Will Biden Seize the Opportunity for an
Alliance With India?
Brahma Chellaney Monday, Jan. 25, 20
President Joe Biden faces a slew of
important foreign policy challenges. But with India, he has a historic
opportunity to forge a strategic alliance to help build a stable balance of
power in Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific region.
India has been a bright spot in U.S.
foreign policy over the past two decades. Continuing a process set in motion by
President Bill Clinton during the 1990s and accelerated by every succeeding
administration, U.S.-India relations thrived during
Donald Trump’s presidency. Not surprisingly, there is strong
bipartisan support in both Washington and New Delhi for a closer partnership
under Biden.
The Trump administration’s
now-declassified “U.S. Strategic Framework for the
Indo-Pacific” gives India pride of place in American strategy. “A
strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a
counterbalance to China,” it states. The framework underlines the U.S.
objective to “accelerate India’s rise and capacity to serve as a net provider
of security” in the Indo-Pacific and as America’s major defense partner.
Trump’s standalone trip to India last
year underscored how the expanding strategic partnership has become an
important diplomatic asset for both countries. The visit is remembered by many
Indians for Trump’s famous words at a huge
rally in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s home city of Ahmedabad:
“America loves India, America respects India, and America will always be
faithful and loyal friends to the Indian people.”
Today, the United States is close to
accomplishing what it has long struggled to achieve: co-opting India in a “soft
alliance” built not on formal security obligations but on common interests.
U.S. officials recognize that such an arrangement will bear little resemblance
to the patron-client framework that was established in Asia during the Cold
War, with Washington as the “hub” and treaty allies like Japan, South Korea and
Australia as the “spokes.” No such arrangement would work with India today, for
the simple reason that a country so large, especially one that values its
strategic autonomy, cannot become another Japan or South Korea to the
U.S. As then-Deputy Secretary of State
Stephen Biegun stressed during a visit to New Delhi in October,
the U.S. is seeking “not an alliance on the postwar model but a fundamental
alignment along shared security and geopolitical goals, shared interests, and
shared values.”
India recently signed the last of
four “foundational” agreements that the U.S. maintains with all
of its close defense partners. India, shedding its earlier hesitation, has also
elevated its involvement in the Quad, a coalition of democracies with
Australia, Japan and the U.S. that is at the center of America’s “Free and Open
Indo-Pacific” strategy. The Quad, which China views as an emerging
Asian version of NATO, held its first joint military exercise in November, when
Australia joined the other Quad members for India’s annual Malabar naval war games.
China’s aggressive expansionism has
helped drive India’s shift toward closer strategic collaboration with the U.S.
A major turning point was China’s decision last spring to
stealthily occupy mountaintops and other strategic vantage
points in the borderlands of the northernmost Indian region of Ladakh. That
move triggered the deadliest clash along the two countries’ disputed border in
decades, and 100,000 war-ready Indian and Chinese troops are still locked in a
military standoff.
The depth of strategic collaboration between the world’s most powerful and
most populous democracies will ultimately be shaped by Biden’s China policy.
India’s alarm over Chinese aggression is
widely shared in Washington, now more than ever, as the Trump administration
began explicitly labeling China as a “revisionist power,” “strategic competitor”
and principal adversary. Before this paradigm shift, successive U.S. presidents
since the 1970s aided the rise of their country’s
most formidable competitor, believing—falsely, it turned out—that an
increasingly prosperous China would become a “responsible stakeholder.”
That blunder will continue to haunt not only the U.S. but also its allies and
partners.
This explains why Trump was more popular in a number
of Asian countries than he was at home or in Western
Europe. As Ian Buruma recently observed,
many Asians “saw Trump as a coarse but powerful leader of the free world
against [Chinese] communist tyranny.” Even within China, Trump was admired by
those concerned about leader Xi Jinping’s increasingly arbitrary
and despotic rule.
Against this background, U.S.-India ties
will remain close. However, the depth of strategic collaboration between the
world’s most powerful and most populous democracies will ultimately be shaped
by Biden’s China policy. Biden has yet to clearly enunciate his approach toward
Beijing or his overall Asia policy. If anything, Biden has fueled uncertainty
over whether his administration will continue with Trump’s strategy, including
by refraining from using the term, “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” coining a new phrase instead:
a “Secure and Prosperous Indo-Pacific.” He has made no mention thus far of the
Quad, which holds the promise of becoming
a formal security arrangement. Biden, however, has done well to name
the veteran Asia hand Kurt Campbell to the newly created position of
Indo-Pacific coordinator on the National Security Council.
Will Biden spurn the Trump
administration’s approach and seek to reset U.S. policy toward China and the
Indo-Pacific? A softer U.S. approach toward Beijing is unlikely to help build
the long-sought soft alliance with India. Given the bipartisan U.S. consensus
and some of his own national security appointments, it is doubtful that Biden
could return to the more-indulgent approach to China of the Obama
administration, when Beijing engaged in mostly cost-free expansionism, including redrawing the South China
Sea’s geopolitical map.
To be sure, there are also other issues,
including Pakistan and human rights, that could impede progress toward India’s
full involvement in the U.S.-led security architecture. A decision to restore U.S. security aid to Pakistan,
for example, would set off alarm bells in New Delhi, as it would relieve pressure
on Pakistan to curb its well-documented support for terrorist groups like
Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani Network, and unwittingly contribute to
the growing China-Pakistan axis against India.
India’s domestic politics mirrors that
of the U.S. in terms of hardened polarization, with a widening divide between
liberals and conservatives. Trump refrained from commenting on contentious
developments in India so as not to be seen as wading into
the country’s domestic politics. But Biden has pledged a renewed
U.S. focus on promotion of liberal values and human rights. In his presidential campaign, Biden criticized
the Modi government’s suppression of dissent in the Muslim-majority territory
of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as a new Indian law to grant citizenship to
non-Muslim refugees that fled religious persecution in the three neighboring
Muslim-majority countries of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Critics have
branded that law anti-Muslim. If the Biden administration were to be openly
critical of such issues, it might embolden Modi’s critics while turning Indian
public opinion against a closer partnership with Washington.
However, Biden and Vice President Kamala
Harris, whose mother was Indian, are likely to pursue a pragmatic approach that
prioritizes deeper engagement with India. This will include clinching a
much-sought-after trade deal with India, whose huge market is an increasingly
powerful magnet for U.S. businesses; forging a partnership with New Delhi on
climate change; and expanding defense ties. Such a balanced approach is
appropriate, for no relationship between any two democracies is as important in
today’s changing world than the one between the U.S. and India.
Brahma Chellaney is a geo-strategist and
the author of nine books, including, most recently, “Water, Peace, and War” (Rowman
& Littlefield).
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