Al Tanf garrison: America’s strategic baggage in the Middle East
Daniel L. Magruder Jr.Friday,
November 20, 2020
America’s presence in the Middle East
holds hidden costs, unknown risks, and nominal benefits in maintaining the
status quo. The “pivot to Asia” under the Obama administration required
balancing how to secure U.S. interests in the Middle East with fewer resources.
The U.S. must consider actions of the past, specifically the strategic baggage
that has accrued over years of growing military commitments. One key case study
in strategic baggage is in Syria.
Federal Executive Fellow - Brookings
Institution
Lieutenant Colonel - U.S. Air Force
“Strategic baggage” refers to a military
commitment that has outlasted its utility. This occurs when, on balance, the
perception of the costs is either too high, benefits too low, or risks too
great to continue. The build-up of baggage impacts other choices regarding
global priorities, goals, and allocation of military forces. In this way, it
hampers America’s ability to make strategic choices moving forward, because we
are wedded to the past and cannot wipe the slate clean.
We have
baggage in the Middle East we should let go.
As the U.S. tries to focus on great
power competition, we have baggage in the Middle East we should let go. For
example, U.S. strategic objectives in Syria often appear confused and the
military role is not clear. As Central Command commander, General Kenneth
McKenzie, has said: “There’s
no viable military solution to the conflict in Syria.” Yet, without a clear
policy regarding U.S. interests — and more importantly, a realistic path
forward — we are left with an open-ended military commitment. Thus, in trying
to balance competing regional and global interests, we end up maintaining the
status quo. An example of this type of strategic baggage, which should be
jettisoned, is Al Tanf garrison in Syria. At this point, Al Tanf is strategic
baggage because maintaining it outstrips most regional benefits and impacts
availability of military assets for other missions.
THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR KEEPING AL TANF
Al Tanf is a tiny outpost near the
tri-border region in southeast Syria straddling the Baghdad-Damascus highway.
There is a token U.S. military presence along with a partner force, the
Maghawir al-Thawra (previously called the New Syrian Army). Originally, the
area was held by ISIS, but was occupied by friendly forces in early 2016. In a
deal brokered with the Russians, there was a 55-kilometer deconfliction zone
circumscribed around the garrison, which is patrolled by Americans and their
partners.
Currently, there are at least three
justifications for sustaining the U.S. presence at Al Tanf: interdicting ISIS
remnants, disrupting the Syrian economy and Iranian influence, and its
potential for political leverage in negotiations.
On the first: Thanks to the coalition’s
success, Operation Inherent Resolve succeeded in its mission of defeating ISIS
and driving the group out of
the area. With freedom of movement limited by the U.S. military presence,
remaining ISIS members have blended in with the 100,000 Syrian Bedouins and
displaced people living in the deconfliction zone.
On the second: Disrupting transit along
the Baghdad-Damascus highway theoretically puts economic pressure on the Syrian
regime and denies it one
of the three potential land-bridge routes between Iran and the Mediterranean.
Former Central Command commander, General Joseph Votel, recognized there
is an “indirect effect” in constraining Iranian actions. Even given the U.S.
interest in aiding Israel’s security, the American presence is not a
significant constraint. If the U.S. presence had more meaningful impact,
there would have been less need for Israel to increase its own pressure on
Iranian activity in Syria. The former chief of staff of the Israel Defense
Forces, Lieutenant General Gadi Eisenkot, said he obtained unanimous consent
from his government in January 2017 to push back on Iran. The result was that
Israeli attacks “became near-daily events,”
with 2,000 bombs dropped in 2018 alone. Furthermore, caravans routinely
travel in the open desert (albeit more slowly) effectively bypassing the
deconfliction zone.
Related Books
·
Public
Sector Reform in the Middle East and North Africa
Edited
by Robert P. Beschel Jr. and Tarik M. Yousef
2020
·
Edited
by Dafna H. Rand and Andrew P. Miller
2020
·
Unheard
Voices of the Next Generation
Edited
by Ali Abusedra and Sasha Toperich; Director Nizar Kirkesh
2020
The justification that has the most
merit is that Al Tanf could be used in negotiating an acceptable outcome in
Syria. Holding on to the real estate complicates Russian, Iranian, and Syrian
plans. All three actors want to expel U.S. presence in order to have a freer
hand to expand influence.
While some think the military presence
at Al Tanf is necessary to undermine the Syrian economy, disrupt Russian and
Iranian plans, and keep open the prospect of diplomatic leverage, this
assumes costs and risks are low and that there are security and political
advantages in this type of open-ended arrangement. But the justifications have
lost merit over time.
THE COSTS
There are tangible and intangible costs
to maintaining the U.S. presence at Al Tanf. This year’s budget request
for the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Force is $200 million. Only a small
fraction of this amount is needed to support operations and the partner force
at Al Tanf. While this is a bargain, the true costs of maintaining Al Tanf are
more complex.
Securing Al Tanf requires more than a
small number of troops. First, the troops must be able to protect themselves
with a quick reaction force, artillery support, medical capability, and a
robust intelligence effort to sniff out threats. Second, they must have
firepower nearby or on-call to deter, and if necessary, respond to aggression.
The prospect that coalition airpower will be used to defend the American flag
above Al Tanf is the decisive deterrent. But this requires airframes to be
airborne, refueled, and ready to fight at a moment’s notice.
The final, and most understated military
cost, is how this force is led and sustained. There are multiple echelons of
command that require staffing to navigate the complex and sensitive
international environment. Logistically, there are no paved roads to Al
Tanf, or airfields, so almost all supplies arrive via convoys across the
desert. Finally, there are three to four units at home in varying phases of
preparation for deployment to support the continuous U.S. presence.
Therefore, any footprint required in the Syrian theater to support operations
at At Tanf should be multiplied by three to four to account for the total cost of a
persistent presence. Even with economies of scale through consolidation of
support activities and including contractors, the ratio of support and staff to
sustain a deployed troop presence is about four to one. Applied across the
region, the sum total of support required for “tooth to tail”
sharply contrasts with the idea that actual troop presence is low. As is true
for any of America’s deployed footprint, the “boots on the ground” are just the
tip of the iceberg.
The “boots on the ground” are just the tip of the iceberg.
There are also reputational costs to
America’s presence in southern Syria. First, the displaced-persons camp on the
Jordanian-Syrian border at Rukban, about 35 miles from Al Tanf, has housed as
many as 60,000 people. Many in the international community believe that, since the
United States effectively controls the area through its presence at Al Tanf, it
is America’s responsibility to care for them.
Relieving the human suffering is hampered by geopolitical
competition, legitimate security concerns, and lately a pandemic. Second, in terms
of international law, we are open to domestic and international scrutiny. For
some Americans, it is ironic that the U.S. touts respect for sovereignty yet
occupies portions of Syria against the will of the government and without clear
justification under international law; it provides the Russians with
ample talking points.
Furthermore, American actions there have spurred debates about
whether its extended presence remains legally justifiable and how the
experience may be establishing state practice to shape future international legal
norms in ways that might not benefit long-term American
interests.
Finally, there are escalatory risks that
exist with the extended U.S. military presence at Al Tanf. Russia has
already acted provocatively against coalition forces at Al Tanf in at least two
instances, in June 2016 and September 2018. The
Syrian regime and Iranian-backed proxies successfully cleared terrain
just outside the 55-kilometer deconfliction zone isolating forces at Al Tanf.
In acts of self-defense, coalition forces struck Iranian-directed forces
on at least three occasions and downed an Iranian drone.
Would the U.S. be able to control escalation if an American were killed?
A final risk is the biggest of all: the
risk of inattention. Deciding not to act is
an act itself. Maintaining the same force structure as situations evolve on the
ground affects America’s ability to act, operate, and focus in other areas of
the world. This is the essence of strategic baggage. There are few reasons to
expect action on Syria policy given domestic priorities and higher priority
national security issues. Put simply, supporting the mission indefinitely ties
up resources that could be used elsewhere.
The United States has a role to play in
order to ensure ISIS remains weak, partners are secure, and humanitarian needs
are met. A small U.S. footprint in northeast Syria can maintain pressure on
ISIS and reassure the Syrian Democratic Forces. However, without clear
objectives for U.S. policy within Syria, it is hard to judge the utility of Al
Tanf.
America has shouldered strategic baggage
in the Middle East over the years. Al Tanf is one of many military commitments
in the region. Compared with other engagements, U.S. efforts yield small
returns on investment. For example, continuing the presence in northeast Syria
for counterterrorism makes sense, but we should be more critical when costs and
risks accrue without a clear upside. Given the evident interest in Washington
to scale back U.S. ambitions and military presence in the Middle East, the U.S.
could use Al Tanf as leverage in negotiations with Russia and Syria.
Perhaps the U.S. could withdraw forces
from Al Tanf to get Russia and Syria to engage in the United Nations’
unanimously-approved Security Council Resolution 2254, as well as secure
commitments to allow the U.N. to provide humanitarian assistance to the people
of Rukban and allow them to return home. We should also negotiate safe passage
for the partner force to assure others in the region who may consider working
with us in the future. Taking these actions could simultaneously relieve a U.S.
military burden and reinvigorate hope in a beleaguered peace process.
The views are those of
the author and do not reflect the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air
University, or the U.S. Government.
No comments:
Post a Comment