Monday, December 5, 2016





Populists Grow Stronger Once in Power
The  World Post

(A partnership of the Huffington Post  and Berggruen Institute )

But it all ends badly. History has not absolved the personalist rule of Fidel Castro or any of the others who took the populist path to power.
Nathan Gardels, Editor in Chief
December 03, 2016

 
Populists, caudillos and strongmen in power don’t fail at the outset, they gain strength. That is because their personalist rule delivers up front to the constituencies that brought them to the top, often challenging bothersome institutional constraints along the way. They worry about the consequences later. The real troubles begin when the consequences arrive, revealing how the short term has eaten the long term. Then the bad overtakes the good.
As the classicist Phillip Freeman has written in The WorldPost, this has been true going back to Clodius in the Roman republic, whose popularity soared as he handed out free grain to the plebeians. But the divisive character of his mercurial rule drove the republic to the point of civil war and opened the way for the dictatorship of Caesar to restore order. In the 1950s in Argentina, Juan and Eva Peron fostered many programs to elevate the poor descamisados  (shirtless ones) until corruption, debt and inflation overwhelmed any gains and the military ultimately stepped in to stem the chaos. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez unquestionably lifted the welfare of the poor the elites had ignored through programs like misiones sociales, but in the end squandered immense oil resources, became heavily indebted to China and whose policies now, under the rule of his successor Nicolás Maduro, have ignited 500 percent, if not more, inflation. Store shelves are empty, medicines are scarce, daily protests fill the streets and citizens that see little hope are fleeing economic collapse by the boatload. 
This pattern also fits Fidel Castro. Though he arrived in power by the bullet instead of the ballot, his rallying cry was populist, nationalist and above all, personalist. He accomplished near universal literacy and free health care for all in that tiny Caribbean island. In the end, though, his caudillo-like rule crushed dissent and personal liberties while his Soviet-style economy, abetted by the U.S. blockade, drove the nation into an impoverished cul-de-sac. History has not absolved Castro or any of the others who took the populist path to power.
Whether Donald Trump fits this pattern, as former Mexican President Vicente Fox argues, remains to be seen. As president-elect, Trump has claimed to have saved some 800 to 1,000 jobs in Indiana from moving to Mexico. His pledge of a $1 trillion dollar infrastructure surge has so far helped boost the stock market and will surely create significant new employment with far reaching multiplier effects if it comes to pass. 
Since no populist politician has ever before occupied the top office of the world’s most powerful nation in modern times, we don’t know what to expect. America is a profoundly pluralist and ethnically diverse society bound by constitutional constraints more hallowed than elsewhere. This context bears little resemblance to where populism has been empowered before.
The flashing red light that cannot escape concern, however, is the very personalist style of operation that brought Donald Trump to power through scapegoating invective against the outside world and perceived enemies within. If troubles appear later on, will he revert to the path that brought him to where he is or abide by the norms of civility and restraint that have limited the authority of every previous American president? All who want America to succeed are obliged to give Trump the benefit of the doubt for now since the democratic ballot box has put him in the White House. But that red light needs to remain flashing every step of the way. 
Emily Peck contends that Donald Trump has “his eye on the wrong ball” by blaming trade for job losses. As true as that may have been in the past, the real threat of job displacement in the future, she writes, comes from Amazon’s takeover of the economy. Ryszard Petru and Guy Verhofstadt, the European Union’s top negotiator on Brexit, take on the populist wave heading to the European continent in the wake of Trump’s victory in the America. “One of the greatest delusions spread by populists on both the left and right,” they argue, “is that turning inwards will empower us. The reality is that in an inter-connected world, no one European country can influence global trade rules. And make no mistake: if we abandon shaping the environment around us, others will shape us.” Writing from Paris, Anne Sinclair worries that “the political future of France has never been more uncertain.” “Time will reveal,” she writes, “if Marine Le Pen will be able to cause the greatest political earthquake in France since the Liberation.”
Following Fidel’s death at 90 last week, several contributions evaluate his life and times. Mark Beeson looks as the triumphs and failures of the Cuban revolution in the context of the struggle against inequality across Latin America. Michelle Manning Barish brings a personal family perspective to the Cuban experience. She warns against romanticizing the Cuban revolution, writing that, “the only people who know the real history of Castro in Cuba are the ones who lived it.” Based on recent conversations in Havana, Abraham Lowenthal cautions that a post-Castro Cuba is not likely to change quickly as a result of the Obama opening – and certainly not if Trump reverses course once in office. 
In other global matters, Sam Stein and Jessica Schulberg report from Washington that foreign policy experts are lining up to press the incoming Trump administration to keep the Iran nuclear deal or risk a nuclear arms race in the Mideast. Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown calls for an international investigation of the Russian-Syrian role in the deadly bombing of a school in the village of Haas which killed dozens of people, mostly children. 
Eric Olander and Cobus van Staden report on how Rwanda is positioning itself as a hub for Chinese investment in Africa. Jeffie Lam of our South China Morning Post partner reports on the rise and fall of the independence movement in Hong Kong. Earlier in the week, the Post reported that Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, told journalists that calls for independence should not be confused with the struggle for greater democracy, which he supports. Writing from Perth, Australia Helen Clark reports that Vietnam is looking to the combined weight of the Association of East Asian Nations, or ASEAN, as a way for smaller nations in the region to protect and promote their interests as the U.S. and China battle for influence.
Stefano Baldolini writes from Italy that a “no” outcome of the referendum this weekend over key constitutional reforms that diminish the role of the Italian Senate and give more power to the prime minister could spark a new round of instability across Europe. 
India is rapidly joining the renewable revolution. Elyse Wanshel reports that India has built the world’s largest solar plant in eight months, and it generates enough power for 150,000 homes. 
The news is not so good elsewhere. Ryan Grenoble reports that, “There’s substantially less sea ice in the world than ever before. The Arctic ― and, for completely unrelated reasons, the Antarctic ― just closed out November with less ice than any other year in history.” 
There is joy in life if you lighten up and let God’s mercy in. That is the takeaway, Carol Kuruvilla writes, for Pope Francis from his favorite film, “Babette’s Feast.” The film depicts an austere Protestant town of joyless inhabitants disrupted by a generous French cook in exile who brings them all together in happy fellowship around a meticulously prepared meal. Writing from Istanbul, novelist Kaya Genc describes how the ongoing political chaos in Turkey is re-energizing the arts scene. “Young Turks,” he writes, are “turning to art in trouble times.” Finally, our Singularity series this week examines the global contest, especially between the U.S. and China, over the most powerful supercomputer. The key to the prize, writes Peter Rejcek, is smart architecture, not speed.
 
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Sunday, December 4, 2016

Koruma Sorumluluğu ve Değişen Egemenlik Anlayışı (R2Protect)

Koruma Sorumluluğu Doktrini ve Değişen Egemenlik Anlayışı

 
 
 
Koruma Sorumluluğu Doktrini ve Değişen Egemenlik Anlayışı
 Koruma sorumluluğu, 2005 yılında Birleşmiş Milletler Dünya Zirvesi’nde kabul edilen, soykırım, savaş suçları, etnik temizlik gibi insanlık suçlarını önlemeyi amaçlayan bir taahhüttür. Uluslararası hukuktaki  tartışmalı konulardan olan koruma sorumluluğu, Vestfalya sisteminden bu yana süregelen egemenlik anlayışını değiştirmiş, insani müdahale kavramının sınırlandırılmış hali olarak kabul edilmektedir.
İnsani Müdahale, en basit tanımıyla bir devletin başka bir devlete karşı, geniş çaplı insan hakları ihlallerini önlemek amacıyla kuvvet kullamasıdır.[1] 19. yy’da sömürgeci devletler, başka toplulukların ülkesine müdahale ederek güvenliği sağlamayı ve bir düzen tesis etmeyi kendilerine hak olarak görmüş bu da İnsani Müdahale anlayışını ortaya çıkarmıştır. 1860 yılında Lübnan’da yaşanan Maruni-Dürzü çatışmasında, Osmanlı yönetiminin çatışmayı önleyemediğini öne süren Fransa’nın Lübnan’a asker çıkarması İnsani Müdahalenin ilk örneklerinden sayılmaktadır.
İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası İnsani Müdahale sömürgeci anlayıştan çıkmış ve yeni bir boyut kazanmıştır.Ancak Ruanda ve Srebrenitsa soykırımlarını önlemedeki BM başarısızlığı İnsani Müdahaleyi yeniden gündeme getirmiştir.2001 yılında Kanada hükümetinin desteğiyle “Müdahale ve Devlet Eğemenliği Komisyonu” (ICISS) tarafından “responsibility to protect” raporu hazırlanmış ve 2005 Dünya Zirvesi’nde kavramın sınırları belirlenmiştir.
     ICISS raporunda egemenlik kavramına sorumluluk anlayışı getirilmiştir.Rapora göre devletler halkın güvenliğini sağlamak ve refahını sürdürmekle yükümlüdür.Ayrıca içeride halka dışarıda da BM aracılığıyla uluslararası topluma karşı sorumlu olmalıdır.Bunun sonucu olarak iç savaş, isyan ve otorite eksikliğinden zarar gören bir topluluğu devleti koruyamazsa içişlerine karışma yasağı (non-intervention) yerini uluslararası koruma sorumluluğuna bırakmalıdır.Yeni egemenlik anlayışı, uluslararası arenada insan temelli güvenlik söylemini güçlendirmiştir.Koruma sorumluluğunun tartışılan kısmı ise müdahale anlayışının askeri müdahaleyi de kapsamasıdır.
              Koruma Sorumluluğuna Dayanan Müdahalenin Şartları ve Unsurları
    ICISS raporunda belirlenen sorumluluğa dayalı egemenlik anlayışına göre, sorumluluklarını yerine getiremeyen devletler egemenlik hakkını kaybedecek ve insanların güvenliği devletin güvenliğine tercih edilecektir.Bu sorumluluklar BM tarafında soykırım,ağır savaş suçları,etnik temizlik ve insanlık suçları olarak belirlenmiştir.Müdahale durumunda müdahaleci devletlerin de sorumlulukları vardır. Bunlar; Önleme Sorumluluğu (Responsibility to Prevent), Harekete Geçme Sorumluluğu (Responsibility to react)  ve Yeniden İnşa Sorumluluğudur (Responsibility to rebuild).
Harekete geçme sorumluluğu doktrinin en tartışılan aşamasıdır.Buradaki sorumluluk insani kriz yaşanan devletin rızası olmadan alınan önlemlerdir.Bunlar ekonomik yaptırımlar ve diplomatik önlemler olabileceği gibi askeri de olabilir.Bu da geleneksel devlet egemenliğine karşı saygı ilkesiyle uyuşmamaktadır. ICISS’e göre ise bazı kriterlere göre askeri müdahale meşru sayılmıştır.Bunlar; Doğru Amaç (Right İntention), Son Çare (Last Resort), Orantılılık(Proportional Means) ve Olumlu Gelişme Beklentisidir (Reasonable Prospects).Ayrıca kararın meşru olması için müdahalenin karara bağlanması gerekmektedir.Karar organı olarak ilk BM Güvenlik Konseyi belirlenmiştir.Ancak geçmişte birçok kez olduğu gibi insani kriz durumunda BM Güvenlik Konseyinin bloke olması halinde Genel kurulun “unit in for peace” kararı ile devreye girilmesi tartışılmıştır.
    BM tarafından belirlenen somut sınırlandırılmalara rağmen koruma sorumluluğu hakkında tartışmalar devam etmektedir.Doktrin karşıtları,bu anlayışın güçlü devletlerin zayıf devletler üzerinde tahakküm kurmasına bir araç olarak görmüşler ve uluslararası hukuktaki sorunlara çözüm olmayacağı belirtilmiştir.Bu duruma ABD’nin Panama ve Haiti’de insanları koruma gerekçesiyle yaptığı müdahale sonrası rejimi değiştirmesi örnek olarak gösterilmiştir.Ancak doktrin destekçileri koruma sorumluluğun insani müdahaleden farklı olduğunu,sınırları olduğunu ve kollektif müdahalenin ülkelerin milli çıkarlarını engelleyeceğini savunmaktadırlar.
    Koruma sorumluluğuna ait bir diğer eleştiri ise,barış için savaş çıkartmanın barışı sağlayabileceğine olan şüphedir. Doktrin destekçileri ise barışı getirmek için savaş çıkarmayı ve insan ölümlerini durdurmak için insan öldürmeyi faydacılık (utilitarianism) anlayışına dayandırmışlardır. Bu anlayışa göre insanlık suçlarını önlemek için yapılan savaş meşrudur.Doktrin ayrıca Vestfalya Sisteminden bu yana süregelen egemenlik ve içişlerine müdahale yasağı ilkelerini değiştirmesi yönünden eleştirilmiştir.Bu değişen durumun silahlanmayı ve savaşı artıracağı iddia edilmiştir.
    Doktrin 2001’den sonra Irak ve son dönemde Libya’da uygulanmıştır. ABD’nin Irak’tan çekildiğinde ülkede güçlü bir yönetim bırakmayarak yeniden inşa sorumluluğunu yerine getirmemiş ve ülkede yaşanan krizlere karşı tepkisiz kalmıştır.2011 yılında Libya’ya karşı gerçekleştirilen müdahale sonrası  da benzer bir durum yaşanmıştır.Müdahaleci güçler Libya’da devlet otoritesini yıkmış ve yerine yeni bir yönetim gelmesini sağlamadan ayrılarak yeniden inşa sorumluluğunu yerine getirmemiştir.Müdahale sonrası Libya “düşkün devlet” olarak nitelendirilmektedir.
    Koruma Sorumluluğu’nun çıkışıyla Vestfalya sisteminin ilkeleri değişmiş ve uluslararası toplumda yeni bir anlayış oluşmuştur.Uygulama kısmında yapılan hatalar doktrinin güvenilirliğini sarsmış ve bunun yeni sömürgecilik anlayışının aracı olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Henüz hiçbir yerde bütün aşamalarıyla gerçekleşmemiş olan doktrin tam olarak somutlaşmamıştır. Bu anlayışın geleceğini de yapılacak olan uygulamaların meşruluğu ve uluslararası siyasetin dengeleri belirleyecektir.
Furkan ÇAKAR

FEYM grubunun Macaristan mesajları

Saturday, December 3, 2016

Iran and Assad in the age of Trump

Tuesday, November 29, 2016
Iran and Assad in the Age of Trump
Why the Don Could Cut a Deal
Alex Vatanka
Alex Vatanka is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington. Follow him @AlexVatanka [1

].
For the generals of Iran’s elite Islamic Revolution Guards Corps [2] (IRGC), anti-Americanism is an indispensable component of their worldview. And yet, to the surprise of many, top IRGC commanders [3] have so far been amenable to the idea of a Donald Trump presidency. It appears that they are following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s lead and are hoping for an American self-extrication from the Middle East in the next administration.
The first big test will be on the question of Syria and Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad [4], with whom Iran’s history is considerably more complicated than many realize. If Trump decides to cut a deal with Russia and Iran over Syria, he will find he has more leverage on the question of Assad’s future than many might recognize.
A FRIENDLY IRAN?
For now, Trump’s Syria policy [5] remains something of an enigma. But there is an air of exuberance in Damascus, Moscow, and Tehran. On November 14, for example, Assad said that Trump might be a “natural ally” in the fight against terrorism. By extension, as Assad put it, that would put Trump on the same side as Iran and Russia, the biggest protectors of Assad’s regime.
Assad’s hopes are not entirely unfounded. Trump has shown an inclination toward simplistic policy views, and like the Syrian and Russian governments [6], he has lumped the multifarious Syrian opposition together with the Islamic State (ISIS). In that equation, he sees Assad as the lesser evil.
This is music to the ears of Khameini and Putin. It might open the prospect for a deal with Russia and Iran as a way of ending the Syrian war. If so, it would be a conclusion that keeps the Assad regime [7], or at least a good part of it, in power. It is therefore unsurprising—but still striking—that the Iranians have been more cautiously open-minded about Trump than several close U.S. allies have been.
Iran’s generals took their cue from statements by Russia’s influential ambassador in Tehran, Levan Dzhagaryan, who called Trump’s comments on Syria a few days after the U.S. election “hopeful.” Dzhagaryan’s words echoed his optimism that Trump could undo what they see as the Obama administration’s mistakes in the Middle East.
Rahim Safavi, a top military adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei [8], even expressed his anticipation that Trump might rethink the United States’ posture toward Iran. Safavi, who was from 1997 to 2007 the head of the IRGC, pointed to Syria and Iraq as the two crucial arenas in which the United States might move closer to the Iranian and Russian positions. And he at least urged other Iranian officials to avoid prematurely judging the American president-elect. His remarks were, in many ways, unprecedented. IRCG generals have long relied on unconditional anti-Americanism. Not a single interest group in Tehran can be said to hold an Assad-or-nothing posture on the question of Syria’s future.
It is safe to assume that Safavi was speaking not only in close coordination with Khamenei’s office but also on behalf of the broader IRGC leadership. The guards, and particularly the IRGC’s expeditionary arm the Quds Force, have over the last five years dug deep in Syria’s trenches to keep Assad from falling.
Herein may lay an opportunity for the next U.S. administration. In a scenario of American-Russian give-and-take over Syria, it is not just the Russians who might reassess their commitment to Assad; the IRGC generals could, too. In reality, not a single interest group in Tehran can be said to hold an Assad-or-nothing posture on the question of Syria’s future.

Abdalrhman Ismail / Reuters Aleppo's historic citadel as seen from rebel-held eastern Aleppo, October 2016.                         
SANCTIFYING ASSAD IN TEHRAN
No doubt Russian and Iranian efforts to bolster Assad [9] will continue in the weeks and months to come. But Tehran’s support for the man has hardly been set in stone since the Syrian war began in 2011.
According to a former Iranian ambassador to Damascus who was recently reappointed to the role, when he was in power, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his populist right-wing civilian team viewed the Assad government as a doomed dictatorship. They were at first reluctant to give Assad a helping hand as protests against the regime boiled up.
Even some of the hardened Islamist ideologues in the IRGC were hesitant. General Qassem Soleimani [10], head of the Quds Force, who today spearheads Tehran’s military campaign in Syria and in Iraq, had urged Khamenei to press Assad to stop massacring his own people and to institute political reform.
Iran’s support for Assad only solidified after 2012 as the war dragged on and the geopolitical spoils increased. Facing competition for influence in Syria from regional rivals such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Tehran doubled down on backing Assad.
Within the Iranian power structure, it is today the IRGC that is most committed to Assad. However, five years into the Syrian war and some half million people dead, IRGC generals are having an increasingly difficult time justifying at home all the efforts it takes to keep Assad afloat.
They sell him as an Arab hero who is a kingpin in the so-called Resistance Front against Israel. Assad is likewise touted as the lifeline to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Tehran’s most successful Arab proxy in history. As one IRGC general put it recently, without Iranian missiles shipped to Hezbollah via Syria and then aimed at Israel from Lebanon, Israel would have long ago bombed Iran’s Bushehr and Fordo nuclear plants.
Then there is the emotional attachment by top IRGC cadre to the Assads. Before the fall of the pro-United States Shah of Iran [11] in 1979, revolutionary Islamists such as Safavi found sanctuary in Syria under Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad. The elder Assad was also one of the first heads of state to recognize the Islamic Republic, and during the Iran-Iraq War, Syria was without doubt an important ally in helping Iran contain Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Such memories are printed daily in Iranian state-run media to justify Iran’s present-day support for the younger Assad.
In reality, the historical picture is far more complicated. Even in the 1980s, the Assads and Iranians were often competitors [12]. They frequently sparred for maximum influence in Lebanon. Even in Iraq, their shared animosity toward Hussein did not mean that Tehran and Damascus agreed on which opposition to back to topple the Iraqi strongman. Even in the 1980s, the Assads and Iranians were often competitors.
During U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s ill-fated arms-for-hostages dealings with Tehran, Hafez al-Assad was seen by U.S. intelligence as anxious—fearing that a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington would come at his expense. This was not lost on Tehran. And then there was deep Iranian anger in 2000 when it emerged that the Syrians had held secret peace talks with the Israelis. Such historic realities undermine the notion that Iran’s alliance with the Assads is inviolable.
In other words, in the event that Trump opts to compromise with Russia and Iran over Syria, the degree of Tehran’s commitment to Assad will be critical. For many in the Syrian opposition, the departure of Assad is not negotiable. For many Iranians, it is. The fate of Assad might just mean the difference between a political settlement and continuation of the war in Syria. Trump should not lose sight of that as he ponders whether to cut a deal with Moscow and Tehran.  

Foreign Affairs: How Washington Can Get to a Settlement

Monday, November 28, 2016
A Syria Policy for Trump
How Washington Can Get to a Settlement
Andrew J. Tabler and Dennis Ross
ANDREW J. TABLER is Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the author of In the Lion’s Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington’s Battle with SyriaDENNIS ROSS is Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service.
 
When U.S. President-elect Donald Trump is inaugurated on January 20, 2017, his most complicated foreign policy challenge will be what to do about Syria. Under President Barack Obama, Washington’s Syria policy [1] has focused on fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). But with ISIS teetering, the government of Bashar al-Assad gaining ground, and outside powers such as Iran and Russia becoming ever more involved [2], simply fighting the caliphate may not be enough for the next leader of the United States.
In order to destroy ISIS [3] and uproot the extremism that has been generated by the Syrian war, the United States will need to help stabilize opposition-controlled areas of the country while pressuring Iran and Russia to move toward a viable political settlement. To get there, President Trump will need to be more willing to put pressure on Moscow and Tehran than he has so far indicated. That means he should be ready to impose penalties on both if they do not fulfill any commitments they make.

A FRAGILE EQUILIBRIUM
Today, ISIS and the Assad regime each control roughly one-third of Syria. Thanks to help from Russia and Iranian-backed Shiite militias, the Syrian government has established control over what it calls “essential Syria”: the urbanized, north–south spine of the country that connects Damascus to the country’s largest city [4], Aleppo, which Assad is now on the verge of reconquering. But if he is successful, what happens next is unclear. Assad claims he will reassert control over the entire country, but he lacks the manpower to take and hold Sunni-dominated territory in northwestern, eastern, and southern Syria [5]. He could only do so by importing more Shiite militiamen from abroad, which could provoke Syria’s neighbors to increase their involvement and fuel the local Sunni insurgency.
Eastern Syria has, for the last two years, been split between ISIS and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), part of the Syrian wing of the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara considers a terrorist group. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a U.S.-backed alliance made up mostly of YPG troops interspersed with Sunni Arabs and minorities, has so far been Washington’s only option for fighting ISIS in the region. But in late August, Sunni Arab and Turkmen rebels, backed by Ankara and supported by the Turkish military, entered northeastern Syria as a part of Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield. These units rapidly capturing ISIS-held areas near the Turkish border.

Ankara’s entry into the Syrian war [6] is the most significant (and potentially destabilizing) development since ISIS’ breakout in 2014. The move is designed to crush two enemies at once. First, Ankara wants to prevent the YPG—which the Turkish government sees as an extension of the terrorist PKK—from uniting the Kurdish-held areas in the east, around the town of Manbij, with those in the west in the canton of Afrin. Second, the Turks want the area to serve as a potential staging ground for further military operations against ISIS. Some speculate that Turkey intends to attack from north of the SDF-held Syrian city of Tal Abyad, the northern gate into ISIS’ capital city of Raqqa. As a result, both the SDF and Ankara have issued a flurry of announcements, with each side claiming that it will be the first to liberate Raqqa. Ankara’s entry into the Syrian war is the most significant (and potentially destabilizing) development since ISIS’ breakout in 2014.
The best-case scenario is that either the SDF or Turkey will be able to wrest Raqqa from the caliphate, delivering a much-needed blow to ISIS. The Kurds have the advantage of U.S. support and unity of purpose, but are relatively few in number and have little desire to take and hold Raqqa, which is largely populated by Sunni Arabs who distrust or even despise the Kurds. Euphrates Shield has the advantage of Sunni Arab foot soldiers and the backing of a NATO army, but it has received little support from Obama and his ISIS czar, Special Envoy Brett McGurk. But the worst-case scenario is that the SDF and the Turkish forces fight each other instead, leaving ISIS in control of the east and Assad secure in the west.

WEST OF EDEN
In the west of the country, a similar territorial division persists, this time between the Assad regime and assorted non-ISIS rebels. The rebels control the northwestern canton of Idlib and areas of Aleppo province, as well as cantons in the southern provinces of Dara’a and Quneitra. Each rebel-held canton is a mix of local militias, jihadists, and non-jihadist Salafists. The most notable of the jihadist groups—outside of ISIS—is Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS) [7], the Syrian al Qaeda affiliate formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra. As anti-regime Syrians have come to doubt Washington’s commitment to removing Assad, more and more have opted to join JFS.
The rapid growth of JFS in the northwest has caused many, including Secretary of State John Kerry, to advocate for a deal involving synchronized U.S.–Russian air strikes against the group, which if carried out would seem to benefit Assad. But his regime is now estimated to have only about 20,000–25,000 deployable troops. That is enough to surround east Aleppo [8] and some rebel-held suburbs of Damascus, but only with help from Hezbollah and other Shiite militiamen from Afghanistan and Iraq. To pursue its siege-and-starve strategy elsewhere in Syria, the regime will need to import more Shiite fighters from abroad. These militias, however, are often poorly trained and have trouble operating in the rural Sunni parts of Syria.
The United States will be lucky if the rebels can somehow resist Assad’s siege of Aleppo and the Trump administration can convince the Russians to resume the cessation of hostilities agreement, which fell apart in September. But that is unlikely. More probably, the Assad regime, aided by the Russians, will continue bombing east Aleppo, thereby worsening the flow of refugees into Syria's neighbors and sending Assad’s opponents further into the arms of JFS and other extremists. Such an outcome would bolster Moscow’s case [9] for making Assad the basis for a solution in Syria. It could also expand Russia’s role in the eastern Mediterranean for years to come.

Alaa Faqir / Reuters A Free Syrian Army fighter in the rebel-held canton of Dara'a, Syria, November 2016.
USING THE BIG STICK
Until now, U.S. policy has remained committed to the unity of Syria under UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which reaffirmed the “sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic.” But Syria has been divided for half a decade, and to deal with it, the United States will need to uproot extremists and provide humanitarian protection to the country’s component parts, with an eye toward putting them back together again [10]. To achieve that, there are five major tactical options that the Trump administration could apply to Syria: no-fly/ safe zones; anti-regime airstrikes to enforce the ceasefire; arming of the vetted opposition; sanctions; and diplomacy. Whatever the combination, these tactics should be employed to reduce U.S. vulnerability to extremism and migration (which is driven by the conflict), recognizing that doing so may require a willingness on Washington’s part to tolerate the risks associated with using force.

The first option, the establishment of limited no-fly/safe zones, [11] has already received some support from both Trump and Vice-President-elect Mike Pence. Announcing the intention to establish no-fly/safe zones would signal to Assad that the new administration does not believe he can actually retake “every inch” of Syrian territory. Of course, a no-fly zone over the entire country would require the United States to attack Syrian and Russian air defense systems—something no president is likely to do given the threat of war with Russia. However, limited no-fly zones along Syria’s borders with Turkey and Jordan already exist, and Turkey’s de-facto safe zone north of Aleppo is an example of how these areas can be blocked off without military confrontation. A smart U.S. strategy would involve deploying special forces to shore up safe zones on the ground and using air strikes and cruise missiles to target regime aircraft and artillery.

Another similar military option would be to use long-distance air strikes to enforce the ceasefires that have repeatedly fallen apart. Ceasefires only work when the parties have positive incentives to negotiate, and sufficiently strong negative incentives not to break the ceasefire. Thus far, Assad and the Russians have been able to punish the opposition, but not vice versa. The United States could help even out the balance of power by punishing the regime with cruise missiles, or airstrikes on regime airfields. This risks inadvertently killing Russian soldiers, but the concentration of Russian forces in a few geographical areas ensures that there are multiple targets within the country—runways, artillery positions, and exposed jets and helicopters—that could be safely attacked by the United States from outside Syrian air space.

Alternatively, the United States could provide qualitatively new weapons in larger amounts to the vetted Syrian opposition—something the Obama administration has been unwilling to do. Controlling territory requires manpower, and given the Assad regime’s limited numbers and the growing influence of extremists, it is important to support the remaining elements of the non-jihadist rebels. Such support would only work, however, if the United States commits to fighting the Assad regime, an option that Obama has sought to avoid and that Trump at this point looks unlikely to pursue.
The United States can also consider deepening sanctions. Doing so would help the United States gain much-needed leverage in future negotiations, allowing Washington to raise the penalties faced by Assad and create incentives for him to accept a real political transition in Syria that would unite the country. This is particularly important given the regime’s desperate need to rebuild infrastructure and the urban areas that it has destroyed. A missing but vital aspect of this diplomacy should include prosecution for war crimes, particularly for the use of chemical weapons.

U.S. diplomacy has so far come up short in terms of forcing Assad to step aside. It has also failed to give the Russians and the Iranians a reason to jettison their client.
A final option is diplomacy, whether coercive or otherwise. U.S. diplomacy has so far come up short in terms of forcing Assad to step aside. It has also failed to give the Russians and the Iranians a reason to jettison their client. Military force and sanctions would strengthen the negotiators’ hand, but more targeted diplomacy with allies, as well as hardnosed negotiations with adversaries, would provide a much-needed shot in the arm to fortify efforts to end the war.

THE ART OF THE DEAL
Apart from its terrible humanitarian consequences, Washington’s decision to focus on ISIS but not Assad has given Russia and Iran a free hand [12] to change the balance of power in Syria. For our Arab and Israeli partners in the region, it has also raised questions about whether the United States cares about the power struggle in the region between the Gulf Arab states and Iran, in which Moscow has chosen to back Tehran. Continued passivity from the Trump administration will reinforce the image that the United States is prepared to acquiesce to Russia and Iran’s regional plans. And as long as this remains the case, it will be difficult for the United States to convince its Sunni partners to fight ISIS, which they see as a far more manageable threat than Shiite Iran.
Yet the United States still has some leverage: only its strategy can reunify Syria. By bombing Aleppo, Russia likely hopes to force the rebels to accept a de-facto partition of the country that leaves Assad in power. But such an outcome is unlikely to be the basis for national reunification. Putin must be made to understand that the United States will only go along with a genuine ceasefire, one that is tied to all the elements of UN Security Council Resolution 2254—the lifting of all sieges, the creation of humanitarian corridors, the drafting of a new constitution, and Assad’s consent to an 18-month transition period. But Putin must also understand that if Assad violates any of these principles, the United States would be willing to carry out punitive military strikes. This alone would signal to the region that the Trump administration means business.

If anything, Trump should send a clear message to Putin: if Russia continues to back Assad, even as he fails to fulfill his commitments under Resolution 2254, Russia may become trapped in an increasingly costly war that it cannot win. In presenting these options, the United States should underscore the fact that there is no whole-country political solution as long as Assad remains in power—too much blood has been spilled, too many crimes have been committed, and too much pain has been endured for the opposition and their regional supporters to accept such an outcome.