Jihadis 2021: ISIS & al Qaeda
By Aaron Y. Zelin on March 17, 2021
In early 2021, the jihadi movement was
the most splintered it had been since prior to 9/11 when al Qaeda was one among
many jihadi groups. The movement had three main poles: al Qaeda and its
branches from Afghanistan to West Africa; the Islamic State (ISIS) and its
external provinces from North Africa to South Asia to East Asia, and Hayat
Tahrir al Sham (HTS), mainly in northern Syria. Al Qaeda and ISIS are still
engaged in global jihadism, regional military campaigns, and local politics.
The two differed on religious interpretations, such as when a Muslim can be
considered an apostate, or takfir – and what punishment or
excommunication was justified. They also split over the right conditions to
create an Islamic state. ISIS’s primary goal has been to capture and govern
territory. Al Qaeda’s goal is to convert people to gradually build a global
caliphate but controlling territory has not been a priority in its short-term
strategy. In contrast, HTS has focused mainly on local jihadism and backing a
civilian polity in northwest Syria. Although its predecessor was once aligned
with al Qaeda until 2016/2017, HTS has since become more independent within the
jihadosphere. Most other jihadi groups have sided with either al Qaeda or ISIS
since their own discord in 2013-2014. Both al Qaeda and ISIS are in transition
phases. Neither entity was at its peak, yet neither were degraded, and they had
differing challenges.
Al Qaeda: Al Qaeda was diminished in impact
and visibility, partly because of deaths of leadership. Ayman al Zawahiri was
still the leader of al Qaeda’s broader network, but several key leaders were
killed in 2020:
·
Jan.
29, 2020: Qassim al Raimi, leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
was killed in a U.S. airstrike in Yemen
·
June
3, 2020: Abdelmalek Droukdel, leader of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,
was killed by French forces in Mali
·
June
14, 2020: Khaled al Aruri, leader of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Huras al Din’s
leader, was reportedly killed in a U.S. drone strike in
Syria
·
Aug.
7, 2020: Abu Muhammad al Masri, second in command of al Qaeda Central, was
reportedly killed in Iran by Israeli agents
(which Iran later denied)
·
Oct.
24, 2020: Husam ‘Abd al-Rauf, top propagandist al Qaeda Central, was
reportedly killed by Afghan forces
In the past, al Qaeda has adjusted to
the loss of leaders, with new figures emerging to take up the banner. But the
turnover at the top also threatened instability, partly since communication
among senior leaders has long been less efficient due to the danger of
communications intercepts. The question whenever there is a transition to new
leaders is whether they will focus more on regional or local conflicts, or will
they redirect resources toward global operations? So far, al Qaeda has given
priority to widening its regional reach. As of early 2021, it has six core
branches stretching from the Sahel to the Indian Subcontinent.
ISIS: ISIS in Iraq and Syria lost the final parts of
the Islamic State caliphate in 2019, but it was not totally defeated. The
Pentagon estimated that it still had at least 10,000 fighters. In 2020, it
managed to sustain attacks—notably assassinations and bombings—in both
countries. Yet there were key differences between the two battlefields. In
Iraq, ISIS carried out operations throughout the country. In Syria, ISIS
attacks were more concentrated in the eastern side of the Euphrates River
Valley.
ISIS was still capable of operations
outside of Iraq and Syria – even well beyond the Middle East. In 2020, ISIS’s
province in northeast Mozambique garnered greater international attention since
it had seized and then withdrew from villages at various points. Likewise, the
ISIS province in West Africa also ramped up attacks, making it one of the
biggest threats after Iraq.
HTS: Unlike al Qaeda and ISIS, HTS focused on
consolidating political and physical control in northwest Syria. It vanquished
Huras al Din, the local al Qaeda branch in June 2020. But there are still
questions about whether its political project—through the Salvation
Government—will succeed or, instead, illustrate shortcomings ruling a society.
HTS has not been as authoritarian as ISIS, but it has frequently arrested
opponents or killed activists and civilians. If HTS can survive, its brand of
insurgency and governance could appeal to other jihadi groups looking for a
model, especially given the failure of ISIS to hold its territorial control.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
AARON Y. ZELIN
Richard Borow Fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy
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