Time for Europe to put Iran’s
missile programme in context
Iran’s Khorramshahr
Missile. Photo: Mohammad Hassanzadeh.
30 October 2017
European leaders have
clearly set themselves apart from the United States and the administration of
President Donald J. Trump in relation to the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal. They view
the deal—also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—as a success
for non-proliferation and international security. In contrast, the current US
Government has criticised the deal for failing to address non-nuclear issues,
notably Iran’s continuing ballistic missile development, which the USA has long
viewed as both a regional and a global threat.
Iran’s missile
programme was also one of the main justifications for President Trump’s recent
refusal to certify that continuing the suspension of sanctions—a key US
commitment under the agreement—is proportionate to Iran’s respective
commitments under the JCPOA. As a result, continued US adherence to the deal
now depends on the US Congress.
However, while
defending the JCPOA, the major European powers have joined the Trump
administration in squarely condemning Iran’s missile tests and satellite
launches. This commonality of views was highlighted in a joint statement on 13
October 2017 by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, which said that ‘as we
work to preserve the JCPOA, we share concerns about Iran’s ballistic missile
programme and regional activities [and] . . . stand ready to take further
appropriate measures to address these issues’.[1]
The Trump
administration expects European countries to take a harder line on this issue.
As part of an attempt to address the JCPOA’s ‘many serious flaws’, the US
President has urged ‘allies to join us in . . . through sanctions outside the
Iran Deal that target the regime’s ballistic missile program’.[2]
Given the
transatlantic disagreement over the JCPOA, European countries might feel
increasing pressure to focus on Iran’s ballistic missile activities in order to
find common ground with the USA. But is the Western perspective on Iran’s
missile programme based on an objective threat assessment, and is a punitive
approach helpful in addressing it?
Transatlantic
disagreement over the JCPOA, solidarity against the missile threat
The JCPOA is a
multilateral agreement negotiated between Iran, the five permanent United
Nations Security Council members and Germany, with the specific aim of putting
an end to concerns that Iran’s nuclear programme might be used for military
purposes. Although ballistic missiles were left out of the agreement, they were
mentioned in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA in
July 2015.
More specifically,
the missile-related provision in the resolution calls on Iran ‘not to undertake
any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering
nuclear weapons’ until 2023. This ambiguous formulation has been a source of
increasing controversy. The Iranian position is that its missile testing has
nothing to do with the JCPOA, because its missiles are conventional and not
designed to carry nuclear weapons. This diverges from the Western expectation
that Iran should have suspended missile testing for eight years.
On these grounds, the
Trump administration argues that Iran’s continuing missile tests violate the
spirit of the JCPOA—as well as Resolution 2231. The USA’s Ambassador to the UN,
Nikki Haley, has repeatedly called for the Security Council members to punish
Iran for its ‘blatant violations’ of Resolution 2231, including ‘provocative
and destabilising missile launches’.[3]
European countries,
in contrast, have stressed that the JCPOA is essentially a nuclear deal, and
that everything else is outside its scope.[4] At the same time, however, they too have
condemned Iran’s missile activities as inconsistent with Resolution 2231, even
though they do not subscribe to the USA’s accusation of violation.
France, for example,
has threatened to push for European sanctions in response to Iran’s missile
tests, and has said that it would consider ‘the means to obtain from Iran the
cessation of its destabilizing ballistic missile activities’.[5] France, Germany and the UK have also joined
the USA in calling for UN Security Council action in response Iran’s missile
tests and satellite launches, arguing that the tested missiles are ‘inherently
capable of delivering nuclear weapons’,[6] and pointing to similarities between
satellite launcher and long-range missile technologies.[7]
The link between
nuclear weapons and missiles
Although there is no
binding international treaty controlling ballistic missiles, they are often
associated with nuclear proliferation. This is because ballistic missiles,
particularly long-range ones, have historically been the most important delivery
system for nuclear warheads.
At the same time,
several countries rely on conventionally armed missiles as part of their
national security strategies. Of the 31 countries that currently possess
ballistic missile capabilities, only 9 are nuclear-armed.[8] The arsenals of most of the remaining 22
states are not generally viewed as problematic due to their short range and
small numbers. However, there are also political factors behind the lack of
attention to their capabilities, which is why it is rare to hear that Israel
and Saudi Arabia actually possess the longest-range ballistic missiles in the
Middle East—not Iran.
Nevertheless, Iran’s
missiles stand out from the rest for several reasons. Apart from having the
largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the region, Iran actively develops its
missiles through testing. It also has an adversarial relationship with the USA,
which has long suspected Iran of having nuclear weapon ambitions. Although it
was hoped that the JCPOA would put an end to such concerns, critics argue that
Iran might still develop nuclear weapons after the deal expires—in which case
it could mate its missiles with nuclear warheads.
Finally, Iran’s past
purchases of North Korean missiles and related technology continue to fuel
speculation about ongoing missile cooperation between the two countries. Iran
has also reportedly provided assistance to the Syrian Government in missile
technology.[9]
Iran’s missile
programme as a regional deterrent
Iran views its
missiles as a counter to the military capabilities of its regional
rivals—particularly their state-of the-art, Western-supplied military aircraft.[10] Despite US and international sanctions,
which have considerably restricted Iran’s ability to develop its conventional
armed forces, the country has become increasingly self-sufficient in developing
ballistic missiles.
The role of ballistic
missiles in Iran’s national security was highlighted in the 1980s, when its
cities were left defenceless against Scud missile and air attacks from Iraq
under President Saddam Hussein. Iran’s acquisition and use of its own
short-range missiles is regarded as a crucial turning point in the Iran–Iraq
War. Since then, Iran’s ballistic missiles have gained further importance as a
conventional deterrent—particularly during the escalation of the nuclear crisis
in 2006–13, when Israel and the USA threatened military action against Iranian
nuclear facilities.
Figure 1: Reach of Iran's
missiles. Source: ‘Between the shield and the sword: NATO’s overlooked missile
defense dilemma', Ploughshares Fund, June 2017.
Iran’s missile
arsenal consists of short- and medium-range missiles. Its longest-reaching
operational missiles have a range of 1600 kilometres, which means that they
could hit Israeli or US military bases in the Middle East. Although Iran
continues to develop its missile capabilities, its focus for the past decade
has been on enhancing the accuracy, rather than range, of its missiles. As
noted by Michael Elleman, a leading missile expert at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, there is ‘no evidence to suggest that Iran is
actively developing an intermediate- or intercontinental-range ballistic
missile [ICBM]’.
In other words,
Iran’s pattern of missile testing—which has sought to address the long-standing
problem of poor accuracy—is consistent with the programme’s stated purpose as a
regional deterrent. It also reinforces the argument that Iran’s missiles are
designed to be conventional, not nuclear: nuclear-armed missiles do not need to
be accurate, due to their disproportionate destructive power. For conventional
purposes, however, inaccuracy severely limits the missiles’ military utility.
Estimates of Iran’s ballistic
missile capabilities. Sources: Elleman, M., ‘Iran’s
missile test: Getting the facts straight on North Korea’s cooperation’,
38North, 3 Feb. 2017; Saab, B. Y. and Elleman, M., ‘Precision fire: A strategic assessment of Iran’s
conventional missile program’, Atlantic Council Issue Brief, Sep.
2016; ‘Missile-Defence cooperation in the Gulf*, IISS Report, Oct. 2016; ‘Khorramshahr’, Global Security, updated Sep.
2017.
Iran’s missile
development has also been influenced by the perceived need to respond to the
growing number of anti-ballistic missile systems in the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) states and Israel. For example, Iran’s Emad missile is equipped
with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle,[12] and the Khorramshahr missile is reportedly
able to carry multiple warheads.[13] Such features can increase the chances of
overcoming missile defences.
The link between
space rockets and long-range missiles
Iran successfully
used the Safir space launch vehicle (SLV) to send its first satellite into
space in 2009, and has since then delivered at least three more satellites into
the Earth’s orbit. In addition, Iran has launched animals into space and has
plans to send humans there as well.[14] It is currently developing a larger Simorgh
SLV to reach higher orbits.[15]
Given the
technological similarities between missile and SLV technologies, Iran’s
satellite programme has raised suspicions about its potential aims to develop intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs). Indeed,
there are many historical examples of states having converted ICBMs into SLVs,
or developing the two technologies in parallel. However, the reverse
scenario—that is, SLVs being turned into long-range missiles—has never
happened, because ICBM development is more demanding in many ways. Missiles
carry warheads that must not just reach space, but must also withstand re-entry
into the atmosphere. Further, they need to work reliably under various
conditions, with little advance warning.[16]
Although having a
satellite programme can contribute to ICBM development, it is not a shortcut to
long-range missiles. Even if Iran converted the Simorgh SLV into a long-range
missile, it would still need to undergo the normal, time-consuming routine of
missile testing, which would not go unnoticed.
Iran’s missiles and
NATO’s missile defence policy
Some of the current
Western solidarity against the Iranian missile threat can be traced to the
missile defence policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—also
known as the European Phase Adaptive Approach (EPAA). Introduced by the USA
under the Obama administration, EPAA was preceded by the Bush administration’s
plans to put large interceptors in Europe to defend the US mainland from
hypothetical nuclear-armed ICBMs coming from Iran.
Instead, the aim of
EPAA was to protect south-eastern parts of Europe from Iran’s existing arsenal
of short- and medium-range missiles. The key idea was to adapt to changing
circumstances: while systems against ICBMs were envisioned in the later stages
of EPAA, President Obama said that there would be no need for the system if the
threat from Iran’s nuclear and missile programs were eliminated.[17]
The NATO Secretary
General at the time, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, also referred to the Iranian threat when
arguing for EPAA to be adopted as official NATO policy. However, since that
decision was made at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the alliance has avoided direct
references to Iran. At the same time, NATO has never openly challenged the US
argument that EPAA is essentially about Iran—except for stressing that the
system ‘is not about any one country, but about the threat posed by
proliferation more generally’.[18]
Arguably, European
countries valued EPAA primarily because it was seen to strengthen the
transatlantic link and provide additional reassurance against Russia. Unlike
many other forms of military cooperation, land-based missile defences have
meant permanent US presence on European soil. This trade-off seemed
unproblematic during the height of the Iran nuclear crisis, but the picture has
changed considerably since then. Despite the landmark nuclear deal, in May 2016
NATO began to construct a new missile defence site in Poland against
intermediate missiles—which Iran does not possess.
Nevertheless, US
officials justify the new Polish site in terms of the Iranian threat, pointing
to the possibility that Iran might still develop longer-range missiles.
Meanwhile, NATO continues to talk about the generic threat of missile
proliferation and points to over 30 countries with ballistic missile
capabilities, without unpacking what this threat means in concrete terms.[19]
European
disinclination to subject NATO’s missile defence policy to critical scrutiny
can be understood in terms of inertia, the desire to ensure US presence on the
continent, as well as the heightened need to maintain transatlantic unity after
the events in Ukraine. This creates a bias that makes European countries less
prone to question US assessments of the Iranian missile threat, also outside
the context of EPAA.
Putting Iran’s
missile programme in context
The prevailing
Western tendency to target Iranian missiles while ignoring the overall military
balance in the Middle East reflects the historical experience of the USA and
its regional loyalties. Despite mounting pressure to join this approach and the
related punitive measures, European countries should put the issue of Iran’s
missiles in its proper context.
Iran’s ballistic
missile programme does not constitute a global threat. Rather, it is part of
broader regional security dynamics, and cannot be addressed in isolation. As
missiles play a key role in Iran’s national security strategy, it is
unrealistic to expect that the country will forgo efforts to improve their
operationality and survivability through testing.
In September 2017,
President Hassan Rouhani responded to US condemnation of Iran’s missile
development by stating: ‘No matter if you like it or not, we will boost our defence
and military capabilities to the extent deemed necessary for defence. We will
not seek permission from anyone to defend our country and our land.’[20]
A punitive approach
to Iran’s missile programme is not only likely to be ineffective, it could also
undermine simultaneous European attempts to maintain the JCPOA, lending
legitimacy to potential measures by the US Congress to link US adherence to the
JCPOA with the missile issue. Even if the US measures do not directly impact
the JCPOA, new sanctions against Iran’s missile programme might further impede
international trade with Iran, thus increasing the already pervasive Iranian
perception that sanctions relief is not being implemented.
Therefore, it is
important that European countries do not let the missile issue distract them
from seeking to maintain the JCPOA as their first priority. The former US
Department of State coordinator for the deal’s implementation, Jarrett Blanc,
recently argued that ‘Iran and its missiles are less dangerous because of the
JCPOA. That accomplishment cannot be sacrificed for an unrealistic effort to
pressure Iran on ballistic missiles’.[21]
However, this does
not necessarily mean that there is no way to constrain Iran’s missile
programme. Given repeated statements by Iranian officials that the country has
no need of missiles beyond the range of 2000 km,[22] Iran could in principle agree to limit its
missiles to that level.[23] As for any further limits to Iran’s
ballistic missile programme, they are unfeasible without parallel discussions
with other states in the region about their respective military capabilities.
Unfortunately, it is
not an optimal time to discuss either Iran’s missiles or the broader issues of
regional security. As the JCPOA has shown, arms control negotiations require at
least some mutual respect and trust, both of which are clearly absent from the
current US–Iranian relationship and in relations among Middle Eastern
countries. This also casts a shadow on any attempts by others to start a
missile dialogue with Iran, which would probably be rejected as part of the
controversial US plans to ‘renegotiate’ the nuclear deal. Further, any new
Iranian compromises with the West should not be expected at a time when
previous promises under the JCPOA are in such serious doubt.
Yet this should not
discourage long-term thinking. European countries could use their political
channels with Iran and other regional actors to get a more thorough
understanding of their respective security concerns. Such knowledge could then
be used to inform future discussions on Iran’s missiles, as well as a more
comprehensive arms control dialogue in the region—a goal that has long evaded
international efforts, but is still worth pursuing.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)
Dr Tytti Erästö is Researcher on nuclear weapon issues at
SIPRI
lobelog.com