Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Monday, March 13, 2017

Trump's Conflict-Ridden World : Five Hotspots to Watch in 2017 (Ukraine/Baltics, China/Taiwan, ISIS, Israel/Palestine, Mexico)


Trump’s Conflict-Ridden World: Five Hotspots to Watch in 2017

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a1.trump.conflict.portrait.storyFrom Berlin to Beijing, from Tallinn to Taipei, President Donald Trump seems eager to pick fights — even among U.S. allies — without leaving the White House, where infighting among his own team has made his young administration one of the most volatile in U.S. history.
In less than a month in office, the 45th president has managed to turn the world order upside down.
He infuriated Chinese leaders by questioning America’s long-standing commitment to Beijing’s “one China” policy regarding Taiwan, provoked anger across the Islamic world by instituting a refugee order widely seen as a blanket ban on Muslims and infuriated Arabs by insisting he would move the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Two weeks into the job, he even sparked outrage in Australia, one of America’s most steadfast allies, by abruptly cutting short a 25-minute phone conversation with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.
As if that’s not enough, he’s lashed out at Germany, indirectly called for the dismantling of the European Union and threatened to start a trade war with Mexico over the building of a massive border wall to keep out illegal immigrants.
Yet all this pales in comparison to the fallout following the forced resignation of Trump’s national security adviser, Michael T. Flynn, after it was revealed that he had discussed U.S. sanctions in a phone call with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and then lied about it to no less than Vice President Mike Pence. The White House, embroiled in controversy over the timeline of who knew what when, is now in full damage control mode.
On Feb. 14, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said it was “highly likely” that the events leading up to Flynn’s departure would be included in a broader congressional probe into Moscow’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Democrats smell blood and are pushing for a wider independent investigation into Trump’s ties to Russia (the FBI is already reportedly looking into contacts between Trump’s campaign associates and Moscow a year before the U.S. election).
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Photo: U.S. Department of Homeland Security
President Donald Trump, center, talks with Vice President Mike Pence, left, and Homeland Security Secretary John F. Kelly during a Jan. 25 visit to the Department of Homeland Security.
Leaks have gushed out of the White House at an unprecedented pace and constant chaos seems to have become the new norm. Conservative pundit Eliot A. Cohen, director of the strategic studies program at Johns Hopkins University and a noted Trump critic, suggests that precisely because the problem is one of Trump’s temperament and character, the situation will not get better.
“It will get worse, as power intoxicates Trump and those around him,” Cohen wrote recently in the Atlantic. “It will probably end in calamity — substantial domestic protest and violence, a breakdown of international economic relationships, the collapse of major alliances, or perhaps one or more new wars (even with China) on top of the ones we already have. It will not be surprising in the slightest if his term ends not in four or in eight years, but sooner, with impeachment or removal under the 25th Amendment. The sooner Americans get used to these likelihoods, the better.”
At the start of the year, many journalists and think tanks reported on possible conflict scenarios to watch out for in 2017, ranging from Islamic State attacks on Turkey to humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen to bloodshed in South Sudan, Myanmar, Afghanistan and Iraq.
But in just a span of a few weeks, Trump has upended that equation, creating new trouble-spots that could erupt in violence or cause global chaos. To make sense of it all, we have selected five areas of conflict, military or otherwise, likely to worsen in 2017 under Trump — and what experts say can be done to prevent things from spiraling out of control.

UKRAINE/BALTICS
It remains to be seen whether Trump’s connections with Russia snowball into a Watergate-like downfall. Regardless, Trump’s admiration of Russian President Vladimir Putin is well documented, as is his desire to please Moscow by lifting sanctions imposed against it by his predecessor, Barack Obama. That leaves Ukraine, still split between a beleaguered central government in Kiev and Moscow-backed rebels in the east, in the crosshairs.
The Flynn scandal may have quashed the administration’s hopes of a major rapprochement with Russia for the time being, but European leaders worry about America’s commitment to the sanctions imposed on Moscow for annexing Crimea in 2014. Europe, a major trading partner with Russia, has felt the sting of those penalties far more than the U.S. has, and without Washington’s backing, Germany and other countries may be hard pressed to convince their publics to stick with sanctions that have hurt their economies.
a1.trump.conflicts.ukraine1.story
Photo: © Evgeniy Maloletka / OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors the movement of heavy weaponry in eastern Ukraine in March 2015. A month before, Ukraine and Russia, along with France and Germany, agreed to a ceasefire under the Minsk agreement, but Kiev and Moscow-backed rebels in the east have failed to implement key parts of the deal.
But removing those sanctions would amount to rewarding the Kremlin for bad behavior, warned John Herbst, director of the Atlantic Council’s Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center.
He said it’s no coincidence that within 36 hours of Trump’s Jan. 28 phone call with Putin — which focused mainly on working together to defeat the Islamic State — “the Russians upped the violence in Ukraine substantially.”
Herbst, who was U.S. ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006, noted that for three days, as fighting raged in eastern Ukraine that killed over two dozen civilians and soldiers, “the administration said only that, ‘We’re concerned about this.’ Only on Thursday, the fourth day of the violence, did Nikki Haley [U.S. ambassador to the United Nations] in New York slam the Kremlin for its aggression. But this slamming was never repeated by the White House. That Sunday, Trump was asked on the news if he was embarrassed by the fact that the violence went up substantially after his phone call, and he said he wasn’t.”
Observers say there is also a chance, however, that Ukraine instigated some of the violence itself.
“Kiev, too, has become less inclined to compromise as it has grown more uncertain about Washington’s policy toward the conflict,” wrote Kiev-based Isaac Webb in a Feb. 6 Foreign Policy article.
He noted that Ukraine has been making frequent incursions into the “gray zone,” the no man’s land separating government and rebel forces, increasing the likelihood of clashes. Moreover, neither side seems particularly inclined to implement the hard compromises laid out in the Minsk accords that led to the current fragile ceasefire.
“At the same time, the Ukrainian president’s office has used the escalation to remind Trump of the costs of rapprochement with Russian President Vladimir Putin: ‘The shelling is massive. Who would dare talk about lifting the sanctions in such circumstances?’” Webb wrote.
But for Trump, Ukraine — whose Russian intervention has led to nearly three years of war and about 10,000 deaths — is at best a secondary consideration, according to Herbst.
“That’s why he keeps talking about lifting sanctions if the Russians help us fight ISIS [Islamic State]. He doesn’t seem to understand that Russia is conducting a war of aggression in Ukraine, and that their aim is to weaken NATO and the EU,” Herbst told The Diplomat. “What we’re seeing right now is a fair amount of institutional pushback against this unwise policy, and not just from Sen. John McCain [R-Ariz.] and the Democrats. Even McConnell made a statement about how this is not the time to be talking about removing sanctions. Sen. Paul Ryan [R-Wis.] said the same thing. I suspect that if Trump keeps pushing, he’ll produce a serious response from Congress.”
Peter Doran, executive vice president at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), said this debate is being watched very closely throughout Eastern Europe, but especially in the three ex-Soviet republics of the Baltics: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
a1.trump.conflicts.ukraine2.story
Photo: OSCE / Evgeniy Maloletka
Civilians make the dangerous crossing over a damaged bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska in eastern Ukraine on Dec. 16, 2016. Shortly after U.S. President Donald Trump took office, skirmishes broke out between government forces and Moscow-backed rebels.
“If the United States is going to be tested somewhere on its frontier of power, that test is likely to come where American capabilities are weak,” Doran told us. “Certainly NATO’s eastern flank has been one of the most neglected zones of conflict in recent memory. Since the Crimea invasion, the U.S. has scrambled to catch up with the game that Vladimir Putin is already playing very well — and winning, for now.”
As part of an agreement struck by Obama last year, NATO has already begun moving thousands of troops to shore up its defenses in Eastern Europe, with the first contingent arriving in Poland in January. But allies remain nervous whether Trump will follow through on the new deployments and other promised NATO initiatives. Indeed, during a Feb. 15 visit to Brussels, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis reiterated Trump’s longstanding threat that NATO members must contribute their fair share and spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense.
“If your nations do not want to see America moderate its commitment to this alliance, each of your capitals needs to show support for our common defense,” he warned.
At the same time, Mattis has repeatedly sought to reassure allies that the security bloc remains vital to U.S. interests.
Still, NATO allies are closely watching to see how the Russia drama will unfold. Doran said that despite the general rancor in Washington, there is “strong bilateral support” on Capitol Hill for taking a tough line toward the Kremlin, as well as a transatlantic consensus that the sanctions against Russia are there for good reason.
“Keeping the sanctions in place sends a very clear message to Russia: that the international system is governed by laws, that those laws must be respected and that these actions are not acceptable in the 21st century. Putin is a leader who respects strength and power — and removing the sanctions as a way of accommodating the Kremlin would be a serious mistake.”
CHINA/TAIWAN
Many observers assumed the initial flashpoint between China and the U.S. under a new administration would occur because of maritime disputes in the South China Sea, where Beijing has been aggressively staking its territorial claims.
But Trump’s surprise December acceptance of a congratulatory phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen — the first since the U.S. and Taiwan severed relations in 1979 — infuriated China and drove a wedge between the world’s two largest economies.
Even before that, the billionaire candidate blasted China for manipulating its currency and ruining the U.S. economy. Once in office, Trump promptly questioned whether the U.S. will use the one China policy — under which the U.S. acknowledges that there is a single Chinese government in Beijing — as leverage to extract concessions from Beijing, which views Taiwan as a renegade province and a core national interest.
But after receiving the diplomatic cold shoulder from Chinese President Xi Jinping for weeks, Trump toned down his anti-China rhetoric, though it’s unclear what might happen next — especially with regard to Taiwan and an even more potentially serious flashpoint: North Korea.
“Donald Trump is enabling Xi Jinping to make China great again,” quipped Robert A. Manning, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security.
“Trump stepped in with his initial inane, ignorant comments, thinking that since the whole world is a real estate deal, he’d put Taiwan on the table as a bargaining chip,” Manning told The Diplomat in a phone interview. “The Taiwanese were pretty indignant. It achieved the unique goal of pissing off Taiwan and China at the same time.”
a1.trump.conflict.china1.story
Photo: DoD / Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley, U.S. Navy
A full honors arrival ceremony welcomes then-Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping to the Pentagon on Feb. 14, 2012. Xi, now president, has bristled at Donald Trump's suggestion that the longstanding "one China" policy can be used as a bargaining chip in bilateral relations.
On Feb. 10, Trump agreed to accept the one China definition during a phone call with Xi, his first since taking office.
“The reality is, this is not a bargaining chip,” Manning said. “That’s why we’re able to have a policy with China in the first place. The idea that the Chinese would negotiate that is really dumb and deeply flawed.”
In fact, he said — and this goes back way before Trump’s election — “many of our core assumptions about China have been proven wrong, for instance the notion that as they became more integrated into the international system, they’d buy into our rules, or as they succeeded economically, we’d begin to see political reform. Actually, it’s going the other way. Given that, there will be a rethinking of China policy in any event.”
High on that policy agenda, of course, are economic issues. Yet here too, says Manning, the Trump administration has been long on rhetoric and short on facts.
“They’re right in identifying China as a troubling economic actor, but they’ve chosen all the wrong issues,” he argued. “They have not manipulated their currency in years. If you talk to 100 businessmen operating in China, 99 of them will tell you the currency issue is pretty far down on their list. The real issue of concern is China’s very nationalistic industrial policies.”
Manning cited a recent U.S. Chamber of Commerce poll which found that 80 percent of U.S. companies say they feel less welcome in China than before.
“Being frozen out — that is the central issue, and hopefully [the Trump administration] will eventually figure that out.”
But Trump may have lost his biggest source of economic leverage by abandoning the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a sweeping trade deal with 12 Asia-Pacific nations that notably excluded China. While widely expected, the move opens the door for China to push its own competing trade pact — which has far less labor, intellectual property and environmental protections — and further cement its hegemony over the region.
“By preemptively eliminating tools like economic statecraft from its foreign-policy toolbox, the Trump administration will be leaving itself with only hard power to counteract China’s ambitions,” wrote Hunter Marston in Foreign Policy magazine on Jan. 23.
Marston cited comments by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson at his confirmation hearing that the U.S. would deny China access to artificial islands it is building in the international waters of the South China Sea. White House press secretary Sean Spicer doubled down on that statement, perhaps unaware of its implications. That’s because any attempt by the U.S. to militarily bar China from those islands would require a naval blockade, which would be tantamount to an act of war.
Whether those comments were a slip of the tongue because Trump officials don’t fully grasp the issue or an intentional warning, they sent a chilling signal to China watchers.
a1.trump.conflicts.china2.story
Photo: U.S. Navy / Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Gerald Dudley Reynolds
A team attached to the guided-missile destroyer USS Decatur conducts drills with a Japanese Akizuki-class destroyer in the East China Sea on Aug. 23, 2016. Decatur is deployed in support of maritime security and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific as part of a U.S. 3rd Fleet Pacific Surface Action Group.
“Tillerson’s provocative remarks may be a rhetorical gesture, another tenuous red line, or they may signal the beginnings of a far more assertive American policy of containment aimed at curbing China’s control of the South China Sea. Either interpretation invites peril,” warned Marston.
What this means for North Korea’s nuclear ambitions remains to be seen. Trump has lamented that Beijing should do more to rein in its erratic neighbor, which fired a nuclear test and a barrage of missile launches last year. Its most recent provocation was an intermediate-range ballistic missile test that took place while Trump was visiting with Japan’s prime minister. Trump’s response was uncharacteristically muted as he sought to avoid an escalation with the North’s mercurial dictator, Kim Jong-un. But if the North fires an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S., that would immediately change the calculus.
Regardless, Trump needs the cooperation of China, North Korea’s economic lifeline, to address the nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula. But Beijing is wary of toppling Kim’s regime, fearing an influx of millions of poor refugees and a unified U.S. ally on its doorstep.
“In the past, China’s role [in North Korea] has been cited as an area of U.S.-China cooperation,” said Manning. “But there’s a real risk it will become an area of U.S.-China contention. They clearly hate North Korea, and North Korea hates them, but they’re stuck with each other. China’s biggest fear is instability on the Korean Peninsula. They don’t want to do anything that would threaten that stability, so there are limits to how far they’d go.”
To that end, some experts say it’s time to end the U.S. policy of strategic patience and engage with the North, a prospect China favors. John Delury, a senior fellow at the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations, wrote in Foreign Affairs that the Trump administration “should negotiate a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program in return for a U.S. security guarantee, since that is the only measure that could enable Kim to start concentrating on economic development and the belated transformation of North Korea.”
He adds: “Like it or not, North Korea’s nukes are a reality. The United States needs a new strategy for dealing with Kim — and Trump is well placed to deliver it.”
ISLAMIC STATE
During his presidential campaign, Trump vowed to crush the so-called Islamic State (also known as ISIS and ISIL) and “defeat the ideology of radical Islamic terrorism.” But that’s easier said than done — Obama essentially made the same pledge to defeat the terrorist group. Last year, Obama’s administration did, in fact, significantly degrade the group’s capabilities, dislodging it from large tracts of territory in Iraq, Syria and Libya and killing thousands of its fighters through a relentless bombing campaign. At the same time, the Islamic State has adapted into a guerilla-style insurgency still capable of recruiting lone wolves to launch spectacular attacks abroad, both in the U.S. and Europe.
Experts fear that Trump’s controversial refugee ban (also see stories "Former Iraqi Ambassador Denounces Controversial Travel Ban", "Trump's Refugee Ban Sparks Uproar at State Department" and "Op-Ed: State Department Memo on Trump's Refugee Ban Long on Rhetoric, Short on Specifics") will only add fuel to the fire, helping the Islamic State recruit disgruntled Arabs all over the world to attack the West.
In any event, “crushing” the Islamic State has little to do with ending the grinding six-year war in Syria, a war that’s cost more than 500,000 lives and sparked Europe’s worst migration crisis since World War II. Nor will a military victory over the group end the global war on terrorism that began with 9/11.
Michael Totten, a veteran foreign correspondent with more than a decade of experience in the Middle East, said Trump’s Mideast approach is doomed to fail.
“President Trump has repeatedly said he wants to partner with Russia in Syria to fight ISIS, but there are a couple of problems with that,” Totten told The Diplomat in an email.
a1.trump.conflicts.islamic.state.story
Photo: U.S. Army / Spc. Paris Maxey
U.S. Army paratroopers maneuver through a hallway as part of squad-level training at Camp Taji in Iraq in 2015 — part of the multinational effort to train Iraqi security forces to defeat the Islamic State.
“First, Russia is not fighting ISIS in Syria. Russia is propping up the [Bashar al-] Assad regime and fighting every faction in Syria except ISIS. Second, Russia is part of the Iranian/Syrian/Hezbollah axis. Syria has been a Russian client state since the Cold War, and Iran gets its nuclear material from Moscow. So Vladimir Putin is a patron and armorer of Syria, which is the biggest state sponsor of international terrorism in the Arab world, and of Iran, which is the biggest state sponsor of international terrorism in the entire world.”
Totten, winner of the Washington Institute Book Prize for his 2012 analysis of Hezbollah, “The Road to Fatima Gate,” is predictably pessimistic about Trump helping to end Syria’s horrific civil war.
“Trump wants to be tough on Iran and tough on ISIS, but he can’t do both at the same time if he climbs into bed with Vladimir Putin,” he told us, referring to Iran and Russia’s alliance in Syria.
As of late 2016, write professors Hal Brands of Johns Hopkins University and Peter Feaver of Duke University in Foreign Affairs, the Islamic State had lost control of key strongholds such as Fallujah and Ramadi in Iraq, and Manbij and Jarabulus in Syria. Iraqi forces are currently struggling to retake Mosul, while U.S.-backed militia groups in Syria are attempting to capture the de facto Islamic State capital of Raqqa. Since August 2014, the Pentagon estimates that the U.S. coalition has killed more than 45,000 Islamic State fighters.
But even if the Islamic State can be destroyed, what happens next in the Middle East?
“Remnants of the caliphate may morph into an insurgency. Al Qaeda and its affiliates will still pose a threat. Moreover, the conditions that breed jihadist organizations will likely persist across the greater Middle East,” the professors write.
They say that leaves four options. “At one extreme, Washington could abandon its military commitments in the greater Middle East on the assumption that it is U.S. interference that provokes terrorism in the first place. At the other, it could adopt a heavy-footprint surge strategy that would involve using overwhelming military force … and attempt to politically transform the societies that produce [terrorist groups]. In between lie two options: one, a light-footprint approach akin to that taken by the Obama administration before ISIS’s rise; the other, a more robust approach closer to Washington’s response to ISIS since late 2014.”
Their conclusion: None of the four options are ideal. “The least worst choice would be an approach close to the medium-footprint strategy being used to defeat ISIS today.”
A February report by Rand Corp. suggests a similar strategy and advocates viewing the group as a trans-regional threat.
“The nature of the threat suggests the need to prioritize the security of Americans in the homeland, but does not imply placing the United States on a continuous war footing,” write authors Lynn E. Davis, Jeffrey Martini and Kim Cragin.
Rather, this approach involves boosting resources for intelligence and law enforcement, as well airstrikes and special ops raids. The authors also say the U.S. must help address underlying grievances that breed radicalism, including weak states and poor governance.
“The U.S. counter-ISIL strategy overseas should be designed to improve these conditions to the extent possible, but strategists must recognize that the United States has limited leverage to affect these conditions, and improvements will require years to accomplish.”
a1.trump.conflicts.israel.palestine.story
Photo: By Bienchido - Own work / Wikimedia Commons GFDL
A panorama of Jerusalem, the contested capital of Israelis and Palestinians, shows the Temple Mount, including Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, as seen from the Mount of Olives mountain ridge next to the Old City.

ISRAEL/PALESTINE
Will Trump be the president that finally brokers peace between the Arabs and Jews?
It’s hard to say, though Trump is the first U.S. leader to have a Jewish daughter and son-in-law. His relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is certainly warmer than the one his predecessor, Obama, had with Israel’s leader.
Throughout his campaign and even during the first week of his presidency, Trump vowed to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. But no such move appears imminent. That doesn’t surprise Gershon Baskin, founder and co-chairman of the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information.
“Trump will probably sign the order delaying the implementation of the move, mainly because the intelligence and military people will tell him that if he moves the embassy, American lives will be at risk,” Baskin told The Diplomat in a phone call from Jerusalem. “That’s what’s happened for the past 20 years, and that’s not likely to change.”
Even so, Trump is seen as more pro-Israel than any American president in recent memory. Although the president has called additional settlement construction unhelpful toward achieving peace, his pick for U.S. ambassador to Israel, Orthodox Jewish lawyer David Friedman, is an unabashed proponent of settlements who has disavowed the two-state solution and bashed liberal Jews.
The administration’s pro-Israeli bend is not necessarily a good thing, warn Dana H. Allin and Steven N. Simon, authors of “Our Separate Ways: The Struggle for the Future of the U.S.-Israel Alliance.”
In a lengthy article for Foreign Affairs, the two authors outline the dangers of Trump’s alliance with Israel’s hard right.
“Although any new administration would find the landscape daunting, the United States’ strategic interests and moral values call for continued opposition to Israeli settlements in occupied territory, a continued insistence that the Palestinians pursue their cause through peaceful means, a continued commitment to a two-state solution, and continued attentiveness to Israel’s strategic vulnerabilities,” they wrote. “In other words, the most basic requirement is to do no harm, thus following in the tradition of past presidents.”
On Feb. 15, Trump — who has suggested enlisting the help of Arab states to break the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate — met with Netanyahu in Washington and held a joint press conference.
“The body language was terrific, and their rhetoric on Iran is probably very close,” said Ariel Cohen, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. “I think both Bibi and Trump are coming to the conclusion that it’ll be almost impossible to scuttle the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] on Iran, but they both want to work to enforce strictly the [nuclear weapons] agreement.”
He added: “They also want to work with Sunni Arab countries. One of the interesting challenges and opportunities is to get Arab states to recognize Israel and provide the imprimatur for some kind of long-term or permanent peace arrangement.”
But that has effectively left the Palestinians out of the equation. In fact, the president, in typical Trump fashion, jettisoned decades of diplomatic convention by declaring that he was open to the idea of a one-state solution, thereby effectively abandoning Washington’s long-term support of two states — one for Jews, the other for Palestinians — as a way of ending the conflict. “I can live with either one,” he told reporters.
Whether the Palestinians can is another matter entirely.
MEXICO
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Photo: By z2amiller - IMG_4919_2.jpg / Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 2.0
Mexican immigrants march for more rights in the northern California city of San Jose in 2006.
The two issues that propelled Donald Trump into the White House were trade and immigration — and Mexico is the proxy for both issues. It’s unfortunate, because until Trump’s election, the relationship between North America’s two most populous countries was quite positive.
Yet Trump’s rhetoric about building a wall (now estimated to cost $21 billion), deporting up to 3 million undocumented immigrants and slapping a 35 percent tariff on imports from Mexico hasn’t ended with his campaign. That worries Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank.
“This administration is still figuring out what it’s going to do on both immigration and trade issues,” he said. “They’ll have to do something that’s a change from the previous administration, because that’s why Trump was elected.”
But things are complicated by the fact that nobody is currently in charge of Latin America at the State Department. And while Roberta Jacobson — a seasoned diplomat who spent four years as Obama’s assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs — is now U.S. ambassador to Mexico, she’s unlikely to stay in that position for very long.
“The question is, how far will he go?” Shifter mused. “[Secretary of State] Tillerson recently met with Mexico’s foreign minister. He and other Cabinet officials like [Secretary of Defense] James Mattis and [Secretary of Homeland Security] John F. Kelly have a better understanding about what the stakes are in the U.S. taking such an aggressive position, which could really hurt us economically. It’s already damaged Mexico in a number of ways and is playing into the election campaign of 2018. If these economic measures are applied, that’s going to make economic conditions in Mexico worse, which is likely to spur migration to the United States.” (Ironically, net migration from Mexico has been down since the 2008 recession.)
Shifter warned that Mexico — which has been “very helpful” on issues ranging from drug interdiction to stemming the flow of Central American migrants — might not want to cooperate if the U.S. government pursues policies that hurt its southern neighbor.
“The hope is that if you have responsible people like Tillerson, Kelly and Mattis in senior positions, and some members of Congress, including Republicans, begin to speak out, the basic elements of our relationship will be preserved going forward and some of the damage could be contained.”
Shifter says he has no doubt that NAFTA will be renegotiated, most likely under the leadership of Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross.
Yet Walter Molano, writing in Latinvex, says Mexico could be the “unexpected star” of Latin America in 2017.
“Despite the rhetoric from the White House, the Mexican economy will benefit from economic revival in the United States,” he predicted. “Today, Mexico is an integral part of the U.S. industrial base. Hence, the expansion in U.S. economic activity will surely be felt south of the border.”
Molano noted that many of the companies that have announced changes to their Mexican investment plans, like General Motors and Chrysler, either received government bailouts in the past or depend heavily on federal contracts.
“It is only natural that they kowtow to the new powers in Washington,” he observed. “Still, the larger set of corporations that are not as dependent on government assistance or projects will continue to operate unabatedly, and provide a strong boost to the Mexican economy. In other words, there will be winners and losers in 2017, but Mexico could be holding the proverbial Trump card.”


About the Author

Larry Luxner is the Tel Aviv-based news editor of The Washington Diplomat.

Sunday, March 12, 2017

Iran's strong geopolitical hand

Iran’s Surprisingly Strong Geopolitical Hand

While the short-term outlook still looks uncertain for Iran, the larger fundamentals hugely favor it.



Credit: Robert Hale Shutterstock.com

Takeaways


  • The Saudi battle with Iran is unequal because Iran brings assets to the table that Saudi Arabia lacks.
  • It matters to China that Iran has the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves and fourth-largest oil reserves.
  • Saudi Arabia might make a few friends in Beijing for now, but Iran still holds far more of the good cards.
Saudi Arabia’s King Salman hopes to exploit a window of opportunity while in Beijing to loosen China’s affiliations with Iran. But he faces long odds.

The Saudi battle with Iran is fundamentally unequal because Iran brings assets to the table that Saudi Arabia lacks.
Those assets, no matter how degraded, include a large population, an industrial base, resources, a battle-hardened military, a deep-rooted culture, a history of empire and a geography that makes it a crossroads.
Saudi Arabia’s traditional assets – including custodianship of the Muslim holy cities, Mecca and Medina, and money — will in the middle and long term not be able to compete.

Iran as an OBOR pivot point

Iran’s strategic advantage is nowhere more evident than in global competition to shape the future architecture of Eurasia’s energy landscape.
Energy scholar Micha’el Tanchum argues that Iran is pivotal to the success of China’s trans-continental, infrastructure-focused One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative in ways that Saudi Arabia is not.
In a study published in 2015, Mr. Tanchum suggested that it would be gas supplies from Iran and Turkmenistan, two Caspian Sea states, rather than Saudi oil that would determine which way the future Eurasian energy architecture tilts: Will it be in the direction of China, the world’s third-largest LNG importer, or in that of Europe?

Iran will choose its buyers

In that context, it matters greatly to China that Iran has the ability to capitalize on the fact that it boasts the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves and its fourth-largest oil reserves was significantly enhanced with the lifting in 2015 of international sanctions.

Enlarge Source: International Gas Union
According to Mr. Tanchum:
  • “Iran, within five years, will likely have 24.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas available for annual piped gas exports beyond its current supply commitments.”

  • “Not enough to supply all major markets, Tehran will face a crucial geopolitical choice for the destination of its piped exports.”

  • Further, he says Iran will be able to export piped gas to two of the following three markets:
    1. 1. European Union (EU)/ Turkey via the Southern Gas Corridor centering on the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP)

    2. 2. India via an Iran-Oman-India pipeline, or

    3. 3. China via either Turkmenistan or Pakistan.

  • “The degree to which the system of energy relationships in Eurasia will be more oriented toward the European Union or China will depend on the extent to which each secures Caspian piped gas exports through pipeline infrastructure directed to its respective markets.”
In other words, Mr. Tanchum argued that to determine the balance of power in Eurasian energy and establish One Belt, One Road as the key determinant of Eurasia’s energy architecture, China would need to position itself as the main recipient of Iranian and Turkmen gas.

China as a natural partner

That, in turn, would enhance China’s growing economic influence in Central Asia, and further extend it to the Caucasus and the eastern Mediterranean.
China has already many of the building blocks needed to make that a reality:
  • close and long-standing relations with Iran

  • significant investment in Turkmen gas production and pipeline infrastructure

  • the construction of Pakistan’s section of the Iran-Pakistan pipeline.
Hooking the pipeline to One Belt, One Road would allow China to receive Iranian gas not only by sea on its eastern seaboard, but also in its land-locked, troubled north-western province Xinjiang.
However, Iran’s geo-political strengths are however not wholly dependent on aligning the Islamic republic with China.

Other friends keep the competition lively

With the development of Iran’s Indian-built Chabahar port and the undersea Iran-Oman-India pipeline that would potentially create an alternative Asia-to-Europe energy corridor, Iran is, according to Mr. Tanchum, well-positioned to play both ends against the middle.
In addition, it can adopt a key role in the trans-Atlantic community’s effort to strengthen relations with India as an antidote to the rise of China.

Iran’s surprisingly strong gas leverage

Iran’s geopolitical significance is further enhanced by the fact that competition for Iranian gas is very real and offers leverage.
Contrary to some assumptions, Iranian cooperation with Russia in Syria and elsewhere is opportunistic and unlikely to prove sustainable, rather than a sure thing Russia can count on for preferential economic treatment:
– Iranian-Russian competition is already visible in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which ironically mitigates in Europe’s rather than China’s favor.
– Iran is likely to deepen energy cooperation with Turkey. The intent here is two-fold: First, it is a bid to enhance its influence in that country
Second, it would help curtail Russian inroads in the Islamic republic’s northern neighbors – Azerbaijan; Turkmenistan, which is China’s principle gas supplier as well as Armenia (where Russia’s state-owned Gazprom has invested in an Iran-Armenia gas pipeline).
All of this positions Iran to be a very choosy supplier and negotiator.
In Beijing and beyond, Saudi Arabia might make a few friends for now, but in the longer run, Iran still holds far more of the good cards.
Anyone already aligned with Iran or considering such an alliance will think twice before walking away from the Islamic republic to back the kingdom.

About James M. Dorsey

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and an award-winning journalist.

Saturday, February 4, 2017

ABD Yönetimleri Yemen'deki Suudi savaş suçlarını örtbas etmekle suçlanıyor.


February 3, 2017

Trump Admin. Covers Up Saudi War Crimes in Yemen, Exaggerates Iran's Role


Ben Norton tells Paul Jay that the U.S. and Saudis are overwhelmingly responsible for the atrocities committed in Yemen

 

PAUL JAY: Welcome to The Real News Network. I'm Paul Jay.

On Thursday morning, Press Secretary Spicer said this:

Press Secretary SEAN SPICER: I think General Flynn was really clear yesterday that Iran has violated the Joint Resolution, that Iran’s additional hostile actions that it took against our Navy vessel are ones that we are very clear are not going to sit by and take, I think that we will have further updates for you on those additional actions, but clearly we wanted to make sure that Iran knows they are on notice, this is not going unresponded to.

PAUL JAY: Not only was it not an American ship, in fact it was a Saudi ship. and it wasn't the Iranians, it was the Houthis. In fact, if this even took place. But clearly it was not an Iranian attack on an American ship.

Now joining us to discuss all of this is Ben Norton. Ben is a reporter for Alternet. His work is also featured in publications like FAIR, Media Watch and The Intercept. He was previously a staff writer at Salon.com. Thanks very much for joining us, Ben.

BEN NORTON: Glad to be here. Thanks for having me.

PAUL JAY: Tell us just a little bit of context, though, in terms of where things are at in Yemen, and why this is such a trigger point.

BEN NORTON: Yeah, but we should also be clear that Sean Spicer, the White House Press Secretary is on record now lying multiple times. In fact, in his first press conference, he went out and claimed in an outlandish lie that the inauguration crowd on January 20th, at Trump's inauguration, was historically large. In fact, it was historically small. So even though small lies like that, which are demonstrably false, I think demonstrate that we should be very skeptical of anything they say at all.

So certainly, when they go out and make an outlandish lie claiming that Iran hit a U.S. vessel, this is absolutely preposterous and, of course, it contributes this fear, this atmosphere of fear-mongering about Iran.

And Yemen, this is an issue that I've reported on a lot, but unfortunately it's not gotten much attention in the U.S. media, let alone in U.S. politics. It was not mentioned at all in the presidential election, but since March 2015, the U.S. has staunchly backed a Saudi-led war on Yemen.

Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East. More than 80% of the population for two years now has been in desperate need of humanitarian aid, according to humanitarian groups. Not only is there a massive bombing campaign that the U.S. has backed, and Saudi Arabia is leading a coalition of 10 Arab countries all Sunni majority that are fighting rebels inside Yemen which are called the Houthis. This is not a religious conflict, but the Houthis are themselves Shi'a and that kind of shows the political alliances. There are allegations that the Houthis that the Saudi-led coalition are fighting are backed by Iran. Rhetorically, they certainly have expressed support for Iran. Politically, they're certainly aligned. The question is how much material support they've gotten from Iran, and that is debated.

I mean, most people agree who seriously look at this, and serious analysts will agree, that Iran's influence is certainly extant, but it's not large. Iran has sent weapons shipments, likely, to the Houthis through Oman, but although Oman said that they're going to stop allowing this to happen. But at the end of the day, the Houthis don't necessarily need access to foreign weapons.

Yemen is also one of the most highly militarized -- just in terms of sheer number of weapons -- countries in the world. Most households have guns. So the Houthis don't have a shortage of weapons, and at the end of the day the Houthis are themselves Yemeni, but a lot of Saudi propaganda that has been echoed by the U.S. government for two years now has claimed that the Houthis are Iranian proxies.

The Washington Post actually published a very good article based on an expert's analysis saying that, no, the Houthis actually are not Iranian proxies, and I would invite anyone interested in further information to read that.

But at the end of the day, the Trump administration is really using their ties to Iran to push for more aggressive action. And, of course, another thing to mention really quickly is that the war in Yemen has been absolutely catastrophic, and destabilizing, too.

Trump's first raid that was carried out, was carried out in Yemen and it was a complete disaster. At least one U.S. Navy SEAL died, which got a lot of attention. But what got less attention is that, according to local medics, more than 10 civilians, including women and children, were killed in the Navy SEAL raid, one of whom was an eight-year-old girl, Nawar al-Awlaki, whose father, Anwar al-Awiaki, was killed in a U.S. drone strike. He was an al Qaeda propagandist, and his 16-year-old son was also killed in a U.S. drone strike. He... Abdulrahman was a U.S. citizen.

So, I mean, when you look at Iranian policy in the region I think there's a lot of exaggeration. The U.S. is really overstating Iran's influence and the war in Yemen--

PAUL JAY: And I think there's another part of this -- the Saudis have been accused of war crimes in the Yemen war, which are at least equal to or similar to the accusations against the Assad government and the Russians, yet there's not a whisper of an accusation of war crimes against the Saudis from the U.S. government.

BEN NORTON: Absolutely. And Saudi Arabia has carried out many documented war crimes -- according to human rights groups -- with weapons that were sold by the U.S. and the U.K. Saudi Arabia has... we now have documentation that they have used cluster munitions in civilian areas in Yemen.

According to the UN report released last February, which was authored by a panel of experts on the war in Yemen, they documented Saudi-led coalition attacks on hospitals, schools, civilian homes, weddings, you can go down the list, even a humanitarian aid warehouse operated by Oxfam, even a refugee camp, and of course, the U.S. is staunchly supporting this. Not only is the U.S. providing weapons, the U.S. and the U.K. have provided military intelligence to the Saudi-led coalition. And in fact, there were reports that American and British military officials were physically in the command room with Saudi bombers when they were choosing their targets. And then, of course, the U.S. has done more than a thousand refueling sorties for Saudi planes. So several months ago, in October, when Saudi Arabia bombed a funeral and injured and killed up to 600 people, most of whom were civilians, the next day, the U.S. government helped refuel Saudi war planes.

PAUL JAY: But wasn't there a report -- I saw a report that the Obama administration was actually withholding a certain amount of arms sales to the Saudis because of the amount of civilian deaths. We're unlikely to see that under the Trump administration, but is that correct, that the Obama administration had pulled back some arms sales?

BEN NORTON: Well, there was a report that claimed that Secretary of State Kerry at the time, had made a deal with Jubeir, who is the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, and that they claimed that the U.S. was going to stop one U.S. arms sale to Saudi Arabia, which was worth about $1 billion. That may have actually been exaggerated. Reuters released a story quoting Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister, in which he downplayed the significance politically of what happened, and he said that it was mostly a kind of bureaucratic development, it wasn't really a political decision.

But even if that is true, if we give the Obama administration the benefit of the doubt, still the Obama administration did record high arms sales, not just with Saudi Arabia, but with the whole of the Middle East -- especially with very repressive regimes who the State Department acknowledges carry out extreme human rights violations.

So, in the case of Saudi Arabia, in his eight years in office, the Obama administration offered more than $115 billion -- $115 billion with a B -- in arms sales just to Saudi Arabia alone. And, of course, several billion of those have gone to weapons that have been used inside Yemen.

As I mentioned, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have photographic and video evidence of cluster munitions fragments that were made in the U.S. that were in the ruins of civilian areas, of homes and hospitals and such inside Yemen. So there's no question that at the end of the day the Obama administration was fuelling actively the war inside Yemen, which according to the UN, has led to more than 10,000 civilian deaths, and those are only the violent deaths. In fact, UNICEF this week said that last year alone 63,000 children -- this is just children -- 63,000 children died from preventable causes, mostly because of lack of access to medical care and malnutrition.

PAUL JAY: Right.

BEN NORTON: And we now know -- I mean, I've written on this, other people including Patrick Cockburn -- have written on how Saudi Arabia-led coalition backed by the U.S. and the U.K. has intentionally targeted civilian infrastructure, especially food production, inside Yemen, which has led to mass starvation. The UN has repeatedly, for more than year, warned that Yemen is on the brink of famine, and more than 14 million people are going hungry.

So, at the end of the day, the U.S. keeps blaming Iran for this ... but Iran's role in Yemen is very limited, and actually at the end of the day, it's a war led by Saudi Arabia with support from the U.S. and the U.K. against Yemenis. Because the Houthis are Yemenis.

PAUL JAY: Thanks very much for joining us, Ben.

BEN NORTON: Thanks for having me.

PAUL JAY: All right, thanks, Ben. Thank you for joining us on The Real News Network.