The Trump Summit
July 9, 2026
NATO’s Ankara Summit was probably the most extravagant in the Alliance’s history. A day before the Summit, in a social media message, the Turkish Presidency’s Head of Communications, Duran, said, “At the invitation of our President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President Donald Trump of the United States of America will pay an official visit to our country on 7 July 2026.”
Given the long-standing problems in Turkish-US relations and President Trump’s continuing praise for President Erdoğan, it was clear from the outset that, from the AKP government’s perspective, the NATO Summit would be a Trump Summit. It indeed was.
Trump’s visit was a state visit. On such visits to Türkiye, foreign heads of state and government always pay their respects to the founder of the Republic at the Atatürk Mausoleum. President Trump did not go there. This put him in the small group of former Iranian presidents Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and the Saudi Kings. Yes, neither did other NATO leaders go to the Mausoleum. However, they were in Ankara for a NATO meeting, and not on a state visit, and those of them who had previously been in Ankara on earlier bilateral official visits had already visited the Mausoleum.
The NATO Summit witnessed a new round of military strikes exchanged between Iran and the US. It was interesting from a regional point of view that while millions of Iranians were on the streets for the funeral of former Supreme Leader Khamenei and chanting “death to Trump”, and hundreds of thousands of mourners filled the streets of the Iraqi city of Najaf on Wednesday, also chanting, praying and weeping for Iran’s late supreme leader, the US President was Ankara’s guest of honor at the summit. That alone shows, beyond the recent military escalation between Iran and the US, the difficulties in turning the Middle East from a region of endless conflict to one of peace and stability.
The escalation prompting Trump to declare the Iran-US MOU, or ceasefire, as “over” in Ankara, was a reflection of Tehran’s determination to prove to the world, through mostly words and sometimes action, that it has the upper hand in the conflict, regardless of the cost. It seems that Trump and his administration are getting extremely frustrated with the Iran war, preventing them from focusing on other fundamental challenges.
President Obama tried to pivot to China, but the Arab Spring chaos prevented Washington from doing so. Despite his occasional words of praise for Xi Jinping, this is also Trump’s desire. This is why he is extremely careful to prevent a rupture with President Putin, who enjoys a strong personal relationship with President Xi. But the war in Gaza and now its lonely war against Iran are becoming obstacles to Washington’s pivot to Asia.
Trump, during his remarks to the press in Ankara, lambasted NATO allies for their failure to stand by the US in the war against Iran and even told Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to stop the trade with Spain. In the Ankara Summit Declaration, the allies reiterated that Iran must never have a nuclear weapon and called on Iran to fully respect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.[i]
During his remarks to the press with NATO Secretary General Rutte, Trump said that he likes Erdoğan and he also likes Bibi. This makes it more than likely that he is seeking an improved relationship between the two countries, at least an end to their needless verbal battles.
Presidents Erdoğan and Trump’s meetings reflected a warm personal relationship. On every occasion, Trump heaped and heaped praise on Erdoğan. As expected, Trump declared that he is considering lifting the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” (CAATSA) sanctions on Türkiye, and delivering the six F-35s, for which Ankara had paid $1.7 billion. He also appeared willing to move forward on the sale of F110 jet engines to Türkiye for its KAAN aircraft.
Trump removed Türkiye from the F-35 program during his first term after Erdoğan accepted delivery of a Russian S-400 air and missile defense system, saying this was a done deal, despite warnings from Washington.[ii] Under the program, Turkish companies were to produce more than 800 components for the F-35, including parts of the airframe structure, landing gear, engine and wiring systems.
Trump’s sanctions were imposed by Congress, under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which prohibited countries from purchasing Russian military material.
The CAATSA is a 2017 US law designed to stop significant transactions with Russia’s defense and intelligence sectors.
Section 231 of CAATSA says that “The President may delay the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, not less frequently than every 180 days while the delay is in effect, that the person is substantially reducing the number of significant transactions described in subsection (a) in which that person engages.”
In other words, President Trump can waive the anti-Türkiye sanctions for six months, but this cannot be an endless process. Whether a waiver could allow the sale of F110 engines to Türkiye remains to be seen.
At present, the Republicans enjoy a majority in both chambers of Congress. However, the 2026 midterm elections on November 3 may change the picture. Besides, there are already some Republicans who would not support such a waiver.
Moreover, in December 2019, Congress further codified Türkiye’s exclusion from the F-35 program in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, which says:
“SEC. 1245. LIMITATION ON TRANSFER OF F–35 AIRCRAFT TO TURKEY
“(a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act or otherwise appropriated or made available for fiscal year 2020 for the Department of Defense may be used to transfer, facilitate the transfer, or support the transfer of any F–35 aircraft to the Government of Turkey, including any defense articles or services related to such aircraft, until the certification described in subsection (b) is submitted to the congressional defense committees.
“(b) CERTIFICATION.—The certification described in this subsection is a written certification by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State that—
“1. Turkey no longer possesses the S–400 air and missile defense system or any other equipment, materials, or personnel associated with such system;
“2. no such system, equipment, materials, or personnel are located on the territory of Turkey; and
“3. the Government of Turkey has provided reliable assurances that it will not acquire or accept the delivery of any such system, equipment, materials, or personnel in the future.”
The ultimate question is whether and how Ankara can put the S-400s problem behind for good. It appears that to accomplish that goal, Türkiye’s S-400s — many of which, reportedly, are still in their shipping containers — may be handed over to a third party, according to one administration official who has been deeply involved in the talks.[iii] However, such a “deal” would necessitate Russia’s approval, which would be more than a tough task.
Another option mentioned is to ensure through a Türkiye-US bilateral verification mechanism that the S-400s remain in Turkish depots. That will not be acceptable to Moscow.
In brief, the problem is somehow getting rid of a “$2.5bn worth S-400 treasure” and then having to fight the anti-Türkiye lobbies in Congress to ensure the passing of a new bill. That, unfortunately, remains more than a tough challenge.
As for the 3.0 dimension of the Ankara Summit, one may say that despite the reaffirmation of allies’ unity, solidarity and collective strength as the foundation of peace, security, and prosperity for the one billion citizens in our Alliance of free and democratic nations, the Summit was not a very happy occasion despite the efforts of Rutte. It confirmed that Europe will assume greater responsibility for common defense and continue to increase defense spending. However, ensuring a unified look into the future of common security will require more work. Clearly, while doing more on defense, the European allies will continue to depend on the US nuclear umbrella.
The Ankara Summit Declaration refers to the “long-term threat Russia poses to Euro-Atlantic security and stability”. Yes, the European allies can contribute more to common defense and provide more military assistance to Ukraine. Yet, they also need to explain to their peoples why they are not resuming dialogue with Russia, fighting a conventional war with Ukraine for nearly five years, and, according to some recent reports, is now losing the upper hand in the battle. I advise my readers to read Alexander Gabuev’s most recent Foreign Affairs article titled “How Europe Can Get Putin’s Attention, The Continent Must Overcome Its Russia Predicament”.[iv]
The Turkish government’s top priority at the Summit was to enhance cooperation between allies in defense production. With shortages of military supplies across the Alliance, there might be some possibilities.
Acknowledging such shortages, Trump, in a gift to President Zelensky, said the US would grant Ukraine a joint production license for the Patriot air defense interceptors it needs to defend against Russia’s missile attacks. At present, only Germany and Japan produce Patriot missiles.
His gift to President Ahmed al-Sharaa was initiating the rescission process of Syria’s Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
With the uncertainties about the sale of F110 jet engines and the F-35s, one may ask what Trump’s promised gift to Erdoğan was. At this point, it seems that the gift was his endless praise for the Turkish President.
What are Trump’s expectations from Türkiye? Better relations with Israel? Help in bringing Hamas and Hezbollah under control? Türkiye’s greater involvement in the Caucasus and the Middle East in confronting Chinese projects aimed at further extending Beijing’s zones of influence? Only time will tell.
During his remarks to the press before departing Ankara, Trump said that the Ankara Summit was a tremendously successful meeting. Türkiye, as the host country, will now watch how this would reflect on our domestic politics.
[i] https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/07/08/the-ankara-summit-declaration
[ii] https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/erdogan-turkey-buying-russian-s-400s-a-done-deal
[iii] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/06/us/politics/trump-turkey-f35.html
[iv] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/how-europe-can-get-putins-attention
