Biden wants to rebuild relationships, but old friends
aren’t so sure.
| APRIL 8, 2021, 12:41 PM
U.S. President Joe Biden talks to reporters in the East Room of the White
House in Washington, on March 25. CHIP SOMDEVILLA/GETTY IMAGES
U.S.
President Joe Biden loves allies. When he took office, his first international
phone calls were to allied heads of state: Canada’s Justin Trudeau, the United
Kingdom’s Boris Johnson, and France’s Emmanuel Macron, along with Mexico’s
Andrés Manuel López Obrador. The president’s “America is back” mantra has
reintroduced the United States as a reliable, consistent, and trustworthy ally
to friends in Europe and elsewhere—at least while Biden’s in office. The
administration’s response to knotty questions—like what to do about China
tariffs or how to deal with Iran—always contains a line about figuring it out
alongside partners. Trump-era demands that foreign friends do more, pay more,
and ask less have disappeared. “America First” has given way to “Allies First.”
Yet
sometimes it’s hard to be an ally. The administration’s new approach is a
breath of fresh air after four years of damage and disparagement, but
complications will rise to the surface as soon as the honeymoon wears off.
Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s gratuitous disputes with allies were
self-defeating, but Biden’s welcome celebration of U.S. alliances raises its
own set of ambiguities and contradictions. The drive to enshrine a U.S. foreign
policy for the American middle class may, in particular, pose new dilemmas for
long-term allies.
The tonal
difference between the two presidents could hardly be clearer. Trump’s
oft-articulated view that allies get rich under U.S. protection, refuse to pay
their fair share, require U.S. commitment to areas of marginal importance, and
generally take advantage of U.S. naiveté is out. In its place are messages like
that of U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, who has emphasized the current administration’s
high regard for NATO, its willingness to listen to allies, and its desire to
both consult and work with them.
Policy is
following rhetoric as well. Trump’s demand that both Tokyo and Seoul increase
their financial contributions for hosting U.S. troops created an impasse; the
new team has already agreed to extend the existing deal with Japan and
finalized a new arrangement with South Korea. Trump ordered the withdrawal
of 12,000 U.S. troops from Germany; Biden
put a halt to it. New sanctions on Russian and Chinese
officials have been coordinated with the European Union and Canada, and the
administration is collaborating on pandemic response in the Indo-Pacific
with partners like Australia.
Still,
dangers lurk under this refreshingly placid surface.
Some stem
from domestic policy decisions whose ripples wash against foreign shores,
particularly in the economic and environmental areas. Consider, for instance,
the United States’ great ally to the north. Biden held a wonderful first phone
call with Trudeau and a successful virtual meeting after that. The tone was
friendly, the smiles were bright, and following four years of Trump antagonism,
the sigh of Canadian relief was nearly audible in the lower 48 states.
Between the
two conversations, however, Biden terminated the Keystone XL pipeline, which would transport
Canadian oil to the Gulf of Mexico—and is both economically important and
politically popular in Canada. He also issued a “Buy American” executive order
that may bar Canadian suppliers from bidding on U.S. government contracts—an
element, Biden said, of advancing a foreign policy for
the middle class. Protecting U.S. jobs and procurement opportunities, it seems,
can mean erecting barriers even to close and long-standing allies.
Other
domestic economic moves impact foreign partnerships. Trump slapped tariffs on
steel and aluminum imports from a variety of U.S. friends, employing a weak
national security justification to do so. Not only has the new administration
so far left those tariffs in place, but it also reversed Trump’s 11th hour
removal of tariffs on the United Arab Emirates, using the same national
security reasoning. Allies fret that protectionist impulses, unchecked either
by the executive branch or Congress, will erode trade opportunities—and with
it, the constituency for close ties to the United States.
A second set
of complications will stem not from foreign frustrations with U.S. policy but
U.S. disillusionment at just how entrenched allied policy positions can be.
Just before Biden took office, the EU signed an investment agreement with
China; despite all of the talk about forging a new transatlantic approach to
Beijing, it took Chinese sanctions on European officials to throw the agreement
into doubt. Germany, out of the doghouse that Trump was so eager to consign it
to, is proceeding with the ill-advised Nord Stream 2 pipeline to supply itself
with Russian natural gas. The new administration sanctioned Myanmar’s military after its
recent coup; Japan has thus far resisted calls to join the economic pressure
campaign.
A third area
of difficulty stems from the administration’s commitment to elevate democracy
and human rights. The approach implies collisions with several allies like
Thailand, the Philippines, Hungary, and Turkey as well as close partners like
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. U.S. policymakers have long faced trade-offs between
a forceful promotion of universal values and the desire to bolster ties with
friends of an autocratic disposition. Yet after four years with a president
disinclined to press allies for improvements in their domestic conduct, the
dilemma will be thrown into newly high relief.
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This
inherent tension flared most prominently after the administration released
an intelligence assessment that blamed the
Saudi crown prince for the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Biden
ultimately employed a pragmatic blend of naming-and-shaming, sanctions against
lower-level officials, reassurance of the alliance’s importance (and a
near-simultaneous attack on Iranian facilities that underscored the point), and
a continued push toward ending Riyadh’s war in Yemen. On the whole, however, his
reasonable response elicited fierce criticism from all sides. Such conundrums
are just the beginning for a new administration that will wish to save
the Visiting Forces Agreement with the
Philippines, ensure Turkey does not stray further into Russia’s orbit, and
enhance ties with India even as worries rise about illiberal tendencies there.
The final
challenge stems from doubts about U.S. steadfastness, often murmured under
allied breaths. Some in Asia, for instance, decried Trump’s disdain,
inconsistency, and overly personalized approach to foreign policy but
appreciated his tough stance on China nonetheless. Middle East partners saw
Trump’s military strikes on Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime and Iran’s Quds Force commander as welcome evidence
of decisiveness and resolve. Should allies join in the “extreme competition”
Biden foresees with China or hedge in case his administration eventually seeks
broad cooperation? Should they stay in Afghanistan despite a peace process they
are not party to? Should they join a coalition to push back against Iran when
the previous Democratic president advocated Gulf Arab states share the region
with Tehran?
More
fundamentally, the “America is back” pronouncement suggests it’s Trump, not
Biden, who represents the aberration from traditional U.S. foreign policy. The
truth of that assumption is no longer self-evident. Observers have wondered
aloud about how much of the past four years have been about Trump and how much
about America. Is the Trumpian cramped worldview—one that defines interests
narrowly and deals with partners transactionally—the outlier, or is it the new
normal from which long-experienced Biden—with his traditionally enlightened
foreign-policy approach—is the last departure? And with presidential terms at
eight years at best, can allies risk siding with U.S. positions if a new leader
enters bent on reversing them?
Consider,
for example, the roller coaster of Iran sanctions that U.S. European allies
have ridden on. Before and during nuclear negotiations, the message from
Washington was European governments and companies should cease most business
ties with Iran. Once the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) took
effect, the Obama administration observed that Tehran must discern tangible
benefits from the agreement and urged Europe to forge commercial ties with
Iran. Enter Trump, who reimposed sanctions and implored Europeans—so recently
told to facilitate trade with Iran—to cease and desist. Now, with the
likelihood of U.S. reentry into the JCPOA, it’s easy to
imagine reversing course one more time. But the roller coaster is not yet back
in the station; if there is a Republican president who, in less than four
years, wishes to sanction Iran, European allies will be in the front car for a
return trip. Such lurching invites weariness, hedging, and cynicism among the
United States’ friends.
Messy
relationships are nothing new in foreign policy, of course, and no alliance is
ever free from complications. Some of the toughest disputes—think trade battles
with Japan in the 1980s or the transatlantic fight over the 2003 Iraq War—have
involved the United States’ closest friends. Setting a new tone, as Biden is
doing now, helps manage them. The key is to make sure potentially divisive
policies do not overwhelm unifying rhetoric and sentiment.
George
Shultz, former U.S. secretary of state who passed away in February, famously
referred to the diplomat’s task of “tending the garden”—building relationships
of trust over time with key counterparts. Less often cited is what he observed
that tending entails. “Any good gardener knows,” Shultz said, “you have to
clear the weeds out right away.” Identify potential problems early, eliminate
what you can, manage what you can’t, and by all means keep them from strangling
the greater good in alliance relationships.
As allies
grow accustomed to Biden’s welcome new tone and policies, the
weeds—protectionist moves, a complicated China approach, pressure on the human
rights agenda, doubts about U.S. consistency, and more—will look taller. The
new team should start tending to them now.
Richard Fontaine is the chief executive officer
of the Center for a New American Security. He worked on the National Security
Council staff and at the State Department during the George W. Bush
administration. Twitter: @RHFontaine
TAGS: GEOPOLITICS, UNITED STATES
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