Wednesday, October 5, 2016

The defeat of England at Lausanne by Dr. Pat Walsh

Written by drpatwalsh

On The Defeat of England At Lausanne by Ataturk


The current Turkish President recently made a comment on the Treaty of Lausanne.
The present writer makes a point of not intervening in Turkish politics. But since this is a historical matter some comment should be made, particularly as it is of interest how the Treaty of Lausanne was seen at the other end of Europe – by the other party who signed it – Britain – and by the people it still ruled in its Empire in Ireland.
The Irish had experience of 8 centuries of British rule and many failed attempts to shake it off. They therefore realised the world-historic thing that Ataturk had achieved and saw in it something that was not only important for the new Turkish nation but something that was a turning point in history.
Having seen its Greek catspaw lose the military confrontation with Ataturk in Anatolia and having backed down at Chanak England determined to recover with a Treaty what it had lost on the battlefield – as it had done in Ireland in 1921.
On the Monday before Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, left England to win through his diplomacy what had been lost on the battlefield, he made the following speech to businessmen in the City of London “where his declaration that the Government would stand firm against Kemalist aggression was received with loud cheers.”:
“The developments in Turkey he characterised as ‘the most definite menace to the peace of the world… The Nationalists, flushed with victory over the Greeks, have run riot during the past few days. They have deposed the Sultan and abolished the temporal power of the Caliph. I wonder what the Moslems of the world will think of this… The Nationalist Party has assumed the Government of Constantinople and has called upon the Allied Powers to withdraw – the fleet of Great Britain, if you please – to withdraw at their bidding from the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles. They have abolished the capitulations and mixed courts, abolished the national debt, and repudiated the national obligations. These pretensions cannot be tolerated. They have no conceivable justification. They are an affront to the Allies and a challenge to Europe… Turkey must learn that there is a limit even to the concessions which we can make to her, and that we cannot purchase peace at the cost of humiliation or disgrace. Turkey must realise that the strength of Britain and the might of Europe are a rock against which she will hurl herself in vain.” (Irish Independent, 9th November 1922)
And yet Lord Curzon returned empty-handed having himself purchased “peace at the cost of humiliation or disgrace”.
The Lausanne Treaty, unlike the Anglo-Irish Treaty, was negotiated with long and hard deliberation spread over an eight-month period (the Turkish delegation withdrew for a three-month interruption in the middle of the proceedings when it was not happy with what was happening). Turkey refused to have terms imposed upon her that would dilute her sovereignty, even though Britain fought tooth and nail to maximize her Imperial influence over the region. The Turkish delegation also refused to be railroaded into a take it or leave it deal imposed by an arbitrary deadline. When Curzon said his train was standing at the station and it was “now or never” the treaty remained unsigned by the Turks. Curzon, after delaying his train in the expectation they would submit, left empty handed on his train. The British returned a few months later and the Treaty was signed on July 24th 1923.
Lloyd-George recognized, in a debate in the House of Commons on 6th June 1924, what a turnabout Lausanne had been for the British Empire compared with Sèvres and the previous objectives:
“I believe it is a complete reversal of the decisions taken at Paris… In three important parts it is a complete departure from the decisions taken… First of all, with regard to Smyrna and South Eastern Anatolia, that was a reversal. The Straits is another. You… had a demilitarised zone, to be occupied and garrisoned by the Allies. Now, you have a demilitarised zone depending entirely upon Turkish Declarations. What were their declarations worth in the late war? Then there is a guarantee of Turkish neutrality by the British Empire. Surely that is a vital distinction. If there is any attack upon their zone, upon Constantinople, upon the Straits, the British Empire by this Treaty is bound to come in—horse, foot and artillery, with all its resources —to defend them from whatever quarter the attack comes. Is not that a vital difference? What is the third departure? The surrender of the capitulations. You surrendered there British rights which had been enjoyed by the traders of this country for centuries. That was not in the Paris arrangement. That was not in the Treaty of Sevres… It is a, perfect farce… These are three serious departures.” (Irish Independent, 7 June 1924)
The Treaty of Sèvres was a treaty dictated by the victors to the vanquished – or so the victors thought. The Treaty of Lausanne was a treaty negotiated between comparative equals. As Curzon, later remarked – when his bluster to the businessmen of the City had been shown to be without substance – Sèvres was “dictation of terms at the point of the Bayonet … Only when the terms had been drawn up was the beaten enemy admitted, to be told his sentence. … Far otherwise was it at Lausanne. There the Turks sat at the table on a footing of equality with all the other powers.” And he admitted: “Hitherto we have dictated our peace treaties. Now we are negotiating one with the enemy who has an army in being while we have none, an unheard of position.”
Curzon had demanded and threatened and the Turks had said: “You and whose army?” And that was that.
There was still a great potential disparity of power between the two parties to the Treaty (which Britain used to good effect) and there was still the British military occupation, which restricted what it was possible for Turkey to retain of its Ottoman possessions. (The major victory Britain secured in the Treaty was the holding on to the oil-rich Mosul region to the north of Mesopotamia that their forces occupied. This meant that they pushed the local inhabitants, the Kurds and local Turkomen, into the new state of Iraq. And many have paid for that momentous ‘victory’ ever since.)
On the question of the Straits the British Admiralty had desired the ability to “hammer at the gates of Constantinople and force the Turks to open the door into the Black Sea.” (A.L. Macfie, The Straits Question, Middle Eastern Studies, May 1979, p.235) Presumably this was to get at Russia, if the need arose.
Turkey was prepared to agree to the free passage of commercial vessels and a more limited passage of warships. The Turks won back the right to close the Straits to its enemies in the event of war and to stop and search neutral vessels suspected of supplying them. However, Turkey was forced to agree to demilitarise a 15 mile wide zone with an international commission to oversee traffic through the Straits – although the Turkish Army could cross the demilitarized zone as it desired and station forces in Eastern Thrace.
These provisions were superseded by another Treaty signed at Montreux on July 20th 1936, which conceded full sovereignty to Turkey over the area, as the Turks availed of the decline in British power (just before DeValera did).
The Treaty of Lausanne was an immensely successful Treaty compared to the other post-War, dictated, Treaties. It brought stability that has lasted near on a century whilst the others, imposed at Versailles, produced another World War within a generation. The Treaty marked the birth of a new State, created by the struggle of its own citizens rather than the gift of the Imperialists. It set the Turks and the new Turkish State apart from all others in the region by being independent of the Imperial powers. It stood the test of time as a result.
The Catholic Bulletin devoted an enormous amount of coverage to the negotiations at Lausanne and the Treaty that followed (it should be remembered that the Bulletin was primarily a religious periodical). Its reporting amounted to about twenty pages in twelve editions, over a period of a year, in which the Treaty and its significance were commented upon.
In April 1923, to keep its readers well informed, the Catholic Bulletin took the unusual step of publishing the official (British) record of the proceedings at Lausanne. It did so without comment, believing, presumably that no comment was necessary. And the Bulletin, being of an Anti-Treaty mind that went into the making of Fianna Fail, contrasted the performance of the Turkish and Irish plenipotentiaries in their respective settlements with the British.
What The Catholic Bulletin did was very important in establishing independent Ireland when many thought the mere signing of a Treaty would accomplish it. Independent Ireland was not a fact in 1921 – it had to be fought for in various ways for another quarter of a century before it was begun to be achieved.
I think we owe some gratitude to Ataturk because Turkey’s example provided some of the inspiration and will to carry on the struggle that was necessary for such an achievement.
The Catholic Bulletin clearly saw what happened at Chanak and then Lausanne as a turning point that had important implications in world affairs – and for Ireland in its future relations with the Empire. It saw these events as “a great defeat for England” at the hands of a small nation fighting for its freedom. That understanding was acted upon over the coming two decades by DeValera to achieve for Ireland what Ataturk had done for Turkey.
Below are some extracts:
FAR AND NEAR
Looking round the world for an instance of brilliant achievement during the year, we see ‘Turkey head of the class.’ After centuries of rule by Mahomedan Caliphs, Mahomedan Kings, Sultans and Princes it was proclaimed in 1923 that Sovereignty belonged absolutely to the Turkish people, while Mustapha Kemal Pasha was then elevated to a dignity never before enjoyed by a ruler in IslamPresident of the Republic of Turkey.” (January 1924)
ENGLANDS SURRENDER
Readers of the BULLETIN will remember the Supplement published last year describing Lord Curzons final interview with Ismet Pasha and others. The very superior person proved on that occasion the most inferior. Threats and blandishments failed to induce the Turkish plenipotentiaries to agree to Curzons terms. It was Curzons second failure. His first, if we remember rightly, was the partition of Turkey by the Treaty of Sèvres. If this was not Curzons personal failure it was, at any rate, Englands failure. The Treaty, which was eventually signed and agreed to by Turkish patriots, has been described as ‘deplorable’ from the British point of view. This fact, we must grasp, if we are to get to the bottom of all the misunderstandings with regard to the alleged responsibilities and liabilities of his Britannic Majestys Dominions. It should be remembered that the Lausanne Treaty was written and signed in the French languagethe English was merely a translation. Therefore, the official document of a treaty, as the honourable Lloyd George pointed out, had been in both languages. The change, said the Welsh liberator of twentysix counties of Ireland, was more than a mistake; it was significant of the fact that ‘we had gone back in authority and prestige in our dealings with foreign powers.’
 “It had, indeed, been a grave surrender on the part of British representatives.
 “The whole Treaty was a stupendous British surrender. British politicians and the British Press thundered that it was a treaty which might have been signed by a vanquished Power so far as British interests were concerned. Privileges, like Capitulations, which the mighty British had treasured for generations vanished like smoke. These, the only constant protection for the precious life, the honest liberty; the valuable property of every British trader in Turkey was ignominiously surrendered. Then the poor Christian minorities, for whose welfare Englands great heart ever beats, particularly those in Belfast, were thrown to the Turkish dogs. Finally, above all things, England who had incited the Greeks to war against Turkey, finding it opportune, suddenly somersaults and guarantees the defence of the nation she relentlessly sought to destroy. This policy has been excellently described by the author of The Lost Dominion’—a sensational book recently published on India. He says:
It is an old policy of England to sacrifice her friends to her enemies. The idea is that your friend is your friend, and will support you anyhow. Your enemy will be so pleased at being allowed to punish your friend that he will forget his old grudge against you, and perhaps himself become friendly. And the policy is often successful enough, especially when the friend is helpless and the enemy placable.
 “If there he a god of nations how he must despise this treachery, not less treacherous when euphemistically styled opportunism!
 “This policy has failed with the Turks who refused to budge until an essential clause of the Lausanne Treaty had been complied with. Ramsay MacDonald has told part of the story, and when reading Ramsay MacDonald bear in mind his motto. He expressed it quite recently at an insignificant meeting in London: ‘Never,’ advised the Prime Minister of England, ‘say you will do anything, but within reason, always keep people expecting that you are going to do it.” (May 1924)

Tuesday, October 4, 2016

stephen Walt

Stephen M. Walt

Stephen M. Walt
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/about/faculty-staff-directory/stephen-walt

Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is also co-editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs and serves on the editorial boards of Foreign Policy, Security Studies, International Relations, and Journal of Cold War Studies.
Previously, Walt taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago, where he served as master of the Social Science Collegiate Division and deputy dean of social sciences. In addition, he has been a resident associate of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace; a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution; and a consultant for the Institute of Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the National Defense University.
Walt is the author of The Origins of Alliances, Revolution and War, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, and, with co-author J. J. Mearsheimer, The Israel Lobby.

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Last Updated: Jul 29, 2016

Stephen Walt on liberalism and presidential election

Remarks

STEPHEN WALT: Great. It's a pleasure to be here and I'm grateful for the opportunity.
My reputation as a realist notwithstanding, I come here not to bury liberalism but to praise it. I share its values. I'm grateful to live in a liberal society. I even think most countries would be better off if they embraced those same principles. So I'm taking no pleasure in the problems that the liberal project is now experiencing.
I want to try and use my time to briefly describe what is happening, building on what David has already said; explain why I think it's happening now; and then say a few words about what might happen to the liberal project after November.
First, as David suggested, one of the best ways to understand where we are today is just to compare where we were in 1993 or so. Communism had collapsed; the Velvet Revolution had taken place; serious people (Frank Fukuyama) had said we'd reached the end of history; Tom Friedman was writing books telling us globalization meant everyone had to put on the "golden straitjacket" and basically become like the United States; the Clinton administration's grand strategy was one of engagement and enlargement, expanding NATO eastward, spreading democracy where it could. This was a period of tremendous optimism.
Today liberalism is under threat on multiple fronts. Roger Cohen of The New York Times writes: "The forces of disintegration are on the march. The foundations of the postwar world are trembling." The World Economic Forum says: "The liberal world order is being challenged by powerful authoritarian movements and anti-liberal fundamentalists." Democracy expert Larry Diamond at Stanford points out that, "Between 2000 and 2015 democracy broke down in 27 countries, and many already authoritarian regimes became even less open and less responsive to their citizens."
Efforts to build stable democracies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans mostly failed. The Arab Spring quickly turned into an Arab Winter almost everywhere. Britain has now voted to leave the European Union, signaling disenchantment with the most ambitious liberal project in Europe. Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Israel—all headed in illiberal directions. A right-wing party in Germany beat Angela Merkel's coalition in local elections last week. And, not to forget, the Republican Party in the United States has nominated a presidential candidate who openly disdains the tolerance that is central to liberal societies, repeatedly expresses racist beliefs, and cottons to baseless conspiracy theories.
So the question is: What went wrong between 1993 and today? I blame this on several interrelated factors.
The first is that we overpromised what liberalism could deliver. Promoters of the liberal experiment argued that spreading democracy, spreading human rights, spreading open markets, and all of these things would guarantee peace and prosperity everywhere and largely for everyone. But of course that turned out not to be the case.
Just thinking of how the spread of markets works, it creates winners, often far more winners than losers; but it does create some losers, people who do not do well, at least in the short term. As a result, the latter are rarely happy about it and the latter can use the same institutions of democracy to make that discontent known.
To make matters worse, liberal elites in a number of places made some serious policy blunders. My favorite list, apart from the invasion of Iraq in 2003: the creation of the euro in Europe, widely forecast to be a disaster, and proven to be indeed; mismanaging the American economy, leading to the financial crisis of 2008; and then, especially in Europe, overdoing the politics and the policies of austerity after 2008, therefore prolonging the economic crisis.
Third, some liberal states used non-liberal means to try and spread liberal values, with a predictable lack of success. Here the classic example is the Iraq War, but it's also true of the Western interventions in Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere. The key lesson to draw from that is that military force turns out to be a terrible tool for spreading liberal values.
Finally, although liberals are generally supportive of the idea of national self-determination, they failed to appreciate just how persistent and powerful nationalism would be and how these local identities of various kinds would remain even in the midst of the liberal project. The European Union was supposed to transcend nationalism, create a new pan-European identity, where national identities would really only emerge, say, during the European Soccer Cup, or something like that. But it's clear, of course, in 2016 that this did not happen.
The United States failed to appreciate that creating the formal institutions of democracy was not enough to create a liberal society without norms of tolerance and other embedded social values. And again, that's especially true if you try to do that with armed force.
Finally, it turns out that many people in many places care as much about national identities, historical enmity, territorial symbols, traditional cultural values as they do about freedom or as they do about purely economic benefits. Those sentiments, I think, loom especially large when change is very rapid and when mostly homogeneous societies are forced to assimilate people whose backgrounds are different in a very short span of time.
Again, I think we know from American history, which we always extol as the successful melting pot—but we know that in fact there have been many moments of tensions when new arrivals have experienced resistance and that blending cultures within a single polity has never been particularly smooth or simple. When that happens, and especially when it's happening rapidly, it provides grist for populist leaders who promise to defend traditional values or "make the country great again." Nostalgia ain't what it used to be, but it is still a very formidable political motivation.
And then finally, I would place some blame on ruling elites in a number of liberal societies, especially the United States, where the operation of money in our politics and special interests have created—not to be too candid—an essentially corrupt political class that is increasingly out of touch with ordinary people, interested in enriching themselves, and largely immune to accountability. The sense, in short, that the game is rigged in favor of the 1 percent is where a lot of this populist anger comes from, and I think is reflected not just in the Trump campaign but was also reflected in the surprising success of Bernie Sanders on the other end.
Let me just close with a couple of thoughts about what might happen after November.
If Trump wins—and I neither expect nor want that to happen—the liberal order will fray even more. His own commitment to liberal values seems paper thin. He has promised to play "hardball" with a lot of traditional American allies, and he has little knowledge, no experience, and hardly anyone advising him who knows much of anything about foreign policy. In short, a Trump presidency would be a social science experiment of historic proportions [Laughter], and it's one I have no desire to participate in.
Now, if Clinton wins, many people expect her to be a much more enthusiastic liberal interventionist than, say, Barack Obama. Now, it's true she has been pretty hawkish in the past and she has made some boneheaded foreign policy judgments. But let me just go out on a limb and say that I think she may be much more restrained in her conduct of foreign policy and her activist promotion of the liberal agenda than you might think. You'll recall that Bill Clinton, whom I believe she still talks to occasionally, talked big on foreign policy, a very ambitious set of foreign policy goals, but he tried to do it all on the cheap and was very risk-averse about using American military power. Hillary, I think, wants to be a domestic president and a very large, ambitious foreign policy agenda isn't consistent with trying to do a lot of things here at home.
Moreover, if you look around the world, there are hardly any possible interventions, particularly military interventions, that look really promising. Instead, they all look like potential quagmires, and you would have to be a real enthusiastic liberal humanitarian to want to do a lot of them.
And finally, remember that she was a big promoter of the so-called "pivot to Asia" during Obama's first term, and you can't pivot to Asia in a serious way if you are trying to do a lot of nation-building in places like Yemen or Iraq.
So I think Clinton will talk a lot about defending and spreading liberal values, but again, like her husband, she will do it as gingerly as possible.
Now, does that mean that the liberal order will continue to erode? Maybe not, because if you're like me and you think the best way to promote liberal values around the world is to set a really good example here in the United States, then a successful domestic agenda and less military intervention abroad might do a better job of selling the liberal ideal than some of the things we have done over the past 25 years. And, needless to say, I hope I'm right.
Thank you very much.

Ege adaları kısa tarihçesi -Hazal Papuççular

Ege Adaları” Üzerine Birkaç SözEKİM 1, 2016Hazal Papuçcular
Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, 29 Eylül 2016’da muhtarlara yaptığı konuşmada “İşte şu an Ege’yi görüyorsunuz değil mi? Bağırsan sesinin duyulacağı adaları biz Lozan’da verdik. Zafer bu mu?” dedi ve tüm Türkiye üzerinden 93 sene geçen Cumhuriyet’in kurucu belgesi Lozan’ı yeniden tartışmaya açtı. Cumhurbaşkanı’nın sözleri kanaatimce özellikle seçilmişti; bitmez tükenmez bir şekildezafer mi yoksa hezimet mi şeklinde tartışılan Lozan ile, kamu nezdindeki bir başka “bam teli,” yani Ege Adaları meselesi aynı cümle içinde geçmeli, böylece sözlerin etkisi iki katına çıkmalıydı.
Beklenildiği üzere bu sözler sosyal medya ile yazılı ve görsel basında büyük bir infial yarattı. Herkes bu sözlerin tarihsel olarak yanlış olduğuna değinmek için adaların aslında Lozan ile değil 1913’te kaybedildiğini söyleyen açıklamalarda bulundu. Cilt cilt dış politika kitabı yazan akademisyenlerin “Oniki Ada aslında 1913 yılında Atina Antlaşması ile Yunanistan’a verilmiştir” gibi hatalı açıklamaları gazeteleri süsleyince konu ile ilgili kısa bir yazı yazmaya karar verdim. (Böyle hatalı bir örnek için tıklayınız)
                             Ada Grupları
Öncelikle, Ege Adaları “şu tarihte” verildi derseniz, bugün Batı Anadolu coğrafyasının karşısında yer alan adaların tamamını kastediyor olursunuz ve bu şekilde hatalı bir yaklaşımda bulunursunuz. Soldaki haritada görüldüğü gibi Ege’de birkaç grup ada bulunur ve bunların tarihçeleri de isimlendirmeleri gibi farklıdır.
Türkiye’nin batı sahillerinin tam karşısında bulunan adalar, Türkçe isimleri ile Boğazönü, Saruhan ve Menteşe gibi gruplara ayrılır. Meseleyi fazla karıştırmamak ve tarihsel bağlamına oturtmak adına, Menteşe grubuna bizim de aşina olduğumuz üzere Oniki Ada, Oniki Ada’nın kuzeyinde bulunan adalara ise Kuzey-Doğu Ege Adaları diyeceğim.
Güneydeki grup, yani Oniki Ada grubu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile İtalya arasında yapılan Trablusgarp Savaşı (1911-1912) sırasında işgal edilir. 1911 yılında Libya’ya saldıran İtalya, burada bir direnişle karşılaşır. Yerli halk ve bölgede bulunan zaviyelerin İttihatçı subaylarla işbirliği yapması ve bu güçlerin İtalyanlara karşı gerilla taktiği ile savaşması sonucunda İtalya, bölgede askerî olarak bir çıkmaza girer. Donanması nispeten güçlü olan İtalya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nu siyasi ve askerî olarak zorlamak için savaşı Akdeniz’e yayar ve dönem dönem bombaladığı önemli Osmanlı limanlarına ek olarak, 1912 Nisan’ında Ege’ye bir harekât başlatır. Çanakkale Boğazı’nı da bombalayan ve Kuzey’deki Limni Adası’ndaki Mondros limanını üs olarak kullanan İtalya, Mayıs 1912’de Oniki Ada’nın tümünü işgal eder. Osmanlı donanması ise denizde üstünlük sağlayan İtalya’ya karşı etkisiz kalır, hatta Ege Denizi’ne dahi açılamaz. Rodos’taki küçük direnişi saymazsak, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, kaybedilişi sürekli Cumhuriyet tarihine atfedilen Oniki Ada’yı savaşmadan İtalyanlara bu zamanda terk eder. Çünkü imparatorluğun Rodos haricindeki adalarda savaşacak herhangi bir askerî kuvveti yoktur. Sadece bu kadarla da sınırlı değil. İtalyanlar, Oniki Ada ve Anadolu arasındaki telgraf hatlarını da kestiğinden Osmanlı İmparatorluğu bu adaların işgal haberini de ancak yabancı konsolosluklardan alabilir. Ve ele geçirilen adalardan karşı kıyıya, örneğin Marmaris’e, İtalyanlar tarafından bombardıman ateşi gerçekleştirilir.
map_of_dodecanese-islands
                                    Oniki Ada
Balkan Savaşı’nın patlak vermesi ile İtalya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Uşi Antlaşması’nı imza eder (1912). Bu antlaşmanın 2. maddesine göre Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Oniki Ada’daki İtalyan işgalini kabul eder. İtalyanlar, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tüm kuvvetlerini Libya’dan çektiğinde adalardan çekileceğini söylese de, bu hiçbir zaman gerçekleşmez. Çünkü İtalya, 1. Dünya Savaşı’na kadar Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Trablusgarp’tan çekilmediğini ve direnişini devam ettirdiğini iddia edecektir. (Ki, bu o kadar da asılsız bir iddia değildir).
Kuzey-Doğu Ege Adaları ise Yunan Donanması tarafından Balkan Harbi (1912-1913) sırasında işgal edilir. Bugün Türkiye’ye ait olan Gökçeada ve Bozcaada da, işgal edilen bu adalar arasındadır. Denizdeki Yunan ablukası ve “Boğazönü” denilen bu adaların işgali, Osmanlı gemilerinin harp boyunca Çanakkale Boğazı’ndan çıkmasına engel olur. 1. Balkan Savaşı bittikten sonra dönemin büyük güçleri, Londra’da bir dizi konferans yapar, bu konferanslarda Ege’deki tüm adaların geleceği ile ilgili tartışmalar yapılır. Özellikle, bu devletlerin boğazlara yakın olan adaların geleceğinin ne olacağına dair görüşleri birbiri ile çatıştığından, konferanslardan sonra imzalanan Londra Antlaşması’na “Ege Adaları’nın geleceğinin büyük devletler tarafından kararlaştırılacağına” dair muğlak bir madde konulur. Sonuç olarak, daha sonra Atina Antlaşması imzalanır (1913) ve dün/bugün sıkça bahsedilen  Kuzey-Doğu Ege Adaları (Gökçeada ve Bozcaada hariç), Yunanistan’a bırakılır. Yani, Oniki Ada ve Atina Antlaşması’nın birbiriyle bağlantılı bir durumu yoktur. Burada mevzubahis Kuzey-Doğu Ege Adaları’dır. 
Burada bir şeye vurgu yapmam gerekiyor: Her ne kadar 1913 Atina Antlaşması, Kuzey-Doğu Ege adalarını Gökçeada ve Bozcaada hariç Yunanistan’a bırakmış olsa da, bu durum imparatorluğa ait bu iki adada Osmanlı hâkimiyetinin yeniden tesis edildiği şeklinde düşünülmemelidir. Örneğin, 1915 Çanakkale Savaşı sırasında Gökçeada’da İngilizler tarafından üsler inşa edilmiş, bölgede cepheden gelen yaralılar için bir hastane bile yapılmıştır. Gökçeada ve Bozcaada’ya benzer bir süreçten geçen bir başka ada da Kaş’ın hemen karşısındaki Meis olmuştur. Teknik olarak Osmanlı hâkimiyetindeki bu adaya gönderilen yönetici, ada nüfusu tarafından esir alınmış ve 1915 yılında da Meis, Fransızlar tarafından işgal edilmiştir. Bu işgal ile birlikte Antalya’ya döşenen Alman topları ile adaya yerleştirilen Fransız topları savaş boyunca birbirlerini karşılıklı olarak dövmüştür. Fransızlar Meis’i 1921 yılı itibarıyla İtalya’ya terk etmiştir.
Kısacası 1. Dünya Savaşı bittiğinde, bahsettiğimiz tüm adalar elden çıkmış durumdadır. 1920’de imzalanan Sevr Antlaşması da Oniki Ada’nın tümünü (gruptan olmasa da gruba daha sonra bağlanan Meis de dahil olmak üzere) İtalya’ya, Kuzey-Doğu Adaları’nı da (Gökçeada ve Bozcaada dahil olmak üzere) Yunanistan’a bırakmıştır. (Boğazlara yakın adalara dair ise ek düzenlemeler vardır.) Lozan Antlaşması ile bu iki Boğazönü Adası, Türkiye’ye iade edilecek fakat bunun dışında adalarla ilgili herhangi bir değişiklik olmayacaktır. Ancak Türkiye’nin, Lozan Antlaşması’nda bu iki ada hariç bir de Meis için İtalyanlarla mücadele ettiğini, fakat İtalyanların Türk heyetine eğer bu isteklerinden vazgeçmezlerse kapitülasyonlarla ilgili maddede sorun çıkaracaklarına dair gözdağı verdiğini, Türkiye’nin ise 1923 yılının Haziran ayına kadar direnip koca bir barış antlaşmasını Meis için feda etmediğini belirtmek gerekir.
Türkiye ile İtalya arasında bunlar sürerken, Oniki Ada üzerine çetin bir başka mücadele de kapalı kapılar ardında Yunanistan ile İtalya arasında sürmüştür. Yunanistan Oniki Ada’yı istemiş, İtalya ise bazı devir antlaşmaları yapsa da sonradan bu antlaşmalara riayet etmemiştir. Buna karşılık Yunanistan ise tüm iki savaş arası dönem boyunca bu antlaşmaları İtalya’ya sürekli olarak hatırlatmıştır.
Sonuç olarak, Türkiye Lozan’da adaları “vermek” yerine mevcut “fiili durumu onaylamıştır”. Tutanaklar incelendiğinde, Meis hariç Oniki Ada’nın müzakere bile edilmediği, ada meselesinde çoğunlukla kuzeydeki adaların tartışıldığı söylenebilir. Fakat bu durum üzerinden Lozan’ın eleştirilmesi ve Lozan’ın bir başarısızlık olarak gösterilmesi tarihsel gerçeklikle bağdaştırılamaz. Zira, Sevr gibi bir antlaşmadan sonra yapılmış Lozan’ın önceliği adalar olmamıştır. Bugün adalar üzerine yapılan hiçbir tartışma – Türkiye Ege’de hangi sorunları yaşarsa yaşasın – Lozan Antlaşması’nın paramparça edilmiş bir imparatorluğun ardından zafer kazanılarak yapılmış bir bağımsızlık belgesi olduğu gerçeğini değiştirmeyecektir.
Son söz: Aynı meselenin bir de 1947 versiyonu mevcuttur. Oniki Ada’nın bu tarihte Yunanistan’a devri sırasında Türkiye, adaları alamadığı için hatta bazen adalar sanki kendisindeymiş gibi “verdiği” için çokça eleştirilir. Onunla ilgili bir yazı hakkımı da bir başka gündeme saklıyorum.
Hazal Papuccular, War or Peace: The Dodecanese Islands in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy, 1923-1947, PhD Dissertation, Boğaziçi University, 2015.

Sunday, October 2, 2016

Article by Brendon J. Cannon on Armenian campaign

History, cynicism and guilt: A critique of the Armenian campaign
BRENDON J. CANNON
PublishedSeptember 30, 2016
History, cynicism and guilt: A critique of the Armenian campaign

The lesson here is that identities, narratives or campaigns based on historical documents and ‘facts' can be construed differently depending on multiple variables, to include time and space. They can also be used and abused for political purposes

The campaign to declare the events of 1915 as genocide needs to be questioned and critically examined.

While closure and healing through recognition are an important part of progression, these two concepts are being manipulated to propagate a campaign for new legislation and "official recognition" of the Armenian events and they do not represent reality.

The Armenian campaign has little to do with history or healing and everything to do with politics. To put it bluntly, it is a political stunt aimed towards reparation, rights of return and the redrawing of Turkey's borders, the brain child of calculating politicians and a host of "genocide scholars" and a well-intentioned albeit ignorant public, particularly throughout Europe and North America.

Armenian diaspora identity

An understanding of the genesis and fecundity of the Armenian campaign for genocide recognition can be found at the intersection of Armenian imagined memories of 1915, their transmission and the development of an Armenian diaspora identity which feeds off efforts to legislate history.

This has grave geo-political and legal implications, and the campaign's politicization of history is manifest contemporaneously from Turkey to Armenia and Europe to North America.

This identity-driven campaign and the implications of it are the subject of my new book. In it, I attempt to explore and deconstruct the campaign, its causes, its virility, its successes and its flaws. In short, it is the first in-depth study of Armenian and Armenian Diaspora identity as viewed via the prism of a historical trauma and the campaign it has spawned. The volatile mixture of Armenian identity as informed by trauma and an imagined history necessarily demonizes Turks and glorifies Armenians in a "self" versus "other" battle to the death. Put simply, Armenian diaspora identity, as developed over the past century, demands it. Yet the power of this identity, and the wealth and lobbying efforts associated therewith, are not the only variables at work and cannot possibly explain the overall success of the campaign to gain ad hoc legislation designating the events of 1915 as the "Armenian Genocide." In this they require willing, often cynical partners who accept Armenian claims of genocide for political and highly politicized purposes.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RECOGNITION

The politicization of historical events - tragic as those events may be - bleeds directly into the operational modes and methods of the Armenian campaign. The Armenian diaspora operates in and focuses on regions and states where natural strengths and allies exist. For example, in France and the United States where there exist relatively large number of French-Armenians and Armenian-Americans. But states with the proverbial axe to grind with Turkey are also a target and need little convincing to pass resolutions and legislation castigating Turkey and shaming it. Russia is a prime example. Greece, with Turkey and the Ottoman Empire as its historical "other" to the Greek "self," is another. These efforts often work in tandem with diaspora. For example, Greek diasporas generally support recognition of the Armenian Genocide because it plays to their identity-based prejudices against Turkey as transmitted generationally.

Elsewhere in Europe the case is slightly skewed. Yet it has no more to do with history, closure or offering succor to a grieving ethnic group than acts performed in Russia or Greece. When countries such as Austria or Italy reach economic or political impasses with Turkey or simply dislike the idea of Turkey in Europe, recognition of the Armenian Genocide becomes a very handy cudgel. This plays into the hands of politicians who cynically, but naturally look to receive a boost in support from their constituents. Italy's recognition that the events of 1915 constituted the Armenian Genocide came in 2000, right on the heels of a diplomatic dust-up with Turkey involving Italy's granting of asylum for Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. An analysis of the legislation passed in Germany in June of this year is similarly instructive. A number of German politicians were incensed at Turkey's demands for visa-free travel to the European Union in exchange for managing the flow of refugees heading to Europe from Syria, Iraq and Somalia. With Turkey holding all the cards, German politicians played the only hand available to them: they attempted to humiliate Turkey by passing legislation recognizing the events of 1915 as the Armenian Genocide. That this legislation carries no legal heft makes no difference. Turkey has again been accused of the most egregious crime known to humankind based on the cynical and politicized calculations of German politicians who are unqualified to from either a scholarly or legal perspective to pass such judgements. The supreme irony is that these same politicians abrogated all responsibility for their votes, claiming they were only recognizing the terminology (the word "genocide" used in association with 1915) used previously by others in Germany, to include historians, deputies and civil society groups.

THE ROLES OF HISTORY AND GUILT

Yet, there is an equally interesting facet at play here and my book points out that this is not simply the work of a hyperactive Armenian lobby or cynical politicians. Rather, efforts at "Armenian Genocide" recognition are greatly assisted by many in the West who can be said to suffer from occasional maladies associated with historical guilt. Some are particularly keen to make amends for the laundry list of Western excesses - colonialism, genocide, slavery, ethnic cleansing, two World Wars - that characterized much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Though the results of this prodigality is rarely, if ever, dealt with on a substantive level, symbolic acts of atonement and remembrance are viewed by some as suitable alternatives. In Europe, these often take the form of legislation or official commemorations such as International Roma Day or The European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism. In North America, American liberals and their Canadian counterparts seem particularly keen to offer their support for recognition of traumatic events because it is the "right" thing to do. Recognition is felt to be a genuine and magnanimous gesture. As importantly, these acts partially assuage the West's guilty conscience without having to address any of their present-day manifestations and results.

These admittedly well-meaning, commemorative acts are thought to honor and bring closure to neighbors, friends and their relatives who are the descendants of traumas such as the events of 1915. Yet they also avoid the rather more difficult, expensive and politically sensitive demands that come from actually addressing historical traumas. In regards to the Armenian campaign, issues such as reparations and rights of return inherently need to be addressed should the events be classified as constituting a genocide. And herein lies the rather disingenuous nature of both the Armenian campaign and its cynical or well-intentioned allies. The campaign works with and exploits both politicians and common citizenry who support such moves because they are cheap, painless and ostensibly address historical grievances that occurred in a nebulous past and in a remote and misunderstood corner of the globe. In other words there is a cognitive dissonance and disconnection with the events of 1915 and the lives of supporters in Chicago or London. Yet many of these same individuals become squeamish when issues such as reparations for slavery or colonial excesses are raised. These issues are closer to home, so to speak, and therefore the historical record and accompanying narratives understandably appear more complicated, involved and potentially very expensive. Correspondingly, the issue of Armenian Genocide recognition becomes necessarily more complicated in Ankara than it would in Marseille or Buenos Aires. This is precisely because the costs are high (reparation, rights of return and ominously the potential redrawing of borders) and the biased narrative presented by the campaign is justifiably viewed with suspicion in Turkey - not only because of the costs associated therewith, but because of the baselessness of the campaign's accusations and the politicized legislation associated therewith. Indeed, what occurred tragically in 1915 - unlike the reality of slavery in the United States or Brazil - is disputed and accusations of genocide in relation to these events are either ignorant or disingenuous. Not only are the events more complicated with multiple groups (Turks and Armenian; Muslims and Christians) suffering immensely, characterizing them as a genocide carries direct and high costs - especially to those who are wrongly implicated - and disgraces one group (Turks) in order to assuage another group's (Armenians) humiliation and defeat .

POLITICIZING HISTORY TO LEGISLATE REALITY

As my book demonstrates, the multi-confessional, multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire finally and spectacularly tore itself apart in the years surrounding 1915 through episodes of ethnic cleansing pitting Christians against Muslims. While not a traditional history, the book does stitch together archival research and demographic records in relation to the disputed tragedy. In doing so, it readily becomes apparent that they bear no resemblance to a genocide of Armenians. A genocidal blueprint by the Ottoman state does not exist. This is because the Ottoman state lacked the desire, rationale and the wherewithal to destroy its Armenian citizens. Rather, tit-for-tat violence was visited upon entire regions and peoples as informed by more than a century of Christian nationalism - encouraged by Europe and Russia - that sanctioned the ethnic cleansing of centuries-old Muslim communities in the heart of Europe, the Crimea and the Caucasus.

The lesson here is that identities, narratives or campaigns based on historical documents and "facts" can be construed differently depending on multiple variables, to include time and space. They can also be used and abused for political purposes. The Armenian Genocide only exists in the imaginations of some Armenians and in their politicized campaign. Yet because Armenian diaspora identity insists that an Ottoman Turkish genocide of Armenians took place, the campaign continues to ignore conflicting historical documents, demographic records and books that directly confront the campaign and chip away at its unsteady foundation. The fact that the campaign is correspondingly assisted by cynical politicians on the one hand, and well-meaning, if ignorant and guilt-ridden individuals on the other, makes the spurious charges of genocide against Turkey that much more egregious and damning.

* Professor at Khalifa University's Institute of International and Civil Security (IICS) in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

Prof.Dr. Zekeriya Beyaz, Fethullah Gülen'i tahlil ediyor.


İlahiyatçı Prof.Dr. Zekeriya Beyaz, beş yıl önce (2011) yayınlanan kitabında Fethullah Gülen’i bakın nasıl analiz etmiş.

Prof.Dr.Zekeriya Beyaz, “Türkiye’de ÖrtülüSavaş” başlıklı , Aralık 2011 baskılı kitabının altıncı bölümünü Fethullah Gülen ve cemaatine ayırmış. (Sayfa 187 – 242)  Prof.Dr. Beyaz, bu bölümde Fethullah Gülen’in Said Norsi’yi itirazsız izlemesi, kendisini  Said Norsi’nin kehanetini gerçekleştirecek kutsal bir kişi olarak görmesi, Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi’ nin Gülen cemaati tarafından desteklenmesi, Gülen’in bu süreçte Humeyni  örneğine benzetilmesi ve parlatılması, Papa ile görüştürülmesi, dinler arası diyalogun bir tuzak olduğu ve bu projede  Gülen’e biçilen rol konularını eleştirel bir yaklaşımla ele almış ve irdelemiştir.

Zekeriya Beyaz’ın , 55 sayfalık söz konusu  bölümün sonuç kısmında yer verdiği bazı  tesbit ve görüşlerini alıntılıyorum.

-          “ ABD’nin F.Gülen ile olağanüstü bir işbirliği içinde bulunduğu bilinen kesin bir gerçektir.

-          “... ABD, F.Gülen eliyle dünyaya  Müslümanlığı yaymak için mi yapıyor bunları? Öyle düşünenlerin şaşarım akıllarına!

-          - “ Yoksa, onu bir Humeyni benzeri olarak kullanmayı, onunla  Türkiye’ye birtakım operasyonlar yapmayı mı amaçlıyor?

-          “...Hiç kimsenin şüphesi olmasın ki, Allah katında böylesi işbirliğinin adı İslami terim olarak nifaktır, münafıklıktır. Kur’an’ı Kerim’in beyanına göre de münafıklar kafirlerden daha aşağı durumdadırlar.

-          “... Son olarak şunu da belirtelim ki; ABD de, F.Gülen de uğursuz amaçlarına ulaşamayacaklardır.

-           .Değil bir tane, yüz tane F.Gülen veya F.Ağlayan da gelse Türk Milletini devletine karşı ayaklandıramaz. O’nu dinine ve devletine karşı isyan ettiremezler. Bütün bir Türk Milletini  değil, bir kasabayı bile ayaklandıramazlar.

-          “... O nedenle F.  Gülen cemaati gibi ABD de yanılıyor. Bu gerçeği herkes gibi onlar da bir gün mutlaka öğreneceklerdir.

-          “... Tek kurtuluş çareleri vardır. O da , derhal yüce Allah’a tövbe ederek af dilemek ve işledikleri suçlarını da itiraf ederek Müslüman Türk milletinden ve devletinden özür dileyip helallik ve af istemeleridir.

-          “...Biz, cemaatin ve yoldan çıkan herkesin gerçek İslam’a dönmeleri için, Allah, vatan ve millet yoluna girmeleri için, hepsine yüce Allah’tan hidayet dileriz.”

Prof.Dr. Zekeriya Beyaz’ın “ Türkiye’de Örtülü Savaş “ başlıklı kitabını ve diğer eserlerini okumalarını arkadaşlarıma içtenlikle öneririm.

 

Saturday, October 1, 2016

Irak-İran savaşının etkileri

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30.09.2016



Karar, 29 Eylül 2016
 
Irak-İran Savaşı her yıl 22-29 Eylül tarihleri arasında “İran’da Mukaddes Savunma Haftası” ile anılıyor. Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi Yard. Doç. Dr. Bayram Sinkaya, sekiz yıl süren bu savaşın Tahran’ın bugünkü Orta Doğu politikasına etkilerini kaleme aldı.
 
22 Eylül 1980’de Irak askeri güçlerinin havadan ve karadan İran’a saldırmasıyla 20. yüzyılın en uzun savaşlarından birisi başladı. Çağın en kanlı savaşlarından birisi olan bu savaşta kaç kişinin öldüğü tam olarak bilinmiyor, tahminler beş yüz bin ile bir milyon arasında değişiyor.
 
Sekiz yıl süren ve 20 Ağustos 1988’de sona eren bu savaş İran halkının dimağında derin izler bıraktı. 22-29 Eylül haftası her yıl “İran’da Mukaddes Savunma Haftası” olarak anılır. Savaşın hatıraları olabildiğince canlı tutulur, şehitler anılır ve şehadet kavramı yüceltilir. Ayrıca sekiz yıl süren ve İran yazınında geçtiği şekliyle İran’a “dayatılmış savaş”ın İran halkını nasıl birleştirdiği vurgulanır. Öyle ki farklı etnik kökenlerden ve kültürel ortamlardan gelen insanlar gerek dini ve ideolojik duygularla devrimi savunmak için, gerek milli hislerle vatan savunması adına aynı saflarda birleşti. ‘Dayatılmış Savaş’ karşısında ortaya çıkan bu birliktelik devrim sonrasında ‘İran milliyetçiliğinin’ yükselmesine katkıda bulundu.  Bu savaş sadece İran milliyetçiliğinin şekillenmesinde ve yükselmesinde değil; İran siyaseti, dış politikası ve güvenlik kültürü üzerinde de belirleyici oldu. Her şeyden önce İran’da savaşla yetişen bir nesil ortaya çıktı. Genç yaşta hayatının bir kısmını cephede geçiren, kimisi savaşın izlerini hala bedenlerinde taşıyan bu nesil bugün İran’da önemli makamlara geldi. Sekiz yıl süren savaşın türlü etkileri altında zihinleri şekillenen bu nesilden gelen siyasetçiler şu an İran siyasetine yön veriyor.
 
Yeni savunma stratejisi
 
Irak savaşının dış politika ve güvenlik kültürü üzerindeki en önemli etkisi, devrim sonrası İran’ın Orta Doğu/İslam tarihi ve siyaseti içerisinde ‘müstesna’ bir yere sahip olduğu düşüncesinin yerleşmesidir. Buna göre İran, İslam ülkeleri arasında emperyalizmin tasallutuna karşı direnişe ve devrime öncülük etmiş bir ülkedir. Bu nedenle İran bölgesindeki diğer “devrimci mücadelelere ve direniş hareketleri”ne destek vermekle yükümlüdür ve onlara liderlik etmelidir. Bu doğrultuda İran, emperyalizme karşı direniş adına farklı ülkelerden çok sayıda siyasi hareketle ilişki kurmuştur.
 
İran bu müstesna konumu nedeniyle “emperyalistler”tarafından kışkırtılan ve desteklenen Irak’ın saldırısına maruz kalmış, savaş İran’a dayatılmıştır. Üstelik İran savaş boyunca “yalnız” kalmıştır. Oysa Saddam Hüseyin yönetimindeki Irak, Suriye dışında Arap ülkelerinin çoğundan destek almıştır. Üstelik İran türlü ambargolara maruz iken Irak, Batı Avrupa ülkeleri ve Sovyetler Birliği dâhil dünyanın farklı ülkelerinden silah tedarik edebilmiştir. Dolayısıyla Irak Savaşı, devrim sonrası İran’ın bölge siyasetinde müstesna bir yeri ve rolü olduğu inancının pekişmesine sebep olmuştur. Bunun pratik sonucu ise İran’ın bölgesel ve küresel aktörlere, özellikle Batılı ülkelere karşı şüpheyle yaklaşmasıdır. İran’ın yalnızlığı, güvenlik alanında kendi kendine yeterli olması için gerekli stratejik adımların atılmasını beraberinde getirmiştir.
 
İranlıların sekiz yıl süren savaştan öğrendikleri hususlardan birisi ‘savunmanın sınırların ötesinde başlaması’ gerektiği görüşüdür. Savaşın ilk yıllarında topraklarının bir kısmı istila edilen ve düşman karşısında “yalnız” kalan İranlılar, tekrar benzer bir durumla karşılaşmamak için savunma hatlarını topraklarının ötesinde kurmaya karar verdiler. Bunun iki yolu vardı: Birincisi ittifak ilişkileri, askeri güç, yumuşak güç unsurları ve benzeri siyasi manevralar ile etki alanını genişletmekti. Bu çerçevede İran, hükümetler ile kurduğu diplomatik ilişkilere alternatif olarak devlet dışı aktörler ile ilişki içerisine girmiş, ilgili başkentleri bypass ederek doğrudan halklarla ilişki kurmanın yolunu aramıştır.
 
Güvenliğin sınırların ötesinde kurulmasının ikinci yolu ise bölgedeki ihtilafların İran’ın güvenliğine potansiyel etkileri açısından değerlendirilmesi ve bu çerçevede politika belirlenmesiydi. Bütün bölgesel gelişmeler doğrudan İran ile ilgili olup olmadığına bakılmaksızın İran-merkezli olarak değerlendirilmiş, bölgedeki bütün çatışmalar İran’ın öncülük ettiği ‘devrimci cephe’, ‘direniş cephesi’ ile devrim karşıtı emperyalistlerin mücadelesi olarak görülmüştür. Böylece İran bölgede birçok çatışmanın doğrudan veya dolaylı bir parçası olmuştur.
 
Altüst olan jeopolitik
 
Gerçekten de Irak-İran Savaşı, İran Devrimi’nin doğrudan sonuçlarından birisidir. Savaşın sebebi yalnızca iki ülke arasına Şatt’ül Arab (Arvand Rud) su yolu üzerindeki anlaşmazlık değildir; savaş birçok çevrede iddia edildiği gibi geçmişi çok gerilere giden Arap-Fars, Sünni-Şii savaşı da değildir. Irak-İran Savaşı, devrimin bölgedeki jeopolitik dengeleri altüst etmesinin bir sonucudur. Devrim öncesinde ABD öncülüğünde Basra Körfezi’nde kurulan güvenlik mimarisinin asli unsurlarından birisi ve muhafazakâr Arap rejimlerinin dostu olan İran, devrimden sonra bölgedeki statükoya doğrudan meydan okumaya başlamıştır. Devrimci coşku ile birlikte Arap sokağına yapılan ayaklanma ve iktidardaki “gayri-meşru, emperyalizmin kuklası” rejimlerin devrilmesi çağrısı hemen hemen bütün bölge ülkelerinin İran’daki yeni rejime şüpheyle bakmasına neden olmuştur. Devrim çağrılarının özellikle Iraklı Şiiler arasında karşılık bulmaya başlaması savaşın esas sebeplerinden birisidir. Diğer yandan İran’ın devrim çağrısından endişe eden diğer bölge ülkeleri de doğal olarak doğrudan veya dolaylı şekillerde Irak yönetimine destek vermiştir.
 
Her iki taraf da zafer ilan etse de sekiz yıllık savaşın ardından kazanan olmadı. Bununla birlikte savaşın İran Devrimi’nin yayılmacı etkisini durdurduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Nitekim İran’ın bölgesel etkisi Saddam Hüseyin, Irak’ta iktidarda olduğu sürece sınırlı kaldı.
 
Devlet dışı aktörlerle ilişkiler
 
Savaş boyunca İran ile Irak’a destek veren Arap ülkeleri arasındaki ilişkiler gergin bir şekilde seyretti. 1988’de hem ateşkesin sağlanması hem de İran dış politikasında görülen bazı revizyonların sonucunda İran’ın Arap dünyası ile ilişkileri değişmeye başladı.
 
Hatta 1990’da Saddam’ın Kuveyt’i işgal etmesi ve Irak’ın bölge ülkeleri için bir tehdide dönüşmesi, diğer Arap ülkeleri ile İran arasındaki yakınlaşmayı artırdı. Bu durum Saddam’ın iktidardan uzaklaştırılmasına kadar devam etti. Irak’ta rejimin değişmesi ile birlikte bölgesel dengelerin yeniden şekillenmesi, İran ile Arap dünyası arasındaki ilişkilerde kırılmalara sebep oldu.
 
Irak Savaşı’nın İran’ın Orta Doğu politikası üzerindeki en önemli ve kalıcı etkisi, Suriye ile kurulan ittifaktır. Savaş boyunca Saddam yönetimine karşı İran’a destek veren tek lider olan Hafız Esad ile İran arasında o yıllarda kurulan ittifak ilişkisi hâlâ İran’ın bölge siyasetindeki en önemli kartlarından birisidir.
 
Savaşın uzun erimli sonuçlarından birisi de İran’ın Iraklı Şiiler ve Kürtler ile kurduğu ilişkilerdir. İki ülke arasında gerilimin artmasıyla birlikte İran’a geçen Şii aktivistler burada uzun süre kalmış, Irak Yüksek İslam Devrimi Konseyi ve Bedir Ordusu gibi hareketleri örgütlemiştir. Saddam Hüseyin’in iktidardan uzaklaştırılmasının ardından Irak’a dönen bu hareketler beraberinde İran’ın etkisini de taşımıştır. Keza İran savaş boyunca Iraklı Kürt hareketleri Saddam yönetimine karşı desteklemiş, dolayısıyla Irak Kürtleri İran’ın müttefiki haline gelmiştir. Savaş yıllarında Irak Kürtleri ile İran arasında temeli atılan bu ilişkinin de etkileri hâlâ sürmektedir.
 
Dolayısıyla, savaşın en önemli sonuçlarından birisi İran’ın devlet-dışı aktörler ile yerel düzeyde kurulan işbirlikleri üzerinden kendi çıkarlarını koruma kabiliyetini geliştirmesidir.
 
Savaş, uzun vadeli müttefikler sağlamanın yanında İran’a sınırları dışında istihbarat ve askeri operasyon yapma yeteneği kazandırdı. Bu amaçla kurulan Kudüs Gücü, sonraki yıllarda İran’ın bölge politikasındaki en önemli araçlarından birisi oldu.
 
Sekiz yıllık savaşın İran’a öğrettikleri ve kazandırdıkları bir yana, Saddam Hüseyin yönetimindeki Irak, İran’ı dengelemeye devam etmiştir. Ancak 2003 sonrasında Irak’ta yeni bir yönetimin tesisi ile İran’ın Orta Doğu’da daha aktif bir rol oynamasının önü açılmıştır. Savaş sırasında edindiği imkân ve kabiliyetleri – devlet dışı aktörlerle yerel düzeyde işbirliği ve sınırları ötesinde operasyon yapma yeteneğini-  yukarıda izah edilen stratejik kültür çerçevesinde değerlendiren İran yönetimi, bölgede sonraki yıllarda artan ihtilafların bir tarafı olmuş ve bu ihtilafları kendi menfaatleri doğrultusunda şekillendirmeye çalışmıştır. Böylece İran hem bölgesel istikrarsızlığın sürmesinde rol oynamış, hem de bölgedeki ihtilaflardan faydalanan bir aktör olmuştur.