How the British became the new Turks

 

Charlemagne – How the British became the new Turks | Europe

 March 19, 2021

By

 NewsDesk 

 

 

March 20, 2021

LIFE IN BRUSSELS has become too exciting for British diplomats. Before Brexit, they needed patience to haggle over boring and complex politics. Now they find a knack for warmongering more useful. Since he finished his departure from the I at the start of the year, the British government threw itself into pieces with its former colleagues. He began by refusing to offer ambassadorial status to the Is man in London. He then unilaterally rolled back parts of his Northern Ireland deal, triggering apoplexy from the European Commission, which accused him of violating international law. British backdrop MPs accuse their European peers of vaccine nationalism, after the I introduced export controls on jabs made in the block. Allegations of hypocrisy and even malice swirl between London and Brussels like a cranky Eurostar.

 

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Leaving the IBritain was always going to be faced with a choice: should it be more like Switzerland or Turkey? The neighboring countries of the world’s largest economic bloc must either accept its supremacy or try to fight it. Switzerland and Turkey best represent these two options. The Swiss, who have a complicated web of agreements with the I, can complain about Is dominance over their affairs, but ultimately accept the intrusion. Turkey has a much simpler relationship: a customs union that allows goods to move relatively freely. Yet the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogans fights the Europeans at all times.

 

Britain could have gone both ways. Theresa May, Prime Minister from 2016 to 19, enjoyed walking in the Alps and I with Swiss realism. Once outside the bloc, she felt, Britain would still seek to influence her, meddling in everything from foreign policy to data protection laws in the same way Switzerland binds itself to various I rules. The plan was to make friends and influence people, with diligent diplomacy making up for the loss of a seat at the table. However, Ms Mays’ successor Boris Johnson, a proud descendant of an Ottoman politician, took a much more Turkish approach. He drove Britain out of the I and in a loose and rather shallow free trade agreement with him. He sees Europe as a sovereign rival and his diplomats follow his example. Private deliberation is over. The public confrontation is there. Brussels is there to be criticized, especially when it does scandalous things, like threatening to block vaccine exports to Britain.

 

Britain discovered its rebellious streak quite late in the day. After voting to leave in 2016, he continued to abide by the block rules. UK officials diligently attended meetings on I youth politics and the like, even though home politics was a four-year game. But now a sharper tone emits from them. During the difficult discussions, as the period of transition to the status quo ended on December 31, officials wore Union Jack lanyards. David Frost, the peer at the head of the British camp, told them to be leaders and not mice. Then and thereafter, threats to tear up agreements already made were frequent. It’s a tactic that I officials negotiating with Turkey will recognize, given Mr Erdogans’ repeated threats to end a deal with the I on refugees. Turkey has been playing this game for a long time. Britain, on the other hand, is still experimenting. It’s like a teenager who questions his identity, says a somewhat condescending Eurocrat.

 

An element of nihilism hangs over the relationship. Neither side wants or expects a deeper partnership anytime soon. Britain is happy to scrap with the I because there is not much at stake. New infringement procedures, which can lead to fines, are not very threatening. (Dozens of such cases are already open against Britain.) Other sanctions are just as brutal. The I may withhold valuable trinkets as a financial match decision, which would allow UK insurers and asset managers to operate in the I. But UK officials have already put the odds of such a concession at close to zero. The threat to withdraw an offer that one never intended to make is not very powerful, as the Turkish government can attest. Turkey has launched its candidacy to join the I in 1987, however, the path turned out to be a treadmill rather than a traveler. He knows his prospects of joining the bloc are nonexistent and he behaves accordingly.

Toblerone with Turkish Delight

In Europe, geography is fate. All parties are stuck with each other whether their government accepts it or not. Switzerland smooths over its disagreements through constant negotiations with the I, haggle over everything from the free movement of people to banking secrecy in an endless cycle of discussions. Being a small landlocked country in the heart of the European continent lends itself to a grumpy compromise. Turkey is in a much more inconvenient place. Seen as not quite European by those in Brussels, it is both too small to pose a challenge but too big to be pushed. In short, he is in a position that Britain can relate to. This poses an enigma to the I, too much. Unlike Switzerland, Great Britain and Turkey are military partners, not just economic ones. Both are members of NATO. The IThe most pressing strategic issues, including an unstable North Africa and an interfering Russia, will be resolved more easily if Turkey and Britain agree.

 

However, it can prove to be even more difficult for the I build a constructive relationship with Great Britain than with Turkey. Ultimately, the I doesn’t care much about Turkey’s fate as long as it remains stable. In the case of Great Britain and I, each side needs the other to fight (although neither will admit it). For Europe, Britain’s situation must be clearly worse because of its exit from the bloc. In exchange for following all of its restrictions, the I promises prosperity. The prospect of a large, prosperous economy with a different worldview just off its northwest coast is uncomfortable. For the British government, the pain of leaving the I must be seen to be worth it. It is easier to claim if the I fails to become a beacon of transnational bliss. Friction is inevitable. Those who hope for a boring relationship are out of luck.

This article appeared in the Europe section of the print edition under the headline “The New Turks”