ICG Commentary/Europe - 09 July 2026 - Türkiye and the Geopolitics of Mediation

 ICG

Commentary/Europe  - 09 July 2026  - 

Türkiye and the Geopolitics  of Mediation

The commentary is part of Crisis Group's body of work examining how middle  powers are reshaping conflict resolution. It explores Ankara's foreign policy, the "Turkish way" of mediation, and strengths and limitations of this approach.

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Global Order and Peacemaking

Türkiye

The era when major powers and multilateral institutions dominated peacemaking is fading. As the international order fragments, middle powers are playing an increasingly prominent diplomatic role. Among them, Türkiye has emerged as one of the most ambitious. Its growing role reflects a broader shift in which middle powers use mediation not only to manage conflicts but also project influence, build partnerships, and navigate uncertainty. Its prominence as the host of this year’s NATO Summit underscores Ankara’s increasingly central role in global peace and security despite persistent tensions with some of its Western allies and partners. 

A NATO member straddling Europe, the Middle East, and the Black Sea – and directly exposed to (and sometimes involved in) conflicts along its borders – Türkiye concluded over the course of the past quarter century that traditional Western alliances and multilateral institutions alone would not safeguard its interests. This perception was shaped by a series of events that strained relations with its Western partners. Ankara opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which it accurately predicted would drive instability in the region. During Syria’s civil war, U.S. security cooperation with Kurdish forces linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party – Türkiye’s decades-long arch-enemy – undermined U.S.-Türkiye relations. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan perceived Western nations to be, at best, indifferent to a failed 2016 coup attempt aimed at toppling his government and was particularly frustrated by the U.S. hosting its alleged mastermind, Fethullah Gülen (who died in October 2024). The de facto collapse of Ankara’s EU accession prospects created a further drag on Turkish relations with many of its European partners.

Tensions between Ankara and its NATO allies, and the U.S. in particular, deepened further during President Donald Trump’s first presidency and persisted into the administration of President Joe Biden. Washington sought to head off Ankara’s purchase of Russian S-400 missile batteries out of concern both that it suggested a drift toward Russia and that the latter would capture sensitive information about its marquee F-35 fighter program. When Ankara nonetheless proceeded with the purchase, the administration imposed sanctions under the “Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act” – a regime normally reserved for the deemed foes of the United States. After Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, frictions also emerged over NATO enlargement, when Ankara delayed its approval of Sweden and Finland’s accession in order to extract concessions from NATO allies on a host of defence and security files. 

While relations between Ankara and its Western partners are now in a much better place, the willingness to chart a distinctive course remains a hallmark of Türkiye’s foreign policy, and a manifestation of its efforts to stake out a measure of “strategic autonomy”. For Ankara, this has meant simultaneously preserving its place in NATO while reducing its reliance on the alliance and maintaining channels with rivals such as Russia and Iran. It has also meant combining military assertiveness with proactive diplomacy. Turkish policymakers frame foreign military interventions, investments in a booming defence industry, and the diversification of partnerships as part of a broader effort to expand Ankara’s room for manoeuvre in a changing international system. The energy Ankara invests in mediation, and the distinctive approach it has developed, form an important part of this picture. 

A Mediation Surge

Ankara has dabbled in mediation for decades, but its level of engagement and its style have changed over the years. In the 1980s, Ankara helped arrange contacts between Iran and Iraq during their eight-year war. In the 1990s, it participated in conciliation efforts in the Balkans and acted as a facilitator in Palestinian-Israeli talks. But its interest in mediation as a diplomatic tool increased significantly with the rise of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. The AKP saw mediation as a way to manage external threats, expand Ankara’s influence beyond its border and develop ties across its neighbourhood. In its first few years in power, Ankara helped facilitate indirect talks between Israel and Syria, engagement among Sunni and Shia factions in Iraq, and reconciliation efforts between Palestinian rivals Hamas and Fatah.

After Ahmet Davutoğlu became foreign minister in 2009 – a post he held until 2014 before serving as prime minister until mid-2016 – these efforts expanded yet further in scope and ambition. Türkiye launched dialogues in the Western Balkans to reduce tensions and build confidence between Bosnia-Herzegovina and its neighbours Serbia and Croatia. Further afield, it also supported the Bangsamoro peace process in the Philippines, including by chairing the Independent Decommissioning Body overseeing disarmament. In addition, Türkiye – together with Brazil – sought to mediate between Iran and Western powers during the 2008-2009 standoff over Tehran’s nuclear program.

For the most part, Ankara’s regional mediation efforts during the aughts and early teens were relatively traditional.

For the most part, Ankara’s regional mediation efforts during the aughts and early teens were relatively traditional. Consistent with a “zero problems with neighbours” doctrine – which underscored its desire to normalise ties with adversaries and get along well with whomever was in power near its borders – it cast itself as a neutral arbiter in its efforts at dispute resolution. 

But this began to change in 2011, as unrest linked to the Arab Spring spread, unnerving Ankara and other governments throughout the region. While Türkiye initially attempted to mediate in Libya between former Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi and opposition rebels, facilitated the release of several journalists detained by Qaddafi’s forces, and sought to encourage dialogue between the Assad regime and protestors in Syria, it soon took sides against both regimes and in other crises across the region, weakening its credibility as a potential neutral broker. Regional turmoil, the influx of millions of refugees fleeing to Türkiye, deepening domestic polarisation following the 2016 coup attempt, and growing tensions with Western allies pushed Ankara toward a more security-driven posture between roughly 2015 and 2020. During this period it curbed its diplomatic activism and instead leaned more heavily on military means as evidenced by its interventions in Syria and Libya.  

After several years, however, the pendulum began to swing back. Wary of regional isolation, Ankara began reinvesting in diplomacy to ease tensions and reset relations with rivals in its neighbourhood. From roughly 2020 onwards, Ankara more openly pursued gradual normalisation tracks with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Greece, and Israel – seeking flexible partnerships where it could build them. In 2022, Ankara inserted itself as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, hosting talks to seek an exit from the conflict. When those failed, the Turkish government helped broker arrangements to mitigate the humanitarian costs of the crisis. By 2024, Ankara had established a dedicated international mediation department in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to help coordinate its efforts in this space. Still, Ankara’s role as a mediator should be viewed within the context of its broader foreign policy. Mediation has been accompanied by expanding arms exports, business interests and military influence, creating ambiguity at times over whether these tools primarily serve Türkiye’s strategic ambitions or broader peace and security objectives. 

The Turkish Way

The style of mediation that emerged from these efforts is in fact an amalgamation of approaches. Although it adopts a traditionally neutral posture in some cases (for example in joining Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt to mediate an end to the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran), Ankara still sees utility in sometimes acting more as a broker. The latter entails using its leverage with conflict parties to shape negotiations, and using negotiations to expand its influence. In Ankara’s view, these sometimes unorthodox methods are fit for the realities of a world where power is increasingly diffuse and alliances unstable, and where middle powers may be reluctant to simply adapt to geopolitical outcomes dictated by bigger states. Against this backdrop, the following have emerged as distinctive features of Turkish mediation. 

Using military muscle as leverage. While the use of leverage is not unusual for conflict stakeholders, Türkiye stands out for the extent to which it has integrated coercive and diplomatic tools into its mediation efforts. Turkish officials frequently use the phrase “strong in the field, strong at the table” to summarise their conviction that Ankara does well by using both its military and other strengths and its geographic position astride key strategic waterways and bridging Europe and Asia to shape crisis and conflict negotiations. 

Ankara’s role in Libya is illustrative. Beginning in January 2020, Türkiye intervened militarily in the country’s civil war, entering the conflict at a time when the internationally-recognised, Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) was struggling to fend off rival forces led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who controlled much of Libya’s east. Türkiye threw its weight behind the GNA, escalating its support through the first half of 2020 – including by deploying drones and Syrian fighters recruited from Ankara-backed armed factions. 

Turkish officials argue that the strategy worked: by enabling the GNA to defend Tripoli, reverse Haftar’s gains and balance the battlefield, Ankara helped bring Haftar to the negotiating table. In January 2020, Türkiye and Russia jointly facilitated talks in Moscow between the warring parties, and in October 2020 the parties reached a ceasefire. That year Ankara also joined the Berlin Conferences on Libya, which helped generate multilateral backing for efforts to consolidate the truce. While none of these efforts produced a comprehensive settlement, they have helped keep Libya from sliding back into war. Since then, Türkiye has expanded its ties across Libya’s political and military landscape, including with Haftar, while its military presence has helped deter renewed fighting. 

Many observers credit Ankara’s 2020 military intervention in Syria for creating conditions in which a ceasefire could be negotiated. For years, Russia supported the Bashar al-Assad regime’s operations across the country including in northwestern Syria, with multiple rounds of talks failing to produce a durable ceasefire. This changed when Türkiye deployed thousands of troops into northern Syria in 2020 to halt another in a succession of Moscow-backed offensives, altering Moscow’s strategic calculations about the costs of continuing in the same fashion. Against this backdrop, Putin returned to the negotiating table, paving the way for an Ankara-Moscow-mediated ceasefire agreement that largely held until Syrian rebels overthrew the Assad regime in late 2024.

Building influence through arms exports and other material assistance. Turkish drone sales in conjunction with growing business ties have helped it to build out relationships that it often leverages diplomatically. For example, in the Horn of Africa, Türkiye’s economic, military, and political ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia have enhanced its ability to mediate when tensions have flared between the two countries. Türkiye stepped in to mediate between the two after Somaliland signed a January 2024 memorandum granting Ethiopia access to a stretch of coastline in return for recognition of Somaliland, triggering tensions with Mogadishu. President Erdoğan helped coax the parties toward the Ankara Declaration, which opened talks on Ethiopian sea access under Somali sovereignty. Although negotiations later stalled, Ankara benefited strategically by deepening its channels to both sides and securing stronger economic agreements with Somalia in return for coming to its defence and promising to ensure its sovereignty. 

Türkiye’s response to the 2011 Somalia famine established it as a major humanitarian power and strategic actor in the Horn of Africa. Ankara has also used its deep defence and development ties to Mogadishu as a point of entry into mediating between it and Somaliland – though with diminishing returns. Initially, both Mogadishu and Hargeisa were receptive, despite the latter’s wariness that Ankara leaned toward Mogadishu. Beginning in 2013, Turkish-hosted talks helped reinforce channels of communication between the parties, and advanced limited confidence-building measures on issues such as airspace management, aid coordination, and security cooperation. But those talks failed to produce a political settlement, and tensions between the two continue to fester. Mediation is sorely needed, but as Ankara’s relationship with Mogadishu has deepened, Somalilanders have become increasingly sceptical that Türkiye can play this role with sufficient impartiality. They perceive a bias toward preserving Somalia’s territorial integrity that stems both from Ankara’s partnership with Mogadishu, and Türkiye’s own sensitivities around Kurdish secession aspirations. 

Pragmatic goals. Turkish officials pride themselves on staking out achievable goals for their mediation efforts. In a world where comprehensive peace agreements like the Dayton, Rambouillet and Aceh accords seem increasingly out of reach, and where the underlying causes of conflict may require decades to address, Ankara is unapologetic about pursuing incremental measures such as ceasefires, humanitarian access and prisoner exchanges. If some critics argue that such measures may prolong conflict by leaving toxic political dynamics in place, Ankara’s view is that such incremental arrangements are essential stepping stones toward peace. While they rarely resolve conflicts outright, they can reduce violence, preserve channels of communication, and prevent conflicts from becoming even more destructive. 

By way of example, Turkish officials point to their efforts at conflict mitigation in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine. After Turkish efforts in March 2022 to broker a war-ending agreement Istanbul came to naught, Ankara worked with the UN to co-broker the Black Sea Grain Initiative between Russia and Ukraine, which protected more than 30 million metric tons of grain transiting the Black Sea from being targeted, stabilising global food prices and easing pressure on vulnerable food-importing states. Ankara (together with Riyadh) also engaged in months of shuttle diplomacy between Kyiv and Moscow to negotiate the release of almost 300 prisoners. The effort helped establish communication channels that facilitated subsequent prisoner swaps.

 A substantial role for the intelligence community. While ministries of foreign affairs tend to take the lead on mediation in most governments, the Turkish intelligence service (MIT) is often at the forefront of Türkiye’s efforts. This is partly because MIT manages some of Ankara’s most sensitive relationships – including by maintaining channels with armed groups and rival governments. Placing the intelligence services at the forefront of high-stakes diplomacy also enables a discreet approach, which is particularly useful when engaging with proscribed or sanctioned actors such as the Taliban and former jihadist groups in Syria where reputational risks can be high. In 2024, this capacity for discretion allowed the MIT to play a central role in what Turkish officials describe as the largest East-West prisoner exchanges since World War II. Twenty-six prisoners from seven countries – including high-profile detainees (among them U.S. journalist Evan Gershkovich) and Russian opposition figures – were released in Ankara. 

 A willingness to work with all comers. Another hallmark of Turkish mediators is their willingness to work with all parties to a conflict, even when apparent conflicts of interest or reputational issues might drive away Ankara’s Western partners. This openness to engaging with all comers has several overlapping features. 

The first is a Turkish aptitude for compartmentalisation. Ankara has become increasingly adept at maintaining dialogue with warring parties even while it is competing directly with them in other contexts or supporting their rivals. Its relationship with Russia is a case in point. Türkiye belongs to NATO – an alliance that has worked to thwart Moscow’s designs on Ukraine, and that Russia regards as a prime adversary. Türkiye and Russia have also backed opposing sides in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus. Moreover, Ankara has continued supplying drones to Ukraine despite Russian objections. Yet despite all these seeming impediments, the countries still have strong diplomatic ties, which enabled Türkiye to play the mediation roles described above. Turkish officials argue that years of managing competition and cooperation particularly during the Syrian civil war have strengthened Ankara’s ability to separate areas of disagreement from areas where dialogue remains possible. 

Engagement with actors that its allies often shun creates political friction but has also proven an asset in some cases.

Secondly, the Turkish president has a penchant for leader-level diplomacy that has helped Ankara manage tricky relationships. President Erdoğan has shown little compunction about engaging with, and indeed rolling out the red carpet for, leaders mired in controversy. Turkish officials argue that dialogue with all sides, including those regarded as pariahs (for example because of a history of armed violence or human rights abuses) is often necessary to reduce violence and create opportunities for negotiation. This engagement with actors that its allies often shun creates political friction but has also proven an asset in some cases. For example, after being initially excluded from Hamas-Israel talks after 7 October 2023 (the result of strained relations between Erdoğan and Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu), Ankara was reportedly asked by the U.S. to use its ties with Hamas to support ceasefire efforts. While Qatar and Egypt were the principal mediators, Ankara’s access to Hamas and Erdoğan’s relationship with Trump allowed Türkiye to play a supporting role in facilitating the deal. Ankara’s relationship with the Taliban also allowed it to work with Qatar in de-escalating clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2025.

Finally, underlying the “all comers” approach is a distinctive framing of values in mediation. Ankara rarely couches its diplomacy in the language of human rights promotion, democracy or free speech that often accompanies Western mediation efforts. “We don’t frontload our values when we mediate”, a former Turkish mediator said. Instead, Turkish officials emphasise concrete goals: violence reduction, halting mass displacement, protecting civilian lives, and restoring stability. In practice, the divergence is often less about the outcomes that are sought and more about the language used to legitimise their pursuit.

The Promise and Limits of the Turkish Way

Although Türkiye and other middle powers are not new to mediation, their expanding footprint – and the increased recognition it receives – reflects a broader transformation in the practice of peacemaking. In an increasingly fragmented international system, mediation is no longer seen as primarily the domain of Western powers or multilateral institutions. Instead, middle powers – often from the so-called Global South – are increasingly using it to manage uncertainty, expand influence, and protect their interests. Ankara has been particularly adept at navigating this environment. It has done so by leveraging diplomatic access, strategic relationships, military partnerships, and flexible coalitions to position itself as a relevant actor across multiple conflicts. But while there is good reason to welcome Türkiye’s commitment to mediation, and recognise the openings that its unorthodox methods can create, it is also important to be clear-eyed about the limitations and downsides of its approach. Three in particular are worth noting.

First, Türkiye has proved more adept at managing crises than resolving them. Ankara has shown itself able to keep channels open, convene adversaries, secure narrow, practical arrangements and create temporary openings for humanitarian relief or de-escalation. Its work to help broker the Black Sea grain deal and Ukraine-Russia prisoner swaps are a case in point. But on the whole it has not been able to build on these openings to alter conflict dynamics or forge durable settlements. This is hardly an indictment of Ankara’s efforts given that other mediators, including more traditional ones, have also struggled in recent years to bring conflicts to an end through negotiations. Nevertheless, it does suggest certain limitations in the approach. 

For all its deftness is keeping channels open to adversarial parties (including its own rivals), Ankara’s partnerships can sometimes get in the way of peacemaking.

Secondly, for all its deftness is keeping channels open to adversarial parties (including its own rivals), Ankara’s partnerships can sometimes get in the way of peacemaking, especially when seen as lopsided. This was apparently the case in the case of Somalia and Somaliland, where the latter increasingly finds Türkiye’s relationship with the former as problematic.

Finally, Ankara’s penchant for intervening in conflicts – either with military force or by supplying one of the belligerent parties – has significant potential downsides. While military interventions can make Türkiye “strong at the table” they can also involve major escalatory risks and the attendant humanitarian and other ills that accompany armed conflict. Similarly, supplying weapons to a conflict party can create bilateral influence, but it can also perpetuate or escalate conflict by allowing a belligerent to take measures that would otherwise not be within its capabilities. This dynamic has been at work in Sudan, where the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt are widely understood (despite denials by the UAE) to be backing opposing conflict parties at the same time as they are acting, together with the U.S., as ostensible mediators. Thus far, the net impact has been to keep both sides in the fight, rather than to move them toward peace.

The Potential for Positive Impact

The promise of the Turkish mediation model may lie less in its ability to end wars than in its capacity to manage them where few alternatives exist. By delivering on this promise, it can make a substantial contribution to peacemaking in an era where traditional approaches have struggled. At the same time, however, the mixing of hard and soft power that has been an essential element of the Turkish way carries significant risks. The way in which Ankara and others that follow its approach manage these risks will shape both their credibility as mediators and their contribution to international peace and security. 

 Contributors

- Dareen Khalifa - Senior Adviser for dialpgue promotion

- Berkay Mandıracı  - Senior Analyst, Türkiye