Ankara in risky geopolitical gamble in Black Sea
Fiddling with the delicate balance of power in the Black Sea might leave Turkey in a worse squeeze between Russia and the United States.
A Liberian-flagged cargo vessel is tugged by a coastal safety boat after it ran ashore in the Bosporus, Istanbul, Turkey, Dec. 27, 2019.
April 15, 2021
Is Turkey on course to
abandon its traditional balancing act between Russia and NATO in the Black Sea
region? Ankara’s posture in the Ukraine-Russia standoff, coupled with its
newfound ambivalence on a decadesold regime governing maritime traffic to the Black
Sea, throws into question the balanced policy that Turkey has long pursued in
the region.
In a rare alignment with
Washington amid ongoing frost in bilateral ties, Ankara last week lent
unequivocal support to Kiev in the face of mounting tensions on the
Ukrainian-Russian border. The show of support for Ukraine coincides with an
unprecedented controversy over Ankara’s commitment to the 1936 Montreux
Convention, which regulates traffic through Turkey's Bosporus and Dardanelles
straits — the maritime link between the Black and Mediterranean seas. The
convention gives Turkey full control of the straits, while imposing strict
limitations for the military ships of non-littoral states, effectively
restricting the access of US and NATO naval forces to the Black Sea.
The decades-long geopolitical equilibrium set by the convention in the
Black Sea has come under increasing strain since Russia’s annexation of the
Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and the ensuing conflict between Russian-backed
separatists and Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine. A fresh flareup in the
past several weeks has seen a big Russian military buildup on the border with
Ukraine, sparking a flurry of diplomacy to defuse the tensions. The United
States and NATO have thrown their weight behind Ukraine and are gearing up
for massive military drills in
the region as part of the Europe Defender-2021 exercises.
After talks with his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky in Istanbul
April 10, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for the continuation of
the cease-fire and a peaceful solution of the conflict, while asserting
Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In a 20-point joint statement, the
two sides pledged “to coordinate steps aimed at restoring the territorial
integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, in
particular the de-occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea … as well as
the territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.” Turkey also
reaffirmed its support for Ukraine’s bid to join NATO.
Ankara’s posture in the
Ukraine-Russia tensions will put to a serious test the main geopolitical
parameters that it has thus far observed in the Black Sea, namely:
· - Supporting Georgia and Ukraine to boost their defense capabilities in the
face of Russia’s military buildup in Crimea, including its deployment of S-400
air defense systems.
· - While doing so, refraining from moves that could provoke Russia.
· - Abiding strictly by the Montreux Convention, which has a direct impact on
Black Sea security.
Turkish-Ukrainian cooperation in the military sector has dramatically
increased in the past several years, making Ukraine Turkey’s chief partner in
a series of crucial military technologies, including turboprop engines and
drones.
Despite its deepening
ties with Kiev, Ankara has maintained a close partnership with Moscow. Yet the
controversy over the Montreux Convention, fueled by Ankara’s plan to build an
artificial waterway — Canal Istanbul — as an alternative to the
Bosporus, raise questions as to whether Ankara is still committed to its
balancing act in the Black Sea.
Russian President Vladimir Putin must have had similar misgivings, for he
called Erdogan on the eve of Zelensky’s visit to emphasize the importance of preserving the Montreux
Convention.
So, what is driving
Ankara into a position that opens the convention to debate and seems to
challenge the geopolitical balance in the Black Sea at the expense of annoying
Putin at a critical time?
Three main factors
appear to motivate Ankara.
The first has to do with domestic politics. Wary of its sagging support in the
polls amid a bruising economic crisis, the government sees the Montreux and
Canal Istanbul controversies as a fresh ground to play its hallmark policy of
polarization and consolidate its conservative-nationalist base. This became
evident earlier this month when it raised a ruckus over an open letter by 104
retired admirals calling for strict adherence to the Montreux Convention.
Ankara lambasted the open letter as a tacit coup threat and launched legal
proceedings against the retired admirals.
The second reason has to do with the Canal Istanbul project, which is not
limited to digging a waterway with the stated aim of easing traffic through the
congested Bosporus. The project involves also sprawling development on the
banks of the canal, including residential areas for at least half a million
people, business plazas, touristic venues, marinas and ports. With groundbreaking
expected in the summer, preliminary estimates suggest
the project could generate up to $60 billion in revenues for developers. To
market the development plan to foreign investors, Ankara needs to call the
existing Straits regime into question so as to provide a political cover
to what many experts see as an economically unviable venture.
Atilla Yesilada, a well-known
Turkish economist, argues that even if the entire Bosporus traffic is rerouted
to Canal Istanbul, annual gross revenues from transit fees would total an
estimated $1 billion, “meaning that inclusive of interest expenses and a fair
return to undertakers of the project, the pay-back period is no less than 30
years.” Such a period, he said, is “extremely long” and makes the project “very
risky” for foreign investors. Moreover, Yesilada believes the canal might never
be completed as its “only sponsor” Erdogan could lose office before he oversees
the completion of the construction, expected to take at least seven years.
Finally, Ankara seems to believe that the US quest for lasting military
presence in the Black Sea region gives it leverage to use the Montreux
Convention as a bargaining chip in the transactional relationship it seeks with
the Joe Biden administration. The restrictive rules of the convention barred
the US Navy from the Black Sea during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea further spurred US efforts for access to
the Black Sea, including possibly through a naval base as part of NATO missions
in Romania or Turkey. Similarly, the United States has backed Ukrainian plans
to build new naval bases in the Black Sea region, while enhancing military
cooperation with both Ukraine and Georgia as well as Romania and Bulgaria, the
two NATO members other than Turkey that border the Black Sea.
Yet Ankara has come under harsh criticism at home for allowing any
questioning of Turkey’s commitment to the Montreux Convention. In a succinct
outline of the objections, Cem Gurdeniz, one of the
retired admirals who signed the open letter, makes the following
points, “Thanks to Montreux, the six littoral states of the Black Sea …
have attained the opportunity to live in peace and tranquility. This balanced
situation has continued from 1936 to date. Turkey has nothing to gain from a
continuous operational NATO presence in the Black Sea or from pushing the
limits of the Montreux Convention, including occasional attempts to breach some
of its rules, or bringing about an imbalance … in the Black Sea.
The Turkish Straits are the gateway of six nations, including Turkey
itself. The greater the instability in the Black Sea, the greater the troubles
for the Turkish straits and Turkey’s geopolitics. Therefore, littoral states
should not fall for the prodding of NATO, the European Union and the United
States in the Black Sea.”
How the Biden administration
responds to Erdogan’s calculus remains to be seen. Will it go for a bargain and
give Erdogan some concessions in return? Putin must be the most eager to know.
Read more: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/04/ankara-risky-geopolitical-gamble-black-sea#ixzz6s8Va2Jr4
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