America Needs a New Transatlantic Script to Deal with China
Neither the transatlantic alliance nor an alliance of
democracies can be the bedrock for stability or for change in today’s world.
by Shada Islam Michael D. Swaine Rachel Esplin Odell
Battered
relentlessly by former President Donald
Trump over four difficult years, relations between the United
States and the European Union are back on track, with China providing an
important spur for the renewed warmth. Expect no automatic and complete U.S.-EU
alignment of views on China, however. As it gets underway, the transatlantic
conversation will spotlight both convergences and divergences in the United
States and EU approaches towards Beijing. For all their enthusiasm for
President Joe Biden’s interest in working with allies, EU leaders have no
appetite for a China policy based on confrontational zero-sum games,
starting another calamitous cold war or a discussion dominated by hard security
and references to preserving U.S. primacy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Biden
was the online “guest of honor” at the virtual summit of European Union leaders
held on March 25. Only hours earlier, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and
Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for foreign and security policy,
relaunched the U.S.-EU dialogue on China. Having started hesitatingly
and reluctantly with former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Borrell has now
promised regular consultations with the United States at the senior official
and expert level to discuss the “full range of challenges and opportunities”
posed by China.
Fresh
from his blistering encounter with Chinese counterparts in Anchorage, Blinken’s message to the EU and later to NATO allies was predictably straightforward: Europe
and the United States must join hands to fend off China’s “coercive behavior”
and attempts to undercut the rules of the international system.
Europe-China Relations Have Reached a New Low
In some
ways, Blinken was preaching to the converted. Attitudes towards China are
hardening in most European countries. Relations with Beijing have reached a new
low following acrimonious tit-for-tat sanctions following an EU decision to
ban travel and freeze the assets of four regional and party representatives
held responsible for the mistreatment of Uighurs.
China’s reciprocal decision to impose similar restrictions on several members
of the European Parliament but also on a number of European academics and
policy institutions for allegedly engaging in “malicious lies and
disinformation” has been described as unacceptable, immature and disproportionate
by many EU policymakers, prompting speculation that the EU-China investment deal agreed last December will
not be able to secure parliamentary approval.
A joint statement by over thirty European think tanks
voices deep concern that China’s actions against independent European
researchers “undermines practical and constructive engagement by people who are
striving to contribute positively to policy debates” and damages EU-China
relations.
Already
fraying in response to Beijing’s assault on what an official EU statement describes as Hong Kong’s
“democratic accountability and political pluralism,” relations between Europe
and China are in bad shape—and could get worse if, as expected, EU
sanctions are also imposed over Chinese policy in Hong Kong. EU governments are
also keeping a close watch on developments in China-Taiwan relations.
Tensions
with Beijing are certainly an added impetus to the EU’s warm embrace of the
Biden administration and hopes for re-igniting transatlantic relations. The EU’s sanctions
over Xinjiang were in fact followed in quick succession by the United States,
Canada and Britain, proving the twenty-seven-nation bloc is serious in its
commitment to consult America and other countries on common approaches towards
China.
Europe’s Strategic Autonomy in China Policy Will Persist
But the
old and tired transatlantic transcript which puts America at the head of the
table and positions EU leaders as willing listeners and avid followers is hopelessly
out-of-date. The EU and the United States will not see eye-to-eye on all
aspects of their complex and multi-layered ties with China—and more
broadly with Asia. EU policymakers agree with the United States on the
strategic challenge presented by China’s growing international assertiveness.
However, they do not always agree on the best way to address this problem.
The
truth is simple, albeit unpalatable for many U.S. policymakers: Having weaned
themselves off over-reliance on America and started to show more
self-confidence both at home and abroad during the difficult
Trump years, and given the realistic European fear that future U.S.
elections could produce more incompetent and chaotic
Trump-like administrations, EU leaders will not sit back and take
instructions from Biden and his team, nor have confidence in the sustainability
of U.S. leadership.
Biden’s
“America is back” rhetoric, therefore, rings hollow across a continent that is
seeking “strategic autonomy” in its domestic, trade, technology
and foreign and security policies. Neither does it fit the EU’s understanding
of a changing world where other nations are not waiting or dependent on U.S.
leadership. Biden’s warnings of “extreme competition” with China over the coming years
isn’t exactly what the EU has in mind either since most Europeans are not as
China-focused or China-obsessed as Americans and mostly do not see China as an
existential threat.
Also,
despite the new warmth in transatlantic ties, U.S.-EU relations have long been
marked by cooperation and competition. Brussels and Washington are still on a
collision course on steel and aluminum tariffs, on digital taxes, and on public
procurement. Germany is seething at suggestions that it could face U.S.
sanctions over plans to pursue the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to import Russian
gas.
Europe’s
heavy hitters are behind such autonomy. French President Emmanuel Macron
has warned against any expectations that the EU will gang up
with the United States against China, saying such a confrontational option
would be counterproductive. It is a sentiment shared by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel.
Both the French and German leaders believe the EU must pursue its own interests
in relations with Beijing and remain strong supporters of the EU-China
investment agreement despite criticism by European parliamentarians and
human-rights organizations.
Compartmentalization Is Key to Combining Cooperation and Competition
Blinken
appeared ready to play ball—at least while in Brussels. The announcement
of the U.S.-EU dialogue on China that Blinken and Borrell launched in Brussels
shunned references to “adversarial” relations with China, the term often employed by the United States. Instead, echoing the
EU language, ties with China were described as “multifaceted, comprising elements of
cooperation, competition, and systemic rivalry.” Blinken was also careful to
insist that the United States was not excluding cooperation with Beijing on
some issues, adding that the emphasis would be on innovation, not
ultimatums.
Biden’s invitation to Xi Jinping to join the virtual Climate
Change summit on April 22 and European Commission Vice President Frans
Timmerman’s recent online discussions with China’s environment minister Huang
Runqui are a reassuring sign that the competition/cooperation template has
operational traction and that environmental issues are not getting entangled in
the wider geopolitical wrangles. Additionally, EU policymakers know they need to
work with China on ensuring a post-virus economic recovery, thrashing out ways
to deal with any future pandemic and tackling the nuclear challenges posed by
North Korea and Iran.
With
growth and jobs on the EU agenda more than ever, maintaining buoyant trade and
investment flows with China will remain a top priority. As such, just as they
stood up to the pressure of the Obama and Trump administrations not to join the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or participate in the Belt and Road
Initiative or demands to impose blanket sanctions on Huawei, EU governments
will likely continue to ply their own (albeit rollercoaster) course in
relations with Beijing.
Much to
the chagrin of many in both the United States and China, this means that the EU
will not be giving in to demands that it makes a binary choice by selecting a
side in the worsening rivalry between the two nations. EU governments will work
hard to forge closer transatlantic ties and will continue to engage with China
through their high-level dialogues on economics, climate, digital policy and
research and innovation.
And much
to the anger of those demanding a clear link between trade and human rights,
this also means continuing to “compartmentalize” between moves to upgrade
economic ties with China while getting tougher through so-called “autonomous”
or unilateral EU rules which deal with inward investments, global supply
chains, the conduct of state-owned enterprises, and the impact of foreign
subsidies on enterprises operating in Europe, as well as on human rights. As
some in Brussels see it, these targeted regulations–and in particular the EU’s
new “Magnitsky-like” human-rights legislation–should reassure those demanding
tougher EU action on rights and stronger reciprocity in EU-China economic
relations and may help secure ratification of the investment deal once it reaches
the European Parliament for a vote early next year.
Both Beijing and Washington Must Adjust Their Relations with Europe
Looking
ahead, Washington will have to come to terms with Europe as an equal partner,
while China also wakes up to an EU which, while striving to build closer
economic ties and eschewing confrontational competition, will be ready to hit
hard on questions related to human rights and fundamental freedoms.
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