10.03.2021
Why Navalny Makes Many Russians Uncomfortable
Russian
Domestic Politics and Political InstitutionsRussian Ideology
Navalny
is pushing Russia’s conformists out of their comfort zone. For now, public
opinion is mainly that of a distrustful observer.
The opposition politician Alexei Navalny’s
near-deadly poisoning, his return
to Russia, and his subsequent imprisonment have only increased the
Russian public’s distrust and disapproval of him, according to a recent poll. The explanation couldn’t be more banal:
it’s a case of shooting the messenger.
With his investigations into senior officials and the
film about “Putin’s palace,” Navalny has presented new proof of the
corruption and moral bankruptcy of the country’s leadership. But the passive
majority doesn’t want to know, and would prefer to block out unfavorable and
compromising information about their country.
This was also the case with the Malaysia Airlines
passenger jet shot down over Ukraine in 2014 (just 2 percent of Russians polled believed that Russia
was responsible), and the 2018 poisoning of the Skripals (only 3 percent blamed Russian intelligence agencies).
Now it’s repeating itself with Navalny: 55 percent of those polled were not inclined to
believe that he had been deliberately poisoned. The average Russian doesn’t
want to believe the worst of the authorities, shrugs off suspicion, and tries
not to think about it. And those who keep presenting new evidence are therefore
increasingly irritating, which is reflected in their approval ratings.
Navalny paid an unbelievably high price to boost his
trust rating by just 1 percent—taking it to 5 percent—before it slid back to
4 percent again.
Mass conformism is one of the safeguards of Putin’s
system, like any authoritarian regime. Anyone who doesn’t show demonstrative
unity is marginalized—or, following the protests earlier this year, even
criminalized.
Federal elections in Russia are really more of a
referendum testing the degree of conformity of the apathetic majority. A good
Russian should go to the polls and vote for an irremovable president, the
ruling party, and regime-backed candidates: it’s a ritual that has been honed
over the years until it’s automatic.
It would be strange to expect these “good” Russians to
change their behavior over a film about “Putin’s palace,” or proof that the
opposition leader had been poisoned, or indeed the return of that opposition
leader to Russia, his arrest, and ensuing mass protests and civil resistance.
A third of those polled who had either watched
Navalny’s film about “Putin’s palace” or had heard about it are sure the
content of the film is untrue, while 38 percent chose the option “the content
seems true, but it is difficult to assess the credibility of the accusations.”
Just were sure that the content of the film was true. That’s the
entire outcome of the film ratcheting up millions of views.
The number of people who believe that protesters took
to the streets because they were paid to was up 16 percentage points from 2017 to 28 percent.
It’s important for conformists to convince themselves that nothing ever just
happens: there must always be someone offstage, plotting to harm the
fatherland. The level of distrust is particularly high with regard to protests
in Russia’s biggest cities (especially Moscow and St. Petersburg), and even
more so of those connected to Navalny: the protests and demonstrations in Khabarovsk last
year over the arrest of the region’s governor elicited far more sympathy among
ordinary Russians than the protests in support of Navalny in January and
February this year.
This is an important point: protests without a
leader—or at least those not associated with the name of a specific opposition
leader—attract more sympathy in the average Russian than protests with a clear
political label, like those in support of Navalny. In January 2021, a negative
attitude (39 percent) and indifference (37 percent) toward
protesters prevailed, while a positive attitude was only expressed by 22
percent of respondents. For comparison, 47 percent of people had a positive
attitude toward protesters in Khabarovsk, and 16 percent had a negative
attitude.
The protests of 2021 are, by their nature, a
continuation of the 2011–2012 protests—a civil movement for the modernization
of state and society—but at the same time, they differ greatly. In 2011–2012,
there was a feeling of euphoria following the short-lived thaw of Dmitry
Medvedev’s presidency, expectation of a dialogue with the authorities, and
certainty that liberalization and democratization were inevitable. Until May
2012, given the lack of repression by the police or legal system thus far,
there was no fear of such repression.
In 2021, there are no illusions or euphoria. There is,
however, a clear understanding that repression is inevitable, and that the
authorities are not prepared to enter into dialogue or to compromise.
There are also major differences with the perestroika
era. Back then, there was a clear and simple idea—“Down With Communism”—and
illusions of a democratic future with a bountiful market economy. But
crucially, the push for democratization and permission for it came from the
very top. A few years later, a leader appeared who symbolized that movement
toward democracy: Boris Yeltsin.
Given Navalny’s monopoly on the political opposition,
and now a significant part of civil society, he is in some ways reminiscent of
Yeltsin. But Yeltsin was part of the elite, and his activity was not considered
unlawful. Navalny has been excluded from the legal political process, including
elections. Civil resistance is not just not permitted; it has been criminalized
by the state.
The simple idea of “Down With Putin!” isn’t nearly
enough to cover the whole of Russia. The average Russian, even one who is
unhappy with the current state of affairs, still isn’t prepared to support the
opposition, or even to join the ranks of those set on modernization.
The fact is that Russians have gotten used to the
circumstances and rules of an authoritarian political regime. When actually
faced with liberalization, they could discover quite quickly that they are
perfectly capable of making use of democratic instruments. But for that to
happen, the initiative needs to come from above, like under Mikhail Gorbachev.
For now, public opinion is mainly that of a
distrustful observer. Navalny is pushing the conformists out of their comfort
zone, and since they are completely unprepared to join civil society, they
don’t like that.
Still, since 2018 (including at the height of the
pandemic), the approval ratings of a symbol of comfort, President Vladimir
Putin, have fallen. Something has driven the conformists to express their
displeasure with the authorities, even if it’s not always very noticeable.
What precisely is changing the mood among the passive
majority, and whether the generational gap in political views and values will
come into play, will be the subject of two upcoming commentaries.
By:
·
Andrei Kolesnikov
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