influence because others wanted to be like them, agreed with the principles they stood for, or viewed them as fashionable, successful, and even “hip.”


A good realist like me is hardly going to denigrate the importance of hard power; on the contrary, it’s hard to have lots of soft power without substantial hard power to back it up. But you can have plenty of hard power and little or no soft power, as Vladimir Putin’s Russia has shown. Ideally, a state would like to have a lot of both, because having a lot of soft power means others will be naturally inclined to do what you want and you won’t have to use your hard power very often. Nye believed America’s combination of hard and soft power gave it enormous advantages when dealing with the outside world, which is one of the reasons he was optimistic about America’s future and skeptical of those predicting its decline. Yet by the end of his long career, even he had begun to worry about what was happening to America’s global appeal.


Under Trump 2.0, the belief that hard power is all you need is abundantly apparent. The administration used the threat of tariffs to force trading partners into one-sided economic agreements, and it vows to continue the effort despite the Supreme Court decision that strikes them down. The administration has used military force in more than half a dozen countries and continues to kill alleged drug smugglers in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean, even when it doesn’t know who they are, cannot prove all of them are in fact engaged in narcotics trafficking, and admits that these actions will have little or no effect on the availability of illegal drugs. President Donald Trump has repeatedly accused other world leaders of being weak, told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he didn’t “have the cards” and should therefore cut a deal with Russia, and imposed a blockade on Cuba intended to further immiserate ordinary Cubans and eventually force its regime to surrender. Last but by no means least, it abandoned diplomacy and launched an unnecessary and unprovoked war against Iran, on the mistaken assumption that the Iranian regime would quickly collapse and yield a government more to our liking.

What is most striking about this fixation with hard power is how little effort is being made to disguise, legitimize, or justify its use. Most countries do nasty things on occasion, and great powers do so more than most, but they usually try to find ways to hide the mailed fist in a velvet glove of normative justification. Not so the Trump administration, which seems positively gleeful whenever it is able to violate some established norm and inflict some pain. When the president threatens to eradicate Iranian civilization, or when the secretary of defense dismisses international law and boasts that U.S. troops will show opponents “no quarter” (which would constitute a war crime), it is clear their goal is to intimidate rather than persuade, to compel rather than attract. Their motto, it seems, is: “Being the strongest means never having to say you’re sorry.”


This veneration of hard power has been accompanied by systematic efforts to undermine the institutions and policies that once made the United States more attractive to others. The U.S. Agency for International Development was abruptly dismantled by Elon Musk and the DOGE effort, endangering the lives of millions of people around the world and making the United States look arbitrary and indifferent. The administration tried to shut down the Voice of America broadcast network, an effort that was blocked in court and by a rare moment of congressional opposition. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has withdrawn the United States from more than 60 international organizations, allowed dozens of diplomatic posts to sit empty, and left the U.S. unrepresented at key international summit meetings. Violent Immigration and Customs Enforcement raids and the killing of innocent protesters have exposed an ugly side of America to the rest of the world, and a sustained assault on higher education—previously one of the most visible symbols of American prestige and soft power—has made U.S. colleges and universities less attractive destinations for foreign students. Not only do these actions hit academia’s bottom line (which may be the point), it also means fewer foreign students will be educated in the United States, an experience that usually makes them even more “pro-America” than when they arrived. Put these things together, and you can understand why China’s image around the world is rising while America’s is falling.

I’m hardly the first person to notice the administration’s systemic assault on America’s soft-power advantage; what’s puzzling is why administration officials don’t recognize what’s happening. Do they not understand that overreliance on hard power—and treating the use of military force to hurt other countries not as a rare and regrettable necessity but as an act to be celebrated—is going to make other countries less willing to work with an erratic, vengeful, and potentially threatening America? Haven’t they ever heard the old adage that “you can catch more flies with honey than with vinegar”?


Here’s what I think is going on.

First, from the president on down, the administration’s weltanschauung divides the world into the strong (“winners”) and the weak (“losers”) and views any sort of compromise with weaker parties as a failure. Hence the tendency to preen and posture and adopt a take-no-prisoners attitude toward even the mildest criticism or opposition, not to mention the mindless attacks on staunchly pro-American countries such as Canada or Denmark. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s macho muscle-flexing about the “warrior ethos” and the joys of “lethality,” and White House advisor Stephen Miller’s declaration that the “iron laws” of history justified dominance by the strong, are perhaps the most obvious examples of this perspective, but they are hardly alone in believing that powerful actors can just tell others what to do and expect them to comply. Remember: They were appointed by a president who bragged that being a star made it OK to molest women. In this (im)moral universe, rules are for other people.


Second, although Trump and his followers claim to be intensely patriotic, they don’t seem to like the country they are trying to lead. Consider the MAGA slogan: If you believe it’s necessary to make America great again, you must not think it’s great today. For all their symbolic flag waving, it’s remarkable how few things Trump and his minions like or admire about this country. They don’t like most of the media; they despise most popular entertainers; they loathe Democrats (who are a larger share of the population than Republicans); they don’t like checks and balances or the rule of law; they are suspicious of citizens who weren’t born here (along with some who were); they have little respect for science and think universities are the enemy; and they remain convinced that a shadowy “deep state” still infects the military, the diplomatic corps, and a lot of government agencies. Trump doesn’t even like the White House and wants to remake it into a gaudy imperial monument. Because they believe America is in terrible shape, they may find it hard to imagine that the country’s enduring features might be attractive to others.

Third, Trump and his followers like quick fixes that they can portray as real achievements (e.g., the administration’s bogus peace agreements, interim trade deals, etc.) while eschewing patient, long-term efforts to win support overseas. Trump and company are more interested in cutting deals with other leaders than in nurturing positive ties between peoples, where the benefits accrue gradually and may not be fully realized until after they’ve left office. Who cares about winning over the next generation of foreign students when you will be out of office after 2028?

If this was your world view, then you would also discount the importance of soft power and lean on hard power instead. But Americans should know better. Some of the greatest successes in U.S. foreign-policy history came from working constructively and generously with others—including some former adversaries—and by working to correct some of the less savory aspects of our own society in order to burnish our global image. Examples include the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Civil Rights Movement, the measured promotion of trade liberalization, and the hard-nosed but ultimately peaceful negotiations that ended the Cold War and reunified Germany. By contrast, some of America’s biggest foreign-policy failures (e.g., Vietnam, the forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ouster of Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, or the current debacle in Iran) came from thinking that sufficient hard power would guarantee success.

The United States still has many appealing qualities, and foreign governments and citizens have been able to distinguish between America as a country and an ideal and the actions of its worst leaders. But if American political life continues to become coarser and more corrupt, and its hard power is repeatedly misused while its soft power atrophies, keeping those two things separate is going to be a lot more difficult.

Stephen M. Walt is a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. Walt is the author of The New Geopolitics, a five-part newsletter masterclass breaking down the biggest concepts you should use to navigate today’s world. Bluesky: @stephenwalt.bsky.social X: @stephenwalt