Anti-Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Warfare and its strategic implications by Fatih Ceylan

 

ANTI-UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES WARFARE AND ITS STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Fatih Ceylan | Ambassador (Retired) and EDAM Non Resident Fellow

 

There have of late been a flurry of articles on progress being achieved in designing and producing anti Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Systems assets by a high number of firms around the globe. This is understandable because of the frequent employment of UAVs/Ss with success in different conflict zones. It looks evident that the trend to explore and improve technologies of anti UAVs/Ss will continue unabated.

UAV/S started to take the stage, albeit in primitive forms, in the mid- 19th. century. Since then there has been an unprecedented evolution both in their employment and technology. Efforts to develop their capabilities and designs gained some traction in the late 1970s and various systems have been put into use, particularly in the military field. What we today witness is an ever increasing use of different types of UAVs/Ss both in military and civil domains. And it has become evident that their employment will increase greatly in the foreseeable future.

It is undeniable that successful employments of different types of UAVs/Ss, or Remotely Piloted Vehicles/Aircrafts (RPA) to use a commonly referred term in military circles, have made these platforms much more attractive for many military and defence experts.

There exist primarily three classes of UAVs/Ss in use; micro, mini(miniature) and small UAVs/Ss (Class I in NATO jargon); medium-sized tactical systems(Class II), and Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) / High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) type UAVs/Ss (ClassIII) that could be described as strategic level types. There also exist Ultra High Altitude UAVs/Ss, still in experimental stages, which could be defined as sub-orbital satellites or high altitude pseudo-satellites using either solar energy or traditional types of fuel.

 

 UAVs/Ss have become extremely useful platforms both in the civil and military domains. They are used for protection/ defence of High Value Assets (HVA) such as airports, seaports, military bases, maritime and aerial assets, deployed troops and non-expendable military assets and capabilities. They also contribute to having a more accurate Recognised Air Picture (RAP) to enhance air superiority in different theatres both in peacetime and wartime. They are also effective instruments in conducting Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance efforts, mounting counterterrorism operations and surgical strikes against adversary’s military capabilities in the military field as well as in delivery of goods, postal services, covering large scale media events etc. in the civil sector.

They are also used for sinister purposes by state and non-state actors against military assets and capabilities in different theatres of war, for espionage, including the industrial field, sabotage and disruptive activities in an ever expanding spectrum. Hence the clear need to develop a new generation of anti UAV/S technologies and counter measures against the potential damage they could inflict on civil and military sectors.

 

TRIGGERS INTEREST IN ANTI-UAV SYSTEMS

It is somewhat ironic, although understandable, that analyses on anti-UAV systems are in comparative terms scant barring the last few years. There are certainly novel and innovative/ disruptive technologies and emerging concepts based on them , but they seem to be in their incipient stages. A brief look at the counter measures against UAVs/Ss follows the usual pattern of detecting, tracking, engaging and neutralising. There exist different techniques, technologies, procedures and practices in use both in detecting/tracking vector and in engaging and destroying UAVs/Ss.

Detecting and tracking ‘Low, Slow and Small’(LSS) type UAVs/Ss, which fly at low altitudes (below 5.000 feet), are a subject that increasingly attract the attention of military and defence experts and planners. Different counter measures are in play when it comes to Line of Sight(LOS) and Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) LLS type UAVs/Ss.

In detecting, tracking and engaging UAVs/Ss used for malign intentions the whole gamut of electronic jamming, electromagnetic operations, ‘spoofing’, that is, radio frequency engagements/attacks, Directed Energy Weapons such as High Power Microwaves or High Energy Lasers would be employed. GSM related capabilities against UAVs/ Ss could also be utilised, particularly for medium to high altitude UAVs/Ss. There is even the use of trained birds of prey for downing LSS type UAVs/Ss.

The challenge faced here is the degree of autonomy of the UAVs/Ss to be countered. If the type of UAV/S is self autonomous and equipped with a highly intriguing algorithm, then it would require daunting work to deal with it. The difficulty of making ultra high long endurance UAVs/ Ss and those UAVs/Ss equipped with hypersonic propulsion intended to achieve the speed of Mach5 and beyond are challenges yet to be seriously considered.

Conventional counter measures such as counter rocket, mortar/projectiles and artillery as well as general purpose air defences are among the more familiar methods of intercepting, engaging and neutralising UAVs/Ss. However, there are limits to countering the threat of UAVs/Ss when such assets are employed. They would prove useless or offer limited success, particularly when there is a swarm attack of ‘kamikaze UAVs/Ss’.

The crucial point to detect and track UAVs/Ss both in lower altitudes and medium to high altitudes is to have enhanced early warning capabilities in place. The ideal scenario in this field of activity would be to detect them and their operators/ locations before they take off with their payloads. That is indeed a very challenging strand of work, which, however, must be among the primary objectives of countering UAVs/Ss.

Another intriguing aspect facing defence/military experts and planners is to elaborate tactics, techniques and procedures for those UAVs/Ss designed on artificial intelligence using 5G networks. Dedicated development and research on this aspect is necessary to succeed in anti UAV/S warfare.

Due to the different types and capabilities of UAVs/Ss, defence against them must be layered like in the case of Ballistic Missile Defence. The proposed layered architecture must have the ability, preferably embedded in its design and production, to defend against UAVs/Ss by using cyber capabilities both in defensive and offensive modes to render the attacking UAV/S’ algorithm dysfunctional. Consequently, integrating cyber capability to anti UAVs/Ss assets may prove attractive. That would certainly not preclude the need to counter them by leveraging existing cyber capacities.

There have been successful initiatives to introduce stealth technology in UAVs/Ss and this would enhance over time. Given that, anti UAV/S capabilities should be designed not to allow those UAVs/Ss with stealth technology to infiltrate into defence lines of a designated area. And that requires a very sophisticated network of highly developed radars able to detect those UAVs/Ss having built-in stealth capability.

It is well known that not all types of UAVs/Ss have allweather capability, which are one of their weaknesses. Under circumstances where those UAVs/Ss without stealth technology are in use, producing non-conducive climatic effects to hinder their operations might well be a simple, but an effective defensive measure against them.

Production and use of UAVs/Ss in civil and military domains have gained tremendous traction in recent years. This fashionable trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. By contrast, defensive and offensive measures against them pale in comparison to investments in further research and development of UAV/S. However, we are witnessing particularly in the last few years serious attempts and initiatives on designing counter UAVs/Ss assets and capabilities. This is bound to achieve progress given the fact that UAVs/Ss have been inflicting heavy damages in different theatres of conflict and also causing the loss of civilian lives. The collateral damage they wreak, when used in dense areas, is exorbitant.

It is certain that defensive and offensive capabilities will soon be in place to counter UAVs/Ss. Because of the complexities involved in anti UAV/S measures due to the highly sophisticated use of technology in UAVs/Ss, the defensive/ offensive toolbox to be developed for anti UAV/S is destined to be by default multi-domain and interdisciplinary bringing together different strands of activity and practice. Any anti UAV/S architecture must be layered like BMD and leverage, to the maximum extent, AI capabilities extending to space-based systems.

Novel technologies to be launched for the sixth generation aircraft should proceed in tandem with anti UAV/S architecture informing its design and capabilities. While further developing anti UAV/S platforms, the means of integrating defensive/offensive capabilities against UAVs/ Ss into the current and future BMD architecture should be explored, thus fusing both BMD and anti UAV/S capability in the same toolbox. In a nutshell, BMD and anti UAV/S should be interoperable and ‘talk to each other.’ Defensive/ Offensive anti UAVs/Ss architecture that smack of Iron Dome should be re-designed to cater also for priorities and needs of an anti UAV/S capability. This would indeed be a costly endeavour, but it is worth it because of risks and threats involved due to UAVs/Ss.

How to design and develop UAV/S-specific Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system or to adapt the current IFF capability to be mounted on evolving anti UAV/S platforms is yet another aspect in need of further exploration. To achieve that ultimate goal toward making anti UAV/S assets much more effective against all types of UAVs/Ss, tireless efforts should be deployed to seek an exhaustive inventory of libraries being used in existing UAVs/Ss. This may well prove to be an almost untenable objective, but it is worth trying to expand the pool of such libraries to detect and track friendly assets and distinguish them from those to be used by potential adversaries.