Showing posts with label TPP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label TPP. Show all posts

Monday, March 13, 2017

Trump's Conflict-Ridden World : Five Hotspots to Watch in 2017 (Ukraine/Baltics, China/Taiwan, ISIS, Israel/Palestine, Mexico)


Trump’s Conflict-Ridden World: Five Hotspots to Watch in 2017

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a1.trump.conflict.portrait.storyFrom Berlin to Beijing, from Tallinn to Taipei, President Donald Trump seems eager to pick fights — even among U.S. allies — without leaving the White House, where infighting among his own team has made his young administration one of the most volatile in U.S. history.
In less than a month in office, the 45th president has managed to turn the world order upside down.
He infuriated Chinese leaders by questioning America’s long-standing commitment to Beijing’s “one China” policy regarding Taiwan, provoked anger across the Islamic world by instituting a refugee order widely seen as a blanket ban on Muslims and infuriated Arabs by insisting he would move the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Two weeks into the job, he even sparked outrage in Australia, one of America’s most steadfast allies, by abruptly cutting short a 25-minute phone conversation with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.
As if that’s not enough, he’s lashed out at Germany, indirectly called for the dismantling of the European Union and threatened to start a trade war with Mexico over the building of a massive border wall to keep out illegal immigrants.
Yet all this pales in comparison to the fallout following the forced resignation of Trump’s national security adviser, Michael T. Flynn, after it was revealed that he had discussed U.S. sanctions in a phone call with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and then lied about it to no less than Vice President Mike Pence. The White House, embroiled in controversy over the timeline of who knew what when, is now in full damage control mode.
On Feb. 14, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said it was “highly likely” that the events leading up to Flynn’s departure would be included in a broader congressional probe into Moscow’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Democrats smell blood and are pushing for a wider independent investigation into Trump’s ties to Russia (the FBI is already reportedly looking into contacts between Trump’s campaign associates and Moscow a year before the U.S. election).
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Photo: U.S. Department of Homeland Security
President Donald Trump, center, talks with Vice President Mike Pence, left, and Homeland Security Secretary John F. Kelly during a Jan. 25 visit to the Department of Homeland Security.
Leaks have gushed out of the White House at an unprecedented pace and constant chaos seems to have become the new norm. Conservative pundit Eliot A. Cohen, director of the strategic studies program at Johns Hopkins University and a noted Trump critic, suggests that precisely because the problem is one of Trump’s temperament and character, the situation will not get better.
“It will get worse, as power intoxicates Trump and those around him,” Cohen wrote recently in the Atlantic. “It will probably end in calamity — substantial domestic protest and violence, a breakdown of international economic relationships, the collapse of major alliances, or perhaps one or more new wars (even with China) on top of the ones we already have. It will not be surprising in the slightest if his term ends not in four or in eight years, but sooner, with impeachment or removal under the 25th Amendment. The sooner Americans get used to these likelihoods, the better.”
At the start of the year, many journalists and think tanks reported on possible conflict scenarios to watch out for in 2017, ranging from Islamic State attacks on Turkey to humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen to bloodshed in South Sudan, Myanmar, Afghanistan and Iraq.
But in just a span of a few weeks, Trump has upended that equation, creating new trouble-spots that could erupt in violence or cause global chaos. To make sense of it all, we have selected five areas of conflict, military or otherwise, likely to worsen in 2017 under Trump — and what experts say can be done to prevent things from spiraling out of control.

UKRAINE/BALTICS
It remains to be seen whether Trump’s connections with Russia snowball into a Watergate-like downfall. Regardless, Trump’s admiration of Russian President Vladimir Putin is well documented, as is his desire to please Moscow by lifting sanctions imposed against it by his predecessor, Barack Obama. That leaves Ukraine, still split between a beleaguered central government in Kiev and Moscow-backed rebels in the east, in the crosshairs.
The Flynn scandal may have quashed the administration’s hopes of a major rapprochement with Russia for the time being, but European leaders worry about America’s commitment to the sanctions imposed on Moscow for annexing Crimea in 2014. Europe, a major trading partner with Russia, has felt the sting of those penalties far more than the U.S. has, and without Washington’s backing, Germany and other countries may be hard pressed to convince their publics to stick with sanctions that have hurt their economies.
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Photo: © Evgeniy Maloletka / OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors the movement of heavy weaponry in eastern Ukraine in March 2015. A month before, Ukraine and Russia, along with France and Germany, agreed to a ceasefire under the Minsk agreement, but Kiev and Moscow-backed rebels in the east have failed to implement key parts of the deal.
But removing those sanctions would amount to rewarding the Kremlin for bad behavior, warned John Herbst, director of the Atlantic Council’s Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center.
He said it’s no coincidence that within 36 hours of Trump’s Jan. 28 phone call with Putin — which focused mainly on working together to defeat the Islamic State — “the Russians upped the violence in Ukraine substantially.”
Herbst, who was U.S. ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006, noted that for three days, as fighting raged in eastern Ukraine that killed over two dozen civilians and soldiers, “the administration said only that, ‘We’re concerned about this.’ Only on Thursday, the fourth day of the violence, did Nikki Haley [U.S. ambassador to the United Nations] in New York slam the Kremlin for its aggression. But this slamming was never repeated by the White House. That Sunday, Trump was asked on the news if he was embarrassed by the fact that the violence went up substantially after his phone call, and he said he wasn’t.”
Observers say there is also a chance, however, that Ukraine instigated some of the violence itself.
“Kiev, too, has become less inclined to compromise as it has grown more uncertain about Washington’s policy toward the conflict,” wrote Kiev-based Isaac Webb in a Feb. 6 Foreign Policy article.
He noted that Ukraine has been making frequent incursions into the “gray zone,” the no man’s land separating government and rebel forces, increasing the likelihood of clashes. Moreover, neither side seems particularly inclined to implement the hard compromises laid out in the Minsk accords that led to the current fragile ceasefire.
“At the same time, the Ukrainian president’s office has used the escalation to remind Trump of the costs of rapprochement with Russian President Vladimir Putin: ‘The shelling is massive. Who would dare talk about lifting the sanctions in such circumstances?’” Webb wrote.
But for Trump, Ukraine — whose Russian intervention has led to nearly three years of war and about 10,000 deaths — is at best a secondary consideration, according to Herbst.
“That’s why he keeps talking about lifting sanctions if the Russians help us fight ISIS [Islamic State]. He doesn’t seem to understand that Russia is conducting a war of aggression in Ukraine, and that their aim is to weaken NATO and the EU,” Herbst told The Diplomat. “What we’re seeing right now is a fair amount of institutional pushback against this unwise policy, and not just from Sen. John McCain [R-Ariz.] and the Democrats. Even McConnell made a statement about how this is not the time to be talking about removing sanctions. Sen. Paul Ryan [R-Wis.] said the same thing. I suspect that if Trump keeps pushing, he’ll produce a serious response from Congress.”
Peter Doran, executive vice president at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), said this debate is being watched very closely throughout Eastern Europe, but especially in the three ex-Soviet republics of the Baltics: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
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Photo: OSCE / Evgeniy Maloletka
Civilians make the dangerous crossing over a damaged bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska in eastern Ukraine on Dec. 16, 2016. Shortly after U.S. President Donald Trump took office, skirmishes broke out between government forces and Moscow-backed rebels.
“If the United States is going to be tested somewhere on its frontier of power, that test is likely to come where American capabilities are weak,” Doran told us. “Certainly NATO’s eastern flank has been one of the most neglected zones of conflict in recent memory. Since the Crimea invasion, the U.S. has scrambled to catch up with the game that Vladimir Putin is already playing very well — and winning, for now.”
As part of an agreement struck by Obama last year, NATO has already begun moving thousands of troops to shore up its defenses in Eastern Europe, with the first contingent arriving in Poland in January. But allies remain nervous whether Trump will follow through on the new deployments and other promised NATO initiatives. Indeed, during a Feb. 15 visit to Brussels, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis reiterated Trump’s longstanding threat that NATO members must contribute their fair share and spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense.
“If your nations do not want to see America moderate its commitment to this alliance, each of your capitals needs to show support for our common defense,” he warned.
At the same time, Mattis has repeatedly sought to reassure allies that the security bloc remains vital to U.S. interests.
Still, NATO allies are closely watching to see how the Russia drama will unfold. Doran said that despite the general rancor in Washington, there is “strong bilateral support” on Capitol Hill for taking a tough line toward the Kremlin, as well as a transatlantic consensus that the sanctions against Russia are there for good reason.
“Keeping the sanctions in place sends a very clear message to Russia: that the international system is governed by laws, that those laws must be respected and that these actions are not acceptable in the 21st century. Putin is a leader who respects strength and power — and removing the sanctions as a way of accommodating the Kremlin would be a serious mistake.”
CHINA/TAIWAN
Many observers assumed the initial flashpoint between China and the U.S. under a new administration would occur because of maritime disputes in the South China Sea, where Beijing has been aggressively staking its territorial claims.
But Trump’s surprise December acceptance of a congratulatory phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen — the first since the U.S. and Taiwan severed relations in 1979 — infuriated China and drove a wedge between the world’s two largest economies.
Even before that, the billionaire candidate blasted China for manipulating its currency and ruining the U.S. economy. Once in office, Trump promptly questioned whether the U.S. will use the one China policy — under which the U.S. acknowledges that there is a single Chinese government in Beijing — as leverage to extract concessions from Beijing, which views Taiwan as a renegade province and a core national interest.
But after receiving the diplomatic cold shoulder from Chinese President Xi Jinping for weeks, Trump toned down his anti-China rhetoric, though it’s unclear what might happen next — especially with regard to Taiwan and an even more potentially serious flashpoint: North Korea.
“Donald Trump is enabling Xi Jinping to make China great again,” quipped Robert A. Manning, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security.
“Trump stepped in with his initial inane, ignorant comments, thinking that since the whole world is a real estate deal, he’d put Taiwan on the table as a bargaining chip,” Manning told The Diplomat in a phone interview. “The Taiwanese were pretty indignant. It achieved the unique goal of pissing off Taiwan and China at the same time.”
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Photo: DoD / Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley, U.S. Navy
A full honors arrival ceremony welcomes then-Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping to the Pentagon on Feb. 14, 2012. Xi, now president, has bristled at Donald Trump's suggestion that the longstanding "one China" policy can be used as a bargaining chip in bilateral relations.
On Feb. 10, Trump agreed to accept the one China definition during a phone call with Xi, his first since taking office.
“The reality is, this is not a bargaining chip,” Manning said. “That’s why we’re able to have a policy with China in the first place. The idea that the Chinese would negotiate that is really dumb and deeply flawed.”
In fact, he said — and this goes back way before Trump’s election — “many of our core assumptions about China have been proven wrong, for instance the notion that as they became more integrated into the international system, they’d buy into our rules, or as they succeeded economically, we’d begin to see political reform. Actually, it’s going the other way. Given that, there will be a rethinking of China policy in any event.”
High on that policy agenda, of course, are economic issues. Yet here too, says Manning, the Trump administration has been long on rhetoric and short on facts.
“They’re right in identifying China as a troubling economic actor, but they’ve chosen all the wrong issues,” he argued. “They have not manipulated their currency in years. If you talk to 100 businessmen operating in China, 99 of them will tell you the currency issue is pretty far down on their list. The real issue of concern is China’s very nationalistic industrial policies.”
Manning cited a recent U.S. Chamber of Commerce poll which found that 80 percent of U.S. companies say they feel less welcome in China than before.
“Being frozen out — that is the central issue, and hopefully [the Trump administration] will eventually figure that out.”
But Trump may have lost his biggest source of economic leverage by abandoning the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a sweeping trade deal with 12 Asia-Pacific nations that notably excluded China. While widely expected, the move opens the door for China to push its own competing trade pact — which has far less labor, intellectual property and environmental protections — and further cement its hegemony over the region.
“By preemptively eliminating tools like economic statecraft from its foreign-policy toolbox, the Trump administration will be leaving itself with only hard power to counteract China’s ambitions,” wrote Hunter Marston in Foreign Policy magazine on Jan. 23.
Marston cited comments by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson at his confirmation hearing that the U.S. would deny China access to artificial islands it is building in the international waters of the South China Sea. White House press secretary Sean Spicer doubled down on that statement, perhaps unaware of its implications. That’s because any attempt by the U.S. to militarily bar China from those islands would require a naval blockade, which would be tantamount to an act of war.
Whether those comments were a slip of the tongue because Trump officials don’t fully grasp the issue or an intentional warning, they sent a chilling signal to China watchers.
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Photo: U.S. Navy / Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Gerald Dudley Reynolds
A team attached to the guided-missile destroyer USS Decatur conducts drills with a Japanese Akizuki-class destroyer in the East China Sea on Aug. 23, 2016. Decatur is deployed in support of maritime security and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific as part of a U.S. 3rd Fleet Pacific Surface Action Group.
“Tillerson’s provocative remarks may be a rhetorical gesture, another tenuous red line, or they may signal the beginnings of a far more assertive American policy of containment aimed at curbing China’s control of the South China Sea. Either interpretation invites peril,” warned Marston.
What this means for North Korea’s nuclear ambitions remains to be seen. Trump has lamented that Beijing should do more to rein in its erratic neighbor, which fired a nuclear test and a barrage of missile launches last year. Its most recent provocation was an intermediate-range ballistic missile test that took place while Trump was visiting with Japan’s prime minister. Trump’s response was uncharacteristically muted as he sought to avoid an escalation with the North’s mercurial dictator, Kim Jong-un. But if the North fires an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S., that would immediately change the calculus.
Regardless, Trump needs the cooperation of China, North Korea’s economic lifeline, to address the nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula. But Beijing is wary of toppling Kim’s regime, fearing an influx of millions of poor refugees and a unified U.S. ally on its doorstep.
“In the past, China’s role [in North Korea] has been cited as an area of U.S.-China cooperation,” said Manning. “But there’s a real risk it will become an area of U.S.-China contention. They clearly hate North Korea, and North Korea hates them, but they’re stuck with each other. China’s biggest fear is instability on the Korean Peninsula. They don’t want to do anything that would threaten that stability, so there are limits to how far they’d go.”
To that end, some experts say it’s time to end the U.S. policy of strategic patience and engage with the North, a prospect China favors. John Delury, a senior fellow at the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations, wrote in Foreign Affairs that the Trump administration “should negotiate a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program in return for a U.S. security guarantee, since that is the only measure that could enable Kim to start concentrating on economic development and the belated transformation of North Korea.”
He adds: “Like it or not, North Korea’s nukes are a reality. The United States needs a new strategy for dealing with Kim — and Trump is well placed to deliver it.”
ISLAMIC STATE
During his presidential campaign, Trump vowed to crush the so-called Islamic State (also known as ISIS and ISIL) and “defeat the ideology of radical Islamic terrorism.” But that’s easier said than done — Obama essentially made the same pledge to defeat the terrorist group. Last year, Obama’s administration did, in fact, significantly degrade the group’s capabilities, dislodging it from large tracts of territory in Iraq, Syria and Libya and killing thousands of its fighters through a relentless bombing campaign. At the same time, the Islamic State has adapted into a guerilla-style insurgency still capable of recruiting lone wolves to launch spectacular attacks abroad, both in the U.S. and Europe.
Experts fear that Trump’s controversial refugee ban (also see stories "Former Iraqi Ambassador Denounces Controversial Travel Ban", "Trump's Refugee Ban Sparks Uproar at State Department" and "Op-Ed: State Department Memo on Trump's Refugee Ban Long on Rhetoric, Short on Specifics") will only add fuel to the fire, helping the Islamic State recruit disgruntled Arabs all over the world to attack the West.
In any event, “crushing” the Islamic State has little to do with ending the grinding six-year war in Syria, a war that’s cost more than 500,000 lives and sparked Europe’s worst migration crisis since World War II. Nor will a military victory over the group end the global war on terrorism that began with 9/11.
Michael Totten, a veteran foreign correspondent with more than a decade of experience in the Middle East, said Trump’s Mideast approach is doomed to fail.
“President Trump has repeatedly said he wants to partner with Russia in Syria to fight ISIS, but there are a couple of problems with that,” Totten told The Diplomat in an email.
a1.trump.conflicts.islamic.state.story
Photo: U.S. Army / Spc. Paris Maxey
U.S. Army paratroopers maneuver through a hallway as part of squad-level training at Camp Taji in Iraq in 2015 — part of the multinational effort to train Iraqi security forces to defeat the Islamic State.
“First, Russia is not fighting ISIS in Syria. Russia is propping up the [Bashar al-] Assad regime and fighting every faction in Syria except ISIS. Second, Russia is part of the Iranian/Syrian/Hezbollah axis. Syria has been a Russian client state since the Cold War, and Iran gets its nuclear material from Moscow. So Vladimir Putin is a patron and armorer of Syria, which is the biggest state sponsor of international terrorism in the Arab world, and of Iran, which is the biggest state sponsor of international terrorism in the entire world.”
Totten, winner of the Washington Institute Book Prize for his 2012 analysis of Hezbollah, “The Road to Fatima Gate,” is predictably pessimistic about Trump helping to end Syria’s horrific civil war.
“Trump wants to be tough on Iran and tough on ISIS, but he can’t do both at the same time if he climbs into bed with Vladimir Putin,” he told us, referring to Iran and Russia’s alliance in Syria.
As of late 2016, write professors Hal Brands of Johns Hopkins University and Peter Feaver of Duke University in Foreign Affairs, the Islamic State had lost control of key strongholds such as Fallujah and Ramadi in Iraq, and Manbij and Jarabulus in Syria. Iraqi forces are currently struggling to retake Mosul, while U.S.-backed militia groups in Syria are attempting to capture the de facto Islamic State capital of Raqqa. Since August 2014, the Pentagon estimates that the U.S. coalition has killed more than 45,000 Islamic State fighters.
But even if the Islamic State can be destroyed, what happens next in the Middle East?
“Remnants of the caliphate may morph into an insurgency. Al Qaeda and its affiliates will still pose a threat. Moreover, the conditions that breed jihadist organizations will likely persist across the greater Middle East,” the professors write.
They say that leaves four options. “At one extreme, Washington could abandon its military commitments in the greater Middle East on the assumption that it is U.S. interference that provokes terrorism in the first place. At the other, it could adopt a heavy-footprint surge strategy that would involve using overwhelming military force … and attempt to politically transform the societies that produce [terrorist groups]. In between lie two options: one, a light-footprint approach akin to that taken by the Obama administration before ISIS’s rise; the other, a more robust approach closer to Washington’s response to ISIS since late 2014.”
Their conclusion: None of the four options are ideal. “The least worst choice would be an approach close to the medium-footprint strategy being used to defeat ISIS today.”
A February report by Rand Corp. suggests a similar strategy and advocates viewing the group as a trans-regional threat.
“The nature of the threat suggests the need to prioritize the security of Americans in the homeland, but does not imply placing the United States on a continuous war footing,” write authors Lynn E. Davis, Jeffrey Martini and Kim Cragin.
Rather, this approach involves boosting resources for intelligence and law enforcement, as well airstrikes and special ops raids. The authors also say the U.S. must help address underlying grievances that breed radicalism, including weak states and poor governance.
“The U.S. counter-ISIL strategy overseas should be designed to improve these conditions to the extent possible, but strategists must recognize that the United States has limited leverage to affect these conditions, and improvements will require years to accomplish.”
a1.trump.conflicts.israel.palestine.story
Photo: By Bienchido - Own work / Wikimedia Commons GFDL
A panorama of Jerusalem, the contested capital of Israelis and Palestinians, shows the Temple Mount, including Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, as seen from the Mount of Olives mountain ridge next to the Old City.

ISRAEL/PALESTINE
Will Trump be the president that finally brokers peace between the Arabs and Jews?
It’s hard to say, though Trump is the first U.S. leader to have a Jewish daughter and son-in-law. His relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is certainly warmer than the one his predecessor, Obama, had with Israel’s leader.
Throughout his campaign and even during the first week of his presidency, Trump vowed to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. But no such move appears imminent. That doesn’t surprise Gershon Baskin, founder and co-chairman of the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information.
“Trump will probably sign the order delaying the implementation of the move, mainly because the intelligence and military people will tell him that if he moves the embassy, American lives will be at risk,” Baskin told The Diplomat in a phone call from Jerusalem. “That’s what’s happened for the past 20 years, and that’s not likely to change.”
Even so, Trump is seen as more pro-Israel than any American president in recent memory. Although the president has called additional settlement construction unhelpful toward achieving peace, his pick for U.S. ambassador to Israel, Orthodox Jewish lawyer David Friedman, is an unabashed proponent of settlements who has disavowed the two-state solution and bashed liberal Jews.
The administration’s pro-Israeli bend is not necessarily a good thing, warn Dana H. Allin and Steven N. Simon, authors of “Our Separate Ways: The Struggle for the Future of the U.S.-Israel Alliance.”
In a lengthy article for Foreign Affairs, the two authors outline the dangers of Trump’s alliance with Israel’s hard right.
“Although any new administration would find the landscape daunting, the United States’ strategic interests and moral values call for continued opposition to Israeli settlements in occupied territory, a continued insistence that the Palestinians pursue their cause through peaceful means, a continued commitment to a two-state solution, and continued attentiveness to Israel’s strategic vulnerabilities,” they wrote. “In other words, the most basic requirement is to do no harm, thus following in the tradition of past presidents.”
On Feb. 15, Trump — who has suggested enlisting the help of Arab states to break the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate — met with Netanyahu in Washington and held a joint press conference.
“The body language was terrific, and their rhetoric on Iran is probably very close,” said Ariel Cohen, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. “I think both Bibi and Trump are coming to the conclusion that it’ll be almost impossible to scuttle the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] on Iran, but they both want to work to enforce strictly the [nuclear weapons] agreement.”
He added: “They also want to work with Sunni Arab countries. One of the interesting challenges and opportunities is to get Arab states to recognize Israel and provide the imprimatur for some kind of long-term or permanent peace arrangement.”
But that has effectively left the Palestinians out of the equation. In fact, the president, in typical Trump fashion, jettisoned decades of diplomatic convention by declaring that he was open to the idea of a one-state solution, thereby effectively abandoning Washington’s long-term support of two states — one for Jews, the other for Palestinians — as a way of ending the conflict. “I can live with either one,” he told reporters.
Whether the Palestinians can is another matter entirely.
MEXICO
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Photo: By z2amiller - IMG_4919_2.jpg / Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 2.0
Mexican immigrants march for more rights in the northern California city of San Jose in 2006.
The two issues that propelled Donald Trump into the White House were trade and immigration — and Mexico is the proxy for both issues. It’s unfortunate, because until Trump’s election, the relationship between North America’s two most populous countries was quite positive.
Yet Trump’s rhetoric about building a wall (now estimated to cost $21 billion), deporting up to 3 million undocumented immigrants and slapping a 35 percent tariff on imports from Mexico hasn’t ended with his campaign. That worries Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank.
“This administration is still figuring out what it’s going to do on both immigration and trade issues,” he said. “They’ll have to do something that’s a change from the previous administration, because that’s why Trump was elected.”
But things are complicated by the fact that nobody is currently in charge of Latin America at the State Department. And while Roberta Jacobson — a seasoned diplomat who spent four years as Obama’s assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs — is now U.S. ambassador to Mexico, she’s unlikely to stay in that position for very long.
“The question is, how far will he go?” Shifter mused. “[Secretary of State] Tillerson recently met with Mexico’s foreign minister. He and other Cabinet officials like [Secretary of Defense] James Mattis and [Secretary of Homeland Security] John F. Kelly have a better understanding about what the stakes are in the U.S. taking such an aggressive position, which could really hurt us economically. It’s already damaged Mexico in a number of ways and is playing into the election campaign of 2018. If these economic measures are applied, that’s going to make economic conditions in Mexico worse, which is likely to spur migration to the United States.” (Ironically, net migration from Mexico has been down since the 2008 recession.)
Shifter warned that Mexico — which has been “very helpful” on issues ranging from drug interdiction to stemming the flow of Central American migrants — might not want to cooperate if the U.S. government pursues policies that hurt its southern neighbor.
“The hope is that if you have responsible people like Tillerson, Kelly and Mattis in senior positions, and some members of Congress, including Republicans, begin to speak out, the basic elements of our relationship will be preserved going forward and some of the damage could be contained.”
Shifter says he has no doubt that NAFTA will be renegotiated, most likely under the leadership of Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross.
Yet Walter Molano, writing in Latinvex, says Mexico could be the “unexpected star” of Latin America in 2017.
“Despite the rhetoric from the White House, the Mexican economy will benefit from economic revival in the United States,” he predicted. “Today, Mexico is an integral part of the U.S. industrial base. Hence, the expansion in U.S. economic activity will surely be felt south of the border.”
Molano noted that many of the companies that have announced changes to their Mexican investment plans, like General Motors and Chrysler, either received government bailouts in the past or depend heavily on federal contracts.
“It is only natural that they kowtow to the new powers in Washington,” he observed. “Still, the larger set of corporations that are not as dependent on government assistance or projects will continue to operate unabatedly, and provide a strong boost to the Mexican economy. In other words, there will be winners and losers in 2017, but Mexico could be holding the proverbial Trump card.”


About the Author

Larry Luxner is the Tel Aviv-based news editor of The Washington Diplomat.

Thursday, September 8, 2016

Article by Joseph R.Biden on US foreign policy

Sunday, August 7, 2016
Building on Success
Opportunities for the Next Administration
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. is Vice President of the United States.
The next administration will take the reins of American foreign policy in a world that is more complex than at any point in our modern history, including the twilight of the Cold War and the years that followed the 9/11 attacks. But it is also the case that despite the proliferation of threats and challenges—some old, some new—by almost any measure, we are stronger and more secure today than when President Barack Obama and I took office [1] in January 2009. Because of our investments at home and engagement overseas, the United States is primed to remain the world’s preeminent power for decades to come. In more than 40 years of public service, I have never been more optimistic about America’s future—if only we continue to lead.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF POWER
From the outset, our administration has been guided by the belief that the foundations of U.S. global leadership reside first and foremost in our dynamic economy, peerless military, and universal values. We have built on these core strengths by expanding and modernizing the United States’ unrivaled network of alliances and partnerships and embedding them within a wider international order of rules and institutions.
Having inherited a deep economic recession, our administration first sought to steer an economy in collapse through an arduous recovery. In doing so, we have reestablished our standing as the world’s strongest and most innovative major economy, undergirded by the rule of law, the finest research universities, and an unparalleled culture of entrepreneur­ship. Smart investments coupled with American ingenuity have also made the United States the epicenter of a global energy revolution, both in renewables and in fossil fuels.
And we are seeing the results of a revitalized economy—in sustained job growth, a shift from outsourcing to insourcing, and a renewed consensus that the United States is once again the best place for businesses to invest worldwide, with the consulting firm A. T. Kearney ranking it now four years running as the top destination for foreign direct investment.
This vibrant economy is essential to sustaining our unrivaled military. We continue to outpace our competitors, spending more on our overall defense than the next eight countries combined. We have the most capable ground forces in the history of the world and an unmatched ability to project naval and air power to any corner of the globe. And thanks in no small part to our efforts to bolster U.S. special operations forces, enhance our cyberspace and space capabilities, and invest in unmanned systems and other game-changing technologies, we’re well positioned to maintain our qualitative edge for years to come.
This is part of a layered defense that has only grown stronger with our laser focus on homeland security, making our borders safer, improving security and inspections at ports, and strengthening screening procedures at airports. Our intelligence and law enforcement professionals are coordinating at an unprecedented level among themselves and with partners around the world, foiling countless would-be attackers. And with U.S. assistance, our partners are now reciprocating by sharing more information, such as passenger records, enhancing security while protecting civil liberties.
This speaks to another reality: America’s greatest strength is not the example of our power but the power of our example. More than anything, it is our adherence to our values and our commitment to tolerance that sets us apart from other great powers. I have no doubt that future generations of Americans will be proud of the way we have doubled down over the last seven and a half years to uphold basic human dignity by banning torture, calling for a more enlightened immigration system, expanding opportunities for women, and defending the rights of the LGBT community at home and abroad.
This is not only the right thing to do; it is also the right strategy, because our commitment to defend what is best in us inspires others to stand with us. That’s vital, since our unrivaled network of allies and partners—from our core democratic alliances in Europe and Asia to our growing partnerships in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East—multiplies our ability to lead. It’s how we mobilize collective action to address just about every major challenge, from the Islamic State (or ISIS) to Ebola to climate change.
President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden celebrate their victory on election night, November 2012.

Equally critical has been our commitment to strengthening the open international system, embracing the time-tested approach that spurred America’s rise in the previous century. The United States built the basic architecture of the international order after the devastation of World War II, and it has served us and the world well ever since. That’s why we have invested so much energy to defend and extend the rules of the road, signing historic arms control and nonproliferation agreements and leading worldwide efforts to lock down nuclear materials, expand trade, protect the environment, and promote new norms to address emergent challenges at sea and in cyberspace.
As a result, no country is better positioned than the United States to lead in the twenty-first century. But it is worth remembering that our indispensable role in the world is not inevitable. If the next administration chooses to turn inward, it could very well squander the hard-earned progress we’ve made not just over the past seven and a half years but also over the past seven decades.
Although the next president will be confronted with innumerable issues, four tasks loom large: seizing transformative opportunities on both sides of the Pacific, managing relations with regional powers, leading the world to address complex transnational challenges, and defeating violent extremism.
PACIFIC OPPORTUNITIES
The next president should deepen U.S. engagement with the most dynamic regions of the world by seizing possibilities on both sides of the Pacific, starting right here in the Western Hemisphere. Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean have an outsize impact on our domestic security and prosperity, and in the twenty-first century, the Western Hemisphere should figure prominently among our top foreign policy priorities.
We’re already seeing the returns of a renewed focus on the region. Because of the way President Obama and I have prioritized improving relations with our neighbors, including the opening to Cuba, the United States’ standing in the hemisphere has never been higher. The next administration should build on this momentum to strengthen the security and prosperity of people throughout the Americas. The table is set to deepen cooperation with Canada and Mexico, capitalize on renewed ties with Argentina, sustain unprecedented engagement with Central America, and expand our partnerships with regional leaders such as Brazil, Chile, and Colombia.
America’s greatest strength is not the example of our power but the power of our example.
Challenges surely remain, including undocumented immigration, drug trafficking, widespread corruption, and fragile democratic insti­tutions, but today the region is defined more by opportunities than crises. The opportunities include the possibilities for stronger trade and investment, greater energy integration, and a more peaceful hemisphere in which the United States helps end long-running conflicts, as we have done in Colombia. Indeed, for the first time in history, it’s possible to imagine a hemisphere that is middle class, democratic, and secure from the northern reaches of Canada to the southern tip of Chile.
On the other side of the Pacific, we’ve recharged our engagement with Asia. The next administration will inherit treaty alliances with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea that are the strongest they’ve ever been. It isn’t always easy to explain on a bumper sticker, but it’s common sense that the United States is wealthier and safer because the world’s advanced democracies are in our corner. It’s also true that being the principal security provider in Asia doesn’t come for free. But we should never underestimate the extraordinary economic costs to the American people if Asia devolved into conflict—something that is far more likely to occur in the absence of sustained U.S. leadership there.
The next administration will be charged with continuing to expand our network of relationships beyond our core alliances, building on the historic opportunities we’ve created to support the democratic transition in Burma (also called Myanmar), deepen ties with Vietnam, manage relations with China, expand the strategic partnership with India, and work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to advance a rules-based order.
And because Asia is home to half the world’s population and many of the world’s fastest-growing markets, we simply cannot afford to ignore the economic opportunities there. That’s why securing the Trans-Pacific Partnership remains a top priority for our administration. The 12 economies of the TPP account for 30 percent of global trade, 40 percent of global GDP, and 50 percent of projected global economic growth. Thanks to U.S. leadership, the deal includes provisions that will raise international standards for the protection of workers’ rights, the environment, and intellectual property. Absent these rules, the region will likely witness a race to the bottom in the form of weak, low-standard regional trade agreements that exclude the United States. This deal is as much about geopolitics as economics: when it comes to trade, maritime security in the South China Sea, or nuclear nonpro­liferation in Northeast Asia, the United States has to take the lead in writing and enforcing the rules of the road, or else we will leave a vacuum that our competitors will surely rush to fill.
MANAGING REGIONAL POWERS
Indeed, in nearly every part of the world, the United States contends with regional powers that have an enormous capacity to contribute to the international order—or to undermine it. Much will rest on how America chooses to lead.
Nowhere is this truer than in our relationship with China. The United States and China are the world’s two largest economies, so our fates are inescapably intertwined. President Obama and I have sought to define this relationship through enhanced cooperation and responsible competition. We have found common ground with Beijing and made historic progress to address such global challenges as climate change, pandemic disease, poverty, and nuclear proliferation. At the same time, we have stood firm on such issues as human rights, intellectual property, and freedom of navigation.
This balancing act will only grow more difficult in the context of China’s economic slowdown and the worrying steps Beijing is taking to reverse course on more than three decades of economic reform and opening up to the world. As a result, the next administration will have to steer a relationship with China that encompasses both breakthrough cooperation and, potentially, intensified competition. And sometimes, as when facing the mounting threat from North Korea, cooperation and competition with China will coexist. The notion that it will be all one or the other is shortsighted and self-defeating.
The same is true with regard to Russia, with which the United States should continue to pursue a policy that combines the urgent need for deterrence, on the one hand, with the prudent pursuit of tactical cooperation and strategic stability, on the other. Russia’s illegal attempt to annex Crimea and its continued aggression in eastern Ukraine violate foundational principles of the post–Cold War order: sovereignty and the inviolability of borders in Europe. In response, we have rallied our allies in Europe and elsewhere to impose real costs on Moscow, making clear that this pressure will continue until Russia upholds its commitments under the agreements reached in Minsk aimed at ending the conflict.
President Obama shakes hands with Xi Jinping in Beijing, November 2014.

Meanwhile, the combination of our $3.4 billion European Reassurance Initiative and NATO’s new forward deployments in Poland and the Baltics will strengthen our European allies and provide a bulwark against further Russian aggression. For years, we’ve also encouraged Europe to spend more on defense and to diversify its energy supplies in order to reduce its susceptibility to coercion. Now we’re starting to see progress on these fronts. And the next administration should redouble the United States’ commitment to strengthening NATO and our partnership with the EU, even as London and Brussels negotiate their ongoing relationship.
Investing in the core institutions of the West does not require reverting back to simplistic Cold War thinking, however. The United States should remain open to cooperation with Russia where our interests overlap, as we demonstrated with the Iran nuclear deal, as well as with the New START agreement on nuclear weapons. It is also difficult to envision how the war in Syria will ultimately end without some modus vivendi between Washington and Moscow. And as new military technologies raise the stakes of miscalculation and escalation, we will need functional and stable channels with Russia to clearly communicate our intentions and maintain strategic stability.
There’s an appealing moral clarity in dividing the world into friend and foe. But in reality, progress in international affairs so often demands working with those with whom we do not see eye to eye. That’s why our administration seized the possibility to move beyond three decades of conflict with Iran to lock in a nuclear agreement. Tehran is neither a friend nor a partner. But our willingness to break taboos and engage the regime directly, combined with our success in mobilizing unprece­dented international pressure on Iran to negotiate, peacefully removed one of the greatest threats to global security: the specter of Iran gaining a nuclear weapon.
Sometimes, cooperation and competition with China will coexist.
One year on, the deal speaks for itself: the agreement is working. Iran has verifiably removed two-thirds of its centrifuges, shipped out of the country 98 percent of its low-enriched uranium (enough for about ten nuclear weapons), removed the core of its plutonium reactor at Arak and filled it with cement, and provided international inspectors unprecedented access to its entire nuclear supply chain to ensure compliance. The deal blocks every pathway through which Iran might seek to develop nuclear weapons, while opening up the possibility for further engagement with Tehran down the road if the regime moderates its behavior. Tearing up the deal now, as some have proposed, would leave Iran’s nuclear program unconstrained, increase the threat to Israel and our partners in the Gulf, turn the international community against the United States, and sharply raise the prospect of another major war in the Middle East.
Critics of engagement should remember that the nuclear deal was never meant to resolve all our problems with Tehran. Engaging Iran need not come at the expense of our ironclad commitments to our allies and partners in the Middle East, including Israel. The United States has retained all the means necessary, including targeted sanctions, to hold Iran accountable for its ballistic missile activities, support for terrorism, and human rights violations, and we are committed to working with our allies and partners to push back against Iran’s destabilizing behavior.
TACKLING TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES
Transnational threats such as pathogens, environmental disruptions, computer viruses, and malicious ideologies don’t respect borders. Even in simpler times, isolationism never offered more than a false sense of security. And now, more than ever, we cannot wall ourselves off from these dangers or sit back and wait for others to solve the world’s problems for us. As the columnist Thomas Friedman aptly wrote, “If you don’t visit a bad neighborhood, it might visit you.”
We’ve learned that true security requires finding solutions that span borders, as when we rallied the world to address the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014. In the face of a terrifying disease, we resisted hysterical calls for quarantines and travel bans and instead followed the science. We drew on all our strengths, from our military to our health-care and development professionals. And with tireless diplomacy, we brought the world along with us to provide urgent, coordinated assistance that ultimately saved hundreds of thousands of lives.
Beyond Ebola, we have made significant investments and built new partnerships to fight HIV/AIDS, turn the tide against malaria, and improve the health of women and children across Africa. And through our Global Health Security Agenda, a partnership between the United States and some 50 other countries that our administration launched in 2014, we are strengthening the capacity of vulnerable countries in Africa and around the world to combat future outbreaks. Improving health security represents just one facet of our growing relationship with Africa. Through such forums as the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit and the Young African Leaders Initiative, we have engaged with African leaders on all levels, from heads of state to civil society, expanding and deepening partnerships that contribute to the continent’s increasingly bright future.
American leadership has also proved decisive in addressing climate change. Our administration’s landmark investments at home have tripled the amount of electricity we harness from the wind and increased our solar power 20-fold since 2008. We’ve put in place rules that will double the fuel efficiency of our cars by 2025, and we’ve set forth an unprecedented plan to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide that our power plants emit. These are the most significant steps the United States has ever taken domestically to combat climate change, and because our actions proved that we take this threat seriously, we were able to rally other countries to make concrete commitments of their own—starting with China, the world’s leading emitter. That’s how we achieved last year’s historic Paris agreement to combat climate change.
At the same time, we’re working to increase the resilience of com­munities that are already being affected by rising temperatures and extreme weather, at home and around the world. We’re implementing strategies to address the increased risk of flooding in coastal communities and improving our national resilience in the face of long-term droughts. We’re also building climate considerations into all our efforts to promote sustainable development around the world, including aid programs such as Feed the Future, which supports climate-smart agriculture. Our $3 billion pledge to the UN’s Green Climate Fund will help the poorest and most vulnerable nations become more resilient to climate change. And through a bold initiative called Power Africa, we’ve set a goal of doubling access to electricity on the continent through clean and sustainable methods.
Through all these efforts, we’ve laid the groundwork to protect our planet. But the resulting opportunities can be seized only if the next president follows the science, recognizes the dangers of doing nothing, and musters the political will to address the threat.
Other transnational threats are only a keystroke away, whether it be state actors pilfering commercial or government data or North Korean, Iranian, or anonymous criminal hackers perpetrating cyberattacks against American companies. That is why we’ve fortified our cyber­defenses, expanded partnerships with the private sector and with other governments, authorized the Treasury Department to impose sanctions against malicious hackers, enhanced our technical and attributional capabilities, and worked to improve our ability to respond to and recover from cyberattacks.
Meanwhile, we have secured a number of important commitments from China on its actions online, including an agreement not to conduct cyber-enabled economic espionage for commercial gain, and a number of other states are following our lead and securing similar commitments of their own. We continue to support an open, trans­parent, and interoperable Internet as an engine of economic growth and civil society. Finally, we are building a growing coalition of like-minded states around a set of voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime, an important effort to enhance stability in cyberspace, which has been endorsed by leaders from a number of the most capable countries, including those of the G-7 and the G-20.
The next administration should pick up this baton and run with it, further refining principles to guide the digital revolution as part of a broader effort to shape new rules of the road for space, the sea, and the other critical domains that will define commerce and competition in the decades ahead.
DEFEATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Terrorism and violent extremism provide perhaps the most vexing example of a virulent transnational danger that demands sustained U.S. leadership. Al Qaeda, ISIS, and their offshoots represent real threats, and the attacks in Paris, San Bernardino, Brussels, Orlando, Istanbul, and elsewhere have reminded us over and over again that terrorism can happen anywhere. At the same time, even amid a climate of fear and uncertainty, we must remember that terrorists cannot destroy the United States or our civilization. They are significant, but not existential, threats—and we should never underestimate the strength and resilience of the American people.
President Obama and Vice President Biden at the White House, June 2015.

Terrorism must—and will—be defeated. But more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq has taught us some hard lessons about when and how to deploy military power to address this danger. Even as we have removed more than 165,000 U.S. troops from combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, President Obama has never hesitated to use force to defend the American people when necessary. Just ask Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda’s top operatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the leaders of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Somalia and Yemen, and more than 120 of ISIS’ top leaders and commanders. Our administration has not been hamstrung by an ideology of restraint, as our most vocal critics allege. Rather, we carefully consider the use of force because we understand the tremendous human costs and unfore­seen consequences of war. We must ensure that when we do use force, it is effective. Accordingly, we have taken precise and proportional military actions, guided by a clear mission that advances U.S. interests. When­ever possible, we have acted alongside allies and partners so that they will share the burden and become invested in the mission’s success.
And perhaps most important, we have used force in a manner that is sustainable. We’ve learned in no uncertain terms that success on the battlefield will not endure if U.S. military involvement outpaces political developments on the ground or the ability of local partners to control their own territory. Lasting victory against al Qaeda and ISIS will therefore require viable indigenous forces to hold liberated areas, rebuild shattered communities, and govern effectively. That’s why we’ve worked with more than three dozen nations to train Afghan forces to hunt down al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And that’s why we’ve invested so much in building a partnership with the Government of National Accord in Libya and with other African governments—from Nigeria to Somalia to Tunisia—to go after al Qaeda and ISIS affiliates.
In Iraq and Syria, we’ve built a 66-member coalition to train local forces, and we’ve provided afflicted communities with critical humani­tarian and stabilization assistance. We’ve deployed special operations forces, and as of July 2016, our coalition has carried out more than 13,000 air strikes in support of local ground forces. With enhanced intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation, we have worked with our partners to improve their border security, reduce the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria by 50 percent, and strangle ISIS’ finances. The result: ISIS is losing. Over the past two years, the group has been under siege from western Iraq to northern Syria, losing approx­imately 50 percent of the populated territory it once held in Iraq and more than 20 percent in Syria. We’ve taken thousands of ISIS’ frontline fighters off the battlefield, and the group has lost a quarter of its overall manpower. Its morale is plummeting, and its hold over local populations is loosening.
Meanwhile, we’re working with the international community to provide billions of dollars in humanitarian aid to displaced people in Iraq and Syria and refugees across the region and billions more to stabilize and rebuild communities liberated from ISIS. To address the grievances that give such groups oxygen, we are engaged at the highest levels in Iraq to encourage greater political inclusivity and reconciliation across that country’s ethnosectarian divide. And we are aggressively pursuing a diplomatic settlement to produce a political transition in Syria—because not only is there no military solution to the conflict; there is also no way to end it so long as Bashar al-Assad remains in power.
It is worth recalling that what initially set ISIS apart in 2014 was the group’s attempt to carve out both a state and a self-described caliphate in the heart of the Arab world. This risked creating a territorial platform for attacks on the West. This is the threat we are systematically dismantling in Iraq and Syria, and the one we are making progress in undoing in Libya.
But even when ISIS’ would-be caliphate is destroyed, the jihadist challenge will continue. Other violent jihadist movements with localized agendas—some that are distinct from ISIS and others that have appro­priated its brand—will likely continue to exploit ungoverned spaces and threaten stability in key countries. Boko Haram was a threat to Nigeria long before it renamed itself the Islamic State’s West African Province, for example, and it will still have to be addressed even if ISIS’ core is destroyed. More broadly, the Salafi jihadist ideology that underpins such groups does not require territory to radicalize lone wolves to carry out attacks like those in San Bernardino, Orlando, and Nice. And foreign fighters returning home from the front may continue to attempt attacks like those in Paris and Brussels.
Even when ISIS’ would-be caliphate is destroyed, the jihadist challenge will continue.
The next administration will have to continue to address this challenge in a smart, sustainable, and holistic manner. This will require the disciplined application of military force, alongside the best efforts of our intelligence and law enforcement communities, diplomats, and development professionals [2]. It will require working with local partners and the international community to improve governance in fragile and failing states. And it will involve countering toxic ideologies online.
But this comprehensive campaign against violent extremism will succeed only if it is carried out in a manner that is consistent with our values and keeps the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims—the vast majority of whom reject Salafi jihadist views—on our side. We know that al Qaeda, ISIS, and their ilk want to manufacture a clash of civilizations in which Americans think of Muslims in us-versus-them terms. Last year, ISIS’ top leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, revealed the goal of his group’s attacks: “Compel the crusaders to actively destroy the gray zone themselves. Muslims in the West will quickly find themselves between one of two choices: either apostatize or emigrate to the Islamic State and thereby escape persecution.”
We should never let these groups win by giving in to the religious war they want. This only raises the premium on adhering to our values and spurning the tactics of our enemies: torture, indiscriminate violence, and religious intolerance. Doing otherwise not only violates our values but also deeply damages our security.
AN ENDURING AGENDA
The next administration will have a lot on its plate: uniting the Western Hemisphere, deepening our alliances and partnerships in Asia, managing complex relationships with regional powers, and addressing severe transnational challenges such as climate change and terrorism. But because of the actions we’ve taken and the boundless energy and resilience of the American people, I’ve never been more optimistic about our capacity to guide the international community to a more peaceful and prosperous future. It bears under­scoring, however, that U.S. leadership has never sprung from some inherent American magic. Instead, we have earned it over and over again through hard work, discipline, and sacrifice.
There is simply too much at stake for the United States to draw back from our responsibilities now. The choices we make today will steer the future of our planet. In the face of enormous challenges and unprecedented opportunities, the world needs steady American leadership more than ever.