Wednesday, February 11, 2026

FP Foreign Policy - February 11, 2026, 12:26 PM - NATO Has Become a Zombie Alliance - European leaders must revive it before disaster strikes.- By Rebecca Lissner, a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.

 FP  Foreign  Policy 

NATO Has Become a Zombie Alliance

European leaders must revive it before disaster strikes.

By , a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
A group of dozens of people covered in gray clay walk in a mass crowd with blank expressions on their faces, arms limp at their sides. Many wear business suits and other formal clothing beneath the caked-on clay.
A group of dozens of people covered in gray clay walk in a mass crowd with blank expressions on their faces, arms limp at their sides. Many wear business suits and other formal clothing beneath the caked-on clay.
Performance artists covered in clay to look like zombies walk trance-like through the city center in Hamburg, Germany on July 5, 2017. Sean Gallup/Getty Images

With dust barely settled from Davos, global leaders will convene again in Europe this week for the Munich Security Conference. On the conference’s main stage and in countless private meetings, the future of the trans-Atlantic alliance will top the agenda. Some leaders, such as NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, may attempt to explain away the recent crisis over Greenland, asserting that any post-American concept for European security is nothing short of delusional. But that perspective, however hopeful, is losing credibility. Worse, it undermines the urgency that this moment of crisis requires.

Rather than lulling themselves into a false sense of security, the United States’ European allies must accept an uncomfortable—and unfortunate—reality: NATO has become a zombie alliance. Formally, its procedural features remain intact. There is a bustling headquarters in Brussels, an empowered American supreme allied commander, and formidable military capabilities deployed across the continent.

But the alliance’s animating spirit—the U.S. commitment to collective defense under Article V of the founding charter—is gone. Without that life force, NATO lacks the credibility and trust that have reassured allies and deterred adversaries for decades. A revival is possible, but it will require Europeans to take ownership of the alliance before it’s too late.


U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term already created a crisis of confidence for NATO. The president repeatedly criticized the alliance, calling it “obsolete” and “very unfair” to the United States while excoriating allies for not paying their share of defense spending.

More alarming, he portrayed the Article V mutual defense clause as conditional. Trump privately considered withdrawing from the alliance and publicly mused about leaving NATO if allies did not “pay their bills.” Admittedly, these broadsides were interspersed with reassuring messages from Trump and his first-term team, but allies’ anxiety persisted. By 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron had pronounced NATO “brain-dead.”

Yet Macron’s words were premature. NATO survived and even thrived. The nadir of the first Trump term was followed by remarkable alliance unity under U.S. President Joe Biden. The alliance cooperated on a concerted response to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine while a growing number of allies met their defense spending commitments and Finland and Sweden joined as new members.

For much of the past year, it seemed as though NATO could weather the storm of another Trump presidency. The 2025 NATO summit at The Hague avoided controversy and delivered Trump a big win with allies’ commitment to increase defense and defense-adjacent spending to 5 percent of their GDPs. Rutte developed a shamelessly obsequious relationship with Trump, which served to keep lines of communication open between the White House and Brussels. Even some of the most concerning pro-Russia turns in Trump’s Ukraine policy were largely reversed after European pushback.

But this time is different. The crisis over Greenland is unlike any that has come before, and it follows on a series of U.S. moves that have exposed the hollowness at NATO’s core. Trump’s proclaimed willingness to use military force to annex Greenland represents a threat to invade one of Washington’s most steadfast NATO allies. He then threatened escalating tariffs against the eight allies who opposed Washington’s imperial quest and, for good measure, suggested that he might not defend Greenland against Russia or China.

The Greenland episode exposed the fiction of appeasement as a sustainable strategy for Europe. Rutte was able to broker a framework agreement that pacified Trump for the time being. But the deal reached at the World Economic Forum meetings in Davos, Switzerland, was essentially a fig leaf, more of a detente than a permanent settlement of the Greenland issue.

What is more, Trump’s Greenland threats built on two months of mounting trans-Atlantic abuse. In December, the White House released a stunning National Security Strategy that downplayed the Russian threat to Europe, warned of the continent’s “civilizational erasure,” and called for political intervention in support of far-right, anti-EU parties. The month prior, Trump shocked the world by trying to force a pro-Russian 28-point peace plan upon Ukraine and its European supporters. Even though he belatedly walked it back, the damage was done.

These events have exposed NATO as an essentially hollow alliance, lacking signs of life in the areas that matter most. NATO’s heart has always been Article V—a commitment by the United States to come to allies’ defense if attacked. Though Washington’s true willingness to “trade New York for Paris,” as Charles de Gaulle memorably put it, was always a question, the U.S. commitment was credible enough over decades to keep the peace. This credibility derived from the capabilities that the United States deployed forward in Europe—but also from the attestations of political will and the postwar legacy of trust that bound nations across the Atlantic.

Today, it is hard to imagine Trump making the decision to intervene in defense of a NATO ally. His affinity clearly lies with Russia, and Russian President Vladimir Putin knows it. There are all too many ways that Moscow might capitalize on this: a major escalation of Russia’s ongoing sabotage campaign in NATO countries, an attempt to seize a land bridge through Lithuania to Kaliningrad, or a purportedly humanitarian operation to protect Russian speakers in Estonia. If Putin acted quickly enough and with the right cover story, how would Washington respond? Perhaps the political and reputational pressure would prove overwhelming for Trump. But who would stake their safety on his willingness to act decisively and risk war with Russia over a sliver of Baltic territory?

While elites in NATO capitals have been navigating stages of grief, European publics seem to understand the dire state of affairs. Polling conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations shows that, even before the Greenland crisis reached its recent fever pitch, only 16 percent of EU citizens viewed the United States as an ally, whereas 20 percent saw Washington as a rival or adversary.

The question, then, for leaders gathered in Munich’s ornate Hotel Bayerischer Hof this week is: Where does NATO go from here?

NATO could limp along in a zombie state, avoiding crisis but failing to meet the moment. A Trump-pacification strategy, with a steady stream of splashy announcements about defense spending, could be enough to forestall a high-profile rupture.

But this will mean little if European leaders refuse to translate those promised euros into real capabilities. Without politically difficult choices, NATO’s European members may well fall short of the estimated $1 trillion in necessary investments to provide for their own defense. As a result, the alliance would gain in capability and fill some shortfalls, but it would still fail to achieve real security autonomy. In other words, Europe’s future would continue to rest on the credibility of Washington’s commitment to Article V.

This might be fine if the alliance is never tested. But it would spell the death of NATO if either Trump or Putin decided to act. Trump, for his part, could simply make good on his threats and withdraw. Even if the United States were still legally bound to the North Atlantic Treaty, an executive order (or even a Truth Social post) announcing the United States’ departure would be enough to kill the alliance. Putin, for his part, has long sought the demise of NATO and may decide to force Trump’s hand through an act of aggression. Even if the alliance chose to avoid invoking Article V as a means of saving face, this in itself would be fatal.

The better alternative is for European leaders to act before it’s too late. NATO can regenerate itself by building a European pillar of the alliance that stands on its own, with or without the United States. The EU has unlocked significant resources, and NATO members have ratcheted up defense spending targets. If European allies can translate these plans and pledges into focused and coordinated investments, with time, they will be able to grow their defense industrial base and generate meaningful defense capabilities.

Europe faces gaps in air defense and space launch; strategic lift; long-range strike; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. But the continent also has resources that it can mobilize to fill them and bolster these conventional capabilities. In the nuclear realm, France and Britain could adapt their arsenals to provide something resembling European extended deterrence. And the coalition of the willing, founded to coordinate Ukraine policy, could become the kernel of a decision-making body that influences NATO from the outside in. A glimpse of this future was just on display, when NATO allies conducted a major exercise—Steadfast Dart—with 10,000 troops from 11 nations, but not a single U.S. weapon or soldier.

European leaders can’t control what Trump or Putin do. But they can anticipate the worst and prepare accordingly. If NATO’s European members want the alliance to survive, they must face reality this week in Munich. This means rejecting any attempts at reassurance from the Trump administration and abandoning the comforting illusion that the pre-Trump status quo will return after Trump’s gone. Only by recognizing that NATO has become a zombie can European leaders do what it takes to bring the alliance back from the dead.

This post appeared in FP's The Reading List newsletter. Sign up here.

Rebecca Lissner is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. She served as a deputy assistant to the president and principal deputy national security advisor to the vice president in the Biden-Harris administration. X: @RebeccaLissner

FP - By Azriel Bermant, - February 9, 2026, 7:00 AM - Why Missile Defense Now Raises the Risk of War - The delusion of invulnerability tempts leaders to take risk

 Analysis

Why Missile Defense Now Raises the Risk of War

The delusion of invulnerability tempts leaders to take risks.

By , a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague.
Donald Trump presents Golden Dome missile defense
Donald Trump presents Golden Dome missile defense
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks in front of an illustration of his proposed Golden Dome missile defense system in the White House in Washington on May 20, 2025. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

As the United States deploys anti-missile batteries to the Middle East as part of its force buildup in the region, the idea that these systems are a purely defensive means to shield against attacks—and thereby deter an adversary from attacking in the first place—is looking increasingly unconvincing. Instead, the current round of conflict in the Middle East suggests the opposite: A reliable anti-missile shield could just as well create an incentive for escalation. If policymakers believe that their state is secure behind the shield, they may calculate that their own offensive military actions carry significantly lower risk.

The purely defensive and de-escalatory case for anti-missile systems is easily made. Exhibit A is Ukraine, where the the Kremlin’s perceptions of Ukraine’s vulnerability—including its lack of missile defense—incentivized Russia to attack in 2022. Between February and May that year, Moscow fired more than 2,000 cruise and ballistic missiles at Ukrainian military installations, infrastructure, and population centers in an attempt to clear the way for taking over the country. Had Ukraine been able to deploy large numbers of sophisticated anti-missile systems, the Russian leadership may have calculated the risks of an invasion very differently.

In the Middle East, too, the logic of missile defense has long been defensive and de-escalatory. When Hamas launched a series of rocket attacks against Israeli population centers in 2012, the effectiveness of Israel’s Iron Dome removed the need for Israel to launch a costly and bloody ground offensive into Gaza. Whether in Israel or Ukraine, even a partially successful missile defense has great value in strengthening public morale and degrading the missile threat posed by adversaries.

Indeed, by devaluing Iran’s missile threat, Israel’s air defenses have contributed to the weakening of the regime in Tehran. In funding Israel’s Arrow 3, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome systems, Washington’s objective was not just to support a key ally but also to make war less likely by degrading the ability of Israel’s adversaries to attack.

Iran’s strikes on Israel in April 2024 also reinforce this argument. With 99 per cent of the approximately 320 Iranian missiles and drones intercepted by Israel’s missile defense systems, as well as U.S., British, French, and Jordanian forces, the Biden administration viewed this success as a reason for self-restraint. “Take the win,” then-U.S. President Joe Biden reportedly advised Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, referring to Israel’s killing of a number of senior generals in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Damascus, which had preceded the unsuccessful Iranian missile attack.

Today, this defensive logic has been turned on its head. Under the Trump administration, missile defense seems not so much a tool to lower tensions but a shorter fuse to war. Rather than disincentivizing the use of force, the psychological reassurance provided by missile and drone defense may increase the temptation to take calculated risks.

This new calculus clearly shaped Israel’s decision to launch air attacks against Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs last June. Iran’s vulnerability to aerial attacks following Israel’s destruction of its Russian-supplied air defenses strengthened Netanyahu’s resolve to strike. At the same time, Israeli confidence in the effectiveness of its own missile and drone shield fortified its belief that it could absorb the inevitable Iranian retaliatory strikes with manageable civilian casualties.

What the new offensive logic of missile defense ignores, however, is the increased vulnerability caused by overreliance on missile shields. Israel’s shield was far less successful in 2025 than 2024. According to the Israel Defense Forces, air defenses intercepted 86 percent of the Iranian missiles during the 12-day war. At least 33 Israelis were killed and more than 3,500 were wounded. The brief conflict also left Israel’s stock of missile interceptors severely depleted. In December, former Israeli National Security Council head Eyal Hulata warned that Israel’s defensive capabilities will struggle to keep pace with Iran’s missile production. Nearly one-third of Israelis still lack adequate protection against missile attacks.

Even as the Trump administration rushes Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries to the region, it is operating under the dangerous illusion that its allies are now missile-proof. In reality, an Iranian regime with its back to the wall—and capable of extreme brutality, as we have recently seen—will have every reason to try and overwhelm the defenses of its adversaries, especially if it senses that the Israeli missile shield is vulnerable. As we saw in the 12-day war, Iran did not hesitate in attacking Israeli population centers. Were it to succeed in causing large-scale civilian casualties in a future confrontation, the prospect of further dangerous escalation would be palpable.

The potentially destabilizing effects of missile defense are not restricted to the Middle East. U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambitions for a Golden Dome to protect the U.S. homeland risks undermining the fragile nuclear balance with Russia and China. By openly planning a universal defense against all threats—not just rogue actors like Iran and North Korea—Trump is triggering a classic security dilemma, whereby the actions taken by one state to strengthen its own security are seen by its adversary as a threat, regardless of the first state’s intent. By merely increasing its own chances of survival, the security dilemma theory posits, a state will invariably threaten the survival of its rival.

U.S. adversaries now fear the worst, viewing a shield against all threats as a potential prelude to a first strike. Thus, the shield will induce them to strengthen their own offensive capabilities to break through. At the height of the Cold War, each superpower’s fear that its rival would enjoy nuclear superiority prompted a dangerous arms race.

The arms control agreements of the late Cold War and early post-Cold War period emerged out of the recognition that nuclear competition was fueling even greater uncertainty and instability, raising the risk of nuclear war. A series of agreements on the limitation, reduction, and elimination of nuclear weapons thus strengthened stability and security while minimizing the likelihood of nuclear confrontation.

This framework of nuclear security and arms control has now disintegrated. Since the Feb. 5 expiration of New START, a treaty that limited the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads by the United States and Russia, there are now no more legal constraints on these weapons for the first time in 50 years. Nothing remains to prevent another era of dangerous nuclear competition.

The controversy over Golden Dome revives concerns from more than 40 years ago, when the Reagan administration unveiled its Strategic Defense Initiative—a never-implemented plan for a space-based missile defense colloquially known as “Star Wars.” The Soviet Union feared that the program would neutralize its own strategic deterrent and make it vulnerable to a U.S. attack; even many U.S. allies feared its potentially destabilizing impact on the nuclear balance.

In previous decades, the United States and the Soviet Union had each developed ground-based anti-missile technologies in a first attempt to make their home territories less vulnerable to nuclear destruction. At the same time, each side recognized that missile defense could damage strategic stability and spark a costly new arms race. The result of these worries was the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which severely restricted ballistic missile defense.

The controversy reignited in the post-Cold War era, when then-U.S. President George W. Bush announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the ABM Treaty in 2001. Reminiscent of the “Star Wars” debate, his administration later announced plans to deploy a missile tracking radar in the Czech Republic and missile interceptors in Poland. Many European countries were opposed to those plans amid unease over the future of arms control and relations with Russia and China.

Today, Russian President Vladimir Putin echoes Soviet paranoia over the negation of Russia’s nuclear second-strike capability by U.S. interceptors. This has driven his obsession with hypersonic glide vehicles and nuclear-armed cruise missiles that can supposedly evade missile defenses. It is no coincidence that Putin framed these weapons as a response to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. When Russia and China believe that the United States could prepare for a first strike under the cover of a shield, they will redouble their efforts to overcome it.

There remains a very strong case to be made for defensive shields over vulnerable countries in Europe and the Middle East. If proof is needed, just look at the nightly Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian power plants, maternity clinics, and apartment blocks. Yet the quest for total invulnerability is not making the world safer. The Trump administration’s reckless approach—combining the push for missile defense with its willingness to aggressively intervene abroad—raises the risks of fatal miscalculations. With its overreliance on missile defense, the United States is laying the foundations for volatile and unpredictable global conflict.

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Anadolu Ajansı Trump'tan Netanyahu'ya "İran'la müzakereler, anlaşma sağlanıp sağlanamayacağı görülene kadar sürecek" mesajı ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, İsrail Başbakanı Binyamin Netanyahu ile görüşmesinin çok verimli geçtiğini belirterek, "İran’la müzakerelerin, bir anlaşma sağlanıp sağlanamayacağı görülene kadar süreceği" mesajını verdi Hakan Çopur, Faruk Hanedar | 11.02.2026 - Güncelleme : 11.02.2026

 Anadolu Ajansı 

Trump'tan Netanyahu'ya "İran'la müzakereler, anlaşma sağlanıp sağlanamayacağı görülene kadar sürecek" mesajı

ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, İsrail Başbakanı Binyamin Netanyahu ile görüşmesinin çok verimli geçtiğini belirterek, "İran’la müzakerelerin, bir anlaşma sağlanıp sağlanamayacağı görülene kadar süreceği" mesajını verdi

Hakan Çopur, Faruk Hanedar  |

11.02.2026 - Güncelleme : 11.02.2026


Trump'tan Netanyahu'ya "İran'la müzakereler, anlaşma sağlanıp sağlanamayacağı görülene kadar sürecek" mesajı

Washington

Beyaz Saray'da basına kapalı görüşmede İsrail Başbakanı Netanyahu ile bir araya gelen ABD Başkanı Trump, Amerikan Truth Social hesabından görüşmeye ilişkin bir açıklama yaptı.


Görüşmenin çok iyi geçtiğini bildiren Trump, "İran’la müzakerelerin, bir anlaşma sağlanıp sağlanamayacağını görmek için sürmesi yönündeki ısrarım dışında kesin bir sonuca varılmadı." değerlendirmesinde bulundu.


Trump, kendisinin, İran'la bir anlaşmaya varılmasını tercih ettiğini Netanyahu'ya bildirdiğini kaydederek, "Eğer (İran'la anlaşma) sağlanamazsa, sonucun ne olacağını bekleyip göreceğiz. Geçen sefer İran anlaşma yapmamanın daha iyi olacağını düşündü ve bu onlar için iyi sonuçlanmadı. Umarım bu sefer daha makul ve sorumlu davranırlar." ifadelerini kullandı.


Gazze ile Orta Doğu'daki son durumu Netanyahu ile değerlendirdiklerini aktaran Trump, "Artık Orta Doğu'da gerçek bir barış var." yorumunu yaptı.


Netanyahu, Trump'tan İran ile anlaşmada "güvenlik gereksinimlerinin" göz önünde bulundurulmasını istedi.


İsrail Başbakanlık Ofisi de Netanyahu-Trump görüşmesinde İran ile müzakereler, Gazze ve bölgesel gelişmelerin ele alındığını açıkladı.


Görüşmenin ardından yapılan açıklamada, İsrail Başbakanı Netanyahu'nun İran ile müzakereler kapsamında İsrail'in güvenlik gereksinimlerini vurguladığı ve iki liderin aralarındaki koordinasyon ve yakın temasın sürdürülmesi konusunda mutabık kaldığı belirtildi.


Öte yandan İsrail devlet televizyonu KAN'ın görüşmenin ardından yayınladığı haberde, Tel Aviv yönetiminin ABD ile İran arasındaki müzakerelerde anlaşmaya varılacağını düşünmediği aktarıldı.


Haberde, İsrail'in, "İran'ın zaman kazanmaya" çalıştığına ve anlaşmaya varılma ihtimalinin yüksek olmadığına inandığı kaydedilirken, Netanyahu'nun görüşmede Trump'a "yapılacak en iyi anlaşmanın İran'ın sonsuza kadar nükleer silah elde etmesini engelleyecek bir anlaşma olduğu" mesajını verdiği ifade edildi.


Netanyahu ile Trump arasında Beyaz Saray'da basına kapalı yapılan görüşme iki buçuk saatten fazla sürdü.









 


FP - February 9, 2026, 9:51 AM - The Post-Cold War Nuclear Era Might Have Just Ended The world is a more dangerous place as New START expires and China’s nuclear arsenal grows.-- By Fareed Zakaria

 The Post-Cold War Nuclear Era Might Have Just Ended

The world is a more dangerous place as New START expires and China’s nuclear arsenal grows.

By Fareed Zakaria, the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and the author, most recently, of Age of Revolutions.

A man in a gray suit stands in the foreground of four camouflaged ballistic missiles on trucks.

Nuclear capable DF-31BJ ballistic missiles are unveiled during a military parade marking the end of World War II in the Pacific in Beijing on Sept. 3, 2025. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

February 9, 2026, 9:51 AM


We all sense that the world is entering a more uncertain phase. Alliances feel shakier, trade is fragmenting, and great powers are jostling more openly. But beneath these visible shifts lies something less discussed and more dangerous: the slow collapse of nuclear stability.


For much of the Cold War, people were terrified that a world with nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to proliferation and that wars would end up nuclear. After all, rarely in human history has a weapon sat unused in arsenals. But that is what happened. The arsenals remained, but they were bound by treaties, habits and doctrines about restraint. Arms control agreements capped numbers. Deterrence relationships were relatively clear. Proliferation was constrained, if imperfectly, by norms and pressure. It was not a safe world—but it was a stable one.


That era might be at an end.


The clearest marker was the expiration this week of New START, the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia. There are now no legally binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals for the first time in more than 50 years. Some hope this will be a brief interregnum, and efforts have begun to find a successor agreement. But the broader context is not encouraging.


When New START was signed in 2010, it reflected a different world. Russia’s strategic weapons were aging. China’s nuclear arsenal was small and oriented toward what was called “minimum deterrence.” Now, as Eric Edelman and Franklin Miller write in Foreign Affairs, that world “no longer exists.”


Russia has modernized roughly 95 percent of its strategic nuclear forces, at least according to President Vladimir Putin. More worrying, Moscow has built a vast regional nuclear arsenal—experts estimating some 1,500 tactical weapons deployable from land, air and sea. These systems fell outside New START altogether. During the war in Ukraine, Putin has repeatedly invoked nuclear threats, engaging in a scary game of blackmail.


China’s trajectory may be even more consequential. When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, China possessed roughly 240 nuclear warheads. Today it has more than 600 and is on track to reach 1,000 by 2030, according to U.S. estimates. China is fielding a full nuclear triad—land-based missiles, ballistic-missile submarines and air-launched weapons—and moving toward more frequent levels of high alert, including the capacity for “launch on warning”: launching while an adversary’s missiles are still in the air.


The Biden administration sought to slow this buildup through dialogue, pressing Beijing to enter nuclear arms discussions. The response was blunt. China would seriously talk only when its arsenal matched more closely that of the U.S. and Russia. As Edelman and Miller note, Beijing views transparency and verification not as confidence-building measures but as vulnerabilities. Arms control is seen as a constraint to be avoided.


The result is a three-sided nuclear competition, far more complex than the bipolar standoff of the Cold War. The Economist captures the shift with a vivid image: What Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the atomic bomb, once called “two scorpions in a bottle” has become three—the more crowded bottle means the scorpions are less predictable.


This matters because deterrence grows more fragile as the system grows more complex. A bipolar nuclear world was dangerous but legible. A tripolar—or multipolar—one is not. Russia and China are cooperating more closely, exchanging technology and conducting joint military exercises, sometimes involving nuclear-capable forces. A bipartisan U.S. Strategic Posture Commission warned in 2023 of the risk of “opportunistic aggression” or even coordinated pressure across multiple theaters. American nuclear forces, designed for a largely bilateral rivalry, weren’t meant to deter two peer adversaries simultaneously.


Arms races are dangerous. Numbers creep up. Doctrines blur. The risk of miscalculation rises—not just in war but also in crises, exercises or moments of panic. Modern nuclear systems are increasingly entangled with cyber networks, space-based sensors and compressed decision timelines. A false alarm or misread signal can escalate far faster than in the past.


Read More

A view of an oil facility on Khark Island, in the Persian Gulf, on March 12, 2017.

A view of an oil facility on Khark Island, in the Persian Gulf, on March 12, 2017.

An Oil Deal for Trump Can Mean a Nuclear Deal for Iran

Venezuela offers a potential diplomatic model for Washington and Tehran.


Analysis | Esfandyar Batmanghelidj

U.S. President Donald Trump shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

U.S. President Donald Trump shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Why Trump Should Accept Putin’s New START Offer

Extending the nuclear treaty is not about trust—it’s about pragmatism.


Argument | Ariel Petrovics

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to journalists as he attends the world premiere of Amazon MGM Studios' "Melania" at the Kennedy Center in Washington on Jan. 29.

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to journalists as he attends the world premiere of Amazon MGM Studios' "Melania" at the Kennedy Center in Washington on Jan. 29.

The Real ‘Civilizational Erasure’ Is Happening in America

Trump’s expansion of state power undermines the West’s core achievement: limits on authority.


Argument | Fareed Zakaria

The danger does not stop with the major powers. According to the New York Times, about 40 countries have the technical skills to produce nuclear weapons.


For decades, nuclear nonproliferation rested on a bargain: Most countries would forgo nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees and the promise that nuclear states would manage their arsenals responsibly. Both pillars are now under strain.


As doubts grow about America’s willingness to protect allies consistently, some are quietly reassessing their options. In South Korea, debate about acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent has moved from the margins toward the mainstream. In Japan, once-unthinkable discussions are now whispered among strategists. If such moves begin in northeast Asia, they will not end there.


We are drifting from managed deterrence toward competitive rearmament, from limits toward accumulation, from predictability toward improvisation.


For decades, we lived under the shadow of the most powerful weapons in history and learned, imperfectly, how not to use them. That achievement is a landmark but may prove to be fragile and temporary.


This article was originally published in the Washington Post and republished here as part of a regular syndication of Fareed Zakaria’s work.


This post appeared in FP's The Reading List newsletter. Sign up here.


Fareed Zakaria is the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and the author, most recently, of Age of Revolutions. He writes a weekly Washington Post column, which is also syndicated in Foreign Policy. X: @FareedZakaria

FP (Foreign Policy) - The Real Risk After New START Isn’t Arms Racing Without the treaty, nuclear forces will become hard to verify and harder to trust. - February 9, 2026, 1:54 PM

 Argument

An expert’s point of view on a current event.

The Real Risk After New START Isn’t Arms Racing

Without the treaty, nuclear forces will become hard to verify and harder to trust.

By , an associate research analyst at CNA, a 
 nonprofit research and analysis organization based in Washington.
The Spain Hall of the Prague Castle is prepared ahead of a meeting between U.S. and Russian leaders, where  the New START nuclear arms control will be signed, in Prague on April 6, 2010.
The Spain Hall of the Prague Castle is prepared ahead of a meeting between U.S. and Russian leaders, where the New START nuclear arms control will be signed, in Prague on April 6, 2010.
The Spain Hall of the Prague Castle is prepared ahead of a meeting between U.S. and Russian leaders, where the New START nuclear arms control will be signed, in Prague on April 6, 2010. Michal Cizek/AFP via Getty Images

New START, the last remaining major U.S.-Russia arms control treaty, is now confirmed dead. While there has been repeated talk about extending it or negotiating some kind of stopgap deal, interest in perpetuating the treaty has cratered. This is due in part to Washington’s growing skepticism about Russian compliance and, perhaps more importantly, U.S. President Donald Trump’s stated desire to pursue a new arms control framework of his own—one that would include China.

With New START gone, there are no longer any legal constraints preventing the United States and Russia from expanding their nuclear arsenals. What such an expansion might look like remains unclear. There are, however, some material constraints, and neither the United States nor Russia is currently well positioned to exploit the removal of limits in any dramatic way.

Both countries have struggled to modernize their nuclear forces and production facilities. While each could draw from existing arsenals to increase their number of deployed missiles, neither is currently capable of engaging in a Cold War-style arms race. Even China—despite having spent the past decade modernizing every aspect of its nuclear weapons enterprise—is now facing delays. The U.S. Department of Defense’s recent China military power report, for instance, stated that China is currently struggling to build fast breeder reactors for producing plutonium.

The most troubling consequence of New START’s collapse is not that the United States and Russia will dramatically expand their arsenals in the near term. It is that in the long run, both the United States and Russia could modify their forces in other ways that destroy any remaining mutual trust and make returning to a future arms control process far more difficult.

It is often forgotten just how much of the United States’ and Russia’s nuclear forces—including how weapons are categorized, where they are based, and how they are prepared for combat—has been shaped by decades of arms control treaty mechanisms designed to minimize cheating and improve accountability. New START and the treaties that came before it, dating back to 1972, imposed detailed restrictions and definitions intended to ensure that verification of both sides’ compliance was feasible.

These provisions mattered because verification was—and remains—difficult. During the Cold War, remote detection via national technical means was expensive, slow, and not of particularly good quality. Even with on-site inspections, there was always a risk that missiles could be hidden, moved, or disguised.

To mitigate these challenges, arms control treaties have established clear definitions for things such as missile bases, required each side to declare their locations, prohibited operating missiles from undeclared areas, and under New START barred deliberate concealment of nuclear forces from the other’s watching satellites.

At the time, these rules did not significantly degrade the survivability of mobile nuclear forces because the available technology could not quickly track missiles in the field. Today, that is no longer the case. Government and commercial remote-sensing capabilities are far more technically advanced and robust than during the Cold War. Advances in cyberweapons add a new layer of risk: On-site inspections could expose vulnerabilities in production or deployment infrastructure that might later be exploited.

If one side believes the other intends to exploit transparency measures in this way to cement their nuclear supremacy—a concern Russia and China have repeatedly raised about the United States—then revealing any information at all could be a serious hazard to a state’s ability to withstand a nuclear first strike. The rational response would be to seal off nuclear forces from external observation altogether.

These are precisely the concerns that have driven China’s nuclear posture. Never bound by arms control treaties, China developed its nuclear forces unconstrained by any verification mechanism. Unlike the United States and Russia, which openly declare and display the locations of their nuclear forces, China uses concealment, deception, and secrecy to ensure the survivability of its arsenal. For instance, it disguises its mobile forces as box trucks (or, hilariously, mail trucks) and utilizes specially built secret tunnels to house its intercontinental ballistic missiles—both of which would be considered New START violations.

Without an arms control treaty that constrains this kind of obfuscation, the United States and Russia are free to adopt similar measures. If, for example, Russia believed that advances in U.S. remote detection threaten the survivability of its mobile forces, it could mirror China’s behavior and alter its basing and operating practices in ways that were previously prohibited—moving its nuclear forces around more frequently, operating from undeclared locations, or concealing its exact number of deployed warheads.

These issues will come to a head if negotiations on a successor treaty drag on or if Trump insists on bringing China into the process. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged this explicitly on Friday: “We understand that this process can take time. Past agreements, including New START, took years to negotiate and were built upon decades of precedent. They were also between two powers, not three or more.”

If negotiating a new arms control treaty among three states is truly something that is going to take years, if not a decade, then the arms control window may already be closing. The longer this dynamic persists, the greater the risk that both sides will drift from postures designed to maximize verification toward ones that are inherently, and perhaps intentionally, difficult to verify.

Such changes would, in turn, breed further distrust, as efforts to enhance survivability of mobile forces could be interpreted as attempts to mask force size or evade monitoring altogether. The result would be a feedback loop of mistrust that would make any future arms control measures progressively harder. Attempting to rope in China would make the entire process grind to a halt, as the United States would likely demand verification mechanisms that would be fundamentally incompatible with China’s current basing method.

These are not easy problems to solve. They may, in fact, be unsolvable given advances in technology for tracking mobile forces and the development of cyberweapons. If even the most mundane piece of information about an enemy’s nuclear force is now a potential attack vector, negotiating what can safely be revealed becomes extraordinarily difficult.

Ultimately, the biggest risks stemming from the collapse of New START have little to do with warhead or delivery vehicle numbers. Rather, they lie in the gradual erosion of trust between the United States and Russia, compounded by a changing technical reality that incentivizes posture changes. How this will unfold is impossible to predict. What is clear, however, is that negotiating the arms control treaty of tomorrow may be far more difficult than the Trump administration expects. As Rubio said, it’s a process that will take years. We should be prepared for the possibility that it may take a decade for any new arms control treaty to enter into force—and for all major nuclear states to become more evasive in the meantime.

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Decker Eveleth is an associate research analyst at CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis organization based in Washington. He studies foreign nuclear postures utilizing satellite imagery. He holds a master’s degree from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and a bachelor’s degree from Reed College.