International Relations of the Asia-Pacific - Volume 26 Issue 2 - 2026 - How government officials in Malaysia and Indonesia deploy public discourse to manage the risks of intensifying US–China technological rivalry

 International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 

Cover Image for Volume 26, Issue 2

Volume 26  Issue 2

2026

(In Progress)

Article Contents

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. Technological neutrality as a discursive strategy

3. Case selection

4. Research methodology

5. Tracing technological neutrality

6 Conclusion

Acknowledgements

Funding

Footnotes

References

Journal Article

Hedging through discursive strategies: Technological neutrality in Malaysia and Indonesia Open Access

Giacomo Bruni

International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 26, Issue 2, 2026, lcag005, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcag005

Published: 22 May 2026 Article history

Abstract

This article examines how government officials in Malaysia and Indonesia deploy public discourse to manage the risks of intensifying US–China technological rivalry. It conceptualizes technological neutrality as a discursive hedging strategy through which officials present technology policy as impartial to carve out agency amid external pressures and technological lock-in. Drawing on official statements and semi-structured interviews, the study demonstrates that discursive strategies are central to the risk mitigation strategies of secondary states in a contested technological order. While both countries draw on ASEAN's discursive repertoire of neutrality, they mobilize it in distinct ways. In Malaysia, neutrality is explicitly articulated to de-securitize economic interdependence and maintain flexibility in technology partnerships, while in Indonesia it remains implicit, embedded within doctrines of non-alignment and the “free and active” foreign-policy tradition. By showing that discursive strategies are constitutive of hedging, the article advances IR debates on secondary-state agency amid great power technological rivalry.

Issue Section: Article

1. Introduction

During his keynote address at Semicon Southeast Asia 2024 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar bin Ibrahim asserted: “Today, I offer our nation as the most neutral and non-aligned location for semiconductor production to help build a more secure and resilient global semiconductor supply chain” (Strangio 2024). In March 2025, the Malaysian government signed a 10-year, $250 million deal with UK semiconductor manufacturer Arm Holdings to secure access to advanced chip design and technology (Yusof 2025). Commenting on the agreement, Malaysian Economy Minister Mohd Rafizi bin Ramli said that the country’s semiconductor push was purely driven by economic rather than geopolitical calculations. He said: “This is not some grand geopolitical strategy to navigate the trade war or outmaneuver global tech competition” (Yusof 2025). Wong Siew Hai, president of the Malaysia Semiconductor Industry Association, stressed that the agreement would help Malaysia move up the value chain, but also reaffirmed that the country “must stay neutral in the [US–China friction] and be ready to respond to developments from both sides.” (Cao 2025; Yusof 2025).

These examples illustrate how decision makers in secondary states increasingly rely on public discourse to manage risks and assert agency within the context of the technological rivalry between the USA and China. In international relations (IR) literature, these actions are frequently characterized as hedging, understood as the mixed strategies through which states combine cooperative and confrontational elements toward a major or rising power to “address risk in the form of potential security-related threats” (Ciorciari and Haacke 2019: 369). While existing scholarship has largely examined hedging through the lens of material strategies, such as institutional engagement, economic diversification, and alliance balancing, significantly less attention has been paid to systemically analysing the discursive strategies employed by state actors. However, as Haacke (2019: 394) put it, “Words matter and defense white papers, policy statements, and even public diplomacy can provide important clues about security perceptions and assessments.” Examining how states narrate their technological choices in relation to strategic alignment is therefore of central importance for IR scholarship because such narratives illuminate how governments interpret external pressures, justify policy decisions, and carve out agency within contested technological structures.

The study employs a comparative analysis of official discourses in Indonesia and Malaysia, drawing on 122 statements by government officials and 79 semi-structured interviews with policymakers and experts in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. The findings demonstrate that public discourse is central to how officials in secondary states carve out agency amid the structural constraints of great power technological rivalry. Drawing on Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foundational repertoire of neutrality, both countries mobilize technological neutrality as a discursive hedging strategy, yet do so through distinct logics rooted in their respective foreign-policy traditions and domestic political configurations. Malaysian officials explicitly invoke neutrality to de-securitize economic interdependence and preserve flexibility in technology partnerships. Indonesian officials, by contrast, embed neutrality implicitly within the “free and active” foreign-policy doctrine to reassert sovereign autonomy and resist technological dependence. Similar structural pressures do not produce uniform discursive responses, showing that material conditions alone cannot explain how secondary states hedge. The form that hedging takes is shaped by how officials narrate technological choices, invoke historical traditions, and construct claims of impartiality. This points to a broader insight for IR: discursive strategies are central to how secondary state agency is constructed, exercised, and sustained amid intensifying great power rivalry.

The article proceeds as follows. First, it conceptualizes technological neutrality as a discursive strategy, situating it within IR debates on hedging and secondary state agency, while outlining the rationale for selecting Malaysia and Indonesia. Second, it details the methodological approach, including data collection, coding and analysis procedures, and analytical limitations. Third, it conducts a comparative analysis of the two case studies by examining official discourse along two dimensions: the logics through which decision makers describe risks and constraints, and the factors they frame as drivers for opportunities. In both cases, the discourse analysis is complemented by insights from semi-structured, multi-stakeholder interviews. The article concludes by synthesising the findings and reflecting on their implications for the literature on hedging as well as broader IR debates on secondary state agency amid great power rivalry.

2. Technological neutrality as a discursive strategy

Technological neutrality has been frequently used across regulatory and policy debates, but remains undertheorized in IR. This article situates technological neutrality within broader dynamics of hedging, risk mitigation, and secondary states’ strategies, defining it as:

A discursive strategy through which government officials choose to signal the procurement and regulation of technology as being impartial, with the objective of carving out agency amid the structural constraints of great power rivalry and technological lock-in.

Existing scholarship in legal studies uses the concept of technological neutrality in reference to the normative assumption that regulations should promote statutory longevity and should neither discriminate against nor favor any specific technological applications. Discussions on the necessity and feasibility of technology-neutral regulations can be found across different subfields, including studies on the regulation of information and communication technology (Koops et al. 2006; Reed 2007; Greenberg 2015), international trade (Gagliani 2020; Shadikhodjaev 2021; Kwak 2022), and climate change policy (Azar and Sandén 2011; Sandin, Munthe, and Edvardsson Björnberg 2022).

Beyond regulatory discussions, the notion that digital technologies are not neutral but rather highly politicized is “hardly a contested statement” (Dunn Cavelty and Wenger 2020: 11). The Science and Technology Studies (STS) tradition has for decades offered critical insights into understanding “technological artefacts” as sites where power relations are materially instantiated (Winner 1980; Behrent 2013). Design processes embed developers’ intentions, norms, and values, while broader structural forces shape the desirability and configuration of particular technological forms (Behrent 2013; Dunn Cavelty and Wenger 2020). The notion that technologies are embedded within power structures therefore renders claims of technological neutrality inherently political. It is precisely for this reason that understanding why and how decision makers in secondary states deploy claims of technological neutrality as part of their hedging strategies amid great power rivalry becomes analytically significant.

Technological neutrality emerges as a strategic claim against the backdrop of the increasing weaponization of interdependence in the context of great power rivalry (Farrell and Newman 2019; Chen and Evers 2023). These dependencies are further entrenched by technological lock-in effects, as economic dynamics, network mechanisms, educational influences, and governance structures compound the structural constraints facing secondary states.1 Discursive strategies acquire importance because they enable decision makers in secondary states to perform impartiality and signal autonomy even as material constraints grow more acute. Examining how discursive strategies function as a mechanism for risk mitigation and policy adaptation directly contributes to the expanding literature on hedging in IR. As Haacke (2019: 394–95) observes, official discourses are a pivotal element of risk mitigation strategies because they provide a primary indicator of both threat perception and strategic intent. In this perspective, “words matter,” and the analysis of official discourses is indispensable for identifying and comparing how secondary states exercise agency in foreign technology procurement.

This article shows how discourse functions as tools of agency under structural constraints, enabling secondary states to frame technological choices in ways that preserve autonomy, resist external dominance, and justify adaptive policy shifts in response to geopolitical pressures. This understanding builds on the literature on strategic narratives, which examines how state actors construct overarching storylines to project order, identity, and legitimacy (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2014; Noort and Colley 2021). Yet rather than treating technological neutrality as a coherent narrative arc, this article highlights its role as a discursive strategy: a flexible repertoire of meanings invoked tactically to maintain ambiguity, manage risk, and preserve strategic agency (Hansen 2006; Dunn and Neumann 2016). This perspective brings into view the discursive dimension of hedging, allowing analysis of how officials in secondary states deliberately adapt regional traditions of neutrality to national contexts, and showing that discursive strategies are constitutive of hedging (Kuik 2016, 2023b; Haacke 2019).

3. Case selection

This article employs a most similar comparative case study design. Malaysia and Indonesia share key background conditions, including founding ASEAN membership, comparable structural exposure to US–China technological rivalry, and a common regional discursive repertoire, yet differ in their foreign policy tradition and domestic political configurations, among other factors. The comparison aims at analytical rather than statistical generalization, using empirical findings to refine theoretical propositions about how shared regional frameworks are adapted to distinct national contexts (Yin 2018). The analysis follows “the method of structured, focused comparison,” systematically examining similarities and divergences across the two cases to develop and refine theoretical propositions about how shared regional frameworks are adapted to distinct national contexts and deployed as part of hedging (George and Bennett 2005: 68–72). A single case would not permit this comparison, while a larger number of cases would foreclose the depth of discursive analysis the article requires. The goal is not to replicate entire causal chains across cases, but to “translate” parts of the argument to new contexts, generating theoretical insights into the discursive dimensions of hedging even as substantive manifestations vary (Simmons and Smith 2026: 116).

The choice of Malaysia and Indonesia as case studies stems from three main factors. First, in official discourse, the framing of Southeast Asian countries as neutral, non-aligned, and independent from foreign influence has been a central regional theme since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. As Stubbs (2008: 456–7) notes, neutrality is among the central ideas that became institutionalized at the core of ASEAN’s approach to regional and IRs. The emphasis on neutrality was formally expressed in the 1971 “Declaration of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality” (ZOPFAN) (‘Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration’ 1971), in which ASEAN’s founding members affirmed: “the neutralization of South East Asia is a desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about its realization.” Since then, neutrality has remained a foundational discursive framework in ASEAN, shaping discourses around foreign engagement and continuing to attract scholarly attention (Emmers 2018).

In the current geopolitical context, discourses on ASEAN neutrality are used by regional countries as strategic tools to exercise agency. As Kuik (2021: 301) notes, while smaller and weaker states, including ASEAN members, typically describe their policies as “non-aligned,” “neutral,” or “equidistant,” they are in fact hedging in various forms because “hedging is a policy that is implemented without pronouncement.” Figiaconi (2025) suggests that such behavior reflects a broader pattern in which hedging operates as a distinct category of neutrality, enabling secondary states to preserve room for maneuver by actively managing risk rather than simply abstaining from alignment.

This article contends that ASEAN’s regional discursive foundations of neutrality constitute a key component of the risk mitigation strategies employed by Southeast Asian states. While grounded in regional frameworks, these discourses are reinterpreted at the national level in light of domestic factors. Whether and how secondary states in Southeast Asia deploy this discursive strategy varies across cases, for, as Haacke (2019: 393) argues, the specific hedging strategies adopted by states depend on their respective degrees of risk aversion, capacities, opportunities, and constraints. In this context, technological neutrality emerges as an evolving discursive repertoire through which governments link national priorities to the overarching regional narrative of neutrality. Among ASEAN countries, Malaysia and Indonesia were selected because they are founding members and have contributed to the emergence and evolution of regional discursive frameworks on neutrality, from which the discursive strategy of technological neutrality is derived.

The second reason for selecting Malaysia and Indonesia as case studies is that Asia-Pacific countries, and more specifically Southeast Asian ones, are central to IR debates on hedging and to broader discussions of how secondary states manage the intensifying pressures of great power rivalry. Their prominence makes them ideal cases for tracing whether, how, and why decision makers adopt discursive strategies of technological neutrality as part of hedging. Regional countries have long served as key cases for understanding risk mitigation strategies in the face of heightened great power rivalry, shaping foundational contributions to the hedging literature (Medeiros 2005; Foot 2006; Goh 2006). Over the decades, they have remained pivotal in comparative analyses of hedging (Ciorciari 2019; Korolev 2019; Marston 2024), including studies of Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s hedging strategies (Kuik 2023a; Yan 2023). Recent work has also begun to examine how regional actors recalibrate their strategies in response to the intensifying technological rivalry between the USA and China (Kuik 2024; Zhao 2025; Yang and Kim 2026). By examining technological neutrality as a discursive strategy, this article deepens understanding of how hedging countries use discourse to manage the risks of great power technological rivalry and preserve strategic agency.

Third, Malaysia and Indonesia stand out among ASEAN member states in terms of their democratic characteristics while differing in recent political trajectories. The V-Dem Institute 2026 democracy report places both countries in regime “grey zones” (Nord et al. 2026). Malaysia is classified as a lower-bound electoral democracy (ED−) and a “near miss” for democratization, following a decade of statistically significant improvement on the liberal democracy index. Indonesia is classified as an upper-bound electoral autocracy (EA+), having officially transitioned from a democracy in 2024 following a ten-year decline in civil liberties and judicial checks. Despite these diverging trajectories, they rank 88th and 99th globally, placing them at the higher end of the regional spectrum in East Asia and the Pacific. This combination of shared “gray zone” positioning and symmetrically divergent political trajectories makes them theoretically valuable cases for analysing how the structural constraints of great power rivalry interact with secondary state agency.

4. Research methodology

This study adopts a discourse analytical approach grounded on the ontological assumption that public discourses and policy are deeply interconnected (Hansen 2006: 25). Discourses are here understood as “systems of meaning-production that fix meaning, however temporarily, and enable actors to make sense of the world and to act within it.” (Dunn and Neumann 2016: 4). From this follows the epistemological corollary that the systematic analysis of official documents is indispensable for uncovering foreign policy discourses (Hansen 2006: 23). In practical terms, this approach entails analysing government publications, official meeting records, and public speeches to understand how decision makers in secondary states interpret and respond to the technological rivalry between great powers.

The analysis of official discourses followed the “three-step method” suggested by Dunn and Neumann (2016: 8). The first step consisted of delimiting the discourse to “a wide but manageable range of sources and timeframes.” To examine whether and how decision makers in selected countries adopt discursive strategies on technological neutrality, the selection of the range of sources followed Hansen’s research methodological insights. This article focuses on text produced by “political leaders with official authority to sanction the foreign policies pursued as well as those with central roles in executing these policies, for instance high-ranked military staff, senior civil servants (including diplomats and mediators), and heads of international institutions.” (Hansen 2006: 60). Particularly, it examines texts that “are characterized by the clear articulation of identities and policies; they are widely read and attended to; and they have the formal authority to define a political position.” (Hansen 2006: 85).

The timeframe for analysis spans from 2015 to 2024. This methodological decision followed Dunn and Neumann’s (2016: 94) suggestion to identify so-called “cutoff points”. For the purpose of this article, the cutoff point is the 2015 announcement of China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR), the technological arm of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Cheney 2019). Southeast Asian countries top the list of DSR-related Chinese investments. Carrozza’s (2025) analysis of Chinese texts and official discourse unveils the DSR’s normative component, suggesting that the overarching intended outcome of investments and projects stands in the promotion of China’s vision of cyber sovereignty and digital governance in DSR recipient countries. The 2015 launch of China’s DSR therefore is the cutoff point because it leads to technological investments pouring into recipient countries and, most importantly, it triggers the discursive strategies adopted by decision makers in response to such initiatives. This choice is consistent with the overarching objective of this article, which is to identify why and how decision makers in selected countries adopt discursive strategies on technological neutrality to mitigate the risks resulting from intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the USA and China in the Asia–Pacific region.

The collection of texts was undertaken using a structured methodological approach. For each country, relevant ministries overseeing digital technology policies were identified through a systematic analysis of national strategies and action plans. The official government websites of these ministries provided the primary sources for collecting, organizing, and coding official statements and speeches delivered by representatives from Malaysia and Indonesia. The analysis focused on deconstructing state-led discourses concerning the domestic development and foreign procurement of digital technology. Particular attention was given to discursive constructions of strategic alignment, the interplay between economic and security considerations within ASEAN, engagements with major powers, and broader representations of digital technology procurement and regulation. This examination was further supplemented with official statements made by representatives of the selected case study countries in international forums, including the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) and the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. As Dunn and Neumann (2016: 101), drawing on Milliken’s (1999) framework, note: “an analysis can be said to be complete (or ‘validated’) when, upon adding new texts, one finds that the theoretical categories one has generated also work for those new texts.” For both Malaysia and Indonesia, the volume, detail, and temporal distribution of the collected data were more than sufficient to conduct a robust analysis of their explicit or implicit adoption of technological neutrality in official discourse. On this basis, the final dataset for the discourse analysis comprises 166 documents produced between 2015 and 2024.

The data collection process presented two principal challenges. First, written records of speeches delivered by government representatives were occasionally unavailable on official ministerial websites, despite public evidence indicating that such statements had been made. In certain instances, the absence of documents corresponding to specific time periods appeared to reflect political considerations. Notably, at times, the availability of official texts aligned closely with changes in administration, suggesting selective archival or publication practices by certain ministries. Second, the volume and frequency of relevant materials varied significantly across case study countries. This disparity is unlikely to stem from deliberate omission by the respective governments, but rather appears to reflect differing national orientations toward digital technology. As elaborated in subsequent sections, Malaysian policymakers, for instance, have consistently and explicitly articulated a commitment to technological neutrality, in contrast to their Indonesian counterparts. Furthermore, in both countries, a clear increase in the availability of speeches and policy documents was observed in the later years of the 2015–24 period. This trend may indicate a growing institutional prioritization of digital technology issues over time, potentially reflecting broader regional and global developments in the digital policy landscape.

The second step suggested by Dunn and Neumann (2016: 8) is the identification of “the representations that comprise the discourse.” To ensure analytical depth and triangulation, the process of identifying key discursive representations regarding the domestic development and foreign procurement of digital technologies was supported by a total of 79 semi-structured interviews conducted by the research group in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, as well as several rounds of stakeholder dialogues.2 Interview participants were purposively sampled to ensure representation across government, industry, civil society, and academia, and interviews continued until thematic saturation was reached. The interviews provided direct access to local stakeholders involved in the foreign-policy processes of the case study countries. They yielded rich, contextualized evidence that triangulated findings from the discourse analysis and illuminated underlying motivations, domestic debates, and the practical implications of divergent national readings of regional neutrality and non-alignment. These interactions played a crucial role in inductively informing the research design, refining the analytical framework, and validating the emerging themes identified in the discourse analysis of official documents.

The third and final step of analysis entails examining how officials adjust and reframe discourse in ways that reveal its layered structure (Dunn and Neumann 2016: 8). The analysis relied on an iterative interplay between deductive and inductive coding. An initial deductive coding guide, grounded in the research objectives and preliminary desk research, was continually refined in light of themes emerging inductively from the fieldwork interviews. The coding guide is organized into thematic sections including policy processes, normative claims, strategic alignments, references to foreign actors, and specific technology domains to ensure systematic identification of how governments articulate their digital and foreign-policy priorities. The analytical narratives presented in the empirical sections draw directly from the combined deductive–inductive coding process, through which patterns in how technological neutrality was articulated were systematically identified across the two case studies. Borrowing from Hansen and Wæver’s (2003) concept of layered discourse, the remainder of this article focuses on the comparative analysis of Malaysia and Indonesia to examine whether, how, and why officials in the case study countries integrate discourses on technological neutrality in their national discursive frameworks.

5. Tracing technological neutrality

The comparative analysis of official statements by government officials in Malaysia and Indonesia reveals three discursive trends across cases. First, between 2015 and 2024, the number of documents containing references to national autonomy in technology increased over time, with leaders strategically choosing to stress independence from foreign influence as the US–China rivalry intensified. Second, officials in both countries deliberately incorporated regional narratives into their national discourses, suggesting that regional historical legacies and shared discourses are actively mobilized as strategic resources to shape ASEAN member states’ responses to a contested geopolitical landscape. Third, Malaysian and Indonesian officials consistently framed their strategies around the shared objectives of maximizing economic gains and mitigating security risks.

Despite these common trends, the discursive strategies of the two countries differ in several aspects. This variation reflects Haacke’s (2019: 393) argument that “…hedging strategies may vary in practice, not least because the appetite to manage risk, relevant capacities, as well as opportunities and constraints, and the ways chosen to do so will vary among states.” Analysing official discourses is therefore essential, as it shows how decision makers actively shape the articulation of these factors and strategically frame the pathways through which they choose to manage them.

To examine whether, how, and why decision makers in Malaysia and Indonesia have adopted or not the discursive strategy of technological neutrality, this article compares their official discourses across two dimensions. First, it examines how official discourse presents the risks and constraints shaping policy choices, focusing on the logics through which decision makers describe technological dependence, geopolitical pressures, and domestic vulnerabilities. Second, it examines how the same discourse portrays opportunities and capacities by highlighting the factors officials frame as drivers rooted in national strengths, anticipated gains, and the institutional and material resources available to pursue them. In both cases, the mapping of official discourses across these two dimensions is followed by an analysis of fieldwork interviews to validate and deepen the interpretation, thereby identifying the political identities, economic priorities, and foreign-policy repertoires that underlie each country’s discursive approach to technological neutrality.

5.1 Malaysia

The discursive representations adopted by government officials in Malaysia evolve from the country’s tendency to engage in hedging strategies. In the context of the technological rivalry between the USA and China, the documents centre on the overarching objective to maximize the economic benefits of foreign partnership while mitigating the security risks associated with technological dependencies. The analysis shows that, upon experiencing increased external pressures, Malaysian decision makers adopt technological neutrality as a discursive strategy. The rounds of interviews conducted in Kuala Lumpur with different stakeholders provide insight into the reasoning behind this embrace of technological neutrality in official discourse, highlighting how leaders sought to justify their choices and manage competing expectations. The next paragraphs first trace the logics through which risks and constraints are framed and then analyses the discursive representations used to describe the factors considered as drivers for opportunities. The analysis then draws on interview material to deepen interpretation and identify the political identities, economic priorities, and foreign-policy repertoires that underlie Malaysia’s discursive approach to technological neutrality.

The articulation of risks and constraints forms the first pillar of the comparative analysis, highlighting the logics through which Malaysian officials frame technological dependence, geopolitical pressures, and domestic vulnerabilities within their broader strategic discourses. A first overarching trend in this regard is the fact that decision makers articulated discourses related to technological risks by focusing on traditional security concerns such as the maintenance of peace and security in Southeast Asia amid emerging new formations such as AUKUS (Saifuddin bin 2021). Within this context, throughout the timeframe of analysis, there is a recurring focus on cybersecurity matters. That stems from the recognition that “Cyber security should become the priority of every nation, especially on matters underlying economic and national security” (Muhyiddin 2021). Cybersecurity is framed as “… a strategic challenge, which needs to be pursued in a comprehensive manner” (Madius Tangau 2016a), and, following global trends, cyberspace is considered as “…the fifth domain apart of land, seas, air and space that need to be safeguarded” (EU-Malaysia Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2018). Despite ample discussions on cybersecurity, public discourses did not directly address the security vulnerabilities associated with technological dependencies. This signals a different discursive strategy to the case of Indonesia, where, as later discussed, decision makers over time re-focused their discourses on the security risks related to critical supply chains. On the contrary, framing security challenges primarily through the lens of cybersecurity suggests an intention on the part of Malaysian officials to confine security discussions to a technical and military domain. This separation signals a strategic choice to compartmentalize economic engagement from security debates and to avoid securitizing trade, investment, or technological partnerships.

A second feature of Malaysia’s discourse on technological risks and constraints is the rejection of hard security commitments and, in relation to US–China technological rivalry, the intention to maintain close but independent security collaborations. Despite shared concerns among Southeast Asian countries about China’s growing interference in regional security dynamics, Malaysian officials still frame China as a key bilateral partner with strong business and cultural ties (Mohammad Najib bin Abdul Razak 2016). That includes joint statements affirming that “…the two countries have been good neighbours for hundreds of years, true friends with sincerity and partners of win-win cooperation” (Qiang and Anwar bin Ibrahim 2024). The USA is described as a crucial partner to secure Malaysia’s “economic vibrancy and national security interests” (Anwar bin Ibrahim 2023), stressing the importance of military cooperation “…crossing between the physical and virtual domains…” and the importance of expertise sharing “… as military doctrines, rules, and norms develop in cyber space.” (Mohammad Najib bin Abdul Razak 2017). These discursive representations point to a deliberate attempt to maintain equidistance amid great-power rivalry, balancing positive portrayals of both China and the USA in ways that preserve Malaysia’s strategic autonomy.

A third pattern in Malaysia’s discourse in regard to security risks is the active pursuit of diversified security partnerships beyond China and the USA. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar bin Ibrahim described Russia as a “…cultural, intellectual, and scientific force” that “…pushed the boundaries of possibility, from pioneering efforts in space exploration to ground-breaking work in nuclear physics and cybernetics.” (Anwar bin Ibrahim 2024) He situated this statement within Malaysia’s broader effort to preserve stability amid geopolitical turmoil and to sustain external partnerships grounded in trade and economic exchange. He argued that “We are witnessing a troubling trend of protectionism that threatens to fragment the global economy. The rise of tariffs, trade barriers, and restrictions on technological exchange constitute troubling developments.” (Anwar bin Ibrahim 2024) Similar discourses accompanied the country’s efforts to strengthen ties with Japan, claiming that “Malaysia will continue to draw lessons from Japan’s vast experience and expertise in automation, robotics, artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things.” (Mohamed Azmin bin Ali 2021) The promotion of alternative security partnerships via renewed economic relations was also central in Malaysia’s engagement strategies with the EU (EU-Malaysia Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2018), Australia (Morrison and Muhyiddin 2021), and South Korea (Anwar bin Ibrahim 2023). Overall, the discourses of Malaysian officials on security risks and constraints align with the country’s broader intention to hedge among multiple foreign partners while actively avoiding unilateral security commitments.

The second comparative dimension examines how Malaysian officials articulate opportunities and capacities by identifying key factors they frame as drivers rooted in national strengths, anticipated economic gains, and the institutional and material resources available for managing technological rivalry. Between 2015 and 2024, official discourses highlight the attraction of foreign investment as a central driver of technological development. While still centred on maximizing the economic benefits of foreign partnerships, the analysis points to a gradual reconfiguration of Malaysia’s strategic discourse. Over the years, even as officials continued to stress the importance of foreign investment for the country’s economic trajectory, they increasingly paired this with an emphasis on Malaysia’s ambition to move up in critical supply chains. It is within this evolving discursive context, and in connection with the broader imperative to mitigate the security risks outlined earlier, that officials chose to present the country as “technologically neutral.”

One critical example in that regard is the semiconductor industry, where government officials from the Anwar administration argued that Malaysia is and will remain “the most neutral and non-aligned location for semiconductor production” (Strangio 2024; Cao 2025). The motivation behind this discursive choice was clearly stated by the Minister of Investment, Trade And Industry (MITI) at the launch of Semicon Southeast Asia 2024, where he affirmed “Malaysia’s firm stand on geopolitical neutrality, coupled with its adept investment diplomacy, further enhances its attractiveness as a global semiconductor hub” (Tengku Zafrul bin Tengku Abdul Aziz 2024b). On an earlier occasion, the Minister explicitly referred to technological neutrality as a key element of Malaysia’s economic success in specific sectors, which was reflected in the way officials reframed the country’s technological capacity. He explained: “Malaysia has for decades prospered due to its value proposition–a strategically located, safe and neutral haven for businesses and investors, amidst the complexities of global geopolitics. We have consistently outshone our regional neighbours on various metrics, including political stability, ease of doing business, competitiveness, physical and digital infrastructure and most importantly, rule of law.” (Tengku Zafrul bin Tengku Abdul Aziz 2024a). Malaysia’s technologically neutral approach encapsulates the overarching political objective to present the country as reliable, technologically advanced and equidistant amid increased great power rivalry.

The discourse presenting Malaysia as technologically neutral marks a substantial reorientation from earlier statements that emphasized securing foreign investment rather than highlighting domestic economic successes and technological advancements. In 2016, for example, the Minister of Science, Technology, and Innovation (MOSTI) claimed that Malaysia failed to play a central role in previous industrial revolutions by saying “In simple words, our role was restricted to being a user and assembler of technologies rather than inventors and innovators.” (Madius Tangau 2016b). Elaborating on the main problems faced by the country in regard to technological advancements, he said “The biggest problem in our STI ecosystem seems to be the proverbial story of about four people named Everybody, Somebody, Anybody, and Nobody. Everybody thought that Anybody could do it, but Nobody realized that Everybody wouldn’t do it. It ended up that Everybody blamed Somebody when Nobody did what Anybody could have done.” (Madius Tangau 2016b). This rhetorical figure highlighted shortcomings in strategic planning and the inefficiency of bureaucratic and political processes. Indepedent of whether such challenges continue to exist or not, they no longer feature prominently in official discourses in the most recent years examined. Instead, particularly between 2021 and 2024, Malaysian officials increasingly emphasize the country’s role as a key actor in the re-configuration of global supply chains.

The interviews shed light on how policymakers and other stakeholders themselves make sense of these risks and opportunities and link them to Malaysia’s political identities, economic priorities, and foreign-policy outlook. First, interviewees provided insights about the role of domestic factors in shaping technological neutrality discourses. They suggested that the country’s neutral approach to technology is primarily an economically informed discursive strategy, which indeed appears to be widely supported by business communities. A business representative summarized its support saying “we are not USA, we are not China, we serve globally, many locations, we are neutral” (Malaysia interview 26 2024). They stressed that the reputation of private business partially depends on Malaysia’s ability to maintain neutrality and remain “…a safe spot in the rivalry.” Malaysia’s neutral stance is indeed believed to be pivotal in attracting foreign investments (Malaysia interview 20 2024; Malaysia interview 31 2024). The emergence of technological neutrality, and the accompanying shift toward presenting Malaysia as a reliable economic partner, appears connected to the desire to play a more proactive role, pursue a development model rooted in local needs, and advance an indigenous technological trajectory (Malaysia interview 12 2024). As an official put it discussing the Malaysian government’s approach to cybersecurity, that unique approach would be rooted in the country hedging between great powers. He claimed: “We leveraged the relationships and facilitated the investments [and partnerships].” “Instead of choosing between the West and East, we facilitated both.” (Malaysia interview 30 2024).

The interviewees stressed the impact of temporal considerations in policymaking, explaining that officials interpret and implement technological neutrality with specific time horizons in mind. Rather than treating technological neutrality as a fixed position, they view it as a strategy whose value depends on the geopolitical conditions of the moment and on the opportunities expected to arise over the next years. Interviewees claimed that Malaysia had not been passively affected by the bilateral escalatory measures adopted by China and the USA, but, on the contrary, had been actively benefiting from the realignment of global supply chains (Malaysia interview 29 2024). For instance, they explained that Malaysia was not constrained by the high technology military bans adopted by the USA (Malaysia interview 06 2024), pointing at “Biden’s friend-shoring incentives” and increased Chinese investment in Southeast Asia as sizeable opportunities for Malaysia (Malaysia interview 02 2023). The promotion of a neutral approach, as it appeared increasingly in official discourses in the second half of the period analysed, was described as instrumental for securing renewed security partnerships, for example, with the USA, Germany, Japan, South Korea, China, and Thailand (Malaysia interview 15 2024). Crucially, several interviewees emphasized that policymakers see a 5- to 10-year window during which Malaysia can take advantage of the current geopolitical conditions and climb up the value chain (Malaysia interview 26 2024; Malaysia interview 28 2024). This temporal perspective clarifies that technological neutrality emerges as a strategically timed discursive strategy used by decision makers to frame and justify Malaysia’s hedging strategies amid a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment.

5.2 Indonesia

The discursive representations adopted by government officials in Indonesia align closely with long-standing national narrative frameworks. Public statements on economic matters emphasize domestic development through digital connectivity and are discursively linked to security narratives portraying Indonesia’s foreign policy as “free and active” and “non-aligned.” The official discourse contains references to ASEAN non-alignment, independence, and autonomy but, unlike in Malaysia, makes only limited mention of technological neutrality. However, interviews conducted in Jakarta with a range of stakeholders reveal that several interviewees, including government officials and bureaucrats, nonetheless characterized Indonesia’s approach to domestic development and foreign procurement as rooted in technological neutrality. These insights suggest that, although technological neutrality may not be explicitly articulated in official documents and public statements, it implicitly informs and shapes the country’s approach to technological procurement and regulation in ways that align with Indonesia’s enduring policy frameworks. Indonesian officials therefore appear to have purposefully chosen not to foreground technological neutrality as a distinct discursive strategy.

As in the Malaysian case, the analysis first considers how Indonesian officials outline the risks and constraints shaping their strategic environment, tracing the logics through which they frame technological dependence, regional power dynamics, and domestic vulnerabilities. It reveals that, over time, the public statements of Indonesian officials included an increasing amount of direct references to security issues, indicating a partial reframing of economic discourses through a security lens. External factors, including the intensification of great power rivalry over technology and the related securitization of economic dynamics, help explain the rearticulation of Indonesia’s official discourse. A central feature of Indonesia’s discourse on risks and constraints, one that differs from Malaysia’s, is the framing of economic self-reliance as a core national security imperative, expressed in the commitment to preserve independence and avoid technological dependence on external powers. This emphasis resonates with Indonesia’s enduring foreign-policy narratives centred on autonomy and non-alignment. At the same time, it introduces a significant discursive shift during the period examined, namely a stronger focus on attaining self-reliance through the development and adoption of locally designed and manufactured technologies. This discourse becomes particularly prominent from 2022 onwards. In 2022, for instance, the Minister of National Development Planning (PPN) Suharso Monoarfa stated that in the context of digital transformation the government would prioritize domestically produced goods and services in public procurement. He emphasized that: “On domestic products, we want truly domestic ones not imported products with local packaging,” (Suharso Monoarfa 2022).

The focus of official discourses on the risks connected to technological dependencies and supply-chain self-reliance has grown even more pronounced since President Prabowo Subianto assumed office in October 2024. During the 39th Trade Expo Indonesia (TEI) Opening Ceremony, President Subianto claimed: “…we must be able to protect our domestic market and sell our products, so that we can dominate the domestic market and expand into foreign markets” (Prabowo Subianto 2024b). At the Inauguration of Indonesia Digital Test House (IDTH), the President stressed that Indonesia “… must not merely be a market. Instead, we must become a player, a producer.” (Prabowo Subianto 2024a) On the same occasion he expressed his concerns with respect to the mismatch between Indonesia’s economic contribution to ASEAN’s economy and its continued reliance on foreign technology. Referring to the share of Apple suppliers among Southeast Asian countries, he said “…our GDP is the largest in ASEAN. Indonesia contributes 46 percent of ASEAN’s GDP, but we only have two suppliers. Why are we doing nothing? Why are you doing nothing? Surprised? It is concerning, but it is a big task that we must do. Other countries can have tens of suppliers, while we, once again, only have two. Therefore, we must improve the capability of our local technology industry.” (Prabowo Subianto 2024a) These remarks illustrate that Indonesia’s discourses differ from Malaysia’s, where decision makers choose to articulate risks and constraints by maintaining a clear separation between development rhetoric and security debates, in a deliberate effort to prevent the securitization of economic and technological partnerships. By contrast, discourses centred on national development through digital connectivity are increasingly securitized in Indonesia to signal a perceived need to reduce technological dependence on foreign actors.

The second comparative angle focuses on how Indonesian officials depict opportunities and capacities by identifying key factors framed as drivers in national assets, economic prospects, and the institutional and material resources underpinning Indonesia’s digital and strategic ambitions. In this regard, the discourses adopted by Indonesian officials centre on the interconnected themes of development and connectivity, which are crucial for understanding how technological choices are framed not only as tools of national progress but also as strategies to maintain autonomy and impartiality amid great power rivalry. Over the timeframe of analysis, the official discourse presents two main overarching pillars: the pursuit of national development through digital connectivity and the aspiration to position Indonesia as a regional leader in the digital economy. President Joko Widodo’s 2016 State Address, delivered on the occasion of the 71st anniversary of Indonesia’s independence in 2016, serves as a key example of how these two themes have long informed the country’s official discourse on digital technology development (Joko Widodo 2016). On this occasion, President Widodo outlined the government’s ambition to make Indonesia a “winner nation,” emphasizing the central role of physical infrastructural development. At the same time, he argued that, in order to take an “active part” in the “global economy race,” rather than figure as a mere spectator, Indonesia needed to complement physical infrastructure with “social infrastructural development namely productive capacity and human resources.” He further articulated the aspiration to “… make Indonesia the largest digital economy country in Southeast Asia….” Throughout the timeframe of analysis, even as economic and technological issues become increasingly linked to security concerns, Indonesian officials continue to frame digital connectivity primarily as an enabler of national development and a means to strengthen Indonesia’s regional economic leadership.

The analysis indicates that, while tailoring their discourse to domestic and international audiences, Indonesian officials maintained a consistent focus on developmental goals. Although security considerations have become more salient in discussions of technological dependence, domestic statements continue to link digital connectivity to the strategic goal to “improve digital connectivity across Indonesia, including in the frontier, outermost, and underdeveloped regions” (Ministry of Communications and Informatics 2021). This priority is sometimes underscored through rhetorical imagery, as in Minister Johnny G. Plate’s 2021 comment: “We will not let village heads climb trees to join a virtual meeting, video conference call.” In extension to domestic narratives, speeches in international fora situate digital connectivity within a global development agenda. At the 2022 G20 proceedings, President Widodo called upon member states “to mobilize investment to build affordable digital infrastructure for all.” (Joko Widodo 2022). At the BRI Forum meeting in Beijing in 2023, he opened his speech by affirming that “connectivity is the path to prosperity” in the current global context (Joko Widodo 2023). Overall, unlike Malaysia, where officials have increasingly paired development rhetoric with a clear ambition to move up critical supply chains, Indonesian discourse continues to centre inward on development and connectivity as the primary means of articulating opportunities and capacities to advance the country’s digital and strategic ambitions.

Interviews in Jakarta clarify how government officials and other stakeholders interpret both the risks and opportunities outlined in public discourse and relate them to Indonesia’s implicit approach to technological neutrality. These conversations show that, despite rare explicit references in official statements, government officials do understand Indonesia’s stance in these terms. As one interviewee explained, “Indonesia’s approach resonates with technology neutrality, avoiding explicit alignment with specific preferences” (Indonesia interview 39 2023). Interviewees explained that “The absence of official statements on specific technology preferences underscores Indonesia’s commitment to remaining adaptable in the ever-evolving technological landscape.” (Indonesia interview 39 2023). They further noted that “the concept of Indonesia’s ‘free and active foreign policy’ reflects a pragmatic approach,” which “… allows Indonesia to navigate complex geopolitical landscapes, making pragmatic choices that benefit the country’s economic and strategic objectives.” (Indonesia interview 41 2023). Indonesia’s implicit promotion of technological neutrality has emerged partly in response to the escalation of great power rivalry in Southeast Asia and the “…perceived pressure to choose between major global players.” (Indonesia interview 43 2023). A common rhetorical image used in this regard is the depiction of Indonesia as a neutral technology actor seeking to bridge rather than align with any particular side. Ultimately, officials frame the adoption of a technologically neutral stance as a nuanced approach that “prioritizes both economic growth and safeguarding national sovereignty, especially in the context of transformative technologies like 5G.” (Indonesia interview 39 2023).

Second, interviews with state officials shed light on the structural challenges faced by Indonesia, the impact of these on the country’s stance on technological neutrality, and how officials have rearticulated related discourses over time. The overarching narrative is that “Indonesia stands firm in adopting a nuanced approach that avoids exclusive alignment with either side” (Indonesia interview 39 2023). However, interviewees communicated a shared preoccupation with the escalation of the technological rivalry between great powers, recognizing that, while strategically flexible, Indonesia’s stance of technological neutrality “…can be a challenge during geopolitical conflicts” (Indonesia interview 38 2023). Officials expressed concerns with specific challenges “…especially in the areas of cybersecurity and geopolitics.” They argued that while decision makers are considering policy changes to better “…navigate the new tech cold war,” the priority remains “to maintain a free and neutral policy, strengthening our position within ASEAN and fostering collaboration” (Indonesia interview 43 2023). High-level officials underscored ongoing efforts to diversify technological partnerships, stressed that Indonesia has “ten bilateral agreements with major players like the US, EU, China, and ASEAN,” and that the country’s approach remains “neutral, with no product limitations based on origin as long as they comply with relevant regulations.” (Indonesia Interview 45 2023). Officials’ stronger reliance on technological neutrality in private conversations and the growing emphasis on security in public discourse both seem to signal an increasing preoccupation with the intensification of technological rivalry.

Third, the interviews with other local stakeholders from business, civil society, and academia further nuance understandings of Indonesia’s technological neutrality and unveil different contextual interpretations. In business communities, there is a diffuse sense of concern with respect to the rivalry between the USA and China (Indonesia interview 12 2023) and the recognition that engagements with foreign companies require “a delicate balance that upholds Indonesia’s interests and aligns with its long-term goals” (Indonesia interview 13 2023). Interviewees in the business sector framed their approach as focused “…on technical and price considerations rather than strictly adhering to geopolitical considerations” as primary factors in decision-making (Indonesia interview 19 2023). While there is a general acknowledgment about “Indonesia’s inclination towards China in the business sector,” there is also a recognition that “Despite business tendencies, we highlight the government’s more neutral position in geopolitical matters.” (Indonesia interview 21 2023).

Differently from the emphasis on geopolitical pragmatism emerging from the discourses of business communities, stakeholders from civil society and academia share a focus on Indonesia’s security vulnerabilities in their discourses on technological neutrality. While recognizing the necessity to manage great-power rivalry and prioritize economic development, interviewees warned about the potential to obscure the “full extent of the competition’s implications” (Indonesia interview 02 2023). That would entail recognizing that short-term economic benefits could lead “to the dependency of technology on a single country,” pointing at the necessity for Indonesia to develop a balanced strategy centred on the development of “our own technology” (Indonesia interview 22 2023). Related to the promotion of indigenous technology is the fact that “the development of technical skills inside the organization, the cultivation of local knowledge, and the implementation of stringent security measures are all crucial” (Indonesia interview 03 2023). While faced with “inherent vulnerabilities,” technological neutrality is understood by academic and civil society circles as Indonesia’s attempt to “fortify itself in the global arena” (Indonesia interview 28 2023) by recurring to its long-standing discursive representations. Overall, the interviews suggest that, in contrast to Malaysia’s explicit adoption of technological neutrality as a discursive strategy in public discourse, Indonesian officials follow a more implicit strategy, invoking technological neutrality as a guiding principle in practice while choosing to frame their official statements through the country’s established repertoire of “free, active, and non-aligned” foreign policy narratives.

6 Conclusion

This article examined the discourses enacted by government officials in Malaysia and Indonesia in response to the intensifying technological rivalry between the USA and China. Drawing on official statements from 2015 to 2024 and semi-structured interviews conducted between 2022 and 2024, the study offers an empirically grounded account of how officials in secondary states leverage discourses as part of their hedging strategies. It advances the conceptualization of technological neutrality in IR by defining it as a discursive strategy through which officials present technology policy as impartial in order to carve out agency amid external pressures and the risks of technological lock-in.

The article analysed whether, how and why officials in Malaysia and Indonesia mobilized technological neutrality, showing that discursive strategies are central to the mitigation strategies of secondary states in a contested technological order. The results yielded systematic variation in the logics, drivers, and normative repertoires that structure how neutrality is articulated and operationalized. They reveal two analytically distinct strategic orientations in the mobilization of neutrality. In Malaysia, technological neutrality is explicitly articulated, functioning as a clearly stated strategy for maintaining flexibility in technology partnerships. In Indonesia, by contrast, technological neutrality remains implicit, embedded in the long-standing doctrines of non-alignment and the country’s “free and active” foreign-policy tradition.

The findings demonstrate that Malaysia and Indonesia do not merely pursue the same hedging strategy under different names. Instead, they hedge discursively in fundamentally different ways because their strategic reasoning, domestic constraints, and foreign-policy traditions follow distinct trajectories. This variation reveals how similar structural pressures generate distinct patterns of discursive hedging, and how discursive strategies do not merely describe hedging but shape how it is conceived and enacted. These findings demonstrate that discursive strategies function as instruments of strategic ambiguity and autonomy, advancing debates on hedging by redirecting attention to the communicative processes that underwrite it.

By showing the constitutive role of discourse in hedging strategies, this study contributes to broader IR debates on secondary state agency, demonstrating that discursive strategies are foundational to how secondary states manage the pressures of intensifying great power rivalry. Discursive strategies are key to how secondary states construct autonomy, frame technological choices, and negotiate asymmetric power relations. In doing so, the study also speaks to long-standing constructivist and foreign-policy analysis approaches that examine how discourse constitutes identities, shapes policy possibilities, and mediates the relationship between structural pressures and state action.

Future research could build on this article and examine how discourses on technological neutrality evolve in response to different technological flashpoints, for example, 5G rollouts, semiconductor supply chains, or AI governance debates. Further work should also examine whether discursive claims of technological neutrality translate into tangible forms of agency, an important question that warrants continued investigation and to which this article offers both conceptual guidance and empirical grounding. As technological rivalry intensifies and the structural pressures on secondary states deepen, discourse will only grow in importance as a means through which decision makers carve out agency, resist external dominance, and mitigate the risks of an increasingly contested technological order.

Acknowledgements

This paper has benefited greatly from years of research collaboration as part of the NORM project. My sincere gratitude goes to my dear fellow project members: Ilaria Carrozza, Nicholas Marsh, Habib Abiyan Dzakwan, Julio Amador III, Deryk Matthew N. Baladjay, Fitriani Bintang Timur, Jens Bertil Johnsen Koning, Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Evan A. Laksmana, Danica Radovanović, Fikry A. Rahman, Gregory M. Reichberg, and (last but certainly not least) Yoshiharu Wakabayashi.

Conflict of interest statement. None declared.

Funding

Funding support for this article was provided by the Research Council of Norway (RCN) - Forskningsrådet https://prosjektbanken.forskningsradet.no/project/FORISS/325129?Kilde=FORISS&Kilde=EU&distribution=Ar&chart=bar&calcType=funding&Sprak=no&sortBy=score&sortOrder=desc&resultCount=30&offset=0<P.1=LTP3+Samfunnssikkerhet+og+beredskap&Fritekst=norm (325129).

Footnotes

1

These insights are drawn from a working paper currently under peer review. Bruni, Giacomo. “The Structural Constraints of Technological Lock-In on Hedging Strategies.” Working paper.

2

The interviews and stakeholder dialogues were conducted as part of a multi-year research project titled: Shaping the Digital World Order: Norms and Agency along the Digital Silk Road in Southeast Asia (NORM), https://www.prio.org/projects/1920.

References