The EU Needs to Aim Even Higher on Its Defense Transformation

   MAY 31, 2022 LAST UPDATED 16:44 ET

The EU Needs to Aim Even Higher on Its Defense Transformation

Max Bergmann Tuesday, May 31, 2022

One of the biggest geopolitical questions raised by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is whether it will transform European defense. At first glance, the answer is obviously, yes. After all, Germany declared a zeitenwende, or turning point, announcing it would invest at least 100 billion euros in its military, while also pledging to meet NATO’s goal of spending 2 percent of GDP annually on defense. Other countries around Europe are similarly upping their defense budgets to meet or surpass the NATO goal. And the EU itself has allocated 2 billion euros to support the provision of security assistance to Ukraine.

Europe is suddenly taking defense very seriously and actually opening up its collective wallet. And that’s good news, as a militarily capable Europe could be a geopolitical game-changer, turning it from a security consumer into a security provider.

But look more closely and the answer becomes murkier. Yes, Europe will spend more, and that will inevitably lead to more defense capabilities. But there is a danger that much of the increased spending will be squandered, because it won’t address the main problem at the heart of European defense: fragmentation.

Europe already collectively spends a sizeable amount on defense—roughly $200 billion. But the EU’s 27 members and NATO’s 30 members don’t get the full value for their money, because defense spending is done on a national basis and is only loosely coordinated. On the one hand, this makes sense, as investing on a national basis is the way defense has always been done. On the other, it makes no sense at all, as the entire purpose of European defense spending should be to defend Europe, or at the very least to protect European interests. In most other ways, Europe has already Europeanized its “national interests” by forming an economic and increasingly political union. Yet, despite this, it still doesn’t conceive of defense on a European basis.

As a result, Europe will probably not get the most out of its increased investment. To be sure, spending more on defense will certainly improve European security. It’s long been known that Germany, for instance, must invest considerable resources in simply increasing the readiness of its forces, including its high-ticket platforms like planes, ships and tanks. The additional money Berlin has committed to its defense budget is meant to accomplish that, while also funding a broader modernization. But it may not stretch that far. European states are busy shipping off significant inventories of weapons to Ukraine and thereby dramatically decreasing their own stockpiles. These will have to be replaced, eating into the increased defense budgets.

Additionally, the increased spending, including Germany’s, will not go toward procuring key, costly enabling capabilities that Europe lacks, such as air lift to transport troops and cargo, and air tankers to refuel fighter jets. These capability gaps are why EU countries couldn’t get their citizens out of Kabul, why France and the EU couldn’t operate a limited military mission in Mali and the Sahel, and why Portugal would struggle to get troops rapidly to Estonia without the help of the U.S. military. And because those gaps are not being addressed, Europe—including France, with the continent’s most capable military—will remain utterly dependent on the U.S. to provide basic capabilities. Put simply, the increased spending will not enable Europe to defend itself or its interests without the U.S.

The EU proposal on defense integration looks like incremental progress when what Europe needs is to seize this opportunity to pursue transformational change.

Moreover, as smaller European countries increase their defense purchases, it could easily lead to a hodgepodge of new capabilities that are procured from different companies and countries. The experience of providing military aid to Ukraine has underscored the importance of interoperability, by highlighting how hard it is to mix and match weapons systems from different national suppliers. In the first weeks of the war, the emphasis was placed on delivering older Russian or Soviet weaponry from the inventories of NATO’s former Eastern bloc member states, as the Ukrainian military was familiar not only with how to operate and maintain those systems, but also had the spare parts and components to do so.

In a European context, it is incredibly complicated for European militaries to fight together, as the “tail” of European logistics is so long and complex, with so many different vehicles, helicopters and planes in various national militaries’ inventories. Thus, as money suddenly washes through European defense ministries and privileged national defense firms come calling, there is a huge risk of locking in the fragmentation that Europe so desperately needs to address.

Recognizing this as a problem, the European Commission has proposed a new, trailblazing initiative to help address it. Essentially, the bloc will push EU member states to coordinate and integrate as much as possible, standing up new defense procurement task forces. The EU plan also includes a defense industrial focus, both to try to keep the spending in Europe and to foster greater consolidation of European defense industries.

This new effort could lead to considerable progress. To support it, the EU has proposed 500 million euros to incentivize cooperation, which is critical to break through bureaucratic and parochial hurdles. In short, if countries work together, they can buy more, as the EU could supplement their acquisitions. This is a smart way forward, one that could build on an existing initiative known as Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO, to facilitate pooled defense investments, for which the EU earmarked 7 billion euros over five years in its latest budget in 2020.

The problem is, that just isn’t enough cash.

As a comparison, the U.S., in its $40 billion Ukraine assistance package, has included $10 billion for security assistance. Much of this will go to Ukraine. But billions will also likely flow to Eastern European EU and NATO members who gave away equipment to Ukraine. While this money will come in the form of direct military hardware, rather than cash, it is bizarre that Washington should be devoting more money for EU members than the EU itself. Additionally, the EU funding won’t fill the big capability gaps, where the bloc is most reliant on the U.S.

Thus, the EU proposal looks like incremental progress when what Europe needs is to seize this opportunity to pursue transformational change. Coordination meetings will help, but ultimately what will make a difference is for the EU to put real money into rationalizing and integrating European defense. The easiest way to do this is simply to borrow the funds, just as the bloc did to finance post-pandemic economic recovery through the creation of the NextGenEU. The same could be done for defense investments.

With real money behind it, collectively increased defense spending could be a geopolitical game-changer for Europe. It could make the EU a stronger actor on the world stage, making Europe more respected by both allies and adversaries alike. But for this to occur, the spending has to be done in a way that strengthens European security. This not only means spending more nationally while coordinating efforts through and between NATO and the EU, but also leveraging the EU’s ability to finance investments and to integrate, pool and share resources. This isn’t rocket science. But it requires Europeans to see security not through a parochial national lens, but through a collective European prism—and to back up that vision with money.

Max Bergmann is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served as a senior Adviser at the State Department from 2011-2017.

WPR