January 28, 2021
What Will Joe Biden’s NATO
Look Like?
Expect the
United States to continue to prod NATO into being better prepared for providing
collective security in an era of great power competition.
Though there are many questions
about the future direction of President Biden’s foreign policy, the U.S. role in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
is not among them. America’s participation in the alliance is the cornerstone
of the common defense of the transatlantic community. That isn’t likely to
change. Meanwhile, expect the United States to continue to prod NATO into being better prepared for providing collective
security in an era of great power competition. It’s a worthy agenda, and there
are some important must-do items on the list.
Making Nice with
NATO
President Biden has called
America’s commitment to joint defense, as outlined under Article V of the NATO
charter, a “sacred trust.” Lloyd Austin’s first phone call as Defense Secretary
was to the NATO Secretary General. Recently, Biden called the secretary as well. Clearly, Biden wants to
reassure our allies that America’s commitment to NATO will be as solid as ever.
Also clear is that there will be
a change of tone in U.S. dealings with the alliance. President Trump often
framed demands for NATO reform and burden-sharing in transactional terms. Biden
won’t do that.
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Further, the Biden team is more
than likely to review the last administration’s decision to withdraw troops
from Germany. That will calm Europeans worried about America First meaning
America gone.
Finally, Biden has signaled he
wants a balanced relationship with Russia. Europeans don’t
want Putin to think the alliance is a pushover. In his first phone call to
Russian President Vladimir Putin, Biden raised concerns about a range of Russian misdeeds, from election meddling and the SolarWinds
hack to the Kremlin’s treatment of dissidents. On the other hand, Biden agreed
to extend the New START treaty for five years. Many NATO members see the
U.S.-Russian nuclear arms agreement as a stabilizing force.
Still, as the Biden team must
know, nice words, won’t solve much. The U.S. may speak more softly, but it
won’t stop pressing the case for burden-sharing. Every modern president has
raised the issue with NATO allies. Biden will be no different. Indeed,
burden-sharing is more important to U.S. strategy than ever.
America is a global power with
global interests and global responsibilities. In an era of great power
competition, the Pentagon doesn’t have enough armed forces to cover all of them
without partners. The shortfalls are well documented in The Heritage
Foundation Index of U.S. Military Strength.
There are other issues as well.
Brussels often found Trump’s haranguing useful, bolstering its argument for
European strategic autonomy and emphasizing its calls to invest within the
European Union (EU). Their quest for autonomy, however, transcends Trump. They
won’t stop with his departure. The tug of war between NATO and the EU will
continue to generate friction. The EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation
(PESCO), which seems more about propping-up European defense companies than
expanding regional defense capabilities, could remain a source of tension.
Finally, there are real
challenges that have nothing to do with tone. As much as NATO would love to
have stable relations with Russia, there no reason to believe that a real reset
is in the offing.
The problem was always Putin, not Trump. There is zero
likelihood Putin will ever give up repression and corruption at home, his
interest in establishing a hard sphere of influence Europe, or his
destabilizing activities to undermine his neighbors. Further, Russia will
continue to threaten short-war scenarios, where Russia does a quick-land grab
of NATO territory hoping to short-circuit a NATO response (out of fear of
escalation) and make a mockery out of the Article V commitment.
Then there is the challenge
of China.
China’s encroaching influence could undermine the solidarity of NATO. There are
a growing concerns about Beijing’s meddling in alliance infrastructure and its
pressuring of alliance members to thwart collective action. Europeans are all
over the map on their response to China. That wasn’t Trump’s fault either.
Building a Better
NATO
Since there are real issues to be
addressed that can’t be palmed off on Trump, expect Biden’s NATO honeymoon to
be a short one. The U.S. administration will have to get down to the business
of building a NATO ready for the contemporary challenges the alliance faces.
Biden has a good foundation to
build on. Trump left NATO better than he found it. The alliance is investing
more in its own defense. NATO allies have made real and sustained increases in
defense spending in recent years. By the end of 2020, non-U.S. NATO members will have invested an
additional $130 billion since 2016. The U.S. has more forward
presence forces. Washington has helped build allied capability through the
European Deterrence Initiative ($5.9 billion alone in FY20). This foundation
provides no shortage of opportunities for building a better NATO.
Biden can take several additional
steps to improve the alliance. Here are three steps that should not be much of
stretch for the new team.
Focus NATO on its
area of responsibility. The age of out-of-area
operations is over. In the new era of great power competition, NATO must stick
to Job 1: ensuring the transatlantic community is safe, stable, and at peace.
In particular, NATO must focus more on making the alliance resilient from the
malicious and destabilizing meddling, particularly in securing infrastructure,
cybersecurity, and information warfare and other “gray zone” threats.
Help the alliance
meet the challenge of China. The recent NATO reflection
process has strengthened the consensus that the alliance must pay more
attention to the threats raised by China. Once there’s agreement on the nature
and scope of the threat, NATO can move on to mitigation planning. The key
question is: How do we ensure that China has little or no capacity to mess with NATO’s
ability to exercise collective defense? The U.S. can certainly play
a strong and constructive role in moving that dialogue forward.
Keep burden-sharing
on the table. NATO still needs more collective capacity. The
conversation about how to do that must continue. There is likely no one-size-fits-all
model for boosting capacity. Romania offers one great example of how to build up joint capability in
partnership with America. There are other constructive
options for enhanced U.S.-German cooperation.
There are also steps that need to
be taken that might make the Biden team a bit uncomfortable. Still, they are
too important to ignore. Here are three.
Keep NATO’s Open
Door Open. Even small
nations have the capacity to make positive contributions to the alliance.
It would be a strategic disaster to give Putin a veto over what free nations
should be allowed to join an alliance of free nations whose only interest is
their own collective security. Georgia, Ukraine, Kosovo and Bosnia and
Herzegovina all have legitimate aspirations for membership in NATO. Moving the
membership process forward won’t happen without the leadership of the United
States. Mustering that leadership will require commitment, energy, and political
capital from Washington.
Extended Deterrence
Matters. Strategic deterrence is a critical stabilizing
factor in the dynamics of great power competition. NATO needs to rest easy
under a capable, modernized strategic deterrence that includes strategic, theater,
and tactical nuclear weapons as well as missile defense-robust offense-defense
mix. This will require not only a strong commitment from Washington, but
overcoming anti-nuclear voices in Europe—not an easy lift.
Conventional
Deterrence Matters. A mix of robust strategic and conventional
deterrence is the most stable geo-political state. In particular, NATO needs to
take the prospects of another short war land grab being successful right off
Putin’s table. An adequate conventional deterrent would include effective forward-deployed forces and the capacity to reinforce them (even
in the face of enemy efforts to deny reinforcements). That requires more, not
fewer U.S. forces in Europe.
Trump was willing to invest in
peace through strength. Even his movement of U.S. troops stationed in Germany
was not about reducing forces; he just wanted to move them around. Committing
to sustain investment in defense in the face of all the other demands on the
administration will be a real challenge for Biden.
A Heritage
Foundation vice president, James Jay Carafano directs the think tank’s research
on matters of national security and foreign relations.
Image: Reuters.
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