The Case for a Quadripolar World
Dec 3, 2020 DARON ACEMOGLU
According to the conventional wisdom, the twenty-first century will be
characterized by the global shift from American hegemony to Sino-American
rivalry. But a bipolar international order is neither inevitable nor desirable,
and we should start imagining and working toward alternative arrangements.
CAMBRIDGE – Having diminished America’s global role
while refusing to accept China’s growing clout, Donald Trump’s presidency
represents the last gasp of a unipolar epoch. But while many assume that the
unipolar post-Cold War world is giving way to a bipolar international order
dominated by the United States and China, that outcome is neither inevitable
nor desirable. Instead, there is every reason to hope for, and work toward, a
world in which Europe and the emerging economies play a more assertive role.
To be sure, as the world’s most economically
successful autocracy, China has already achieved significant geopolitical
influence in Asia and beyond. During the two most recent global crises – the
2008 financial collapse and today’s pandemic – the Communist Party of China
quickly adjusted the country’s political economy in response to changing
circumstances, thereby solidifying its grip on power. Because countries that do
not want to toe the US line now routinely turn to China for inspiration and,
often, material support, what could be more natural than China emerging as one
of the two poles of global power?
In fact, a bipolar world would be deeply unstable. Its
emergence would heighten the risk of violent conflict (according to the logic
of the Thucydides Trap), and
its consolidation would make solutions to global problems wholly dependent on
the national interests of the two reigning powers. Three of the biggest
challenges facing humanity would either be ignored or made worse.
The first challenge is the concentrated power of Big
Tech. While technology is often presented as a key
front in the US-China conflict, there is considerable congruence between the
two countries. Both are committed to the pursuit of algorithmic dominance over humans,
whereby digital platforms and artificial intelligence (AI) are used as tools by
the government and corporations for surveilling and controlling the
citizenry.
There are differences, of course. Whereas the US
government has adopted Big Tech’s own vision and become subservient to the industry, Chinese tech
giants remain at the mercy of the government and must abide by its agenda. For
example, recent research shows how
local governments’ demand for surveillance technologies shapes Chinese AI
creators’ research and development. In any case, neither country is likely to
strengthen privacy standards and other protections for ordinary people, much
less redirect the trajectory of AI research so that its benefits are
unambiguous and widely shared.
Likewise, advocacy for human rights and democracy would
be a low priority in a bipolar world. With repression in China growing, the US
may appear by comparison to remain an exemplar of these values. But America’s
principled commitment to democracy and human rights is thin and generally not
taken seriously abroad. After all, the US has overthrown democratically
elected but insufficiently friendly governments in Latin America, Asia, and
Africa. And when it has supported democracy in places like Ukraine, it has
generally had an ulterior motive, such as the desire to counter or weaken
Russia.
The third big issue likely to receive short shrift in
a Sino-American bipolar world is climate change. In recent years, China has
appeared more supportive of international agreements aimed at reducing
greenhouse-gas emissions than the US has. But the two superpowers are not just
the world’s two biggest emitters;
they also are both beholden to energy-intensive economic models. China will
remain dependent on manufacturing growth, while consumers and growth industries
(like cloud computing) will
sustain high demand for
energy in the US. And one can expect that both sides’ short-term interest in
economic supremacy will trump everyone else’s interest in a swift green
transition.
All of these problems would be more likely to be
addressed in a world with two additional poles, represented by the European
Union and a consortium of emerging economies, perhaps within a new organization
– an “E10” – comprising Mexico, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey,
South Africa, and others. Such a quadripolar world would be less conducive to a
new cold war, and it would bring more diverse voices to global governance.
For its part, the EU has already emerged as a standard-bearer for
privacy protection and regulation of Big Tech, and it is well positioned to push back against
algorithmic automation. Even though it is US and Chinese companies that largely
drive concerns about privacy, consumer manipulation, and labor-replacing AI,
the European market is so large and important that it can tilt the playing
field globally.
But a strategic pole that speaks for emerging
economies may be even more consequential. If AI continues to displace humans in
the workplace, emerging economies will be the biggest losers, because their
comparative advantage is abundant human labor. With automation already cutting into the
supply of jobs that had previously been offshored to these economies, it is
critical that they have a voice in global debates that will determine how new
technologies are designed and deployed.
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Europe and the emerging world also can form a powerful
constituency against fossil-fuel emissions. While the EU has become a world
leader in decarbonization, emerging economies have an acute interest in climate
action, because they will suffer disproportionately from global warming
(despite having contributed the least to the problem).
To be sure, a quadripolar world would not be a
panacea. With a wider array of voices and the possibility for more
opportunistic coalitions, it would be much more difficult to manage than was
the unipolar world of the recent past. With Brazil, Mexico, India, and Turkey
all now led by authoritarians intent on silencing their
opponents, independent media, and civil-society groups, Europe inevitably would
find itself at odds with this bloc when it comes to human rights and democracy.
Yet, even here, a quadripolar world would offer more
hope than the bipolar alternative. Bringing these countries to the
international table might make them more willing to countenance opposition at
home. Moreover, emerging economies can cooperate as a united front only if they
abandon their most authoritarian, nationalistic, and destructive behavior.
Ushering in a quadripolar world may thus yield unexpected dividends.
Writing for PS since 2012
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Daron
Acemoglu, Professor of Economics at MIT, is co-author (with James A.
Robinson) of Why Nations
Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty and The Narrow
Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty.
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