Encircling China And Praising India: The US Strategic
Framework For The Indo-Pacific
Written by Binoy KAMPMARK on 15/01/2021
The feeling from Rory Medcalf of the Australian National University was one
of breathless wonder. “The US government,” he wrote in The
Strategist, “has just classified one of its most secretive national
security documents – its 2018 strategic framework for the Indo-Pacific, which
was formally classified SECRET and not for release to foreign nationals.”
Washington’s errand boys and girls in Canberra tend to get excited by this
sort of thing. Rather than seeing it as a blueprint for imminent conflict
with China, a more benign reading is given: how to handle “strategic rivalry
with China.” Looming in the text of the National Security Council’s US Strategic Framework for the
Indo-Pacific (SFIP) is a generous doffing of the cap to
Australia’s reckless, self-harming approach towards China. As an unnamed
senior US official (of course) told Axios,
the Australians “were pioneers and we have to give a lot of credit to
Australia.” Australian senior intelligence advisor John Garnaut is given
high praise for his guiding hand. When war breaks out between Beijing and
Washington, we know a few people to thank.
The SFIP, declassified on January 5, is very much a case of business as
usual and unlikely to shift views in the forthcoming Biden presidency.
The timing of the release suggests that the Trump administration would like to
box its predecessor on certain matters, notably on China.
In a statement from
National Security Advisor Robert C. O’Brien, the SFIP “provided overarching
strategic guidance for implementing the 2017 National Security Strategy within
the world’s most populous and economically dynamic region”. The National
Security Strategy, in turn, recognised “that the most consequential challenge
to the interests of the United States, and those of our allies and partners, is
the growing rivalry between free and repressive visions of the future.”
Beijing is cast in the role of repressive force in “pressuring Indo-Pacific
nations to subordinate their freedom and sovereignty to a ‘common destiny’
envisioned by the Chinese Communist Party.”
The imperium’s interests, according to the SFIP, must be guarded
(“strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific region”); a “liberal economic order”
must be promoted while China is to be prevented “from establishing new,
illiberal spheres of influence”. North Korea is deemed of high importance
in terms of whether it threatens the US and its allies, “accounting for both
the acute present danger and the potential for future changes in the level and
type of threat posed” by Pyongyang. The US is also to retain “global
economic leadership while promoting fair and reciprocal trade.”
One of the “top interests” of the US in the Indo-Pacific is identified in
pure power terms: retaining “economic, diplomatic, and military access to the
most populous region in the world and more than one-third of the global
economy”. Washington is keen to preserve “primacy in the region while protecting
American core values and liberties at home.” But there is the spoiling
presence of China, aspirational superpower, and keen for its bit of
geopolitical pie. “Strategic competition between the United States and
China will persist, owing to the divergent nature and goals of our political
and economic systems.”
China is ever the cheeky opportunist, seeking to “circumvent international
rules norms to gain an advantage.” Beijing “aims to dissolve US alliances
and partnerships in the region” exploiting “vacuums and opportunities created
by these diminished bonds.” With this in mind, US defence strategy should
be “capable of, but not limited to: (1) denying China
sustained air and sea dominance inside the ‘first island chain’ in conflict;
(2) defending the first-island-chain nations, including Taiwan; and (3) dominating all
domains outside the first island-chain.”
The document also acknowledges an untidy region of shifting power balances
and increased defence spending, which will “continue to drive security competition
across the Indo-Pacific”. Japan and India are singled out for special
mention in that regard. A measure of angst is registered: “Loss of US
pre-eminence in the Indo-Pacific would weaken our ability to achieve US
interests globally.”
The authors of the SFIP are unashamed about the fistful of principles that
will maintain US power, the sort that masquerades in popular language as the
“liberal rules-based order”. Desirable objectives include the US being
the “preferred partner” of “most nations” in the region; and that these powers
“uphold the principles that have enabled US and regional prosperity and
stability, including sovereignty, freedom of navigation and overflight,
standards of trade and investment, respect for individual rights and rule of
law, and transparency in military activities.” No wobbling will be
permitted; allies will have to get in line.
India, “in cooperation with like-minded countries,” figures as a shining
hope. Its rise is deemed essential, serving as “a net provider of security
and Major Defense Partner”. What is envisaged is a strategic partnership
“underpinned by a strong Indian military able to effectively collaborate with
the United States and our partners in the region to address shared interests.”
For its spiky anti-China message, the nature of the economic relationship
with Beijing is hard to ignore, provided it is conducted on US terms. The
strategy is, to that end, most Trumpian in character, emphasising the need to
“prevent China’s industrial policies and unfair trading practices from
distorting global markets and harming US competitiveness.”
In what has become a tradition of the Trump administration, the Framework
document does not tally with messages from other equivalent national security
assessments. The officials of empire are not speaking with a coherent
voice. The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report by
the Department of Defense, for instance, makes good mention of Russia as a
“revitalized malign actor”. (Pentagon pundits can never seem to give the
bear, or their paranoia, a rest.) Despite tardy economic growth
occasioned by Western sanctions and a fall in oil prices, Moscow “continues to
modernize its military and prioritize strategic capabilities – including its
nuclear forces, A2/AD systems, and expanded training for long-range aviation –
in an attempt to re-establish its presence in the Indo-Pacific region.”
The authors of the Framework document are, in sharp contrast, barely
troubled by Moscow and, surprisingly, sober on the issue. “Russia will
remain a marginal player in the Indo-Pacific region relative to the United
States, China and India.” Abhijnan Rej of The Diplomat could
not help but find this inconsistency odd.
“So Russia is a threat in a public document but not one in a classified one?”
As for India, the 2019 IPSR does much to avoid exaggeration and
elevation. “Within South Asia, we are working to operationalize our Major
Defense Partnership with India, while pursuing emerging partnerships with Sri
Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh and Nepal.” The Pentagon notes an
increase in the “scope, complexity and frequency of our military exercises”
with India. But for all that, New Delhi hardly remains a jewel of defence
strategy relative to such traditional allies as South Korea and Japan.
The SFIP, in contrast, makes a bold stab at linking the goals of
maintaining US regional supremacy with New Delhi’s own objectives. This
is bound to cause discomfort in the planning rooms, given Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s rhetoric on regional multipolarity. An article of faith
in Indian policy on the matter is ensuring that no single power dominates the
region. Another potential concern is
the prospect that India is being thrown into the US-China scrap.
Medcalf concludes his assessment of
the framework document with his own call for what promises to be future
conflict. “America,” he insists, “cannot effectively compete with China
if it allows Beijing hegemony over this vast region, the economic and strategic
centre of gravity in a connected world.” The conflict mongers will be
eagerly rubbing their hands.
Reposts are welcomed with the reference to ORIENTAL REVIEW.
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