THE FREE PRESS A Way Out of the Iran Mess Where on Earth do we go from here? As I see it, there are four options. The president has to choose between four options on the Strait of Hormuz. None of them are pain-free. By Aaron MacLean 07.09.26 —

THE FREE PRESS

A Way Out of the Iran Mess

Where on Earth do we go from here? As I see it, there are four options. (Francisco Seco via AP Photo)

The president has to choose between four options on the Strait of Hormuz. None of them are pain-free.

By Aaron MacLean

07.09.26 —

U.S. Politics

Aaron MacLean is a columnist at The Free Press, national security analyst at CBS News, and host of the School of War podcast.

As the clouds gathered in Europe in 1938, Winston Churchill summed up British policy toward Germany in a letter to an associate, writing, “We seem to be very near the bleak choice between War and Shame. My feeling is that we shall choose Shame, and then have War thrown in a little later on even more adverse terms than at present.”

You could say the same thing about the Trump administration’s approach to Iran and, in particular, the need to secure the Strait of Hormuz. Its stubborn refusal to confront reality on this issue led directly to the deeply flawed memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed just three weeks ago—and now, to that agreement’s predictable collapse.

Setting aside questions about the overall wisdom of Operation Epic Fury, the original sin in its design was failing to anticipate and proactively counter the obvious Iranian countermove: closing the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil historically passes. The first drafts of history suggest that Trump bet that Iranian resolve would collapse so quickly that such a closure simply wouldn’t happen. Ideally, the outcome of Epic Fury would be swift and look like Venezuela, with new Iranian leaders emerging to do good deals with the United States.

That didn’t happen. As March turned to April, the strait was closed to all but Iranian oil traffic. (In an unfathomable blunder, the United States, with an eye to the energy markets, permitted these ships to move throughout this time even as the passage was otherwise closed to the world.) Faced with this new reality, the thinking in the White House seems to have evolved. At this point the belief—the hope—was that the sheer intensity of the U.S.-Israeli campaign would compel the recalcitrant Iranians to back down and be forced into a deal that would involve opening the strait. When Iranians refused to budge, the president’s rhetoric intensified, and he even threatened to destroy Iranian “civilization.”

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Vance Tries to Have It Both Ways on the Iran Deal

Then the charade really began. The April 7 ceasefire was announced with the U.S. president claiming that the Iranians had agreed to open the strait completely. The Iranians swiftly clarified—no, they would control traffic in the strait. After early negotiations to sort this and other issues out in Islamabad sputtered, the president imposed an American blockade on Iranian ports, matching the de facto Iranian blockade with his own. A splashy effort to begin “guiding” ships through the strait, dubbed Project Freedom, was swiftly aborted when Saudi Arabia, growing wary of American resolve, refused to support it. And though it seems that the limited escort operations have quietly proceeded ever since, the amount of traffic has never gotten close to prewar levels.

By the middle of June, the president was hearing that energy markets were nearing a cliff. Both a shortage of munitions and the fact that he had promised the American people a short war meant he was reluctant to return to the kind of major combat operations that fully reopening the strait would likely require. But in the negotiations, the Iranians were also refusing to agree to a complete reopening.

So, desperate to increase the amount of traffic through the strait and demonstrate diplomatic progress, the administration essentially repeated the same strategic self-deception in which it had engaged in early April: It claimed that the new memorandum of understanding negotiated under the supervision of Vice President J.D. Vance required Iran to open the strait, when the text of the MOU did nothing of the sort.

The Trump administration’s stubborn refusal to confront reality led directly to the deeply flawed memorandum of understanding, and now, to its collapse.

The relevant language was ambiguous and seemed to grant Iran authority to control traffic in the strait, tasking Iran with making “arrangements” for the “safe passage of commercial vessels, with no charge for 60 days only.” True to character, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps then set out to enforce its implicit authority by shooting at ships that failed to make arrangements with Iran before making the passage. America has responded with several rounds of punitive strikes. More significantly, the administration yesterday revoked the sanctions waivers permitting Iran to sell its oil. Along with lifting its own blockade of the strait, these waivers were America’s primary upfront concession in the MOU. If the revocation persists, the agreement is effectively dead. And indeed, President Donald Trump said as much on Wednesday morning, telling a reporter at the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, that the MOU is “over.”

So: Where on Earth do we go from here? As I see it, there are four options.

We could return to the uneasy mix of self-deception and bad-faith agreements with the Iranians in which we have indulged since the April ceasefire. The paltry results of such a method are plain for all to see. At best, it can only buy time, which is presumably why it has been the preferred course since April.

We could surrender, and cease to contest Iran’s control of the strait. This would have catastrophic consequences for the region and the world, and the administration seems to have no appetite for it.

Read

Trump Gives Iran a Lifeline and Calls It Peace

We could launch a maximalist regime-change military campaign against Iran—President Trump’s threatened but undelivered “bridge and power plant” day writ large. Risks would abound and, again, the administration gives no evidence of an appetite for this course.

Or we could strike a middle course that addresses the core strategic failure at the center of this mess: the administration’s refusal to accept at the outset that, barring the fall or fundamental change in character of the regime, the price of launching a war with Iran would be protracted, costly maritime escort operations in and around the Strait of Hormuz. That means formalizing Project Freedom as the indefinite American policy in the region while supporting the associated insurance costs, along with imposing sanctions on Iran and reimposing the American blockade. Such a move would be sustainable, if painful, for the United States, but create conditions the Iranian economy cannot survive, ultimately forcing a better outcome for the U.S. But it will take time, perhaps a lot of time, and the Iranians will absolutely exact other costs along the way, testing American and allied resolve. Moreover, even the most effective escort operation will not reduce the amount of incoming fire in the strait to zero. There will be waves of fighting in the strait itself, Iranian attacks elsewhere in the region, and the need for America to respond from time to time.

This is not an attractive picture. Protracted escort operations, sustained economic warfare, and indefinite ongoing rounds of combat in the region may not seem like an acceptable price to pay when compared to the benefits of the war thus far. But we had the war, and somewhere, somehow, we are going to pay the price.

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