POLITIS to the point OPINION The Washington Test 12.07.2026 08:00 - YUSUF KANLI - Congress, lobbying networks and the electoral calendar will determine whether Ankara’s diplomatic breakthrough becomes lasting policy

POLITIS  to the point

OPINION

The Washington Test

12.07.2026 08:00

YUSUF KANLI

Congress, lobbying networks and the electoral calendar will determine whether Ankara’s diplomatic breakthrough becomes lasting policy

 

If the Ankara Summit fundamentally transformed the political atmosphere surrounding Turkish-American relations, it did not remove the institutional obstacles standing between diplomatic ambition and durable policy. On the contrary, the most difficult phase of normalization now begins. Donald Trump’s willingness to rebuild defense cooperation with Türkiye must navigate Congress, the Pentagon, statutory restrictions, regional lobbying pressures and the unforgiving calendar of American domestic politics. The future of the alliance will therefore be determined less by summit diplomacy than by the ability of the American political system to translate presidential intent into sustainable policy.

The summit answered one fundamental question. Both Trump and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan now appear convinced that prolonged strategic estrangement serves neither country’s interests. They have chosen to replace confrontation with selective cooperation based on defense, regional security and geopolitical necessity. Whether Washington’s institutions share that assessment remains an entirely different matter. The next chapter of Turkish-American relations will therefore unfold not in Ankara but inside the American capital, where executive ambition must confront congressional skepticism, bureaucratic caution, organized political resistance and the rapidly approaching November midterm elections.

Presidential diplomacy meets institutional America

Unlike many foreign policy decisions that remain largely within presidential authority, the commitments announced in Ankara intersect with legislation specifically designed to distribute decision-making among several institutions. Sanctions relief, major defense exports and any discussion concerning Türkiye’s future relationship with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program involve congressional oversight, statutory notification procedures, Pentagon certification requirements and export licensing rules that cannot simply be set aside by presidential preference.

Trump made his political intentions unmistakably clear when he declared that Washington would move toward removing sanctions on Türkiye, framing the matter in the language of alliance friendship rather than punishment. Those remarks represented the strongest public endorsement of restoring defense cooperation since sanctions were imposed in 2020. They did not, however, eliminate the legal architecture that has developed over the past six years. Instead, they initiated a political process whose success depends on persuading institutions that have spent years viewing Türkiye primarily through the prism of the S-400 dispute and regional tensions.

That distinction is critical. Summit diplomacy can redefine political direction, but American institutions ultimately determine implementation. The Ankara meeting created momentum. Washington must now decide whether to convert that momentum into policy.

Congress becomes the decisive arena

Congress is likely to emerge as the principal battlefield in the coming months. Skepticism toward Ankara has become one of the relatively few foreign policy issues enjoying bipartisan support. Republican and Democratic lawmakers alike have criticized Türkiye over its purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system, military operations in northern Syria, disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and deteriorating relations with Israel. Those concerns have been reinforced through legislation, committee hearings and successive defense authorization bills that collectively established a restrictive framework governing bilateral defense cooperation.

Several legal mechanisms now converge. The Arms Export Control Act allows Congress to challenge major weapons sales through resolutions of disapproval. The National Defense Authorization Act incorporates provisions connected to Türkiye’s removal from the F-35 consortium. CAATSA itself establishes legal conditions governing sanctions policy. Individually, none of these instruments necessarily prevents the administration from advancing its objectives. Collectively, however, they ensure that implementation will be neither automatic nor politically uncomplicated.

Trump enters this debate with substantial influence over his own party, yet influence alone may not prove sufficient. Many legislators have publicly defended sanctions against Türkiye for years and are unlikely to reverse their positions without compelling strategic justification. The administration must therefore persuade Congress not merely that relations have improved, but that changing geopolitical realities require a fundamentally different approach toward Ankara.

Netanyahu’s intervention broadens the debate

Political resistance extends well beyond Capitol Hill. Even before the Ankara Summit concluded, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu launched a forceful public campaign opposing renewed American defense cooperation with Türkiye. Warning that supplying F-35 aircraft to Ankara would damage the regional military balance, he argued that Türkiye could no longer be regarded as a reliable strategic partner deserving access to America’s most advanced military technologies.

The intervention reflected more than disagreement over a particular weapons system. Netanyahu sought to frame Türkiye’s military modernization as a regional security issue rather than a bilateral NATO matter. His argument draws upon one of the most deeply entrenched principles of American Middle East policy: preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge. By presenting Turkish access to advanced combat aircraft as incompatible with that objective, Israeli officials hope to broaden congressional resistance beyond concerns directly related to the S-400 issue.

Trump nevertheless appeared unwilling to allow Israeli concerns alone to define American policy toward Ankara. His response suggested that the administration intends to evaluate Türkiye according to its broader contribution to NATO, Black Sea security and regional stability rather than exclusively through the lens of Turkish-Israeli rivalry. That distinction may become central to the debate now moving through Washington.

The lobbying equation

Netanyahu’s intervention also illustrates the broader political landscape confronting the administration. Israeli lobbying organizations remain among the most influential foreign policy actors in Washington, particularly on issues touching regional military balances. They are unlikely to oppose normalization alone.

Greek-American organizations have consistently expressed concern over preserving the military balance in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, while Armenian-American advocacy groups continue to oppose expanded defense cooperation with Ankara for longstanding historical and political reasons. Although these organizations approach Türkiye from different perspectives, their immediate objectives increasingly overlap. Each has reason to resist rapid restoration of Turkish access to advanced American military technologies.

Their combined influence should not be underestimated. They possess longstanding relationships across both political parties, regularly engage with congressional committees responsible for defense and foreign affairs, and have demonstrated their ability to shape legislative debate on issues involving Türkiye. Their opposition does not necessarily determine policy outcomes, but it significantly raises the political cost of reversing decisions that have become embedded within Washington’s national security consensus.

The unresolved S-400 question

No issue better illustrates the persistence of institutional caution than the S-400 missile defense system itself. For many officials within the Pentagon and the broader defense establishment, the controversy extends beyond the physical deployment of Russian-made missile batteries. It has become shorthand for larger concerns regarding alliance interoperability, technological security and strategic trust.

American officials continue to argue that operating Russian air defense systems alongside advanced Western combat aircraft creates unacceptable intelligence risks, regardless of Turkish assurances that the systems remain operationally separate from NATO infrastructure. Those concerns are rooted in technical assessments rather than political preference, making them considerably more difficult to resolve through diplomacy alone.

Ankara, by contrast, believes the political environment has fundamentally changed. Erdoğan has repeatedly referred to a visible softening in Washington’s approach to CAATSA while emphasizing that communication with Trump has become more open and constructive. Such political goodwill undoubtedly matters. It cannot, however, substitute for the detailed technical arrangements and confidence-building measures that American defense planners will require before endorsing deeper military integration.

Time may be Trump’s greatest constraint

Political timing may ultimately prove as decisive as congressional arithmetic. If Trump intends to fundamentally reset relations with Türkiye, he has only a narrow window in which to act. As the November midterm elections approach, congressional attention will increasingly shift toward domestic politics, leaving lawmakers less willing to support controversial foreign policy initiatives that could expose them to criticism from influential lobbying groups or key constituencies.

That reality places particular pressure on the administration. Decisions largely within executive authority, including easing aspects of CAATSA implementation and advancing export licenses such as the General Electric F110 engines for the KAAN fighter program, are likely to be pursued as quickly as possible. More politically contentious initiatives, especially reopening Türkiye’s path back into the F-35 program, require considerably greater congressional engagement and therefore become progressively more difficult as the electoral calendar advances.

For the White House, the challenge is not simply overcoming institutional resistance but doing so before the political environment hardens. Every month that passes without visible implementation provides opponents with additional opportunities to organize hearings, mobilize lobbying campaigns and consolidate bipartisan resistance. Once the midterm campaign enters full swing, foreign policy initiatives that require congressional cooperation traditionally become far more difficult to advance.

The administration therefore faces a race against both political opposition and the electoral calendar. If Trump wants to leave a lasting imprint on Turkish-American relations during his second term, he will almost certainly need to secure the key elements of the Ankara understandings before Washington’s attention becomes consumed by November politics. Otherwise, the opportunity created by the summit risks becoming another unfinished chapter in a relationship that has too often been overtaken by domestic political constraints on both sides of the Atlantic.

What can realistically be achieved?

Not every element of the Ankara understanding faces identical obstacles. Approval of General Electric F110 engines for Türkiye’s indigenous KAAN fighter program appears considerably more attainable than reopening the F-35 consortium. Export licensing procedures remain politically sensitive, but they involve a narrower legal process and fewer institutional actors than reintegrating Türkiye into the world’s most advanced multinational combat aircraft project.

The F-35 issue is considerably more complex. Restoring Turkish participation would require congressional acceptance, Pentagon certification, renewed industrial negotiations among partner nations, technology security reviews and potentially additional legislative action. Even under the most favorable political circumstances, such a process would almost certainly unfold over several years rather than months.

The Ankara Summit therefore established a political pathway rather than a completed policy. Its importance lies in reopening possibilities that had long been considered closed, not in resolving every legal and institutional challenge associated with them.

A strategic decision for Washington

Beneath the legislative debates and lobbying campaigns lies a broader strategic question confronting the United States. Washington must decide whether Türkiye should continue to be viewed primarily through the lens of disputes inherited from the previous decade or according to the geopolitical realities emerging across Europe, the Black Sea and the Middle East. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, prolonged instability in the Middle East, uncertainty surrounding European security and NATO’s growing emphasis on defense industrial capacity have collectively increased Türkiye’s strategic importance in ways that were far less evident when bilateral relations reached their lowest point.

Trump has clearly embraced that reassessment. His administration increasingly views Türkiye as an indispensable regional power whose military capabilities, defense industrial base and geographical position strengthen the alliance at a time of mounting geopolitical competition. Whether that assessment ultimately becomes the consensus of Washington’s broader political establishment remains uncertain.

The central contest is therefore no longer between Washington and Ankara. It is taking place inside Washington itself, between an administration seeking to redefine relations with Türkiye and institutions that remain cautious about abandoning policies shaped by years of mistrust. The outcome of that debate will determine not only the future of Turkish-American relations but also whether NATO can successfully adapt to an international order increasingly defined by geopolitical necessity, technological competition and strategic resilience rather than by the assumptions of the post-Cold War era.

For that reason, the Ankara Summit should be understood not as the conclusion of Turkish-American normalization but as the opening of a far more consequential political struggle. Diplomatic momentum has been created. Whether it evolves into lasting strategic realignment will depend on decisions still to be made in committee rooms, Pentagon offices and congressional hearing chambers thousands of miles from Ankara. Only there will it become clear whether the summit represented a temporary diplomatic thaw or the beginning of a durable reconstruction of one of NATO’s most important bilateral partnerships.

 

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