Saturday, April 27, 2024
CNN Politics - Blinken tells CNN the US has seen evidence of China attempting to influence upcoming US elections By Simone McCarthy, CNN Updated 6:38 PM EDT, Fri April 26, 2024
CNN Politics
Blinken tells CNN the US has seen evidence of China attempting to influence upcoming US elections
Simone McCarthy
By Simone McCarthy, CNN
6 minute read
Updated 6:38 PM EDT, Fri April 26, 2024
Beijing
CNN
—
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the US has seen evidence of Chinese attempts to “influence and arguably interfere” with the upcoming US elections, despite an earlier commitment from leader Xi Jinping not to do so.
Blinken made the comments to CNN’s Kylie Atwood in an interview Friday at the close of a three-day to trip to China, where the top American diplomat spent hours meeting with top Chinese officials including Xi, as the two countries navigated a raft of contentious issues from US tech controls to Beijing’s support for Moscow.
Blinken said he repeated a message President Joe Biden gave to Xi during their summit in San Francisco last November not to interfere in the 2024 US presidential elections. Then, Xi had pledged that that China would not do so, according to CNN reporting.
“We have seen, generally speaking, evidence of attempts to influence and arguably interfere, and we want to make sure that that’s cut off as quickly as possible,” Blinken said when asked whether China was violating Xi’s commitment to Biden so far.
“Any interference by China in our election is something that we’re looking very carefully at and is totally unacceptable to us, so I wanted to make sure that they heard that message again,” Blinken said, adding there was concern about China and other countries playing on existing social divisions in the US in influence campaigns.
Beijing has repeatedly said it does not interfere in US elections, based on its principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. China or actors that are believed to be affiliated with Beijing have been accused of political interference in other countries, such as Canada.
Blinken’s trip — his second to the country in less than a year — is the latest in a string of high-level engagements that culminated in the Biden-Xi summit late last year and that have seen the two countries start to expand what had been severely diminished bilateral communications.
“We are (now) focused on areas where we’re working to cooperate, but also we’re being very forthright about our differences and that’s important if we’re going to avoid the competition we’re in turning into conflict,” Blinken told CNN.
Warning on support for Russia
Blinken also said he used his meeting to raise the Biden administration’s concerns about China’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base – and to stress that further action would be taken by the US on top of existing sanctions on more than 100 Chinese entities and individuals if such support continues.
The US believes that Chinese support is enabling Russia to ramp up production of tanks, munitions and armored vehicles – and to continue its onslaught on Ukraine.
A Russian Yars intercontinental ballistic missile system drives during a military parade on Victory Day, which marks the 78th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War Two, in Red Square in central Moscow, Russia May 9, 2023.
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China is giving Russia significant support to expand weapons manufacturing as Ukraine war continues, US officials say
“What we said to China is this – we’re going to take actions we already have, and if it doesn’t stop, we’re going to have to take more action, and you can anticipate as well, that other countries will (too),” Blinken said, adding that he raised the issue to both Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Xi. “We’re looking to them to act, and … if they don’t, we will.”
He also said that Chinese counterparts had not acknowledged the role of these goods in the war in Ukraine. Instead, they characterized this as trade with Russia and said Moscow’s success didn’t depend on China, Blinken added.
Beijing has previously slammed the US as making “groundless accusations” over “normal trade and economic exchanges” between China and Russia.
China has long contended that it maintains neutrality in the Ukraine war and has continued to present itself as a potential peace broker in the conflict, even as it has strengthened its economic, strategic and diplomatic ties with Russia since the war began.
Defending the right to protest
Blinken also defended the American right to protest, when asked about pro-Palestinian protests that have erupted across college campuses in the US in recent days amid mounting concern about the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Gaza.
Responding to a question referencing reports of use of antisemitic rhetoric at some of these gatherings, Blinken said there had been instances where there have been clear expressions of antisemitism, but “protests in and of themselves are not antisemitic.”
“What we’re also seeing is people, young people, people from different walks of life, who do feel very passionately, who’ve had very strong emotions about (the conflict),” he said.
He also stressed the importance of such expression in democracies, without explicitly noting the lack of such freedoms in China.
“In our country, and in our society and in our democracy, giving expression to that is, of course, something that’s both appropriate and protected,” he said. “But we’ve certainly seen instances where that has clearly veered from a totally legitimate expression of views and beliefs, to in some instances, yes, clear expressions of antisemitism.”
Blinken said that the administration listens to the American people and “takes their views into account.” But he did not explain how the protestors concerns would impact Biden administration policy.
Asked if the administration would consider stopping sending weaponry to Israel, because that is what some of the protestors are calling for, he said no.
“No we are focused on what’s in the interests of the United States. How do we best reflect both our interests and our values in our foreign policy across the board, whether that’s with Israel, or with any anyone else,” Blinken said.
Ending the war in Gaza
When asked about resolving the conflict in Gaza, Blinken said it was on Hamas to decide if they are going to allow a ceasefire to go forward or not, after the militant group refused to agree to multiple possible deals.
He also said tensions in the wider region seemed to be alleviating following apparent tit-for-tat airstrikes between Iran and Israel earlier this month that ratcheted fears that the war in Gaza could expand into a wider conflagration.
“I think now, hopefully we are not seeing that kind of escalation,” Blinken said, explaining that Hamas might have been looking at that escalation when it rejected Israel’s hostage proposal.
Blinken also said it could be possible to roll out a framework for the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia along with a two-state solution proposal for Israel and the Palestinians before a Gaza ceasefire in place, marking a reversal in the order of events that US officials had previously expected to follow.
“Certainly that’s, that’s possible,” Blinken said. “Ceasefire or not we’ll continue to make these possibilities known. But in order to actually realize this, there’s going to have to be an end of the conflict in Gaza. And as I said, there’s also going to have to be a resolution to the Palestinian question, or at least an agreement on how to resolve it.”
Previously US officials said that the ongoing negotiations to secure a ceasefire had to reach an agreement before any further regional efforts could manifest.
Referencing the countries that came to Israel’s defense after Iran launched its April 13 aerial attack, Blinken said you could “see a path in the future where Israel is genuinely integrated in the region, where other countries are helping to make sure it’s defended.”
“But that also requires that (the conflict in) Gaza come to an end, and that there be a clear pathway to a Palestinian state. In that kind of future, Israel gets what it has sought from the start of its existence, which is normal relations with countries in the region,” he said.
Blinken cited the sustained US efforts to work towards normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia as part of a potentially reach a historic agreement to bring the Israel-Hamas war to an end.
“We’ve been working intensively to flesh it out, working with our partners, working – with European partners on this as well. And I think the more concrete it becomes, and the more it moves from the hypothetical and theoretical to something that’s actually possible, that’s real, then everyone involved is actually going to have to make decisions and make choices. And so we’re doing this work. And we’re trying to make it as real as possible,” Blinken said.
CNN’s Jennifer Hansler contributed reporting.
Foreign Affairs : Putin’s Brittle Regime Like the Soviet One That Preceded It, His System Is Always on the Brink of Collapse BY MAKSIM SAMORUKOV April 25, 2024
Putin’s Brittle Regime
Like the Soviet One That Preceded It, His System Is Always on the Brink of Collapse
- MAKSIM SAMORUKOV is a Fellow at Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.
By many outward appearances, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s grip on power is stronger than ever. The country has rebounded from early military defeats in Ukraine and the initial shock of Western sanctions. State oil is flowing to new markets in Asia, including China, India, and Turkey, and the country’s defense sector is producing more weapons than all of Europe. At home, Putin has crushed what remains of political opposition on both the right and left, having eliminated the mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, whose rebellion against Moscow failed last summer, and popular opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who died in a Siberian prison in February—and then won an unprecedented fifth term in office in a highly choreographed presidential election in March. Meanwhile, Russian society, buoyed by a 16 percent hike in public spending, has adapted to Moscow’s self-styled “existential confrontation” with the West, which the Kremlin is ready to pursue to the bitter end.
But Putin’s Russia is vulnerable, and its vulnerabilities are hidden in plain sight. Now more than ever, the Kremlin makes decisions in a personalized and arbitrary way that lacks even basic quality controls. Since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian political elite have grown more pliant in implementing Putin’s orders and more obsequious in pandering to his paranoid worldview. The costs of these structural deficiencies are mounting. But even a horrific terrorist attack by the Islamic State (or ISIS-K) at a concert hall on the outskirts of Moscow on March 22—killing 145 civilians—failed to make the Russian leadership reconsider its priorities.
Putin’s regime, a highly personalized system run by an aging autocrat, is more brittle than it seems. Driven by Putin’s whims and delusions, Moscow is liable to commit self-defeating blunders. The Russian state effectively implements orders from the top, but it has no control over the quality of those orders. For that reason, it is at permanent risk of crumbling overnight, as its Soviet predecessor did three decades ago.
PITFALLS OF AUTOCRACY
The Princeton historian Stephen Kotkin once noted that the West failed to foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union because the country was simply not collapsing. There were no long-term trends that made the Soviet breakup inevitable. Rather, a relatively stable state was toppled by a series of decisions made at the very top and uncritically implemented by a system void of checks and balances.
Although the comparison may at first seem unlikely, Putin’s situation today resembles in some ways that faced by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the final years of the Soviet Union. In the late 1980s, Gorbachev instructed conservative apparatchiks to press ahead with political and economic liberalization. Accustomed to blindly executing orders from above, the officials offered little resistance. Putin has none of Gorbachev’s idealistic humanism, but he does resemble Gorbachev in one critical respect: his ability to impose his personal vision on the Russian state.
Putin has used his concentrated power to throw Russia into a brutal war with Ukraine. Russia’s state bureaucracy devotes more and more resources to anticipating and fulfilling the president’s wishes. Some of the consequences of this increasingly autocratic system are self-evident. Putin has degraded political freedom, impoverished the media landscape, and forced many talented Russians into exile. Other effects are less obvious. The Russian security services spent decades fighting Islamist extremism both at home in the North Caucasus and abroad in Syria. But Putin’s war in Ukraine has made the institutional knowledge of the security forces obsolete, and they now dismiss information shared by Western intelligence agencies. Two weeks before the attack at Crocus City Hall, the United States had identified the concert venue as a possible target of terrorism. Putin described the U.S. warnings as attempts to “intimidate and destabilize our society.”
Investigating and apprehending violent religious extremists is no longer a priority, as the president channels state resources to dreaming up conspiratorial links between terrorist acts and Kyiv. Not even a major terrorist attack near the capital itself has provided a wake-up call. By instructing officials to try to establish Ukrainian involvement in the concert arena massacre, Putin is effectively hamstringing the investigation and distracting from measures to prevent future such attacks.
Similarly, Russian ministries in charge of the economy have ceased to coordinate with one another. Instead, they concentrate on producing figures that will please Putin. The central bank’s efforts to curb inflation with high interest rates go hand in hand with state-subsidized loans ballooning the domestic demand. The government has imposed export embargoes on Russian oil products, rescinded them, and then reimposed them, as part of a turf war between the Energy Ministry, which seeks to lower domestic prices, and the Finance Ministry, which wants higher revenues. The bureaucrats managing the economy have made what were meant to be temporary administrative fixes permanent in order to avoid actual solutions that might displease the president.
Russia’s economic policymakers have garnered international acclaim for keeping the country’s economy afloat amid unprecedented Western sanctions, but they are increasingly stymied by the Kremlin’s despotism, and it is unclear how much longer the current stability can be sustained. These technocrats could also be ditched entirely if Putin decides the war effort requires a tighter grip.
INDECISION FATIGUE
Putin’s indecisiveness tends to be just as destructive as the actual decisions he makes, and here the similarities with the late Soviet Union are especially striking. By the end of 1989, Gorbachev had grown so baffled by the magnitude of the changes he himself had set in motion that he tried to halt the reforms, leaving the state apparatus bereft of a coherent vision and confused as to how to proceed. Deprived of top-level guidance, the Soviet system drifted for a while—before collapsing.
Modern Russia faces a similar problem. Having started an all-consuming war, Putin rarely bothers to explain to state and quasi-state actors how to adapt to the new reality. In the absence of instructions, they either fall into a stupor or take matters into their own hands, sometimes with disastrous consequences. The mercenary leader Prigozhin’s mutiny was a case in point. For years, Prigozhin’s Wagner company, the private militia funded by the Kremlin, coexisted uneasily with the Defense Ministry, but as the war became increasingly bogged down in the east in the late spring of 2023, their mutual hostility reached an apex. When Putin refused to arbitrate between them, Prigozhin launched a rebellion, bringing thousands of heavily armed mercenaries to the outskirts of Moscow. Russia’s bloated security apparatus offered no resistance. Putin intervened at the 11th hour, orchestrating a negotiated end to the crisis and then (almost certainly) ordering the downing of Prigozhin’s private plane, resulting in his death. The crisis laid bare the stunning impotence of the ostensibly mighty Russian state in the absence of the leader’s instructions. It also pushed the country to the verge of a civil war between government forces and a private warlord’s mercenary army.
Two months later, Putin’s failure to rein in extremism set the stage for an attempted pogrom in the mostly Muslim region of Dagestan, in southern Russia, when a mob stormed an airport in search of Jews arriving from Tel Aviv. Such rioting would have been unimaginable before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but Russia has stepped up its cooperation with Iran since the war began, and Iranian-influenced anti-Zionism has crept into Moscow’s anti-Western rhetoric. The local authorities did not know whether they should support or suppress these “anti-Israeli activists.” In the end, it required direct intervention from Moscow to disperse the mob.
The terrible human cost of the ISIS-K attack outside Moscow was also a result of ambiguous and contradictory signals from the Kremlin. On the one hand, Russian intelligence agencies are tasked with combating terrorism. On the other, they have a long-institutionalized practice of regarding information that comes from Western powers with suspicion. The March 22 attack would likely not have cost so many lives, and might have been averted entirely, had Russia maintained functional intelligence-sharing channels with the West. Instead, Putin dismissed the U.S. warnings, referring to them as “blackmail,” and Russian intelligence agencies declined to take seriously the sound information with which they were presented.
PUTIN’S HOUSE OF CARDS
Putin’s inflexibility and obduracy have been strengthened by his many years spent surrounded by toadies and yes men. Shielded from negative feedback and objective counsel, he is susceptible to tunnel vision, muddled priorities, and emotional outbursts, all of which are channeled into his decisions. Russia’s foreign policy, domestic security, and economic prospects all suffer as a result.
Many dictators are obsessed with history and their personal legacy, and Putin is no exception. He has been in power longer than any Russian leader since Stalin. At 71, he is also approaching the point at which most of his twentieth-century predecessors died. His awareness of his own mortality surely impinges on his decision-making. A growing sense of his limited time undoubtedly contributed to the fateful decision to invade Ukraine in 2022. It may well manifest itself in even greater blunders.
On the surface, Putin’s regime appears stable. The docility of the elite, the persistence of vast financial reserves and oil rents, and the state’s adeptness in shaping public opinion all make Putin seem invincible. But his system is “not collapsing” in the same way that the late Soviet Union was “not collapsing.” And as with the Soviet Union, the structure of Putin’s regime makes it far more fragile than it appears.
Consider that, just a year ago, hardly anyone could have envisioned Prigozhin’s mercenaries marching hundreds of miles toward Moscow and meeting hardly any resistance along the way, or an anti-Semitic mob storming a Russian international airport. Similar unpredictability is likely to mark future crises of the Russian regime. Even a minor incident, whether a setback in Ukraine, elite infighting, or new domestic unrest, could trigger a political avalanche if accelerated by the authorities’ inaction or policies based on Putin’s delusions. It is not the gravity of Russia’s problems but how the Kremlin deals with them that has positioned the regime permanently on the brink of collapse.
A collapse may take years to materialize. Or it could happen in a matter of weeks. But the West should be aware that at any given moment the events in Russia may spiral out of the Kremlin’s control, triggering the swift demise of its seemingly imperishable regime.
Önder Özar'ın kişisel görüşü : Bu "disinformation" değilse, iyimser bir yaklaşım.
Friday, April 26, 2024
AVİM - 27 Nisan 2024 - "1. Dünya Savaşından Günümüze Ermeni Meselesi” başlıklı bir webinar
Dış Politika Enstitüsü (DPE), Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi (AVİM) ve Ankara Üniversitesi işbirliği ile 28 Nisan 2024 tarihinde ZOOM Platformu üzerinden “1. Dünya Savaşından Günümüze Ermeni Meselesi” başlıklı bir webinar düzenlenecektir. Moderatörlüğünü Dış Politika Enstitüsü Akademi Kurulu Başkanı Prof Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu’nun yapacağı webinarın konuşmacıları Ankara Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi Prof. Dr. Yıldız Deveci Bozkuş ve AVİM Analisti Hazel Çağan Elbir olacaktır.
Webinara kayıt için tıklayınız:
AL MONITOR - April 26, 2024 The Turkey Briefing by Amberin Zaman
Erdogan's White House visit put off No images? Click here April 26, 2024 Welcome back to the Turkey Briefing. The big story is whether Erdogan cancelled his long-sought meeting with President Joe Biden in Washington that is scheduled to be held on May 9. I thought it was a storm in a teacup, as I noted here. But I got egg all over my face. Thanks for subscribing! Amberin Follow me on X @amberinzaman and on Insta @amberinzamanjournalist Turkey postpones Erdogan's White House visitTurkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is postponing his May 9 visit to the White House, multiple outlets reported on Friday, a move that will likely upend efforts to mend ties after prolonged friction and that will play into the hands of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. No reason was cited. A spokesperson from the US Embassy in Ankara said, “We look forward to hosting President Erdogan at the White House at a mutually convenient time, but we have not been able align our schedules.” Sources familiar with the details of the planned summit told Al-Monitor the decision likely stemmed from the White House’s decision to take so long, as Ankara saw things, to formally announce the visit. Comments from National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby on Thursday are thought to have been the tipping point. Asked about the visit, Kirby said, “There’s nothing on the schedule to speak to in terms of a specific visit by President Erdogan. So, I don’t really have a comment on that.” You are receiving the complete version of this newsletter for free. To get regular, full access to Al-Monitor's newsletters, subscribe with code TUR25 to get 25% off your first year, which also includes full access to our news, analysis and more.Officials on both sides have been preparing for the meeting, which was long sought by Erdogan, and speaking on background said the trip was on up until today. US President Joe Biden is the first in two decades not to receive Erdogan in the White House in his first three years in office. Turkey’s acquisition of Russian-made S-400 missile batteries and its military operations against the US-led anti-ISIS coalition’s Syrian Kurdish allies poisoned ties. However, the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza and escalating tensions with Iran have put Turkey’s strategic heft back into the limelight. Erdogan has sought to leverage this to the maximum, holding out on approving Sweden’s NATO membership for long months. The Biden administration’s decision earlier this year to greenlight the sale of F-16 fighter jets and modernization kits for Turkey’s existing fleet led to a thaw and an invitation to the White House. News of the visit was leaked by Ankara two days ahead of nationwide municipal elections on March 31. Oda TV, a Turkish news outlet, reported on April 20 that Erdogan would be canceling the visit after the United States approved a $26 billion aid package for Israel. The change in tone was palpable as Erdogan lambasted Israel and the Biden administration over its Gaza policy during a conference on Jerusalem held in Istanbul today. He called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “the butcher of Gaza” and asserted that “we won’t be among those who falsely accuse Hamas of being a terrorist organization.” Erdogan continued, “With the unconditional military and diplomatic support that it lends to Israel, the American administration is not contributing to a solution, rather it is making the problem bigger.” Erdogan also took aim at the United States’ veto at last week’s United Nations Security Council in response to Palestine’s request for full membership of the international body. Erdogan, a passionate advocate of Palestinian rights, has thrown his support behind the Palestinians in the Gaza war but has been criticized by his base for not doing enough. They made their displeasure known at the ballot box during the March 31 local elections, defecting in considerable numbers to a smaller Islamist party, the New Welfare Party, which campaigned on a militantly pro-Gaza platform. The party more than doubled its ratings in the elections, snatching several key municipalities from Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party. Ankara has since been steadily harshening its stance, slapping restrictions on the export of 54 items to Israel. It has not, however, curbed the flow of oil to Israel from Azerbaijan via a pipeline that runs to the southern Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Around 60% of Israel’s oil imports are thought to come from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. And while Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv soon after Hamas ignited the conflict when it slaughtered some 1,200 Israelis on Oct. 7, there has been no hint of freezing diplomatic ties. Indeed, sources familiar with the planning of Erdogan’s program suggested that the real issue was the lack of clarity from Washington that allowed hawks around Erdogan pressing him to scotch the trip to prevail. Oda TV is known for its anti-American and pro-Russian stance. Namik Tan, a former Turkish ambassador to Washington and Israel and a member of parliament for the pro-secular main opposition Republican People’s Party, said it would not be surprising if Erdogan had been insisting on being accorded a reception at a level that the Biden administration was not willing to provide and that the Turkish leader decided to opportunistically postpone the visit and “reclaim his mantle as the savior of Palestine” among his base and on the Arab street. “It is clear that the White House mismanaged things very badly and did not read Erdogan’s mood accurately. This is a huge win for Russia,” Tan told Al-Monitor. Gonul Tol, director of the Middle East Institute’s Turkey program, concurred. “Erdogan will use this to shore up his image domestically and staunch further defections to New Welfare,” she told Al-Monitor. A Western diplomat speaking to Al-Monitor on background said, "If the purpose is to grandstand for Gaza, what better opportunity to blast the administration's Israel policy than standing before the cameras alongside Biden in Washington?" The likely damage inflicted to US-Turkish relations will become clearer once the sides pronounce themselves officially on the matter. Does the postponement mean that Erdogan will not take part in July’s NATO summit in Washington? That too remains unclear. But for now, “Putin is likely rubbing his hands in glee,” Tan noted. As for what concrete difference the cancellation will make to the people in Gaza that is even less clear, Tan added. Other top stories Ezgi Akin had the story on Turkey’s top asks of Mark Rutte, wannabe NATO secretary general, who met with Erdogan today in Istanbul. As Ezgi predicted, Erdogan said the fight against terror was one of the leading topics during his discussions with the outgoing Dutch prime minister. He also alluded to existing restrictions by some NATO states on arms exports to Turkey, saying it was “imperative” for the new secretary general to ensure that they are removed. Erdogan did not say whether he endorsed Rutte for the job. Turkey’s Central Bank has kept rates steady despite rising inflation. Foreign investors aren’t too pleased, as Ezgi reports. Ezgi also describes how German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s official visit this week descended into a debate on doner kebabs. Barin Kayaoglu examines whether Turkey can lead diplomacy between Israel and Hamas as Qatar is about ready to give up. Ezgi reported on Erdogan’s trip to Iraq, where he inked a multibillion dollar deal with his hosts for an ambitious transport corridor that is supposed to link Iraq to Europe. Qatar and Saudi Arabia are slated to help finance the scheme. The brilliant Nazlan Ertan has an evocative feature on a bookshop on the Turkish side of the divided island of Cyprus. We also reported on how Turkey’s endangered Van cats are making a big comeback. On our reading list Reuben Silverman has a really good deep dive into Turkey’s local elections, complete with cool infographics. I recommend this thoughtful essay by Gonul Tol and Nimrod Goren drawing on the local election results in Turkey and Israel: "Are mayors democracy’s best bet?” For a break from the grimness, do read Nazlan’s hilarious write up for Anka on the perils of posting pictures of your pricey food. |