Iran: Cashing Chips Won in War
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Faced with such a foe... the worst thing to do is wound him but let him live.
After almost half a century, it must now be clear to all that the Khomeinist regime is incapable of reforming itself unless it is for the worse.
The negotiating process that, in the absence of grown-ups, that is to say professional diplomats from the US, produced the shambolic "memorandum of mis-understanding" is at a dead end. Those in Tehran who might want a deal don't have the power to do so. And those who have the power don't want a deal.
The good news is that for the first time in almost half a century, the idea of regime change is gaining traction inside Iran, even within the regime's core support base.
The "Iran problem" is a multifaceted challenge that cannot be met solely by bombing. It requires political spadework with elements within the regime and its peripheries that fear the loss of their wealth or even lives.
After more than a year of war, albeit with on-and-off fighting spells, it is perhaps time for US President Donald Trump to take stock of what has happened so far as a guide to what he might do next.
But before he does that, he needs to ponder the key question: is this a war of choice or of necessity?
Wars of choice seldom produce the results desired by those who start them. One example was the US war in Vietnam, later expanded to Cambodia and Laos. Another was the 1956 British-led war against Egypt. The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was another example of wars of choice, as was President Bill Clinton's decision to intervene in Somalia.
Currently the most glaring example is the war that Russian President Vladimir Putin started against Ukraine. In wars of choice, even if you emerge as victor, which is seldom the case, the reward you get is often less than the price you paid in blood and treasure.
Wars of choice are children of jingoistic minds. The disastrous Crimean War began in 1853 with the chant: "We don't want war - but by jingo if we do. We've the men, the ships and the money too!"
In contrast, a war of necessity happens because the status quo you find yourself confronted with has become intolerable on a medium- to long-term basis or because you have been attacked and you have no choice but to respond. In 1939, despite its comparative weakness in men and materiel, Britain couldn't have thrown in the towel without at least testing the first rounds of combat.
Back to the current war: judged by six different administrations in Washington, the status quo that existed between the unsavory Khomeinist regime in Tehran and the United States had not morphed into a clear and present danger to either side.
Based on that judgment, the US administrations tried a number of schemes to prevent the Islamic Republic from becoming a clear and present danger in the future. They imagined that down the line, Tehran's rulers, besotted by a deadly ideology, would develop intercontinental ballistic missiles, fit them with nuclear warheads, and threaten to hit New York.
But even if that assumption were right, you already have North Korea, which has the missiles and the nuclear warheads. The difference is that Kim Jong Un threatens to hit San Francisco.
Seen from the US and many other countries, especially in the region, the Islamic Republic is a deadly threat. Iran is a large country, rich in natural and human resources, that if mobilized for doing mischief, could do a great deal of harm. From that angle, it is not just a competitor, rival, or mere adversary. Nor is it just another classical enemy or foe. It has shown it will massacre its own citizens by the thousands and deprive them of daily bread to finance the killing of Syrians and Lebanese, among many other nations.
Faced with such a foe, or hostis humani generis as the old Latin phrase says, the worst thing to do is wound him but let him live. With such a foe, you either kill him or transform him into a friend. Successive US administrations never managed to decide which of the two options to seriously pursue. President George W. Bush spoke of "goodwill breeding goodwill" only to see more Americans being seized as hostages by the Khomeinists.
Clinton's shibboleth was "containment" plus cuddling the mullahs. He was rewarded by attacks on US embassies and bases in the region. Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden bought into Tehran's narrative and forged the disastrous JCPOA "nuclear deal" based on a non-existent fatwa by Ali Khamenei. This gave that expert in Madison Street-style self-promotion, General Qassem Soleimani, the ability to build an empire that at one point controlled four Arab capitals.
After almost half a century, it must now be clear to all that the Khomeinist regime is incapable of reforming itself unless it is for the worse. The current war has shown that short of a full military invasion of Iran, there is little chance of the truncated leadership in Tehran to substantially change its behavior.
Right now, almost all options seem unattractive. Bombing the same targets in Iran again and again achieves little even in military terms. Even taking control of the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz by the US won't restore normal navigation.
The "nuclear threat" from Iran is more remote than ever. Almost the whole nuclear industry has been shut for at least the past six months. The "targeted killing" of Iran's top 23 nuclear scientists has produced a gap that could take years to bridge.
The negotiating process that, in the absence of grown-ups, that is to say professional diplomats from the US, produced the shambolic "memorandum of mis-understanding" is at a dead end. Those in Tehran who might want a deal don't have the power to do so. And those who have the power don't want a deal.
The good news is that for the first time in almost half a century, the idea of regime change is gaining traction inside Iran, even within the regime's core support base. For obvious reasons, the war halted that traction but didn't end it. If Trump cannot change the regime in Tehran, it doesn't mean that Iranians can't either.
Despite the brouhahas prompted by Trumpophobia, the Islamic Republic has been defeated in this war and knows it. And defeat in war is often a prelude to regime change.
The regime is clearly indicating its fear that a halt to bombing by the US while "maximum pressure" measures continue could encourage its many opponents inside Iran, including sections of the Khomeinist constituency, to restart the revolts that shook it last winter.
The "Iran problem" is a multifaceted challenge that cannot be met solely by bombing. It requires political spadework with elements within the regime and its peripheries that fear the loss of their wealth or even lives.
Contact is also needed with opposition forces inside Iran and diplomatic efforts to persuade regional and European nations to sing from the same hymn sheet on Iran. The ultimate aim would be to translate military victory into a political one. There are times when war is the continuation of politics by other means. But there are also times that politics is the means of cashing the chips won in war. That strategy, however, requires patience and persistence, not yawing from one tweet to another.
Amir Taheri was the executive editor-in-chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran from 1972 to 1979. He has worked at or written for innumerable publications, published eleven books, and has been a columnist for Asharq Al-Awsat since 1987. He graciously serves as Chairman of Gatestone Europe.
Gatestone Institute would like to thank the author for his kind permission to reprint this article in slightly different form from Asharq Al-Awsat.
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