Discussions and claims have already intensified, but questions are pouring in more than anything else. Let me therefore outline the framework. I aim to address expectations to some extent.
The main headings are as follows:
I. NATO’s Accumulated Experience
II. Near-Term Threats and Strategies
III. Summits and Evolving Strategies
IV. Proposals for Accelerating NATO Decision-Making Mechanisms
V. Evaluation of the Ankara NATO Summit (7-8 July 2026) and Possible Scenarios
VI. Conclusion
I have titled this article a “booklet.” It can be used as a handbook because it is a guide that can answer virtually every conceivable question. Historical analyses of examples such as Turkey, the United States, Iran, and Libya have also been included. NATO’s potential new vision has been examined. The reasons why the Ankara Summit could be historic have been concretized.
I. NATO’s Accumulated Experience
When we consider NATO by its foundational name, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, observers today might think the organization is subject to geographical limitations. NATO derives its name from the political definitions, unity of purpose, economic structures, culture, and—in short—the Western values of its member countries. This naming should be understood in terms of its worldview. As the planet’s longest-lasting, still-active, concrete, and sole defense organization, NATO possesses an established institutional structure and extensive experience. Its fundamental definition is politico-military. The political and administrative head of NATO is the Secretary General, who operates at the level of member countries’ foreign ministers.
NATO does not have a single command position; the highest-ranking military officials hold different titles depending on their roles. The military command positions are: Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (CMC), and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).
Some refer to NATO generally as a defense organization. However, we are talking about a structure with a broad global political perspective—hence geopolitical, strategic, and visionary—supported by its own institutional maturity. It is political because it consists of democratic countries. NATO operates under civilian leadership. This is its selectivity; the values it defends and seeks to promote are clear. It is not an iron fist over dictatorships or autocratic countries, but it can incorporate them if it transforms them toward democracy and free-market economies. On one side there is politics, on the other defense—just like the pair of prosperity and security.
Member countries enjoy equality within an institutional framework where all kinds of discussions can take place. Power dynamics operate among and within members, and each conducts its own policy in due course. Common decisions, however, are carefully monitored. Allies meticulously adhere to the activities they are convinced of and have signed onto. In NATO, discussions are based on civilian and democratic will; it is not an organization composed of militaristic regimes. Discussion exists because it stems from politics’ fundamental understanding of debate. But if a solution is to be reached, it must be planned and systematic.
One example: NATO invoked Article 5 only once in its history, following the United States’ 9/11 attacks. Turkey argued on multiple occasions that it deserved the same procedures due to the threats it faced. NATO preferred to provide only defensive support in those processes. Today the United States finds itself in a similar situation. In the Iran War, nuclear disarmament, and the Strait of Hormuz issue, Trump requested support from the allies. NATO limited itself to providing logistical support. Turkey has criticized NATO’s system in this regard, and today Trump does as well. What does Trump say now? NATO must be able to make decisions quickly; if changes are needed, address this internal working system.
NATO’s system is aimed at sustaining peace, cooperation, and development; deterring aggressors and potential threats; focusing on defense; operating on the basis of preemptive measures; and defending the values of democracy and freedom. Threats are not only armed ones; general human issues such as environmental threats are also included among NATO’s objectives. Its institutional structure, decisions, and actions are based on this. In this respect, NATO meticulously monitors threats and is obliged to do so. It conducts threat assessments and prepares the necessary documents. There is no unplanned execution; it has a budget system and projects. For sudden developments, it has mechanisms to take necessary measures, which are developed according to conditions. Decisions are taken through equal negotiation mechanisms.
NATO summits are important as they address both strategies and measures. Preparatory work begins well in advance; NATO headquarters and the Secretary General work continuously, with ongoing consultations. Finally, member countries’ foreign ministers convene to complete summit preparations. Leaders attend the summit, observe certain rituals and hold contacts, and decisions (most likely) are adopted, followed by the necessary announcements. What matters here are the leaders’ speeches. Through both their presentations and bilateral meetings, leaders criticize NATO’s understanding, express what needs to be done according to their own views, and develop definitions regarding priorities.
Decisions in NATO are taken through the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Pre-summit meetings of foreign ministers (e.g., Helsinki, May 2026) prepare the texts. The silence procedure is used: a proposal is circulated, and if no objection is received, it is adopted. It can also be said that if the text worked on for the summit and approved through the silence procedure constitutes a strategy document indicating a major transformation, it is noteworthy and guiding. However, if the document does not create a major change, it is adopted through the silence procedure, but in that case consultations during the summit come to the fore. This means NATO sets tasks for the next period, and therefore consultations may become more prominent.
II. Near-Term Threats and Strategies
The Cold War began in 1947 and NATO was founded in 1949. If the Cold War is over, why does NATO still exist? The issue is the defense and sustenance of democracy and the free world; within this, the operation and development of the prosperity-security equation in the established order, and the protection of related interests, is the most important matter. Is this always possible? It is difficult! Because it is difficult, discussions have increased today. The world system is changing, and it is natural that the questioning of this institutional structure and the addition of new elements to known values in such an ecosystem will lead to debate. It may become dysfunctional or it may evolve. But considering that this has become evident since 2019 (the 70th anniversary), ignoring the steps taken in the context of this existing evolution and closing the discussion would also bring incomplete thinking. At least International Relations does not allow it.
With the end of the Cold War, NATO had evolved from its founding philosophy centered on the Soviet threat into a structure more focused on broader security and crisis management. The newly established Russian Federation even opened an office in NATO (Brussels). The goal was integration with the West. Russians, who are essentially representatives of Western culture, had fought hand-in-hand with the United States, Britain, and other Europeans against Nazi Germany in World War II. Then dictator Stalin began occupations and divided Europe. He caused the deaths of nearly 20 million of his own people. For what? Communism. What happened to Communism? It went bankrupt. When? As a result of the Cold War. Who won the Cold War? NATO. At the time of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, what did Russian leaders and politicians think? Integration with the Western system as it should be. That was the thinking. Opening an office in NATO, expanding partnerships in banking, insurance, stock markets, etc., were all due to this.
However, Vladimir Putin’s period changed these thoughts. From the early 2000s, Russia emphasized armament. It disregarded the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on nuclear weapons for the states that emerged from the dissolution of the USSR. It began renewing nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Putin viewed NATO as a trap and claimed it would undermine the foundations of the oligarchy. With these thoughts, his actions evoked a “neo-Tsarist period.” Russia began establishing economic and political relations with various countries through oligarchic capitalism on one hand, while developing expansionist policies on the other. It engaged in proxy wars and deployed mercenaries. It again opened spheres of influence in various geographies, primarily Africa and the Middle East, and initiated gray zone operations. It intensified efforts in propaganda and cognitive warfare. What it did was not limited to third-world countries; it concerned every place its hand could reach, including the United States and European countries. It began targeting voters in democracies.
Putin, a former KGB operative, developed his activities as a complete manipulator and strategy expert. They were actively involved in regime changes in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004). These were called “color revolutions.” Essentially, the United States on one side and Russia on the other were engaged in a struggle for influence in these countries. What happened affected the people of those countries. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022 pulled the alliance back to a line based on defense and deterrence. The 2014 Crimea issue was a continuation of Tsar Peter the Great’s policy of reaching warm seas (the Black Sea and the Mediterranean). In those periods, Russia had strong relations with the Chechens and Armenians in the Caucasus. During the Nagorno-Karabakh War, it supported Armenia against Azerbaijan. It strengthened its military garrisons in Armenia on the Turkish border (Gyumri). Prior to all this, on 7 October 2002, the heads of state of Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan established the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Tashkent.
I recall these to make the following point: If Russia, while undergoing its own transformation, suddenly realized it would lose power (an existential issue) and experienced fluctuations, it then preferred—with Putin—to return to its roots (!). As someone who advocates realist policy, I find this reflex natural. Expecting a geopolitical and strategic power like Russia to integrate easily with Europe and America was nothing but wishful thinking. Nevertheless, let me note that the Western leaders of the period may have found themselves in a process of goodwill or acted with the intoxication of victory.
The United States (and NATO), while being the winner of the Cold War, had tried to accelerate the issues tied to defended democracy and liberalism by intervening in these geographies. This was, of course, among the issues that drew reactions. From 1994 onward, NATO turned toward existence in all regions that emerged from the dissolution of the USSR through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Take another look at NATO’s program: Partnership for Peace. This means that while a peace environment was being developed and Western values were beginning to be rebuilt there, Putin later rejected these issues. These are exactly matters of policy.
In this process, Russia’s nuclear capacity modernization along the axis from the Baltic Sea to the Arctic Ocean, hybrid operations, and expansionist policies directly shaped NATO’s strategic moves. This attitude continuing under Putin’s leadership made the alliance’s decisions “threat-oriented.” NATO countries also decided on strategies based on development along the line west of the axis from the Nordic countries to the Black Sea.
The subsequent strategic change process began to materialize in the Indo-Pacific. The stealthy rise of the People’s Republic of China and its seizure of third-world countries, primarily through the economy, were seen as notable developments. China, however, took advantage of the carelessness of liberal countries to accelerate its own planned development. Meanwhile, a division occurred among liberal countries: Is China really a threat or an opportunity? The broadest discussion of this issue took place among power centers within the United States and the leading countries and powers of Europe. This led to comments that liberalism was in decline.
Those of us in the realist school, of which I am a part, said the following: Liberalism has entered decline. In this context, it was normal for questions to arise: So what will happen now? These are major issues in the context of discussing change, and the situation has not yet fully clarified. At exactly this juncture, when looking at NATO-centered discussions, of course it would be said: We shall see.
Under these conditions, it was not overlooked that threats against the founding philosophy of democracy and freedom values were also taken into account in NATO. As authoritarian countries agreed among themselves, this would stage imbalances that could harm the values of member countries in the future. The complexifying foreign policy scene and economic-technological transformation were beginning to indicate the existence of a new type of threat environment—hybrid wars using AI, quantum, and autonomous systems. Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran were clearly beginning to pose threats to the global system, with their cooperation directed toward many fields: defense, armament (including nuclear weapons), economy, trade, finance, energy, and the use of mineral resources. Organizations such as BRICS and the SCO were established and expanding. As the so-called Global South developed discourse in favor of a new world order, the themes of the United States, NATO, and liberalism naturally became controversial.
Although multi-centric efforts among powers are developing in the world, it is not yet a bipolar order, but a hybrid polarization exists. I wrote about this issue in detail in my article titled “Global System Interaction and China’s Hierarchical Vision.” In this hybrid and not-yet-fully-clarified polarization, where will NATO stand? Perhaps after the Ankara Summit, NATO’s new position will be at the forefront of discussions.
When asked, the first thing I remind people of is this change and uncertainty. The world is in an uncertain period and many experts are developing thoughts on these issues. I am also among those working on it. On the other hand, the problem is here. Theses such as “The Ankara Summit will be historic, very important” are rightly put forward. However, will the document to be signed in Ankara be one that signals a major strategic transformation, or will it be a summit where the transformation is discussed and solutions for the next summit are debated? This question arises. My view is the latter: It will be discussed in Ankara, and the spirit of subsequent strategic vision studies will be determined in Ankara.
III. Summits and Evolving Strategies
In NATO, global policies and threats are continuously examined and adapted to change. Even issues where precautions can be taken initiate related studies in the defense field. Why? Not to be late! In this framework, let us look at NATO’s reform processes (evolution). Now let us examine how the situation I described above is tied to concrete decisions in NATO.
NATO has continuously undergone reform and adaptation processes since its founding to adapt to the changing security environment. These reforms have occurred in structural, military, strategic, and institutional areas. Reforms accelerated especially in the post-Cold War period. Between 1990 and 2010, command structure reform was carried out and downsizing occurred.
It was prepared in an optimistic environment after the Cold War. It was based on the assumption that the Euro-Atlantic region was “at peace” and that the probability of a conventional attack was low. It aimed to transform NATO into a more flexible, more capable, and cost-effective structure. The first major strategic step after the Washington Summit (1999) was taken in Lisbon. At the Lisbon Summit (2010), the new Strategic Concept (Active Engagement – Modern Defence) was adopted. Three Core Tasks: Collective defense, crisis management (preventing conflicts, stopping crises, and providing stability with political and military tools), and cooperative security (partnerships, open-door policy, dialogue, and cooperation with international organizations such as the UN and EU). What were the threats: Measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (especially ballistic missiles and nuclear), countermeasures against terrorism and cyber attacks (for the first time), environmental issues, energy security, instability-related threats (arms, drugs, and human trafficking). How was Russia viewed? Defined as a “strategic partner,” because there was an optimistic approach in 2010. While the combination of nuclear and conventional capabilities was emphasized for defense and deterrence, the development of a missile defense system was decided. More agile forces, joint capability development, efficiency in defense spending, and the Smart Defense approach were adopted. Expanded partnership policy (e.g., Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) and open-door policy (openness to new memberships) were signed here. NATO’s increased contribution to global security was emphasized, but the basic focus remained the Euro-Atlantic region. A continuous reform commitment was given: Simplifying structures, improving working methods, and increasing efficiency. For financial and capability reforms, activities were integrated through Smart Defense (launched 2011-2012) and the Connected Forces Initiative. In this period, the 2% Defense Spending Commitment was adopted (Wales Summit 2014). In summary, the 2010 Strategic Concept was a document in which NATO evolved toward becoming a “global actor” but still assumed an optimistic security environment. With Russia’s 2014 Crimea and 2022 Ukraine moves, this concept quickly became outdated, and a radical change occurred with the 2022 Madrid Concept.
The London Summit hosted by the Queen in 2019 for the 70th anniversary was a turning point where NATO addressed China as a strategic challenge for the first time at a high profile, and cyber and space threats were discussed in a more integrated manner. For example, in the 50th anniversary (1999 Washington) and 60th anniversary (2009 Strasbourg/Kehl) summits, these issues were not yet at the forefront; NATO was then mostly preoccupied with the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Russia, whereas the current focus became global, cyber, and space. NATO took China as a systemic challenge for the first time in an official summit communiqué. The statement was: “We acknowledge that China’s growing influence and international policies create both opportunities and challenges, and we must address them together as an Alliance.” China’s military modernization, hybrid threats, and challenges to international rules were emphasized. Although NATO traditionally focused on Russia and regional threats, it became clear that the situation was different from the old script; in 2019, issues such as China’s global military modernization, hybrid activities, 5G technology, presence in the Arctic and Africa began entering the alliance agenda. The cyber defense issue had been on the agenda since the 2002 Prague Summit, but it was officially recognized as a “cyber domain” at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. In 2019, China-linked cyber threats were addressed more prominently. The space issue also gained momentum in 2019; satellite systems, space-based threats, and defense capabilities were discussed. These areas were strengthened at the 2021 Brussels Summit. From 2019 onward, NATO’s “360-degree threat” approach (Russia, China, and new technologies) became much more mature.
The NATO-2030 vision study was important. NATO focused on innovation, technology (artificial intelligence, quantum), cyber, and space capabilities in this process. NATO-2030 is a reflection process launched by then-Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in 2020. The aim was to prepare the alliance to be stronger, more cohesive, and competitive in a security environment up to 2030. The process was carried out by an independent group, and the final report was published in November 2020. The report contained 138 recommendations. Stoltenberg’s three priorities were: becoming militarily stronger (strong deterrence and defense), becoming politically stronger (deeper political consultation and unity), and adopting a more global approach (China, Indo-Pacific, global threats). In the NATO-2030 vision, it was defined as a vibrant, useful, relevant, and enduring alliance. While maintaining its core tasks (collective defense, crisis management, cooperative security), adaptation to new threats (Russia, China, hybrid, cyber, space, climate) was required. Strengthening the transatlantic bond while increasing Europe’s defense burden was desired. It noted that the 2010 concept was insufficient and recommended preparing a new concept. This happened at the 2022 Madrid Summit (Russia defined as a threat, China as a systemic challenge). New and Disruptive Technologies (EDT) such as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, quantum, and biotechnology were discussed in terms of increasing NATO’s coordination role. The EDT Strategy’s implementation was integrated into the defense planning process (NDPP). Strengthening national and collective resilience against hybrid threats, disinformation, and climate change was requested. A more proactive stance against China’s rise (cyber, technology, rules-based order) was on the agenda, while a balance of deterrence and dialogue was addressed regarding Russia. Increasing and fairly distributing defense spending was ever-present. Efforts to increase NATO’s role in climate security (security implications of climate change) were included in the text. Deepening relations with Indo-Pacific countries (IP4: Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand) and other partners was desired. NATO-2030 was a vision study that prepared the alliance’s transition from the optimistic approach of the 2010s to strategic great power competition. Most of the recommendations were implemented in the 2022 Madrid Concept and subsequent summits (Vilnius, Washington, The Hague). Significant progress was made especially in technology, China, and resilience areas. This report is one of the basic references for the Ankara 2026 Summit; it has shaped ongoing reforms in areas such as defense spending (%5 target), technology adaptation, and burden sharing.
The 2022 Madrid Strategic Concept returned NATO from its post-Cold War “crisis-focused” structure to an alliance based once again on “collective defense and deterrence.” This document formed the basis for subsequent summits (Vilnius, Washington, The Hague) and actually sets the strategic framework for the Ankara 2026 Summit. Let us review the main points. Russia is once again a threat. Here, Russia was described as “the most significant and direct threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.” Russia, which was seen as a “strategic partner” in the 2010 concept, was defined in 2022 as an “aggressive, expansionist, and revisionist” actor. This came immediately after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Strategic Concept includes deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. China also received its first official reference in this document. China was addressed for the first time at summit level as a “systemic challenge to the Alliance’s interests, security, and values.” China’s military modernization, hybrid activities, coercive diplomacy, and influence in the Indo-Pacific were emphasized. The 360-degree defense approach, resilience (national and collective resilience emphasized as the first line of defense against hybrid threats), technology and innovation (superiority in new warfare domains such as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cyber, and space) were explained. Support for Ukraine was decided, the importance of its sovereignty and territorial integrity was emphasized, and long-term support commitment was made. Another important point was the acceleration of membership processes for Finland and Sweden (one of the most concrete results of the period). On burden sharing, encouragement was given to increase defense spending.
At the Vilnius Summit (2023), “irreversible” support for Ukraine was emphasized, the NATO-Ukraine Council was established, and regional defense plans were approved. The Washington 2024 Summit (NATO’s 75th anniversary) reinforced collective defense and deterrence. Cooperation with the IP4 in the Indo-Pacific axis was deepened; awareness against the China threat was increased. These summits showed that NATO appreciated the shift in the balance of power created by Russia’s expansionism (Black Sea, Eastern Europe, Baltics).
The Hague 2025 Summit, the first major summit in Trump’s second presidential term, was the peak of “burden sharing” discussions. Allies committed to raising defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 (3.5% core defense and 1.5% related security areas). This came under pressure from the Trump administration and was an important step toward increasing Europe’s military capacity. Defense industry production, technology adaptation (artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cyber-space), and support for Ukraine were also on the agenda.
Trump’s “America First” approach viewed the Russia threat as secondary to China and the Pacific axis, bringing the search for peace in Ukraine to the fore. However, the Iran crisis and insufficient support from allies created tension within NATO. Trump softened relations with Russia (Alaska meeting, telephone diplomacy) while increasing pressure on allies for defense spending. In this period, NATO witnessed Europe-centered strengthening; Europe’s development of its own defense capacity is encouraged.
Now let us ask: What could current and future-oriented reforms be? Increasing defense industry production and joint production capacity. New capabilities in cyber, space, hybrid threats, and artificial intelligence. Increasing Europe’s defense burden (European Pillar). Increasing flexibility in command structure and decision-making processes (while preserving the consensus rule).
NATO reforms are usually threat-oriented and proceed gradually. While focusing on “crisis management” after the Cold War, it returned to collective defense and deterrence from 2014 onward. The Ankara 2026 Summit appears critical for the implementation of these reforms and the consolidation of the 5% target.
What can be said about the Ankara 2026 summit? The Ankara Summit (7-8 July), whose preparations were completed with the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Helsinki on 22 May 2026, will build on this accumulation. Expected agenda items:
• Consolidation and implementation of the 5% defense spending commitment.
• Strengthening joint production, dual-use technologies, cyber-space, and artificial intelligence capabilities.
• A support framework in which Europe contributes more to Ukraine.
• Russia’s expansionism, disinformation, the Iran/Hormuz crisis, and nuclear risks.
• Securing global energy corridors and trade flows.
Although Trump’s participation is still uncertain, the summit could acquire a “historic” character. Decisions will largely have been prepared in advance; leaders will express their priorities. While there was a more collective approach in the Biden period, a vision of a “more lethal, faster” NATO under Trump’s pressure comes to the fore.
Thanks to Russia’s aggressive attitude, NATO has made a return close to its founding philosophy (collective defense). The process from Madrid to Ankara demonstrates the alliance’s adaptability. However, elements such as burden sharing under Trump’s leadership, Europe’s autonomous strengthening, and strategic shift toward China will determine the future structure. The Ankara Summit could be an important milestone in this transition. Harmony among allies and concrete steps will shape the alliance’s future.
IV. Proposals for Accelerating NATO Decision-Making Mechanisms
NATO’s basic decision-making mechanism is based on the consensus (unanimity) principle. Every member country has veto power, which protects the alliance’s legitimacy but causes slowdowns in crisis moments. Especially with criticisms of being “too slow” in Trump’s second term, discussions on acceleration have increased. Below is a summary of the current mechanism, NATO-2030 proposals, and current reform ideas.
Current Situation and Problem: As I mentioned earlier, decisions are tied to texts prepared through the silence procedure. What is the problem? A single country’s blockage can stall the entire process; urgent operational decisions may be delayed. There is a systemic aspect to Trump’s current complaint. However, NATO had worked on this possibility in 2020, and the NATO-2030 Vision addressed it.
NATO-2030 Reflection Group Proposals (2020 Report): The NATO-2030 process addressed decision-making reform as one of the priority areas. Strengthening political consultation mechanisms (foreign ministers should meet more frequently, broader-format meetings). Time limits in crisis situations (introducing specific deadlines for decision-making in emergencies, e.g., automatic escalation in case of blockage). Greater support for temporary (ad hoc) coalitions (coalitions of the willing to move quickly without binding the entire alliance—similar to EU PESCO). Making single-country blockages more difficult (raising thresholds especially for blockages arising from external bilateral disputes at ministerial level). Speed in technology and capability development processes (flexibility in the defense planning process).
At this stage, various proposals were developed and discussed. Especially proposals advanced in the Trump period (2025-2026):
Prioritization and Timelines: Introducing clear, applicable time limits for capability development and operational decisions. Results-oriented management instead of procedures.
Minilateralism and Coalition Model: After NAC approval, sub-groups such as a “NATO Contributions Committee” to execute operations. Willing countries using NATO infrastructure but with reduced full consensus requirement.
Strengthening the European Pillar: European countries being able to make faster decisions among themselves (a structure similar to a European Security Council). Europe’s independent action capability if NATO is blocked.
Reform in Defense Industry and Capability Processes: Reducing bureaucracy in joint production, dual-use technologies, and emergency procurement procedures. Models such as giving limited authority to local commanders.
Inclusion of Finance and Defense Ministers: Participation of finance ministers in summits to coordinate burden sharing and spending more quickly.
Example Analysis
After 9/11, NATO’s invocation of Article 5 was a decision taken with the participation of every member. In other demands or situations, procedures under Article 4 come into play, and at the point of decision-making, the positions of countries using veto power affect the outcome.
What happened in the intervention in Libya? On 17 March 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973. The resolution gave authority to take “all necessary measures” to protect civilians and civilian populated areas in Libya, declared a no-fly zone, and called for a ceasefire. It excluded “foreign occupation force.” On 19 March 2011, the Paris Summit was held. France, Britain, the United States, Germany, the Arab League, and UN representatives attended. While the summit was ongoing, French reconnaissance aircraft conducted reconnaissance in Libyan airspace. Meanwhile, many countries (Italy, Canada, Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, etc.) announced they would support the initiative. On the same day in the afternoon (around 16:00-17:00), French jets carried out the first air strike against Gaddafi forces south of Benghazi. The United States and Britain struck air defense systems with Tomahawk missiles. The coalition (led by France, Britain, and the United States) moved into action. The initial attacks were not under NATO command. These were carried out by an international coalition (led by France, Britain, and the United States) based on UN-1973. NATO later became involved. On 23 March 2011, NATO took over the arms embargo operation. On 24-25 March, it accepted the implementation of the no-fly zone. On 31 March, NATO assumed command of all military operations and Operation Unified Protector (OUP) officially began. From this date onward, tasks continued under NATO coordination (until 31 October 2011). Was Article 5 (Collective Defense) used in this application? No, it was not. Libya was not an attack on a member state, so Article 5 did not come into play. NATO fought against an Arab country for the first time in Libya, but this was recorded not as a defense alliance but as a “crisis management” operation under UN authority.
This example gives us the opportunity to analyze from many angles. This means NATO forces can undertake missions in different geographies such as Libya, and can conduct operations under Article 4 if not Article 5. So what was the formula here? Crisis management.
Now let us ask: Didn’t Turkey want a coalition and then NATO operation against the PKK or ISIS terrorist organizations? What did Trump request from his allies regarding Hormuz? NATO should be by his side for political purposes! Could this be achieved? What did NATO crisis management mean? Now, if acceleration of the decision-making mechanism is desired, what does Trump want? What is different?
Expectations in the Context of the Ankara Summit
In line with Trump’s possible criticisms, the following issues may come to the agenda in Ankara (7-8 July 2026): Acceleration of decision-making mechanisms with the criticism “the world has changed, you are still working with old methods.” NATO’s ability to respond more quickly in urgent crises such as Iran/Hormuz. Flexibility and follow-up mechanisms in the implementation of the 5% defense spending commitment.
Completely abolishing the full consensus rule is not realistic (it is the alliance’s fundamental principle). Instead, hybrid models (full consensus, rapid coalitions, and time limits) appear to be the most likely path. If these reforms succeed, NATO can become more “lethal and fast”; otherwise, Europe will accelerate autonomous defense structures.
V. Evaluation of the Ankara NATO Summit (7-8 July 2026) and Possible Scenarios
A. Main Points Regarding the Summit
Trump’s Participation Is Not Yet Certain; Last-Minute Decision Possible: Trump’s participation carries uncertainty in the style of “it will become clear when he boards the plane.” The Turkish side (Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan) is preparing on the assumption that Trump will come and states that positive signals were received in telephone conversations with Erdoğan. However, due to Trump’s style, there is a possibility of surprise until the last moment.
Rubio’s Statement Is Noteworthy: U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed Trump’s participation and described the summit as “probably one of the most important meetings in the history of the alliance.” This indicates that significant discussions will take place.
Preparations Completed by Foreign Ministers: Decision texts were largely prepared at the Helsinki meeting on 22 May 2026. Leaders will express their priorities in Ankara, but the basic text will not change. (This point was explained in the previous section.)
Bilateral Meetings and Future Agenda: Bilateral meetings at the summit will be of critical importance. These meetings will guide the NATO Secretary General’s subsequent steps and the agenda of the next summit. Controversial issues will be clarified here.
Routine Issues: Support for Ukraine, the Russia threat, European burden sharing, and general armament.
Controversial Issues: The Iran War / Strait of Hormuz / nuclear risks and the peace process in Ukraine. Also tensions in the Greenland, Canada, and Arctic Ocean axis (with countries such as Denmark and Britain).
China, Cyber, and Space: These issues have been on the agenda since the 2019 London Summit; they were included as a “systemic challenge” in the 2022 Madrid Concept. No detailed new decisions are expected in Ankara, but emphasis will be placed (in line with NATO-2030 recommendations).
Burden Sharing and Armament: The 5% GDP defense spending commitment (from The Hague 2025) will be consolidated. Dual-use production, drone/missile systems, and defense industry investments will come to the fore. Turkey’s capacity in this area (domestic production advantage) can be emphasized.
Trump’s Iran and Global Perspective: Trump frequently criticizes allies for insufficient support in the Iran operation. The question “Why didn’t we use NATO in Hormuz?” may come to the agenda. With NATO-2030 and the new strategic concept in place, acceleration of the alliance’s decision-making mechanisms and evaluation of global opportunities (China, energy corridors, Arctic) will be demanded. (We examined the acceleration of decision-making mechanisms earlier.)
Turning Point Potential: Will the summit be a routine meeting or will it evolve into reform discussions with Trump’s criticism that “the world has changed, you are still acting according to old methods”? This will also affect Trump’s participation decision.
B. Possible Scenarios and Analyses
Scenario-1: Trump Participates and a Constructive/Controlled Summit Takes Place: Trump praises the implementation of the 5% defense spending commitment, accepts Europe taking more burden on Ukraine, and receives promises of limited Iran support. Results: Transatlantic tension decreases, NATO unity is consolidated. European defense industry moves accelerate. Turkey gains prestige. However, due to Trump’s “America First” priorities (focus on China), deep reform remains limited. The summit is evaluated as “successful but ordinary.”
Scenario-2: Trump Participates, Sharp Discussions and Tension Occur (Most Likely): Trump openly criticizes allies (some European countries) that did not provide support in Iran, brings Greenland/Canada issues to the table, and says decision-making mechanisms are “too slow.” Results: Short-term crisis arises, some allies (especially Northern Europe) accelerate European autonomous defense plans (European pillar). In the long term, progress on the 5% target and concrete commitments on defense production can be obtained. Ankara goes down in history as a “tense but transformative” summit. Trump’s “historic” emphasis is realized.
Scenario-3: Trump Does Not Participate (Low Probability, Despite Rubio and Fidan Confirmations): Trump does not come for “domestic agenda” or “more important” reasons and is represented by his Vice President or Secretary of State. Results: The summit proceeds ordinarily, European leaders agree more among themselves, and “European plans” strengthen. Trump-NATO tension increases, the next summit becomes more critical. NATO’s preparation for “America-less” scenarios accelerates.
Scenario-4: Unexpected Concrete Steps and Turning Point (Optimistic):Limited NATO support mechanism (logistics or maritime security) on Iran, a peace framework in Ukraine, and progress on decision-making reform (acceleration) are recorded. Results: Ankara truly becomes “historic.” The NATO-2030 vision materializes, a more global alliance profile emerges against China and new threats. Trump declares “victory,” and transatlantic relations are rebalanced. However, this depends on allies giving Trump significant concessions.
General Evaluation: The Ankara Summit will be the most important test of the transition from the Biden period’s collective approach to Trump’s pressuring and results-oriented style. The most critical factor is Trump’s level of satisfaction regarding Iran and burden sharing. The summit can permanently bring discussions on accelerating NATO’s decision-making mechanisms to the agenda.
VI. Conclusion
NATO is evolving. NATO is becoming more European. Here, Turkey’s importance manifests itself due to geopolitical reasons and its moves in the defense industry. Aside from the European perspective, NATO in general has adapted to the times through adaptation processes up to now and will take similar steps in the future; its institutional structure has the capabilities to cope with these processes. However, only in cases of very major global ruptures can major disruptions emerge; since the United States does not mean Trump, the issue we need to focus on is the general state of the world or global balances.
The NATO Ankara Summit is important and will be successfully carried out; in my opinion, it even has the potential to be historic. Because beyond the reflection of ordinary matters in decisions, during the summit leaders will make “new global readings” regarding important changes and will activate “new persuasion” methods for each other.
If the systemic issue of NATO’s rapid decision-making is decided in Ankara, this already means a historic change. However, members must agree on a middle ground here; while trying to keep up with the times, they must not harm the foundations of democracy and peacefulness. Therefore, this discussion may continue a bit longer, or perhaps hybrid procedural models (full consensus, rapid coalitions, and time limits) will be put into effect.
