Commentary
How the Kremlin Achieved Its Latest Implausible Election Results
Sergei Kiriyenko used Russia’s parliamentary vote to further hone his strategy of corporate mobilization that is designed to maximize votes for United Russia.
Winning 57.96 percent of the votes in Russia’s parliamentary elections with a turnout of 59.32 percent was not the ruling party United Russia’s best result in a quarter of a century. But amid war fatigue and socioeconomic problems, these figures look suspiciously high. For many observers, it appears that the Kremlin’s political curators went too far, manufacturing completely implausible results.
Yet the Kremlin’s political bloc, led by first deputy chief of staff Sergei Kiriyenko, is unlikely to see this implausibility as a problem—not least because parliament will now have its largest-ever number of United Russia deputies, and because turnout was higher than in 2003, 2016, and 2021. This was achieved through outright falsification, as well as innovation in the application of administrative pressure and coercion—not only against state employees, but also against other political parties.
During the recent election campaign, Kiriyenko’s KPI for United Russia’s result was first lowered and then raised. The reason was President Vladimir Putin’s decision to become actively involved in the campaign. It’s unlikely that the president’s pro-war speeches boosted support for United Russia, but they altered the nature of the campaign. It was no longer just a question of support for United Russia, but the popularity of Putin himself.
Since Russia’s 2018 presidential election, Kiriyenko’s primary strategy for influencing election results has been so-called corporate mobilization: the tactic of ensuring votes are cast by “dependent voters,” including public sector staff and employees of major state-affiliated companies. This part of the electorate has long been carefully counted by the Kremlin, while political strategists and managers honed their methods for ensuring that they turn out to vote.
The introduction of three-day voting in 2020 simplified this task because it meant there was still time to compel any laggards to vote, while the use of online voting also makes it easier to control the process. However, amid the war fatigue, internet blackouts, and gasoline shortages of 2026, Kiriyenko’s previous strategy was insufficient. In the spring, even the Kremlin-affiliated VTsIOM and FOM polling agencies showed that support for the authorities was falling.
In response, the Kremlin began to identify “foremen” at state agencies and commercial companies—usually middle managers or simply highly motivated staff—who were sent on courses about elections and how to persuade people to vote. This system has given the Kremlin greater control over turnout.
In addition, it’s become common to demand proof from government employees not only that they voted, but that they voted for United Russia. Proof could be a photo of a ballot paper or a screenshot of online voting. There was clearly concern in the Kremlin that people coerced into going to polling stations would cast their ballots for the “wrong” party.
Another innovation used to influence turnout was electronic lists of voters, which allowed the appointed foremen to see in real time who had—and had not—voted.
There was also a noticeable increase in pressure against Russia’s other political parties. The liberal Yabloko party was barred from running after it began to become a magnet for anti-war and opposition voters. Prior to this decision, Yabloko had been considered an integral part of Russia’s political system. The party’s founder, Grigory Yavlinsky, was granted meetings with Putin even after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Then there were the purges of Communist Party candidates. One of the party’s most charismatic politicians, the blogger and ex-regional deputy Nikolai Bondarenko, was convicted of the administrative offense of displaying an extremist symbol: a conviction that bars him from standing for public office. The Communists also agreed not to allow some of their most popular regional politicians to stand, including Mariya Prusakova in the Altai region and Pyotr Ammosov in Yakutia.
Numerous complaints from voters and observers about pressure tactics reveal the significance of administrative resources in increasing the turnout. Outright fraud was recorded in the form of rewritten tallies. A Just Russia party, for example, which had run on a loudly pro-war platform, suddenly acquired an additional 60,000 votes needed for it to clear the 5 percent threshold required for Duma representation.
Despite the implausibility of the official results, from a tactical point of view, these elections can be considered a success for the Kremlin. “Democratic” bodies that have been elected with the use of pressure and coercion are not representative and cannot count on the support of the Russian public. But that is apparently not a problem for the Kremlin, which is likely to continue down the same path.
Kiriyenko decided long ago to use corporate mobilization as his primary tool to manage Russian political life, and now he’s got the chance to expand its remit even further. A growing number of staff at state-owned companies are being enrolled in propaganda courses about the “foundations of Russian statehood” originally designed for university students. And the training of “foremen” has recruited fresh faces into Kiriyenko’s orbit, which could be used to establish a permanent network. One result could be the establishment of grassroots United Russia cells in companies: a longstanding party goal.
Well-trained “foremen” will be well placed to head up such cells, monitor the sentiment among the workforce, and act as grassroots “social architects.” The HR departments of major companies, which Kiriyenko has long been using to implement corporate mobilization, are already part of this system. Now he’ll be able to increase the coverage of his network, bringing the state closer to being able to control every individual Russian citizen.
The electronic voter lists compiled for these elections could also be used for the same purpose. In theory, they could even enable the regime to move toward something resembling China’s social credit system. This is a long way off for the moment—but it would be easy to imagine the Putinist system moving to collect data on people’s political behavior.
