Iran Update Special Report - July 11, 2026 - Iran's relatively pragmatic negotiators are likely trying to preserve negotiations and avoid renewed large-scale conflict with the United States.

 

Iran Update Special Report, July 11, 2026

Key Takeaways: •    Iran's relatively pragmatic negotiators are likely trying to preserve negotiations and avoid renewed large-scale conflict with the United States. Top Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officers who are close to the supreme leader likely approved efforts to use force to secure Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, however. •    The differences between the negotiators and the IRGC are one of immediate tactical means—negotiations or military action—not strategic ends.  Iranian regime factions appear to broadly agree that the strait represents critical leverage for Iran. The effect of Iranian negotiators blaming an “errant faction“ for attacks in the strait is that it allows the regime to sustain talks and attempt to reap potential economic benefits while the IRGC continues to enforce Iran’s control over the strait.  •    There are major negotiating gaps between Iran and the United States on the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program.  The United States has demanded that Iran publicly acknowledge that the strait is open to all commercial traffic, end attacks on vessels, and restore maritime arrangements to their pre-war status quo. Iranian officials have consistently rejected any return to the pre-war system and view control over the strait as essential strategic leverage.

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Iran's relatively pragmatic negotiators are likely trying to preserve negotiations and avoid renewed large-scale conflict with the United States.  Top Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officers who are close to the supreme leader likely approved efforts to use force to secure Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, however. Iranian officials privately told US officials that an “errant” hardline faction that seeks to undermine negotiations is responsible for Iran’s recent attacks on commercial vessels in the strait, according to unspecified senior US officials.  Iran attacked three commercial vessels using the southern Omani route on July 6 and 7 in order to enforce its control over the strait, which prompted US strikes on Iran.  An unspecified US official told Axios on July 10 that Iranian negotiators reached out to the Trump administration and requested that the two sides continue talks after the two days of attacks.  The US official claimed that Iran is facing an internal “power struggle.”  Iranian regime’s English-language media outlet, Press TV, citing a senior Iranian intelligence source, rejected claims that “rogue forces” were operating in the Persian Gulf or that Iran had requested negotiations, however.     Iranian negotiators are likely attempting to preserve talks with the United States by pointing to internal fractures within the regime to explain recent Iranian aggression against civilian ships. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (who is leading negotiations), Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and President Masoud Pezeshkian all support negotiations. The New York Times reported that Pezeshkian, reportedly fearful of the US blockade and the deteriorating economic situation in Iran, implored the supreme leader to accept the MoU despite the supreme leader’s concerns and desire to retain control over the Strait of Hormuz.  US officials have acknowledged that they assess that the Iranians attacked shipping on July 6 and July 7 once they realized how quickly the strait was slipping out of their control.  That the IRGC Navy—which is responsible for attacks in the strait—responded to ensure it could control traffic in the strait indicates that the Iranian chain of command, not an “errant faction,” made a strategic decision to resume attacks.    The recent Iranian attacks on commercial vessels to enforce transit along Iran’s own traffic separation scheme are consistent with Vahidi and the IRGC’s strategy throughout the ceasefire.  An IRGC-affiliated outlet also contradicted Iranian negotiators‘ reported pleas to resume talks by claiming that no negotiations will take place until the United States make concessions.    The Iranian officials’ characterization of an ”errant faction” does not necessarily imply that Iranian negotiations do not seek to secure Iranian control over the strait, however, given that Iranian regime factions appear to broadly agree that the strait represents critical leverage for Iran.  Iranian negotiators, such as Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, and other relatively more pragmatic regime officials such as Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, are likely seeking to preserve talks in order to avoid another large-scale US strike campaign, which would inflict significant economic damage to Iran. The preservation of US-Iran talks also allows Iran more time to militarily reconstitute (see below). The differences between the negotiators and the IRGC are one of immediate tactical means—negotiations or military action—not strategic ends.    The effect of Iranian negotiators blaming an “errant faction“ for attacks in the strait is that it allows the regime to sustain talks and attempt to reap potential economic benefits while the IRGC continues to enforce Iran’s control over the strait, however. The Trump administration has directed senior officials, including Vice President JD Vance, Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner to continue negotiations.   Araghchi traveled to Oman on July 11 to hold talks on safe passage through the strait with Omani officials.    There are major negotiating gaps between Iran and the United States on the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program.  The United States has demanded that Iran publicly acknowledge that the strait is open to all commercial traffic, end attacks on vessels, and restore maritime arrangements to their pre-war status quo.  Iranian officials have consistently rejected any return to the pre-war system and view control over the strait as essential strategic leverage.  Iran may agree to end attacks and permit commercial traffic while continuing to require vessels to follow Iranian-designated traffic separation scheme. Iran can also argue that this position is compatible with Clause 5 of the memorandum of understanding, which requires Iran to facilitate safe, charge-free passage for 60 days and calls for talks with Oman and other Persian Gulf littoral states to define the strait’s future administration and maritime services.  Two senior Iranian sources told Reuters on July 8 that relinquishing its management of the strait would amount to ”surrender” and that Iran would not discuss its nuclear program unless the United States recognized full Iranian management of the strait.  US officials told the Wall Street Journal on July 10 that the United States will not conclude a nuclear agreement unless Iran relinquishes its enriched nuclear material.  Iranian officials have given no indication that the regime is prepared to surrender this material.

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War will provide regular updates, including daily updates, as the crisis warrants.   Not subscribed to Iran Updates? Click here to receive regular email updates