Sunday, December 31, 2023

The National Interest December 28, 2023 Topic: Vladimir Putin Region: Russia The rising profile of his cousin, Anna Putina, suggests Vladimir Putin may be set on dynastic succession. by Andrew C. Kuchins Chris Monday

The National Interest 

December 28, 2023  Topic: Vladimir Putin  Region: Russia  Tags: RussiaVladimir PutinAuthoritarianismSuccessionWagner GroupThe Kremlin

After Putin, a Putina?

The rising profile of his cousin, Anna Putina, suggests Vladimir Putin may be set on dynastic succession.

by Andrew C. Kuchins Chris Monday


Vladimir Putin confirmed his candidacy for a fifth term as Russian president on December 8 at a medal-awarding ceremony for soldiers returning from Ukraine. He did so in an entirely stage-managed response to a passionate entreaty from Lt. Col. Aytem Zhoga of the renowned Sparta Battalion in Donetsk. In fact, for a man who was reported dead in late October, Putin has been remarkably active: flying to the Middle East to meet with leaders in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on December 5–6, receiving the Iranian president on the December 7, conducting his annual four-hour-plus press conference on December 14, and speaking before the United Russia Party Congress on December 17. Constitutionally, Putin not only can run in 2024 but also again for another six-year term that would take his leadership to 2036. By this time, he would be eighty-three, three years younger than Joe Biden if the incumbent were to be re-elected in 2024 and serve a full term. 


Given this, the reader may ask: Why think about Putin’s successor now? CIA Director William Burns’ assessed in June 2022 that Putin was “entirely too healthy” and that his opponents spread rumors of his ill health. However, anyone’s health in their seventies and eighties is fragile. Accordingly, it would be prudent for Putin and his clan to groom a potential successor.  Perhaps more importantly, it behooves any authoritarian leader to introduce new and significant political figures to the public to ensure their sense of the stability of the current system. During the past two years, rumors of Putin’s supposedly terminal health problems and even death may have catalyzed the Kremlin to present a potential successor who is a generation younger than the current president. 


The last time Putin faced this question directly was in 2007–8, when his two-term constitutional limit was imminent. To solve this problem, the Kremlin spin doctors came forward with “Putin’s Plan” in the fall of 2007. This boiled down to ensuring the continuity of Putin’s power and policy beyond his presidency—a sort of improvisation in which he eventually traded places with then-Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. There was much speculation in the Fall of 2007 that the final two candidates were then Deputy Prime Ministers Sergei Ivanov and Dmitry Medvedev. Likely, Medvedev’s advantage in this competition was his relative lack of his own political base, thus making him more malleable for Putin.  Few doubted that Putin remained the senior partner in the relationship, but he lost confidence in Medvedev in 2011 and decided to run again for president in 2012. He has since been re-elected for two six-year terms. In neither of these last two electoral rounds has anybody new emerged as a potential successor.


Putin fully understood the reason for his selection as Yeltsin’s successor in December 1999, which was confidence that he would protect the interests of the Yeltsin “family” after his election. We believe that Putin has given this issue deep thought and has concluded that there is no one better to entrust with protecting his family and their vast interests than a member of his own family. We will lay out a case for his cousin, Anna Putina Tsivilyova. Of course, there are other potential candidates, but in this article, we have chosen to focus on her unique prospects. Since she founded the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation (DFF) in April, her rise to the Russian media spotlight this year has been nothing less than meteoric. Pointedly, Putin spoke highly of Anna and the Foundation at his press conference on December 14:


As for the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, it operates well. There is a strong team of people. I met with the director, Anna Evgenievna [Tsivilyova], and visited a regional branch [in Veliky Novgorod]. These people are wonderful and very passionate about this positive work.


Before delving into Anna Putina’s life, it is essential to understand the significance of the task Tsivilyova has taken on in founding The DFF. From the Decembrist Revolt in 1825 to the February Revolution in 1917 to the Soviet-Afghan War, the potential for unhappy veterans of foreign wars stirring trouble is a constant concern in Russian history. U.S. intelligence estimates that Russia has suffered 315,000 casualties since the beginning of the war in February 2022. And then there is the flood of wounded and non-wounded returning veterans. Meeting the needs of these people constitutes a massive challenge for the Russian government.


Who is Anna Putina?


Anna Putina (Tsivilyova) is a first cousin once removed from Vladimir Putin. Vladimir Putin’s grandfather and Anna’s great-grandfather was Spiridon Putin, who served as Stalin’s cook at the highly secured Gorki compound outside of Moscow. Spiridon’s son and Anna Putina’s grandfather, Mikhail, died fighting in World War II. As a result, Anna’s father, Evgenii, born in 1933, was raised by Spiridon, a man he called “old-father,” at Stalin’s residence. Evgenii became a doctor specializing in urology. He worked in the textile town Ivanovo from 1970 to 2000, where he raised his children, Anna (born in 1972) and Mikhail (born in 1967), to be doctors. In 1996, Anna began working as a psychiatrist at a mental institution, Bogorodskoie, well outside the city of Ivanovo.


As a young girl, Anna met Volodya Putin on family trips to Leningrad during the 1980s. When Vladimir became president, family fortunes prospered. In 2002, Anna left Ivanovo for good. In Moscow, she received degrees in management from princeling-friendly institutions, the Patrice Lumumba University of International Friendship and the State University of Management. Together with her brother Mikhail, Anna began the profitable job of ordering medical equipment for state hospitals at the company Medtekhsnab. After divorcing her first husband, Anna married Sergei Tsilovyov in 2007, possibly having been introduced by her cousin Vladimir and almost certainly gaining his approval of the marriage, an arranged marriage reminiscent of feudal times.  Asked how she met her fiancé, the well-poised Anna answered evasively, “through people.” 


Born in Donetsk, the burly Tsivilyov served as a naval officer in the 1980s and, after the Soviet collapse, in the mid-1990s, found work as a “lead security guard” for Kremlin insider Boris Berezovsky’s Aeroflot Bank in St. Petersburg.In this criminalized town, “security services” was often a euphemism for a protection racket. Putin, as deputy governor of St. Petersburg, had ties to these rackets. Tsivilyov may have crossed paths with the future president. By 2007, he was managing a construction company, Lenexpoinvest, charged with constructing the Len-Expo, a prized project of the Russian president. These and other companies that Tsivilyov worked for have been tied to Putin’s closest associates.


The Tsivilyov family’s interests soon centered on the West Siberian city of Kemerovo, a center for coal mining since the early eighteenth century. The Kremlin fairy dust was heaped on the Tsivilyovs. In 2012, Putin’s alleged bagman, Gennady Timchenko, purchased a major coal-producing enterprise, Kolmar. Despite having no experience in mineral extraction industries, Sergei Tsivilyov was named chairman of its board of directors. In a murky set of incidents in 2018, Tsivilyov became governor of the Kemerovo region and transferred his assets and management responsibilities to Anna. Explaining her surprising move from psychiatrist to coal boss, Anna Putina declared, “In the family, a decision was made.” These machinations were part of Putin’s grand project to replace independent regional elites with trusted lieutenants. In this case, Sergei Tsivilyov supplanted Aman Tuleyev, a strong-willed Kemerovo boss who had repeatedly challenged Boris Yeltsin throughout the 1990s. 


With the help of more than 11 billion rubles in subsidies from the federal government, massive tax breaks, and rising global coal prices, Anna’s business performance has been nothing short of stellar. Under her leadership, coal production increased fifteen times in seven years. Kolmar was transformed into a gigantic enterprise that sprawled across Russia. The company claims its Yakutia reserves contain one billion tons of coal. In 2023, it produced 16 million tons. According to Putina, by 2021, she employed 9,000 workers. About 40 percent of her coal is sold domestically. The rest is exported to China. Radio Liberty, in 2022, estimated her net worth at $2.5 billion. Local citizens interviewed in a story on Radio Liberty view Anna as the powerbroker and brains of the Tsivilyov family.


Ascension and Coalition Building


Putina has effectively used her philanthropic work to fortify her political network. For example, she regularly holds “International Women’s Fora” in Kemerovo. Typical topics focus on the “role of women in industrial regions” and “dealing with Covid.” Her conferences attract thousands of participants, among which are the wives of regional leaders. One prominent backer of these forums is St. Petersburg governor Valentina Matvienko, a wily politician with deep roots in Soviet Leningrad. 


Anna Putina can count on the Putin dynastic network. Anna’s brother, Mikhail, serves as the president’s overseer at Gazprom. Igor Putin and his son Roman have been involved in various business spheres and money laundering. Putin’s romantic partner and purported common-law wife, Alina Kabaeva, oversees a vast media empire. Putin’s daughter, Katerina Tikhonova, supervises investments in AI and biotechnology. 


Vladimir Putin has now entrusted Anna with a critical task dealing with the ocean of returning veterans and bereaved families. She has cited the shabby treatment of Afghan and Chechen veterans as a key motivation for her founding of the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation (DFF). That Putin would turn to Anna is not surprising. She has displayed a high level of competency in Russia’s rough-and-tumble coal business. A rarity for the Putin elite, she is articulate and charismatic. As head of the DFF, she has forged robust ties with military and regional elites. Sergei Kiriyenko, Putin’s Deputy Chief of Staff responsible for domestic politics, chairs the Foundation’s Board of Directors, a very significant indicator of the Kremlin’s support. The Russian media regularly spots Anna together with the key Kremlin powerbrokers. But she is also careful to be seen with bereaved mothers and maimed soldiers.


Concerning her task, Anna Putina claims, “The main aim of the [Veteran] fund is to help everyone who is returning home from the front to socialize, adapt, and return to a peaceful, creative life. This process must take into account all nuances. Our job is not to miss a single detail in their lives and to help veterans and their families for as long as necessary.” Recently established in April 2023, the organization has already opened eighty-nine centers in nearly all regions of Russia and occupied Ukraine. She has received 445,000 requests and, she boasts, has fulfilled 354,000 of them) On September 22, 2023, the Russian Government allocated over 5 billion rubles ($55 million) to her fund. It’s a safe bet that Russian oligarchs will be obliged to “donate” much more. 


In May 2023, Russian national TV launched a carefully calibrated campaign. With great fanfare, nightly news rolled out the Herculean plans for Anna Putin’s organization. At first, Russian national news on May 16, 2023, announced that a “presidential academy” would train over 3,000 people to help families who have lost men in the war. This “academy” would be led by none other than Anna Tsivilyova Putina. “The main goal of the fund’s work,” she declared, “is targeted support for every veteran and every family of a dead soldier, assistance in solving problems and returning to normal life. To do this, it is important to reach each of them, personally communicate, and delve into the features of a particular life situation. To do this, we have begun training social coordinators who will receive the necessary for such work and will be in touch with the wards of the fund 24/7.”


On May 21, the Russian Sunday flagship news, Vesti Nedeli, showcased Anna (Putina) Tsivilyova: for the first time, Russian TV viewers saw mothers grieving for fallen sons.By June 2023, Anna Putina’s “academy” would morph into the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation. Her TV appearances would soon become a regularity, and her “spontaneous initiative” would receive massive state funding. In a typical scene, on July 20, 2023, Russian TV news spotlighted a speech by Anna Putina given to a hall full of veterans. 


During the first year and a half of the war, Russian news censored any coverage of wounded soldiers or grieving mothers. But by July 2023, Anna Putina had wisely broken this taboo. Her social media posts and TV appearances feature stage-managed scenes that, nonetheless, bring home the brutality of war. In a typically theatrical display on November 24, 2023, Russian state TV highlighted Anna Putina in Moscow holding a virtual meeting between Russian soldiers on the front lines and their mothers. In emotional scenes, viewers see soldiers cry. Anna then counsels these mothers. In this meeting, she appeared with Andrey Vorobyov, governor of the Moscow Region and a key figure in the technocrat wing of Russia’s power elite.


Importantly, Anna Putina is the sole political figure publicly confronting the fallout from the Wagner Group insurrection in June. On August 24, 2023, Russian state TV news reported Vladimir Putin offered his brusque condolences to the recently perished Wagner Group leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin. But soon after this jarring scene, Russian TV moved to Anna Putina. She stated that all members of “private military organizations” would receive equal benefits to those serving in the regular army. In this broadcast, Sergei Kirienko and war correspondent Evgeniy Poddubny (two figures associated with Prigozhin) rushed to heap praise on Putina.


While the faint-hearted Russian media avoid the name “Wagner,” Anna Putina has repeatedly celebrated them. For example, on November 11, 2023, Anna Putina (with Father Kiprian) handed out veteran identity cards to the Wagner fighters. She proclaimed, “All veterans of the special operation are heroes of our time. All defenders of the Fatherland should have the same rights, independent of their status.” The Wagner warriors are to be honored and glorified by the state, she declared.


While mainly appearing with members of the Orthodox Church in her photo ops, Anna does not neglect the role of Muslim soldiers. Notably, she has made several trips to Chechnya. On June 3, 2023, Russian state news showed Ramzan Kadyrov opening one of Anna Putina’s veteran centers. In North Ossetia, Anna announced that her centers follow the “one window” principle, where all legal, medical, employment, and psychological issues can be handled without bureaucratic snafus. Veterans, she reiterated, must be provided dignified jobs. 


Anna Putina’s main institutional support for her Veteran Fund comes from Valentina Matvienko and Andrei Turchak, the son of one of Putin’s Leningrad judo Partners. In photos, we see clues to her place in the Kremlin hierarchy. For example, she is seen sitting, on equal terms, opposite her mentor, Matvienko. Moreover, Anna is sitting on the side of the office where Putin himself always sits with his interlocutors. This is not likely a coincidence.


Anna Putina is doing what others in the Putin elite cannot: she is forming a wide range of clientelistic bonds throughout all levels of Russian society. By crisscrossing the entire nation to build her veteran centers, she has made sure to showcase her meetings with regional elites. As part of her organization’s social footprint, she is seen with prominent cultural figures, from theater manager Vladimir Kekhman to the widow of celebrated crooner Iosif Kobzon. In one social media post, Anna Putina notes patronage from far-right media magnate Konstantin Malofeev.


Putina ensures her messages always end on an inspiring and hopeful note. She promises that her veteran organization will be “creative and personal.” In a typically upbeat event, on December 6, 2023, she opened a national skiing competition for wounded soldiers. In another example of her “creative and personal” approach, on July 28, 2023, Russian state news covered Anna Putina’s visit to a summer camp for the children of soldiers at the front. She stirred the children with tales of “the history of Russia, the glorious deeds of the heroes of the Fatherland of different eras, which everyone should know about.”


In sum, Anna Putina’s veteran organization provides her with a powerful political springboard. Her growing sway was cemented in December 2023 when Putin confirmed he would run again for president. Notably, Matvienko issued this call for elections in March 2024 from the Senate floor. The next day, Artem Zhoga, the son of a fallen Donetsk fighter and a key figure in the veteran organization, begged Putin to run for office once again. His plea was immediately seconded by Maria Kostiuk, a leader of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and DFF’s point woman for her veteran organization branches in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk. ​​


A Future President?


Russian media, day after day, present Anna Putina as an effective manager and a consensus unifier of the technocratic, intelligence, and military clans in the Russian power elite. It’s clear that Vladimir’s cousin is a political force. But what exactly is her function? 


For a long time, it has been clear to Kremlin watchers that Putin is weary of the day-to-day demands of managing Russia from Moscow. Still, until now, he has not been able to identify anyone both competent and loyal enough to ensure his family’s and his cronies’ personal safety and assets. There are many things to criticize Putin for, but he has displayed uncanny political gifts over twenty-four years in holding onto power. Perhaps he sees these skills in his cousin.


Moreover, Putin is clearly planning for a long war with the West and realizes the dangers. His military and political strategy is premised on causing political chaos abroad while maintaining iron rule at home. His successor can’t be a phony, Dmitry Medvedev-type with no real clout. Looking ahead, the Russian elite must eventually circle around a consensus figure. These elites realize all too well that other pretenders to the throne, such as Nikolai Patrushev or Igor Sechin, for example, represent narrow parochial interests. Ideally, the successor should be of the next generation to ensure continuity of power and policy, the essence of Putin’s plan.


Despite making sure to circumscribe the reach of all his subordinates, Vladimir appears to have made Anna Putina the sole figure allowed to spread her influence over wide realms of politics, the economy, and culture. This is what makes her case so compelling. While increasingly well-known in Russia, she is virtually unknown outside of Russia. Two years before Putin became president, he too was little known in Russia and totally unknown outside the country. Inexperience is not necessarily a deal-breaker.


Indeed, Anna Putina has been actively preparing for such a role. It has become common practice among Kremlin powerbrokers to publish vanity doctoral dissertations. Vladimir Putin published his in 1997 at the Mining Institute in St. Petersburg entitled “Strategic Planning in the Reproduction of the Natural Resource Sector in Market Economic Conditions in the St. Petersburg Region.” In 2022, Putina published her doctoral dissertation on “Management of the Development of the Production-Technological Potential of Coal Industry Enterprises” at the state-affiliated All-Russian Scientific Research Institute in Moscow. The similarity of research topics, natural resource management, is hard to miss.


Many analysts like to conceive of the Kremlin as a mafia organization. There is truth in this metaphor, but it is incomplete. We believe the best way to think about Russian governance is as one enormous intelligence special operation. All of the real insiders were recruited as Soviet intelligence officers in the 1970s and 1980s when then KGB Chairman and Putin’s idol Yuri Andropov was very consciously recruiting the “best and the brightest.” In December 2000, Putin’s then Director of the Federal Security Services (FSB) and current Chair of the National Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, described Russia’s intelligence officers as Russia’s “new nobility.” The “Higher Police,” described by Clifford Gaddy and Laurence Muravschik in The National Interest in 2002, have viewed themselves for centuries with a special mission to save Russia from traitors within and outside the country. The war in Ukraine is not a war for the Kremlin but a “special military operation.” The plan for Putin’s succession in 2007–8 was called “Operation Successor.” There is no subtlety here. The plan to promote Anna Putina could be just another “special operation.” At this point, it appears that Deputy Chief of Staff to the President (with responsibility for domestic affairs, Sergei Kiriyenko, is the likely curator of the Anna Putina project, but aspects of this subtle stage management recall the work of former Kremlin spin doctor Vladislav Surkov who orchestrated “Operation Successor.”


If we are right about Anna Putina, then the Kremlin seeks to prolong the Putin dynasty for another generation. Putin, as an avid student of Russian history, may find the idea of a hereditary dynasty attractive. However, while it has become a cliche to read of Putin as the “new czar” of Russia, his idea of succession is less neo-Romanov than it may initially appear. The dynastic model has also been deployed in other post-Soviet states like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, and it appears that Emomali Rahmon, President of Tajikistan, is also looking to place his son as leader in 2024. 


For all of these regimes, where electoral and legal norms for an orderly transition do not exist, succession is a continual dilemma. Many dictators aspire to the Deng Xiaoping or Lee Kuan Yew models of exercising power more informally after leaving their formal positions. Both the dynastic and “grey cardinal” models fail as often as they succeed. Just look at Russia’s neighbor Kazakhstan, whose founding President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s effort to remain the power behind the throne was stymied in January 2022. Only time will tell if Putin’s plan is for his cousin Anna to succeed him, and then, more importantly, whether “Operation Putina” will be successful and durable.



Chris Monday is an Associate Professor of Economics at Dongseo University in Busan, South Korea.


ekathimerini the greek letter 32 december 2023 . That was the year thst was : 2023

 

That was the year that was: 2023[InTime News]
Constantine CapsaskisNewsletter Editor

Happy New Year and welcome to the yearly round-up of news by Kathimerini English Edition. Looking back over the important news of the year for this second edition of the GreeK Letter’s annual review, several important themes became increasingly apparent.

Continuity and Changes

Election years are always a fascinating bellwether of the political situation in a country, and Greece this year had its fair share of elections. The New Democracy party of incumbent Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis won two resounding victories in national elections held in May and June, with main opposition SYRIZA crumbling to below 20% in the polls.

This dismal performance by SYRIZA led to the resignation of long-time leader and former prime minister Alexis Tsipras, and the eventual (and tumultuous) election of political newcomer Stefanos Kasselakis in his stead

The national elections also saw the re-emergence of the far-right, a political force that had largely been electorally contained in recent years, with three far-right parties being sworn in following the June elections.

Finally, in October, regional and local elections were a game of two halves. New Democracy seemed to confirm its dominance of Greek political life in the first weekend of elections, winning several races outright. However, things would sour for the ruling party on the second week as its candidates in the second round lost in all major cities and most of the regional run-offs.

However, a common theme of the national and regional elections was a historic level of low voter turnout. In June’s national election, 47.18% of voters did not participate in the polls, while in the second round of the Athens municipal elections only 26.7% of voters showed up.

The future of the opposition in Greece remains one of the most important questions at the end of the year. The fragmentation of SYRIZA following the election of Kasselakis, and the party’s continued slide in the polls, do not seem to have been exploited by its competition in the center of the political spectrum to a significant extent. This void, the lack of a strong opposition which can keep the government accountable, can only harm Greece’s democracy.

On the other side of the political spectrum, apart from the resurgence of the far-right, several New Democracy parliamentarians, most prominently former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, have begun to vocally dig their heels in against the more liberal elements of Mitsotakis’ proposed reforms, from migration to the announced legislation legalizing same-sex marriage. Whether this is “broad church” politics in action, or the emergence of a rift within New Democracy, remains to be seen.

Peaceful overtures in the Aegean

This time last year, this newsletter warned of a “a particularly tense 2023 with elections in both Greece and Turkey” following a difficult year in their bilateral relations. However, out of disaster and unimaginable horror came a period of greatly improved relations and the prospect of lasting calm. The devastating earthquake that struck southern Turkey in February, and the rapid Greek humanitarian response, radically changed the prevailing situation in the Aegean.

Despite several hiccups along the way, something that was to be expected given the status quo prior to February, the second manifestation of “earthquake diplomacy” largely succeeded in 2023. The rhetoric emanating from Ankara was more conciliatory. As a result, there were several meetings at a ministerial level, as well as between diplomatic staff, both prior to the elections in each country and in their aftermath.

In July, with the two leaders fresh off their victories in their respective elections, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Vilnius for over an hour. They agreed to resume talks and confidence-building measures to capitalize on the positive climate, with the two identical statements released by the prime minister’s office and the Turkish Presidency noting that “the two sides agreed to build on the positive momentum and activate multiple channels of communication.”

The two men would meet again in New York on September to confirm the positive atmosphere between the two countries and set out the roadmap that culminated in the official visit of Erdogan to Athens on December 7 for the 5th High-Level Cooperation Council.

In Athens, the two leaders signed the “Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations and Good-Neighborliness”, as well as several memoranda of understanding and declarations.

Undoubtedly, the public commitment of both men to lasting peace in the Aegean is a far cry from where bilateral relations were just a ten months ago. Turkish overflights by fighter jets and UAVs above Greek islets and islands have almost ceased entirely, while the threats of war against Greece have made way to overture of friendship and good neighborly relations.

However, there are still many hurdles to overcome before the difficulties in bilateral relations are completely resolved. They range from settling on a final agenda to be discussedmuch less referred to, the International Court of Justicethe continued occupation of Cyprus, and even geopolitical developments in the wider Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey’s relationship to the West.

Disasters

This year also leaves behind it a legacy of disasters and destruction. On February 28, a head-on collision between a passenger and a freight train led to the death of 57 people, primarily university students, and exposed fatal lapses in basic safety standards of the Greek railway system.

The European Railway Agency stated that it had been warning successive Greek governments since 2014 about the dire situation and the lack of proper safety standards, with the disaster unveiling the lack of transparency regarding the allocation of funds and completion of public projects that is common in many facets of the modern Greek state.

The railway disaster, Greece’s deadliest, led to days of political unrest and strikes and the eventual resignation of Transport Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis.

The Parliamentary Inquiry into the disaster is ongoing, with the association created by the relatives and survivors of the collision organizing a protest rally on December 12 decrying the slow progress of the proceedings.

In the summer, wildfires ravaged the country, from the devastation on Rhodes in July that led to the evacuation of thousands of tourists, to the 16-day fire in Evros in late August that killed at least 20 people and led to the destruction of over 93,000 hectares of land, making it the largest fire in the European Union since records began in 2000.

Many of those tested by the fires proved their quality, whether by assisting the hundreds of firefighters from all over Europe and the wider region or by providing assistance to the tourists who found themselves stranded by the flames.

However, it is clear that these massive wildfires have become a recurring feature of the Greek summer and that the Greek state has failed to keep up, with many accusing the government of failing to prepare adequately for the situation.

This same criticism would also be levelled at the government a few days after the fire in Evros finally abated, when Storm Daniel flooded central Greece and left 16 people dead. The persistent flooding that destroyed the majority of the region’s agricultural crop (in one of Greece’s most fertile areas) and killed hundreds of thousands of animals left households without drinking water for days and led to the proliferation of disease as dead livestock rotted in the stagnant waters. The overall cost of the damage can be estimated in the billions

It is worth noting that the area had also faced flooding in 2020, with questions being raised once again about the response of both central and regional governments.

It is clear that the impact of climate change on the lives of people in the region is here to stay and it is vital that our governments rise up to the challenge facing them.

Economic recovery

To finish the year on a more positive note, 2023 also saw the long-heralded return of Greece to investment grade by the majority of the major international credit ratings agencies.

It began with DBRS Morningstar which, on September 8, upgraded Greece’s bonds and put an end to their “junk status” after 13 years, providing a symbolic end to the financial crisis. However, there were more than just symbolic benefits, particularly for Greek banks.

It was followed by Standard and Poor’s Global Ratings, the first among the “big three”, in October, which noted that “supported by a very rapid economic recovery, the Greek government has been able to regularly outperform its own budgetary targets despite gradually increasing social transfers”.

Finally, in December, Fitch Ratings also granted investment grade to Greece, leaving Moody’s as the only outlier that has yet to upgrade the country’s sovereign credit.

“The Greek economy’s credit rating upgrade by Fitch Ratings marking its ascent to investment grade is an important national success,” noted Finance Minister Kostis Hatzidakis in the aftermath of the decision. 

The upgrades by the credit rating agencies opens the door to major international investors, with Bloomberg Index Services including 17 Greek bonds worth 73 billion euros in its index.

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OPINION
Tom EllisEditor-in-Chief, Kathimerini English Edition
Topping the agenda in 2024[InTime News]

In 2024 the government will face its next political test in the June European elections; this time the challenge coming not so much from the fragmented opposition, but rather from itself. The threat of arrogance and complacency is the main worry, for obviously different reasons, for both supporters and critics alike.

And then there are the internal feuds with respect to sensitive social issues like legalizing same sex marriage, where the ruling conservatives are divided.

The more liberal wing of the ruling party has the upper hand, but there is a large segment, especially in the base, which is not onboard with some of the policies; another being immigration. Parties on the far right could be the beneficiaries of this disharmony.

The new head of main opposition SYRIZA will also be tested and be judged by how well he does in the European elections. Given the discord and alienation seen during the last few months, the result could have existential repercussions for his leadership.

In the same polls PASOK and New Left will face their own judgement day as the broader center left has become a quicksand.

On the economic front, the challenge for the country is to convert the overall optimistic perceptions, reinforced by positive assessments of foreign media and ratings agencies, into gains in the real economy and tangible benefits for the average person.

Last but far from least, on the diplomatic front, relations with Turkey will obviously top the agenda, with all indications being that the positive climate of the latter part of last year will continue into the next, starting with the Prime Minister’s planned visit to Turkey in the spring, while the EU accession process of the Western Balkans will be the other important issue on Greece’s foreign policy radar.

CHART OF THE WEEK
The yield of the 10-year Greek bond has dropped below 3%, the lowest levels since April 2022 when the main interest rate of the ECB was still at negative levels. Additionally, the Greek spread has returned to the 100-basis point range, where it last hovered in August 2021. That was the lowest levels since 2009, before the outbreak of the debt crisis. With the yield set at 2.93%, the Greek bond is at a distance of just 10 basis points from its Spanish counterpart. The recovery of investment grade and the return of Greek bonds to international indices are seen as the two main drivers behind this strong performance.
 
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ECONOMY IN A NUTSHELL
“The Athens Exchange (ATHEX) general index closed on Friday, the last session of 2023, at 1,293.14 points, up 0.17% from last week. The index grew by 38.7% year-on-year.”
“The Greek state budget exceeded its target for the first 11 months of the year, recording a primary surplus of 5.826 billion euros between January and November. The target was a surplus of 3.771 billion euros, in comparison to a primary deficit of 1.091 billion euros over the same period in 2022.”
“Shipping Minister Christos Stylianides announced that Greece is in deliberations with the European Commission over the green transition of the shipping sector. ‘The deliberation is in progress and we do not want to let this opportunity slip away’, he stated.”
WHAT'S ON THE AGENDA
  • 01/01/2024New Year: Happy New Year!
  • 03/01/2024Treasury Bill Auction: The Greek state will auction off treasury bills with a duration of 3-month (expiring on April 5) worth an estimated 625 million euros.
  • 06/01/2024Opposition leaders in Istanbul: Leader of main opposition party SYRIZA Stefanos Kasselakis and PASOK leader Nikos Androulakis will travel to Istanbul to attend the traditional ritual of the Blessing of the Water on the Golden Horn.
Editor's PickGreek public opinion never took to Wolfgang Schaeuble, because it saw in him the harsh fiscal measures of the memorandum period. His passing is an opportunity for reflection.Evangelos VenizelosRead the article
PODCAST
20/12/2023 • 12:12Greece: The top economic performer of 2023For the second year in a row The Economist once again listed Greece as the top economic performer of the year out of a list of 35 countries. Alex Patelis, the chief economic adviser to Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, joins Thanos Davelis to look at Greece’s economic performance over the last year, and break down why we should expect Greece’s economy to continue to outperform in 2024.
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