Ahmet B. ERCİLASUN'un " Laiklikten uzaklaşmak" başlıklı, 14 Şubat 2016 tarihli yazısı:
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin temel ilkelerinden biri de laikliktir. Kelimenin ilk hecesi, tıpkı "lafız, latif" sözlerinde olduğu gibi ince l ile söylenir; a ise asla uzatılmaz; araya da y sesi asla girmez.
Laikliğin tanımı genellikle "din ve devlet işlerinin birbirinden ayrılması" şeklinde yapılır. Bu doğru değildir. Çok iyi bir hukukçu olan rahmetli Mukbil Özyörük'ün dediği gibi laiklik, bir devletin yasalarının, dinî olduğu kabul edilen kurallara "betahsis" dayandırılmaması anlamına gelir. Buradaki betahsis kelimesini, "tesadüfen değil dinî kurallar böyle olduğu için" şeklinde anlamalıyız. Laiklik elbette şahısların vicdani kanaatlerine ve dinî uygulamalarına karışmaz.
Laiklik bir yandan ilmî ve dünyevî dünya görüşünü temsil eden bir ilke, bir yandan da ülkemizdeki farklı dinî anlayışlar, Müslümanlığı farklı yorumlayan ve uygulayan gruplar arasındaki çatışmayı önleyici, millî birliği sağlayıcı bir ilke olarak düşünülmüştür.
Laikliği dinsizlik olarak anlayan ve topluma bu şekilde sunan gruplar son on yıllarda maalesef gittikçe artmış; İslam tarihinin gelişme çağlarını dikkate almayan selefî yaklaşımlar gittikçe çoğalmıştır. Siyasi kadrolara, devlet kademelerine, eğitim kurumlarına kadar yayılan selefî anlayış, IŞİD gibi terör örgütlerine eleman yetiştiren mümbit (verimli) bir zemin hazırlamıştır. Başka bir ifadeyle, IŞİD vb. terör örgütü sempatizan ve elemanlarının ülkemizde yetişmesinin asıl sebebi laiklikten uzaklaşmış olmaktır.
***
Bütün yasaların dinî kurallara dayandırılması demek olan teokrasi (laikliğin zıddı), millî birliğe zararlı olduğu gibi doğrudan doğruya dinin kendisine de zararlıdır. Çünkü toplumların idari, hukuki, içtimai ve iktisadi meseleleri on binlercedir ve teokratik sistemde, bu on binlerce meselenin son derece sınırlı olan dinî metinlerdeki hükümlerden çıkarılması mümkün değildir; ister istemez yoruma başvurulacaktır. Böylece din içinde yeni parçalanmalar ortaya çıkacaktır. İslam tarihinde böyle olmuştur ve bugün teokrasiyle idare edilen Suudi Arabistan ile İran arasında ne kadar büyük farklar olduğu da meydandadır. İhvancıların yorumu ikisinden de farklıdır. IŞİD'in teokrasi anlayışı ise bambaşkadır.
Bütün dünya işlerini din ile çözmeye çalışmak dinin manevi tarafını, kutsallığını da yıpratır; dini, dünyevi bir çatışma alanı hâline getirir; siyasi ihtirasların aleti yapar ve hatta meşru olmayan birtakım işlerin mazereti durumuna sokar. Nitekim bunun örneklerini çevremizde bol bol görmekteyiz.
Her şeyi din açısından görenler, din ile açıklamaya çalışanlar, evrenin bin bir sırrı karşısında da pasif durumda kalırlar. Buna karşılık dinlerden bağımsız olarak tabiatın ve evrenin sırlarını çözmeye çalışan Batı, bilimde sağladığı olağanüstü ilerlemeler sayesinde Müslüman dünyayı sömürmeye ve köleleştirmeye devam eder.
***
Geçen gün bir televizyon programında tarihi de sadece din ile açıklamaya çalışan bazı konuşmacılar gördük. Bunlardan biri "İslam'dan önce Türkler de Farslar da ve başka milletler de adam değildi, İslam hepsini adam etti" deyip durdu.
576 yılında Köktürkler, Kırım'dan Büyük Okyanus'a kadar uzanan bir coğrafyayı idare ediyordu. Bu alan, o zamanın büyük devletleri olan Çin, Sasani ve Doğu Roma topraklarının her birinden çok daha büyük bir alandı. Köktürkler'den kalan anıtlardaki sosyal devlet ve milliyetçilik anlayışı bugün dahi bilim dünyasını şaşırtmaktadır. İranlı Sasaniler de büyük bir medeniyet kurmuşlardı; 6. asırda çok gelişmiş tıp fakülteleri vardı ve o fakültedeki doktorların Nesturi torunları birkaç nesil Abbasi halifelerine doktorluk etmişlerdi.
Tuhaf olan, "İslam'dan önce Türkler adam değildi" sözlerine zemin hazırlayan bir siyasi partinin bazı mensuplarının da bizden bu sözlere cevap vermemizi istemeleridir. Onlara tavsiyem Türk düşmanlığı zeminini yaratan siyasi partiden bunun hesabını sormalarıdır.
( Yeni Çağ gazetesi -Ahmet Ercilasun - 14 Şubat 2016)
Monday, February 15, 2016
Wednesday, February 10, 2016
Iran : Nation versus Revolution by Shireen Hunter
Nation vs. Revolution in Iran
by Shireen Hunter February 10, 2016
The Implementation
of Iran’s nuclear agreement with the P5+1, known as the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA), has not yet been completed, but critical statements by
its detractors in Iran about its ineffectiveness have already began. For
example, recently Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, a former speaker of the Parliament
and an adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, said that so far the JCPOA
had not had a single positive impact. Others have taken President Hassan
Rouhani to task for not yet improving the Iranian economy after the nuclear
deal. Some have launched attacks on the Rouhani government’s efforts to enlist
European participation in Iran’s development projects.
A particular target
of attack has been Iran’s desire to buy a number of Airbus planes as part of
its efforts to refurbish its aging fleet of passenger planes. Sardar Naghdi, a
firebrand hardliner and the commander of the Basij, has chided the president
that buying Airbus planes will not solve Iran’s problems of economic recession
and unemployment. Needless to say, Naghdi would have preferred that a good part
of Iran’s unfrozen assets go to the Basij. In the past, opposing Rouhani’s
economic outlook and asking for a “resistance and jihadi economy,” he had said
that if provided with adequate resources, his volunteer militia could solve
Iran’s problems of economic deprivation and unemployment.
Earlier, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (of which the Basij are part) contributed to
undermining Rouhani’s policies by arresting a group of US sailors and, even
worse, by showing them kneeling in front of the Iranian military. No one can
dispute Iran’s right to defend its territorial waters. However, the US sailors
could have been warned off—or, even better, politely escorted from Iranian
waters—instead of being arrested and displayed in the public media. Their
arrest was a calculated act to embarrass the Rouhani government even as it has
been trying hard to show a softer image of Iran. The IRGC knows well that such
acts exacerbate anti-Iran sentiments in the West and leads American politicians
in particular to say harsh things about Iran. The hardliners can then use these
statements to show that the US continues its hostile policy toward Iran. Nor
did the episode with the American sailors end with their release. Instead,
Ayatollah Khamenei decorated their captors, an act accompanied by exhortations
that the anti-imperialist struggle will never end.
At first glance,
these acts might appear to be mere random mistakes that represent at natural
political rivalries. However, a closer look at the pattern of their repetition
over the last 30 years reveals a more fundamental fault-line in Iran, namely
the incongruence of the country’s national and revolutionary aspirations.
Against the Nation
Sadly for Iran, the
Islamic revolution has always had an anti-national dimension. For the
Islamists, especially Ayatollah Khomeini, what was important was Islam and not
Iran. This became crystal clear upon his return to Iran. When asked what he was
feeling about returning to his homeland, he said “absolutely nothing.” For the
leftist elements, the search for socialist utopia and the anti-imperialist
(read anti-American) struggle were the key priorities. Most revolutions have
such conflicts between their local and more universal aspirations, especially
at their early stages. After a while the requirements of national survival and
advancement prevail over universalist goals. But in Iran’s case this dichotomy
still persists, and revolutionary aspirations often trump national interest.
Periodically over the last 30 years, when external circumstances have posed
serious threats to national survival, the revolutionary goals have been
relegated to the second place. As soon as the immediate threat has passed, the
previous pattern returns.
When Rouhani came
to power, the nuclear issue was hanging over Iran’s head like a sword of
Damocles. Therefore he was given license to pursue a solution. Now that the
hardliners feel that the immediate threat has passed, they are back to their
old tricks.
More fundamentally,
there is a dichotomy between the interests of nizam—the “system”—and
that of Iran as a country and people. This was evident from the beginning of
the revolution. The very fact of creating a separate military in the form of a
revolutionary guard whose sole goal is to protect the revolution and the system
attests to this reality. Never in Iran’s very long history, and despite its
occupation by foreign forces, had there existed two rival militaries.
Iran’s national
interests require that it maintain good or reasonable relations with all those
countries which are willing to reciprocate. It requires that Iran’s energies be
spent in making a better life for its people. It requires that Iran not spend
its forces in pursuit of goals beyond its reach or pursue goals that earn it
the enmity of others without gaining the friendship of any. The best example of
such a goal is Iran’s stand on the Palestinian issue, which has been at the
root of all its problems, including economic sanctions. Iran has earned the
unrelenting hostility of Israel without obtaining the friendship of Arabs. Even
the Palestinians, for whose sake Iran has spent so much of its resources, just
recently sided with Saudi Arabia in its dispute with Iran. Iraq, too, voted
against Iran in the Arab league, and both Iraq and Bashar al-Assad’s Syria have
supported the United Arab Emirates in its dispute with Iran over the three
islands in the Persian Gulf.
Stuck in the Past
The material and
emotional interests of the hardliners are at stake in this juxtaposition of
Iran’s national interests and the interests of the revolution and the system
that embodies it. Moreover, the hardliners have remained unchanged while Iran
and the world have moved on. Iran’s hardliners are still stuck in the 1980s.
They still talk of holy war and holy defense and the martyrs and the sayings of
Ayatollah Khomeini. They still see the world through the prism of the Cold War
and the leftist clichés of the 1960s. They are still obsessed with the Pahlavis
without realizing that at least half of Iran’s population has no memory of life
under the Shah. All they know is the Islamic system and its shortcomings. The
hardliners are thus yearning for the relatively more simple times when people
could be lured with mere slogans.
But Iran has
changed. Its population is more educated and informed. Most importantly it has
experienced life under an Islamic system and knows its drawbacks and has no
illusions about its promises. The world has also changed. The post-Cold War era
is more complex with no overarching paradigm to guide states, whereas Iran’s
hardliners are still operating under the Cold War paradigm and anti-Imperialist
struggle and become frustrated when they see that others don’t see the world as
they do.
Therefore, whatever
the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections and regardless of how
valiantly the Rouhani government tries to remedy the country’s problems, Iran
cannot hope to achieve a national revival economically or otherwise until and
unless it stops being a revolution. At this juncture, it would be wise for the hardliners
to remember that without a strong and prosperous Iran they themselves will
cease to exist.
Photo: Sardar
Naghdi
About the Author
Shireen T. Hunter is a Research
Professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Her latest book
is Iran Divided: Historic Roots of Iranian Debates on Identity, Culture, and
Governance in the 21st Century (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).
Sunday, February 7, 2016
Türkiye'nin Suriye politikasının çöküşü
Tolga Tanış- Hürriyet -07 Şubat 2016
UZUN süredir zaten herkes söylüyordu, ama Türkiye'nin Suriye politikasının çöküşü sanırım daha önce hiç bu kadar net biçimde ortaya çıkmamıştı.
Son bir haftadır yaşananlar ışığında hikâyeyi üç maddede toplamaya çalışacağım.
Çöküşün üç ayağını ele alacağım.
1) ROJAVA SİYASİ DESTEK BULDU
2014 Eylül’ünde Türkiye İncirlik Üssü’nü IŞİD karşıtı koalisyona açmakta direnince başladı Amerikalıların Suriye Kürtleriyle işbirliği.
19 Ekim Kobani silah yardımıyla.
Ancak o günden sonra ABD ve PKK’ya yakın bölgedeki PYD’nin işbirliğinin hep askeri düzeyde olduğu vurgulandı.
Özellikle de ABD’ye 10 ay direnen Ankara’nın geçen temmuz İncirlik’i açmayı kabul etmesinden sonra.
Ancak geçen hafta bu konuda yeni bir eşik aşıldı.
Ve Başkan Obama’nın IŞİD’le Mücadele Temsilcisi Brett McGurk, Kobani’yi ziyaret etti.
Türk basınında McGurk’ün üniformalı Kürt savaşçılardan aldığı plaket tartışıldı daha çok.
Halbuki bu ziyaretin asıl çarpıcı kısmı Kobani’ye 17 kişilik bir heyetle inen McGurk’ün bölgedeki Kürt kantonlarının temsilcileriyle yaptığı görüşmeydi.
Zira bu ziyaretle ABD, Suriye Kürtleriyle ilişkisini askeri düzeyden siyasi düzeye taşıdı.
McGurk ziyaretinde gençlik yıllarında PKK’ya katılıp sonra 2003’te kurulan, şimdi Kuzey Suriye’de üç Kürt kantonundan oluşan özerk Rojava yönetiminin mayası Demokratik Toplum Hareketi’nin (TEV-DEM) yönetimine giren Aldar Halil (46) ile de görüştü.
Rojava projesinin en önemli beyinlerinden biri Halil.
Ve Halil’e Kürtlerin Suriye’de oluşturdukları yönetim yapısını öven McGurk’ün ziyareti de, Erdoğan Yönetimi’nin kabus senaryosunun son aşaması.
Bölgede oluşacak özerk bir Kürt şeridinin ABD’den alacağı politik desteğin vesikası.
2) ESAD MUHALİFLERİ BOZGUNA UĞRADI
Sadece siyasi zeminde değil, askeri alanda da çöktü Ankara’nın politikası.
Ve savaşın başından beri destek verilen, Türkiye’nin bütçesinden pay ayrılan Suriye’deki rejim karşıtı güçler Halep çevresinde bozguna uğradı.
Rusların ve İranlıların desteğiyle Esad rejimi üç yılda kaybettiğini üç günde geri aldı.
Ve Türkiye’nin kuzeyden Halep’teki muhaliflere erişimi kapandı.
Geriye tek Reyhanlı’dan olan hat kaldı ki, bu, Halep’e yardım ulaştırmak istiyorsa Türkiye’yi El Kaide uzantısı El Nusra’yla yeniden çalışmak zorunda bırakacak bir durum doğurdu.
Cephede Türkiye’nin ikinci kabûs senaryosu yaşanıyor şimdi.
Halep’e kuzeyden erişim sağlayan Azez koridorunun tamamen ortadan kalkması ve bölgenin ya rejim ya da Kürtlerin eline geçme ihtimali.
Yani Ankara’nın sabit politikaları göz önüne alındığında kırk katır mı kırk satır mı.
En kötüsü de Ankara’nın bunu duruduracak elinde hiçbir araç kalmaması.
Denediler aslında.
24 Kasım’da Rus uçağını düşürdüğünden beri Suriye üzerinde uçamayınca, Türkiye top atışlarıyla ayrı bir güç odağı olmayı tasarladı.
Ancak topçuların da halledemeyeceği bir aşamaya geldi iş.
Türkiye’nin Suriye’ye kara operasyonu düzenleyebileceği söylentileri ise hiçbir zaman gerçekçi karşılanmadı.
Özellikle ABD’nin buna karşı olduğu ve bölgede Rusların düşürülen uçaklarının intikamı için bekledikleri düşünülecek olursa.
Nitekim cuma günü Amerikan Dışişleri Bakanlığı Sözcüsü John Kirby’ye, “Suriye’de Amerika olmasa bile Türkiye ya da Suudiler gibi başkaları tarafından düzenlenecek bir kara operasyonu şu aşamada verimli olur mu” diye sorduğumda aynen şöyle yanıt verdi: “Sorunuza kısa cevap hayır. Suriye iç savaşında askeri bir seçenek olmadığına inanmaya devam ediyoruz.”
3) TÜRKİYE, ABD’NİN KALDIRAÇ GÜCÜNÜ KAYBETTİ
Tabii ilk iki başlıkta Ankara ve Washinton arasında öyle bir uçurum oluştu ki, bu durum ister istemez Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin geneline de yansıdı.
Ve çok boyutlu, çok alanda işbirliğinin yaşandığı Ankara-Washington ilişkileri bu farklılıkların gölgesine girdi.
Sonuç olarak Ankara bölgede birçok alanda yararlandığı Washington’ın kaldıraç gücünü de kaybetti.
Dahası, Suriye’de yaşananlar, özellikle Pentagon’da Türkiye’ye karşı tamiri oldukça güç bir güven erozyonuna sebep oldu.
Öyle ki, Türk askerinin sınır hareketliliğine bile şüpheyle yaklaşan bir yaklaşım oluştu ABD Savunma Bakanlığı’nda.
Türkiye üç hafta önce Cerablus’un karşısında mayın temizlemeye başlayınca, Pentagon’da konuştuğum üst düzey bir yetkili, “Ne yapmaya çalışıyorlar bir fikrimiz yok.
İzliyoruz” diyerek bu şüpheyi açıkça ortaya koyuyordu.
Çünkü IŞİD’in kontrol ettiği 98 km’lik hattı kullanıma kapatmaya çalışırken girişilen aynı hattaki mayın temizleme faaliyetlerini kafalarında oturtamamışlardı.
Ancak şimdi daha endişe verici başka bir gelişmeyi söyleyeyim.
Mesele şimdiye kadar 98 km’lik IŞİD hattıyken, Halep operasyonundan sonra buna söz konusu hattın Mare’den sonra batıya doğru uzayan Azez koridoru da eklendi.
Zira rejim bastırınca Nusra dahil buradaki çoğu radikal silahlı muhalif unsurların Türkiye’ye çekilme ihtimali ortaya çıktı...
Öyle bir haftaydı ki, beş yıllık Suriye iç savaşının, Türkiye’ye nasıl büyük bir bedel ödettiğinin çok net bir fotoğrafıydı.
(Hürriyet gazetesi -Tolga Tanış -07 Şubat 2016)
UZUN süredir zaten herkes söylüyordu, ama Türkiye'nin Suriye politikasının çöküşü sanırım daha önce hiç bu kadar net biçimde ortaya çıkmamıştı.
Son bir haftadır yaşananlar ışığında hikâyeyi üç maddede toplamaya çalışacağım.
Çöküşün üç ayağını ele alacağım.
1) ROJAVA SİYASİ DESTEK BULDU
2014 Eylül’ünde Türkiye İncirlik Üssü’nü IŞİD karşıtı koalisyona açmakta direnince başladı Amerikalıların Suriye Kürtleriyle işbirliği.
19 Ekim Kobani silah yardımıyla.
Ancak o günden sonra ABD ve PKK’ya yakın bölgedeki PYD’nin işbirliğinin hep askeri düzeyde olduğu vurgulandı.
Özellikle de ABD’ye 10 ay direnen Ankara’nın geçen temmuz İncirlik’i açmayı kabul etmesinden sonra.
Ancak geçen hafta bu konuda yeni bir eşik aşıldı.
Ve Başkan Obama’nın IŞİD’le Mücadele Temsilcisi Brett McGurk, Kobani’yi ziyaret etti.
Türk basınında McGurk’ün üniformalı Kürt savaşçılardan aldığı plaket tartışıldı daha çok.
Halbuki bu ziyaretin asıl çarpıcı kısmı Kobani’ye 17 kişilik bir heyetle inen McGurk’ün bölgedeki Kürt kantonlarının temsilcileriyle yaptığı görüşmeydi.
Zira bu ziyaretle ABD, Suriye Kürtleriyle ilişkisini askeri düzeyden siyasi düzeye taşıdı.
McGurk ziyaretinde gençlik yıllarında PKK’ya katılıp sonra 2003’te kurulan, şimdi Kuzey Suriye’de üç Kürt kantonundan oluşan özerk Rojava yönetiminin mayası Demokratik Toplum Hareketi’nin (TEV-DEM) yönetimine giren Aldar Halil (46) ile de görüştü.
Rojava projesinin en önemli beyinlerinden biri Halil.
Ve Halil’e Kürtlerin Suriye’de oluşturdukları yönetim yapısını öven McGurk’ün ziyareti de, Erdoğan Yönetimi’nin kabus senaryosunun son aşaması.
Bölgede oluşacak özerk bir Kürt şeridinin ABD’den alacağı politik desteğin vesikası.
2) ESAD MUHALİFLERİ BOZGUNA UĞRADI
Sadece siyasi zeminde değil, askeri alanda da çöktü Ankara’nın politikası.
Ve savaşın başından beri destek verilen, Türkiye’nin bütçesinden pay ayrılan Suriye’deki rejim karşıtı güçler Halep çevresinde bozguna uğradı.
Rusların ve İranlıların desteğiyle Esad rejimi üç yılda kaybettiğini üç günde geri aldı.
Ve Türkiye’nin kuzeyden Halep’teki muhaliflere erişimi kapandı.
Geriye tek Reyhanlı’dan olan hat kaldı ki, bu, Halep’e yardım ulaştırmak istiyorsa Türkiye’yi El Kaide uzantısı El Nusra’yla yeniden çalışmak zorunda bırakacak bir durum doğurdu.
Cephede Türkiye’nin ikinci kabûs senaryosu yaşanıyor şimdi.
Halep’e kuzeyden erişim sağlayan Azez koridorunun tamamen ortadan kalkması ve bölgenin ya rejim ya da Kürtlerin eline geçme ihtimali.
Yani Ankara’nın sabit politikaları göz önüne alındığında kırk katır mı kırk satır mı.
En kötüsü de Ankara’nın bunu duruduracak elinde hiçbir araç kalmaması.
Denediler aslında.
24 Kasım’da Rus uçağını düşürdüğünden beri Suriye üzerinde uçamayınca, Türkiye top atışlarıyla ayrı bir güç odağı olmayı tasarladı.
Ancak topçuların da halledemeyeceği bir aşamaya geldi iş.
Türkiye’nin Suriye’ye kara operasyonu düzenleyebileceği söylentileri ise hiçbir zaman gerçekçi karşılanmadı.
Özellikle ABD’nin buna karşı olduğu ve bölgede Rusların düşürülen uçaklarının intikamı için bekledikleri düşünülecek olursa.
Nitekim cuma günü Amerikan Dışişleri Bakanlığı Sözcüsü John Kirby’ye, “Suriye’de Amerika olmasa bile Türkiye ya da Suudiler gibi başkaları tarafından düzenlenecek bir kara operasyonu şu aşamada verimli olur mu” diye sorduğumda aynen şöyle yanıt verdi: “Sorunuza kısa cevap hayır. Suriye iç savaşında askeri bir seçenek olmadığına inanmaya devam ediyoruz.”
3) TÜRKİYE, ABD’NİN KALDIRAÇ GÜCÜNÜ KAYBETTİ
Tabii ilk iki başlıkta Ankara ve Washinton arasında öyle bir uçurum oluştu ki, bu durum ister istemez Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin geneline de yansıdı.
Ve çok boyutlu, çok alanda işbirliğinin yaşandığı Ankara-Washington ilişkileri bu farklılıkların gölgesine girdi.
Sonuç olarak Ankara bölgede birçok alanda yararlandığı Washington’ın kaldıraç gücünü de kaybetti.
Dahası, Suriye’de yaşananlar, özellikle Pentagon’da Türkiye’ye karşı tamiri oldukça güç bir güven erozyonuna sebep oldu.
Öyle ki, Türk askerinin sınır hareketliliğine bile şüpheyle yaklaşan bir yaklaşım oluştu ABD Savunma Bakanlığı’nda.
Türkiye üç hafta önce Cerablus’un karşısında mayın temizlemeye başlayınca, Pentagon’da konuştuğum üst düzey bir yetkili, “Ne yapmaya çalışıyorlar bir fikrimiz yok.
İzliyoruz” diyerek bu şüpheyi açıkça ortaya koyuyordu.
Çünkü IŞİD’in kontrol ettiği 98 km’lik hattı kullanıma kapatmaya çalışırken girişilen aynı hattaki mayın temizleme faaliyetlerini kafalarında oturtamamışlardı.
Ancak şimdi daha endişe verici başka bir gelişmeyi söyleyeyim.
Mesele şimdiye kadar 98 km’lik IŞİD hattıyken, Halep operasyonundan sonra buna söz konusu hattın Mare’den sonra batıya doğru uzayan Azez koridoru da eklendi.
Zira rejim bastırınca Nusra dahil buradaki çoğu radikal silahlı muhalif unsurların Türkiye’ye çekilme ihtimali ortaya çıktı...
Öyle bir haftaydı ki, beş yıllık Suriye iç savaşının, Türkiye’ye nasıl büyük bir bedel ödettiğinin çok net bir fotoğrafıydı.
(Hürriyet gazetesi -Tolga Tanış -07 Şubat 2016)
Saturday, February 6, 2016
Armağan Kuloğlu: Rusya krizden çıkar sağlama peşinde
Armağan KULOĞLU'nun, "Rusya krizden çıkar sağlama peşinde" başlıklı 06 Şubat 2016 tarihli yazısı
Rusya'nın agresif bir politika izlediği, Batı'yla çekişme içine girdiği ve bu davranışıyla yeniden dikkate alınacak bir ülke olmayı hesapladığı düşünülmektedir.
ABD ve NATO etkinliğinin sınırına dayanması, Rusya'yı tedirgin etmiştir. Birçok eski Sovyet ülkesinin NATO ve AB'ye girmesi, bu tedirginliği artırmıştır. Batı'nın Gürcistan ve Ukrayna'ya el atması karşısında Rusya, karşı hamlelerle bu yaklaşımları püskürtmeye çalışmıştır. Son açıklamalarında ve Ulusal Güvenlik Strateji Belgesi'nde NATO'yu artık tehdit olarak gördüğünü ifade etmiştir.
Yeniden süper güç olma girişimleri
Rusya kontrolü kaybettiği etki ve ilgi alanlarında ve Orta Doğu'da yeniden inisiyatif alarak etkin olma peşindedir. Gürcistan ve Ukrayna operasyonlarını gerçekleştirmiş, Kırım'ı ilhak etmiştir. Orta Doğu'daki son kalesi Suriye'yi, karışıklıktan istifadeyle kontrol altına almaya çalışmış, ortaya çıkan IŞİD tehdidini, Batı'yla birlikte bertaraf etme bahanesiyle bölgeye yerleşmiştir.
Kendisiyle çatışmaya girmenin, dünya savaşı çıkarabileceği endişesi yaratmaya çalışmaktadır. Bir dünya savaşının göze alınamayacağını da bildiği için, karşı güçleri, geri durmaya zorlamaktadır. Bunda ABD'nin ağırlık merkezini Orta Doğu'dan Asya-Pasifik'e kaydırmasının da etkisi vardır.
Rusya Batı'nın yaptırımlarına maruz kalmıştır. Gelirinin esasını oluşturan petrolün, bilerek düşürülmesinden dolayı da sıkıntısı artmıştır. Bunlardan kurtularak güçlenmek için, doğrudan kendisiyle çatışmanın göze alınamayacağını da hesaplayarak, kriz yaratmaktadır. Bu açıkça "Krizden Beslenme Politikası"dır. Yenilenen Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi Belgesi'nde nükleer gücü ön plana çıkarmasının da, Batı'ya gözdağı verme niyetinden kaynaklandığı değerlendirilmektedir.
Türkiye'yle olan gerginlik
Rusya, Suriye'de Türkiye'nin önünü kesmeye çalışmaktadır. Suriye'deki gücünü ve nüfuzunu pekiştirmek için, Türkiye'nin burada kıstırılması gerektiğini düşünmektedir. Rusya'nın, Türkiye'nin angajman kurallarını hiçe sayarak, sınır bölgesindeki hava sahasını kendi amaçlarına göre kullanmakta ısrarlı olduğu görülmektedir.
Rusya, Türk hava sahasını ihlal eden Rus uçağının düşürülmesinden sonra, daha da umursamaz, uzlaşmaz ve hatta saldırgan bir tutum izlemeye başlamıştır. Uğradığı prestij kaybını telafi etmek için fırsat kollamaktadır. Rövanş peşindedir. Rusya, Kuzey Suriye'de hava sahasını, fiilen Türk uçaklarına kapatmıştır. Türk Hava Kuvvetleri, fiili bir çatışmaya meydan vermemek için hassasiyet göstermektedir. Türkiye de Rusya'ya, Açık Semalar Anlaşması gereği yapılacak uçuşa, rota anlaşmazlığı gerekçesiyle izin vermemiştir.
Türkmenler hedefte, PYD yayılıyor...
Rusya'nın Türkmenleri hedef alması da ayrı bir endişe kaynağıdır. Rus hava bombardımanı altında Türkmenler, Esad güçleriyle savaşmakta zorlanmaktadır. Siviller Türkiye'ye göç etmektedir. Türkmenler Türkiye'den, insani yardımın yanında silah, mühimmat ve malzeme talep etmektedir.
Diğer taraftan PYD, bölgede yayılarak kantonlarını genişletme çabasında. ABD'nin ardından şimdi Rusya'dan da aktif destek görmektedir. Rusya'nın, Kamışlı'ya asker ve teknik personel gönderdiği istihbar edilmiştir. Kamışlı'daki hava alanı Esad rejiminin kontrolündedir. Rusya, burasını da Lazkiye'deki hava üssü gibi kullanmak istemekte ve PYD'yle de iş birliği içinde hareket etmektedir.
Türkiye-Rusya krizi büyüyebilir...
Türkiye Fırat'ın batısını "kırmızı çizgi" ilan etmiştir. Ancak bunun PYD'yi ne kadar durduracağı ve YPG güçlerinin daha ileriye gitmesi halinde Türkiye'nin hangi riskleri göze alacağı henüz bilinmemektedir.
PYD, Rus yetkililerle, hava desteği konusunda temas içindedir. Bu desteği özellikle Fırat'ın batısı için talep etmiştir. PYD, Rusya'nın sahada tam destek için söz verdiğini söylemektedir. Kobani'yle birlikte Afrin bölgesinde de hareketliliğin arttığı söylenmektedir. İngiliz Times Gazetesi, Türkiye ve Rusya'nın Suriye topraklarında sıcak bir çatışmaya girebileceğini dahi yazmıştır.
Barzani de durumdan istifade peşinde...
Barzani, bağımsızlık için referandum yapmanın en doğal hakları olduğunu, devletlerini kurmak için kimseden izin istemeyeceklerini beyan etmiş, Kürt milletinin kaderini tayin etmesi için de en doğru zamanın bu zaman olduğunu söylemiştir.
Bu karmaşık tabloya IŞİD'in, iç, dış ve sınır güvenliğine oluşturduğu tehdidi de eklemek gerekmektedir.
İçeride PKK'yla mücadele devam etmektedir. Rusya, Suriye, YPG, IŞİD, Barzani'yle kriz yaşanmaktadır. Yunanistan, Ege ve Kıbrıs konuları da krize doğu gitmektedir. Yönetim ise yeni anayasa ve başkanlık peşindedir. Etkisiz muhalefeti de peşine takmış sürüklemektedir. Bindik bir alamete, gidiyoruz... Dikkat!
Rusya'nın agresif bir politika izlediği, Batı'yla çekişme içine girdiği ve bu davranışıyla yeniden dikkate alınacak bir ülke olmayı hesapladığı düşünülmektedir.
ABD ve NATO etkinliğinin sınırına dayanması, Rusya'yı tedirgin etmiştir. Birçok eski Sovyet ülkesinin NATO ve AB'ye girmesi, bu tedirginliği artırmıştır. Batı'nın Gürcistan ve Ukrayna'ya el atması karşısında Rusya, karşı hamlelerle bu yaklaşımları püskürtmeye çalışmıştır. Son açıklamalarında ve Ulusal Güvenlik Strateji Belgesi'nde NATO'yu artık tehdit olarak gördüğünü ifade etmiştir.
Yeniden süper güç olma girişimleri
Rusya kontrolü kaybettiği etki ve ilgi alanlarında ve Orta Doğu'da yeniden inisiyatif alarak etkin olma peşindedir. Gürcistan ve Ukrayna operasyonlarını gerçekleştirmiş, Kırım'ı ilhak etmiştir. Orta Doğu'daki son kalesi Suriye'yi, karışıklıktan istifadeyle kontrol altına almaya çalışmış, ortaya çıkan IŞİD tehdidini, Batı'yla birlikte bertaraf etme bahanesiyle bölgeye yerleşmiştir.
Kendisiyle çatışmaya girmenin, dünya savaşı çıkarabileceği endişesi yaratmaya çalışmaktadır. Bir dünya savaşının göze alınamayacağını da bildiği için, karşı güçleri, geri durmaya zorlamaktadır. Bunda ABD'nin ağırlık merkezini Orta Doğu'dan Asya-Pasifik'e kaydırmasının da etkisi vardır.
Rusya Batı'nın yaptırımlarına maruz kalmıştır. Gelirinin esasını oluşturan petrolün, bilerek düşürülmesinden dolayı da sıkıntısı artmıştır. Bunlardan kurtularak güçlenmek için, doğrudan kendisiyle çatışmanın göze alınamayacağını da hesaplayarak, kriz yaratmaktadır. Bu açıkça "Krizden Beslenme Politikası"dır. Yenilenen Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi Belgesi'nde nükleer gücü ön plana çıkarmasının da, Batı'ya gözdağı verme niyetinden kaynaklandığı değerlendirilmektedir.
Türkiye'yle olan gerginlik
Rusya, Suriye'de Türkiye'nin önünü kesmeye çalışmaktadır. Suriye'deki gücünü ve nüfuzunu pekiştirmek için, Türkiye'nin burada kıstırılması gerektiğini düşünmektedir. Rusya'nın, Türkiye'nin angajman kurallarını hiçe sayarak, sınır bölgesindeki hava sahasını kendi amaçlarına göre kullanmakta ısrarlı olduğu görülmektedir.
Rusya, Türk hava sahasını ihlal eden Rus uçağının düşürülmesinden sonra, daha da umursamaz, uzlaşmaz ve hatta saldırgan bir tutum izlemeye başlamıştır. Uğradığı prestij kaybını telafi etmek için fırsat kollamaktadır. Rövanş peşindedir. Rusya, Kuzey Suriye'de hava sahasını, fiilen Türk uçaklarına kapatmıştır. Türk Hava Kuvvetleri, fiili bir çatışmaya meydan vermemek için hassasiyet göstermektedir. Türkiye de Rusya'ya, Açık Semalar Anlaşması gereği yapılacak uçuşa, rota anlaşmazlığı gerekçesiyle izin vermemiştir.
Türkmenler hedefte, PYD yayılıyor...
Rusya'nın Türkmenleri hedef alması da ayrı bir endişe kaynağıdır. Rus hava bombardımanı altında Türkmenler, Esad güçleriyle savaşmakta zorlanmaktadır. Siviller Türkiye'ye göç etmektedir. Türkmenler Türkiye'den, insani yardımın yanında silah, mühimmat ve malzeme talep etmektedir.
Diğer taraftan PYD, bölgede yayılarak kantonlarını genişletme çabasında. ABD'nin ardından şimdi Rusya'dan da aktif destek görmektedir. Rusya'nın, Kamışlı'ya asker ve teknik personel gönderdiği istihbar edilmiştir. Kamışlı'daki hava alanı Esad rejiminin kontrolündedir. Rusya, burasını da Lazkiye'deki hava üssü gibi kullanmak istemekte ve PYD'yle de iş birliği içinde hareket etmektedir.
Türkiye-Rusya krizi büyüyebilir...
Türkiye Fırat'ın batısını "kırmızı çizgi" ilan etmiştir. Ancak bunun PYD'yi ne kadar durduracağı ve YPG güçlerinin daha ileriye gitmesi halinde Türkiye'nin hangi riskleri göze alacağı henüz bilinmemektedir.
PYD, Rus yetkililerle, hava desteği konusunda temas içindedir. Bu desteği özellikle Fırat'ın batısı için talep etmiştir. PYD, Rusya'nın sahada tam destek için söz verdiğini söylemektedir. Kobani'yle birlikte Afrin bölgesinde de hareketliliğin arttığı söylenmektedir. İngiliz Times Gazetesi, Türkiye ve Rusya'nın Suriye topraklarında sıcak bir çatışmaya girebileceğini dahi yazmıştır.
Barzani de durumdan istifade peşinde...
Barzani, bağımsızlık için referandum yapmanın en doğal hakları olduğunu, devletlerini kurmak için kimseden izin istemeyeceklerini beyan etmiş, Kürt milletinin kaderini tayin etmesi için de en doğru zamanın bu zaman olduğunu söylemiştir.
Bu karmaşık tabloya IŞİD'in, iç, dış ve sınır güvenliğine oluşturduğu tehdidi de eklemek gerekmektedir.
İçeride PKK'yla mücadele devam etmektedir. Rusya, Suriye, YPG, IŞİD, Barzani'yle kriz yaşanmaktadır. Yunanistan, Ege ve Kıbrıs konuları da krize doğu gitmektedir. Yönetim ise yeni anayasa ve başkanlık peşindedir. Etkisiz muhalefeti de peşine takmış sürüklemektedir. Bindik bir alamete, gidiyoruz... Dikkat!
Wednesday, February 3, 2016
FKÖ Dışişleri Bakanı (1994 -2005) Nebil Şaat, Filistin, Yunanistan ve Kıbrıslı Rumlar arasındaki dostluğu açıklıyor.
EU Observer - Opinion
Old friends? Palestine, Cyprus, and Greece- January
26, 2016
·
Greek FM Nikos
Kotzias, who lobbied for Israel at the EU Council last week, with Palestinian
FM Riyad al-Maliki last year (Photo: Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών)
JAFFA, PALESTINE, 26. Jan, 18:1
Built on common experience,
long-term interests and moral principles, Palestine’s relationship with Cyprus
and Greece goes back a long way.
Short-term economic gains should
not be allowed to damage these deep and precious friendships.
·
Israel, Cyprus, and Greece are
looking to exploit Mediterranean Sea gas (Photo: turkstream.info)
Over the last 70 years, the
relationship of Cyprus and Palestine was that of close friendship and political
alliance. Both were former British colonies and both suffered from British
manipulations, leaving behind two divided homelands.
The struggle of the Cypriots to
liberate and unite their land found close allies in the Arab World,
particularly in Egypt. President Nasser of Egypt and archbishop Makarios of
Cyprus stood side by side in the struggle against British occupation.
For the Palestinians, these two
leaders were natural allies in their struggle for freedom and independence.
Egypt, Cyprus and the Palestine Liberation Organisation joined the Non-Aligned
Movement.
I remember my first trip to
Nicosia in 1965. It reminded me of my hometown of Jaffa.
The fragrance of jasmine and
orange blossom, and the colourful flowers, brought back all the memories of the
home I lost when Israel was created in 1948 - the year that I and the majority
of my people became refugees.
As Palestinians, we stood against
the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus [from 1974]. I remember, in my former
capacity as foreign minister of Palestine, my instructions were very clear: to
stand by the legitimate government of Cyprus, and to stand against any
recognition of a separatist state in the North of Cyprus, particularly within
the Arab League, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, where we had some
moral and political influence.
The friendship was mutual. Cyprus recognised the state of Palestine in
1988. It supported our struggle for independence and our pursuit of peace.
Palestine supported Cyprus in its pursuit of independence, territorial
integrity, and unity.
Greek friendship
We have traditionally had an
equally strong relationship with Greece.
Part of our ancestral origin can
be traced back to the Greek island of Crete. We raise the Greek flag on all our
Orthodox churches, to which most of our Christians belong.
We will never forget the welcome
party in Athens, in 1982, after 88 days of Israeli bombardment and siege of
Beirut, killing thousands of Palestinians and Lebanese people.
Prime minister Andreas Papandreou
led the party that met our historic leader, Yasser Arafat, on his arrival.
As foreign minister, I worked
very hard to support Greece in the Arab and Muslim world, both economically and
politically. The close bond shared between Papandreou and Arafat, and between
me and his son George, reflected a long friendship between Palestine and
Greece.
That relationship, like our
relationship with Cyprus, was not limited to a particular political party. It
was a friendship among peoples: Greeks, Cypriots, and Palestinians.
After Greece and Cyprus joined
the EU, they became two of our closest allies in the bloc, supporting our quest
for a peaceful political solution, and standing by us when Israel violated its
commitments, whether by continuing to expropriate land and water, by destroying
the Gaza Strip, or denying us the state we had accepted - on just 22 percent of
our original homeland.
Our Greek and Cypriot allies
stood by the principles and commitments which had brought us together for 70
years.
Oil and gas
Lately, and very regrettably,
these relationships have begun to change.
One understands the importance of
economic and political interests in the formation and shifts of political alliances.
Today, Cyprus, Greece and Israel are linked by certain issues, including
natural gas, oil, geopolitical influence, as well as financial crises.
We understand. But, such
connections are not unique to Greece and Cyprus. Several other countries such
as Russia, China, India and other EU countries have developed important
economic relations with Israel.
Some of them were also historical
allies of the Arab World and of Palestine. At one time, we felt that their
closeness to both Palestine and Israel may be an advantage in supporting the
peace process.
Short-term changes in economic
interests and political positions do not change important facts, such as: Who
is the occupier and who is the occupied in the Holy Land? Or, who, out of
Palestine and Israel, is now being warned, even by its closest allies, that
it’s becoming an apartheid state?
Nor should it change assessments
of the balance of power. Such as, who has extensive military and nuclear
capabilities? Or, whose national income is 40 times that of the other?
Finally, one should not forget
who has remained committed to the peace agreements, and who has violated those
agreements.
Changes in economic interests do
not change international law, or the sanctity of justice and human rights.
China, France, Brazil, and Russia
have common economic and political interests with Israel, but their position on
the rights of the Palestinians, and on the necessity of ending the Israeli
occupation, has not changed.
In fact, as Israel continues to
violate international law, UN resolutions, and signed agreements, these powers
have become more ready to condemn Israeli actions against the Palestinians, and
to apply sanctions against Israel.
Assurances?
We were given assurances by the
leaders of Cyprus and Greece that their closer relationship with Israel would
not change their commitments to Palestine, nor would it adversely affect their
historical relationship with Palestine or the Arab and Muslim world.
The prime minister of Greece and
the president of Cyprus both recently visited Palestine and Israel. Both made
statements in Palestine reaffirming these historical positions.
Palestinian president Mahmoud
Abbas Abbas was invited to attend the vote in the Greek parliament, which
unanimously recommended that the Greek government should recognise the state of Palestine.
The explanation was very clear:
Parliament members of all the Greek parties, representing all of the Greek
people, support Palestine, and the right of the Palestinians.
In the light of the above, it is
very difficult to explain some of the recent words and actions of leaders of
these two countries.
On 12 January, Averof Neophytou,
the head of Cyprus’ ruling party, the DICY, and the chairman of the Cypriot
House of Representatives, visited Israel.
He was quoted as saying:
"Cyprus no longer sees Israel as an aggressive country imposing its will
by force on the Palestinians, but rather as a small nation fighting for
survival in the face of much greater odds.”
He told the Israeli newspaper,
The Jerusalem Post, that, over the last decade, his country which had once,
alongside Greece, been among the most critical of Israel in Europe, now had a
“clearer picture.”
“It is a country of 8 million
fighting a struggle for survival and having to face hundreds of millions of
Muslims and Arabs, part of who don’t even recognise the right of the existence
of a Jewish state … So which side is strong, and which side is weak? Which side
is fighting for survival?,” he said.
I was glad to see the Cypriot
opposition party, AKEL, call him out on trying to “distort history and
reality.” But the fact the statement was made, and, so far, not retracted,
disturbs me.
EU foreign policy
What’s even more worrying is the
apparently total change in the position of Greece and Cyprus in terms of voting
and lobbying in the EU Council.
On the 17 January, the Greek
foreign minister almost succeeded in torpedoing the conclusions of the latest
meeting of EU foreign ministers, by insisting on an Israeli version of several
key paragraphs.
Meanwhile, statements attributed
to Greek leaders, announcing their refusal to implement the EU directive on
labeling of settlement products, were shocking. They were later corrected.
Greek statements supporting
Israel’s claim that the whole of Jerusalem is the historical capital of the
state of Israel and the Jewish people, completely ignoring Palestinian rights
in Jerusalem, were even more shocking.
They remain uncorrected.
The Palestinian people expect a
correction and an explanation. We do not want to abandon our friendship with
Greece or Cyprus, nor do we want to see a shift away from the strategic
relationships that link these two neighboring countries to the Arab and Muslim
world.
I am sure the majority of the
Greek and Cypriot people share my feelings about our relationship.
Loyalties
We are loyal to this heritage,
and we do not change our moral commitments and principles due to a temporary
shift in economic interests.
We do not object to Greece or
Cyprus pursuing their mutual economic interests with Israel, but we call on
them to remain committed to their long-term friendship and to our shared
principles.
In the long run, these principles
are the cornerstones upon which peace, stability, security, and economic
prosperity are built, not only in the Eastern Mediterranean, but in the whole
world.
Nabeel Shaath is the Fatah party’s foreign relations
commissioner. He served as Palestinian foreign minister between 1994 and 2005
Thursday, January 28, 2016
Iran - Iraq war by Pierre Razoux LRB book review
The Iran-Iraq War by Pierre Razoux, translated by Nicholas Elliott
Harvard, 640 pp, £29.95, November 2015, ISBN 978 0 674 08863 4
Harvard, 640 pp, £29.95, November 2015, ISBN 978 0 674 08863 4
Predicting what will start a war, and when, is an unrewarding business. Long-term trends (‘causes’) are often clear enough, but not the proximate causes, or triggers. We can assess the comparative significance of competition for resources, hunger for power, the nature of political systems, the psychology of leaders. What precipitates a conflict, though, may be a sudden, unforeseen event: an accident, misreading or miscalculation, or a temperamental leader’s flash of hubris. Often, of course, it is a combination of such things. Yet there is nothing inevitable about the outbreak of conflict. (Bear in mind when I say this that I work for an NGO that operates on the premise that conflicts can be prevented.)
We face the same obstacles in analysing what will bring a war to an end, and how long it will take – or, to put it differently, what would persuade the warring parties to seek to reach peace. Take the war in Syria. Its participants blundered into it, responding to each provocation by their adversaries with an escalation of their own, so that gradually a local popular protest turned into a civil war wrapped up in a regional power struggle folded into a confrontation between superpowers that so far has cost more than a quarter of a million lives and displaced almost 11 million Syrians – about half the population – within and outside the country’s borders. How will it end? How can it be ended, when the participants themselves show no sign of being ready to end it?
The Iran-Iraq War offers as useful a case study as any in how conflicts begin and are brought to an end. The war started in September 1980, when Saddam Hussein, perceiving a significant threat in Iran’s recent Islamic Revolution, sent his troops across the border with the intention of dealing his neighbour a quick and humiliating blow. He was worried that the Islamic Republic’s radical ideology and revolutionary zeal might incite Iraq’s majority Shia population to revolt against his own secular rule. He also sensed a momentary weakness on Iran’s part, as the new regime was busy eliminating its internal enemies. Strategically, he hoped to rein in Iran’s hegemonic pretensions in Iraq and the Gulf, a region with a significant Shia population.
After eight years of war, and hundreds of thousands of dead and injured on both sides, Iran’s younger generation was dangerously depleted, its troops exhausted and its population demoralised. The new republic had also become isolated internationally as a result of the 1979-81 US hostage crisis. By contrast, Iraq, while vulnerable on a number of fronts, was gathering strength with the help of Arab and Western support. Yet the war was brought to an end, and what clinched it, Pierre Razoux argues in his new history of the conflict, was the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. This made possible a rapprochement between Tehran and Moscow, which the Soviets were eager to achieve, afraid that a defeat for Iran would permit the US to extend its influence in the Gulf. According to Razoux, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed that if the Soviets put pressure on Iran to end the conflict, Washington would persuade Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to facilitate the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The broader point is that no headway can be made in negotiations for peaceful settlement of local conflicts until the international context allows for it. Arguably the war in Syria won’t end without an agreement, or at least an accommodation, between Iran and Saudi Arabia – which, in turn, would have to be facilitated by Russia and the US. It is heartening that, despite their significant differences, both Russia and the US are now sponsoring an inclusive process to end the war in Syria.
In Iraq, the study of history is hardly a priority now, with its middle class severely damaged by two wars (Iran then the first Gulf War), 13 years of crippling UN sanctions, then the second Gulf War and the mayhem ensuing that continues to this day. What remains of the educated elite is just trying to get by, or trying to leave. US military researchers debriefed Iraqi generals after 2003, but their views are useful only in relation to wartime decision-making and operational matters; some of their more outrageous claims about the regime, or about Iran or the Kurds, went unchallenged by their questioners, who appeared knowledgeable about individual battles but clearly had little or no understanding of the political and historical context in which they took place. The Kurds themselves, who chose Iran as their ally in an attempt to free themselves from the Iraqi yoke and suffered grievously in consequence, have undertaken very little historical inquiry, with the exception of a few autobiographical accounts.
So we have reason to be grateful to Razoux, who between chapters zooms out of the battlefield to focus on the international power struggles and diplomacy that helped shape various confrontations in the war. What emerges is that the mindsets driving state policy in Iran and Iraq today, or the actions of sub-state actors, including Islamic State, are largely rooted in the instincts that propelled the war in the 1980s. The war wasn’t simply a conflict between two states but a clash between two cultural traditions, political philosophies and nations – all intertwined – that transcended state borders: Arab v. Persian, Sunni v. Shia, secular v. theocratic.
Each side drew on its religious traditions in its propaganda, using a coded language that would be clearly understood by the other, and was meant to injure. Saddam had a particular knack for it, referring to the war in its entirety as his ‘Qadisiyyah’ (to invoke the decisive defeat of Persians by Arab Muslim forces in 636 ce), and naming the ballistic missile with which the Iraqi military struck cities as far away as Tehran the al-Hussein, not after himself but after Hussein ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib, the third imam of Shia Islam, who was killed and beheaded by his (Arab Sunni Muslim) rivals in the battle of Karbala in 680.
Battles deriving from the seventh-century schism between Sunni and Shia continue to be waged in the popular imagination. The divide, which concerns lineage more than religious practice (although it has evolved ritual differences as well), is deep, but doesn’t necessarily generate violent intercommunal conflict. There have been long historical periods of peaceful commingling and extensive intermarriage. Politicised by the Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, however, it now drives the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen. To put the genie back in the bottle will require Iran and Saudi Arabia to find a new balance of power in the Gulf, but even this may no longer be enough to suppress the region’s conflicts.
What emerges in illuminating detail from Razoux’s study is the impact of the power struggle between Ayatollah Khomeini’s two protégés, the men he promoted and protected till the end of his life in June 1989, and left in charge of a house divided by their rivalry: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Hosseini Khamenei. Rafsanjani was the gregarious son of wealthy pistachio farmers, Khamenei the ascetic product of a Shia theological seminary. The war was Rafsanjani’s handiwork, especially after mid-1982, once Iran had succeeded in expelling Iraqi forces from its territory. He continued to press the case for continuing the fight even in the face of the growing realisation that Iran couldn’t sustain it. As the war drew to a conclusion, he made sure that his mentor, Khomeini, took the responsibility for ending it, thereby securing his own political survival.
By contrast, Khamenei alternately supported and opposed continuing the war, making sure never to contradict the Supreme Leader. Razoux may be correct when he says that Rafsanjani made the only mistake of his long political career by allowing Khamenei to succeed Khomeini, giving him the last word on all major decisions. As a result, over time, Rafsanjani has largely been sidelined, though this has done little to temper his ambition or cramp his ability to promote his disciples, including the current president, Hassan Rouhani. They belong to the political wing that, while wanting to preserve the revolution and the regime it produced, sees the value of opening Iran up to the outside world – an approach Khamenei fears will be the beginning of the end.
Razoux gives a good account of Rafsanjani’s push to establish the Revolutionary Guards and Basij volunteers as rivals to the army, which the ruling clerics associated with the shah and the revolution’s secular wing. The use of militias to counteract established state institutions as a way of protecting the Islamic Revolution is a model that Iran is replicating today in Lebanon (Hizbullah), Iraq (the Popular Mobilisation Forces) and Syria (the National Defence Forces). But healthy state institutions would potentially be far more effective in projecting Iran’s power beyond its borders.
The deal between Iran and the existing nuclear powers, concluded last year, shouldn’t be seen merely as a political fix to a technical problem. The decision to pursue nuclear weapons is primarily rooted in fear and can only be adequately addressed by a building of trust. In this respect, the US and Iran still have a long way to go. One of the potential obstacles will be the US’s perceptions of Iran’s role in the region, and its support of proxies in Lebanon and Syria in particular. But Iran argues that Western states have no business throwing their weight around in the Middle East, that Western military interventions, rather than solving problems, have created a whole host of new ones, and that the root cause of instability – the failure to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict – remains unaddressed. Moreover, Iran claims it has legitimate security interests in the region, and that Syria is a long-time partner which came to Iran’s aid when its existence was threatened in the 1980s; it is only reasonable, from Tehran’s perspective, that Iran should support the Assad regime now that it finds itself besieged. (What Iran leaves unsaid is that one of its primary motivations is its need for a corridor through Syria to its principal ally, Hizbullah in Lebanon.) As for Iraq, Iran has an abiding interest in seeing a nominally friendly Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, presiding over a weak state in no position to threaten its neighbour.
Finally, Razoux highlights the critical role of oil, which, even if it wasn’t the casus belli, informed the actions of all the key players, Iran and Iraq included, as in their repeated targeting of oil infrastructure and shipping. One way of describing the war in the most basic terms is that it pitted Iran’s vastly greater reservoir of young men against Iraq’s easy access to loans, credit and bank guarantees, which it used to finance its war machine. When Saudi Arabia, prodded by the US, began flooding the market with oil in July 1985, precipitating a dramatic drop in the price to below $10 per barrel, it caused severe financial difficulties in the Soviet Union and Iran, as well as Iraq. Saddam’s backers in Riyadh helped him out with new loans; after the war, the debt added to the pressure on an Iraqi economy struggling to revive itself, eventually resulting in the Kuwait fiasco. But Iran suffered the most, its income reduced by a half or even two thirds in a very short time. This, and the continuing high rate of casualties, resulted in a surge of domestic criticism of the war that could no longer be ignored or appeased. It would still take three years for Iran to sue for peace, and another three for the Soviet Union to collapse, but the US-Saudi manipulation of oil prices may have been a determining factor in both cases.
This part of the story has echoes today, even though the circumstances are quite different. In the face of a falling oil price, in part caused by the extraction of shale oil and gas in the US, Saudi Arabia has refused to reduce output (it argues, reasonably, that others will promptly seize its market share), and this is placing enormous pressure on Russia, Iran and Iraq, as well as Saudi Arabia itself. There is no overt manipulation, but everyone knows that Saudi Arabia – which has built up significant financial reserves and imposed austerity measures – is likely to be in a better position to weather the storm than states which are strapped for cash and may face a reduced capacity to project their power abroad. The longer Saudi Arabia can hold out, the thinking perhaps goes, the harder it will be for the others to maintain their level of engagement in Syria.
The basic facts are straightforward. In 1975, when Saddam and the shah struck a deal over the contested Shatt al-Arab waterway (the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates as they reach the Gulf), Iraqi Kurds, who had fought an insurgency with the shah’s support, were hung out to dry and faced imminent total defeat. The rebels under Mustafa Barzani fled into exile in Iran; their families were deported to camps in southern Iraq. Subsequently, the Kurdish movement split along political, ideological and linguistic/geographical lines, and by the time Saddam started the war with Iran in 1980, the two main factions, under Mustafa’s son Masoud Barzani and his rival Jalal Talabani, were pursuing shifting alliances with neighbouring states, just as the Kurds have often done and still do today, the better to compete with each other. In 1983, Barzani’s fighters served as Iran’s scouts in battles in corners of Iraqi Kurdistan, while Talabani entered into a one-year truce with Saddam; meanwhile, the two groups were fighting each other in the mountains, either directly or through tribal proxies.
Three years later, Iran had managed to convince the two leaders to work together under Tehran’s authority. By opening a front in Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran hoped to relieve pressure on its forces in the south, and by early 1987 the strategy had been so effective that Saddam saw the need to mount a counterinsurgency. He appointed his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid as overseer of security operations in the north. In February 1988 the regime launched what it called the Heroic Anfal Operation, a six-month-long campaign in eight numbered stages designed to cover all of rural Kurdistan. Each stage was preceded by the extensive use of chemical weapons against Kurdish strongholds: this drove people out of the countryside and into the arms of the Iraqi military, which dispatched them in convoys to execution sites in the south. It’s estimated that between eighty and one hundred thousand people, most of them civilians, died this way.
In a separate operation, as part of the war, the Iraqi regime attacked the Kurdish town of Halabja with poison gas in March 1988 after it was captured by a combination of Iranian and Kurdish forces. The attack killed thousands of civilians, while leaving the fighters, who had protective clothing, mostly unscathed. (This wasn’t the first Iraqi gas attack on a population centre: that took place in the Iranian Kurdish town of Serdasht in June 1987.) Significantly, the Iraqi army couldn’t have been as successful as it was in dislodging Kurdish villagers, who had grown inured to constant shelling and air attacks, had events at Halabja not sent a powerful message as to what might befall them if they stayed. After Halabja, as chemical clouds wafted down in selective locations during the Anfal campaign, the merest rumour or hint of a gas attack would be enough to send people running, just as the army intended.
Razoux has a somewhat limited understanding of the extent and significance of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons throughout the conflict, but especially during its final year. Poison gas may, to some, be merely one tool among many to be used on the battlefield, but its psychological impact – the terror it inflicts, especially on civilians, who are usually unprotected – can be enormous, a so-called force multiplier. For Iraq’s military, it was an asymmetrical advantage. Iran’s forces were reaching exhaustion point in early 1988. Knowing this, the Iraqis dropped huge quantities of gas onto Iranian lines on the first day of each of the five stages of the Tawakalna ‘ala Allah operation, a few months after the attack on Halabja. The gas attacks preceded a concerted effort with conventional weapons to drive demoralised troops out of the remaining pockets of Iraqi territory Iran was holding. The gambit was an overwhelming success; little actual fighting was required during these final ‘battles’ of the war.
At the same time, the Iraqi regime had found a diabolic way of eroding Iranians’ morale at home. The ‘war of the cities’ had involved direct missile attacks on Tehran in February 1988, prompting a massive evacuation of its population. Days after the Halabja attack the Iraqi media began broadcasting threats that Iraq would place chemical warheads on its modified Scud missiles, the al-Husseins. Now Iranians fled Tehran in even greater numbers, while its hospitals began preparing for the arrival of large numbers of casualties from chemical strikes. For many Iranians this was a psychological turning point.
In the event, Saddam failed to make good on his threat: he may have realised he didn’t need to. In hindsight it’s clear that the actual and threatened use of chemical weapons proved instrumental in undermining public support of the Iranian war effort, just as it had done wonders in draining the Iraqi Kurdish countryside of a population that had enabled the rebels to move about with ease. The impact of this smart, strategic, depraved use of poison gas is missed by Razoux, as it is by many others writing on the war. This is surprising, in that the significance of the gas attacks wasn’t lost on the international community, which gathered for the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons immediately after the war; some years later, this led to the adoption of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Iraq’s escalating use of chemical weapons – greater quantities, ever more lethal and diverse agents, and an expanding set of targets reached over larger distances – may have been the precipitating factor in Iran’s decision not to pursue any longer a conflict it had come to acknowledge it couldn’t win. But this alone wasn’t enough to end the war. A combination of structural factors – dwindling oil revenues, international isolation, a decline in recruits to what was essentially a volunteer army, war exhaustion, popular demoralisation, the US engaging Iran in naval battles in the Gulf, and a changing international context with the thaw in the Cold War and the start of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in May 1988 – paved the way for Iran’s obstinate leader finally to bow to reality. To predict what may bring the Syrian civil war to an end, or the war in Yemen, or any other of the world’s current conflicts, will require a close analysis of the key factors influencing the course of events in each case, and of what might be needed to tip that course in the right direction.
After eight years of war, and hundreds of thousands of dead and injured on both sides, Iran’s younger generation was dangerously depleted, its troops exhausted and its population demoralised. The new republic had also become isolated internationally as a result of the 1979-81 US hostage crisis. By contrast, Iraq, while vulnerable on a number of fronts, was gathering strength with the help of Arab and Western support. Yet the war was brought to an end, and what clinched it, Pierre Razoux argues in his new history of the conflict, was the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. This made possible a rapprochement between Tehran and Moscow, which the Soviets were eager to achieve, afraid that a defeat for Iran would permit the US to extend its influence in the Gulf. According to Razoux, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed that if the Soviets put pressure on Iran to end the conflict, Washington would persuade Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to facilitate the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The broader point is that no headway can be made in negotiations for peaceful settlement of local conflicts until the international context allows for it. Arguably the war in Syria won’t end without an agreement, or at least an accommodation, between Iran and Saudi Arabia – which, in turn, would have to be facilitated by Russia and the US. It is heartening that, despite their significant differences, both Russia and the US are now sponsoring an inclusive process to end the war in Syria.
*
In Iran, the experience of the war still reverberates. A great deal continues to be written about military and strategic decision-making during the war. Yet the Iranian debate, while valuable, is limited. Controlled by the Revolutionary Guard war research centre, it overemphasises military strategy, highlights the heroism of Iranian soldiers, and reflects a very particular perspective, based as it is on a daily record (thirty thousand cassette tapes) of wartime discussions between commanders.
So we have reason to be grateful to Razoux, who between chapters zooms out of the battlefield to focus on the international power struggles and diplomacy that helped shape various confrontations in the war. What emerges is that the mindsets driving state policy in Iran and Iraq today, or the actions of sub-state actors, including Islamic State, are largely rooted in the instincts that propelled the war in the 1980s. The war wasn’t simply a conflict between two states but a clash between two cultural traditions, political philosophies and nations – all intertwined – that transcended state borders: Arab v. Persian, Sunni v. Shia, secular v. theocratic.
Each side drew on its religious traditions in its propaganda, using a coded language that would be clearly understood by the other, and was meant to injure. Saddam had a particular knack for it, referring to the war in its entirety as his ‘Qadisiyyah’ (to invoke the decisive defeat of Persians by Arab Muslim forces in 636 ce), and naming the ballistic missile with which the Iraqi military struck cities as far away as Tehran the al-Hussein, not after himself but after Hussein ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib, the third imam of Shia Islam, who was killed and beheaded by his (Arab Sunni Muslim) rivals in the battle of Karbala in 680.
What emerges in illuminating detail from Razoux’s study is the impact of the power struggle between Ayatollah Khomeini’s two protégés, the men he promoted and protected till the end of his life in June 1989, and left in charge of a house divided by their rivalry: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Hosseini Khamenei. Rafsanjani was the gregarious son of wealthy pistachio farmers, Khamenei the ascetic product of a Shia theological seminary. The war was Rafsanjani’s handiwork, especially after mid-1982, once Iran had succeeded in expelling Iraqi forces from its territory. He continued to press the case for continuing the fight even in the face of the growing realisation that Iran couldn’t sustain it. As the war drew to a conclusion, he made sure that his mentor, Khomeini, took the responsibility for ending it, thereby securing his own political survival.
By contrast, Khamenei alternately supported and opposed continuing the war, making sure never to contradict the Supreme Leader. Razoux may be correct when he says that Rafsanjani made the only mistake of his long political career by allowing Khamenei to succeed Khomeini, giving him the last word on all major decisions. As a result, over time, Rafsanjani has largely been sidelined, though this has done little to temper his ambition or cramp his ability to promote his disciples, including the current president, Hassan Rouhani. They belong to the political wing that, while wanting to preserve the revolution and the regime it produced, sees the value of opening Iran up to the outside world – an approach Khamenei fears will be the beginning of the end.
*
The crisis over Iran’s nuclear aspirations has its origins in the war too. The shah had established the programme under US tutelage; Iran’s revolutionary leaders cancelled it, saying the use of nuclear weapons contradicted the principles of Islam. Once the Iraqi nuclear threat had been removed by the Israeli strike on the Osirak reactor in June 1981, Iran no longer felt the need to pursue a nuclear path. But Iraq’s extensive use of poison gas during the conflict forced Iran’s leaders into a recognition that they had left the country dangerously exposed. (To be clear, both sides repeatedly committed atrocities during the war, targeting civilians at will and, in Iran’s case, dispatching children to the front for suicidal tasks such as minesweeping.)
Iran’s frequent, emphatic remonstrations with the UN, based on its careful reading of international law, were largely ignored. It had, in its view, made rightful, reasonable and responsible appeals to the world’s highest political body and been rebuffed. It was only then that Iran’s revolutionary leaders considered restarting the nuclear programme; they also decided to build up their own arsenal of chemical weapons so as to be able to counter Iraq. (The war ended without Iran having deployed these weapons. Iraq, in addition, had started to develop biological weapons, but at war’s end had only reached the testing stage.)The deal between Iran and the existing nuclear powers, concluded last year, shouldn’t be seen merely as a political fix to a technical problem. The decision to pursue nuclear weapons is primarily rooted in fear and can only be adequately addressed by a building of trust. In this respect, the US and Iran still have a long way to go. One of the potential obstacles will be the US’s perceptions of Iran’s role in the region, and its support of proxies in Lebanon and Syria in particular. But Iran argues that Western states have no business throwing their weight around in the Middle East, that Western military interventions, rather than solving problems, have created a whole host of new ones, and that the root cause of instability – the failure to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict – remains unaddressed. Moreover, Iran claims it has legitimate security interests in the region, and that Syria is a long-time partner which came to Iran’s aid when its existence was threatened in the 1980s; it is only reasonable, from Tehran’s perspective, that Iran should support the Assad regime now that it finds itself besieged. (What Iran leaves unsaid is that one of its primary motivations is its need for a corridor through Syria to its principal ally, Hizbullah in Lebanon.) As for Iraq, Iran has an abiding interest in seeing a nominally friendly Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, presiding over a weak state in no position to threaten its neighbour.
This part of the story has echoes today, even though the circumstances are quite different. In the face of a falling oil price, in part caused by the extraction of shale oil and gas in the US, Saudi Arabia has refused to reduce output (it argues, reasonably, that others will promptly seize its market share), and this is placing enormous pressure on Russia, Iran and Iraq, as well as Saudi Arabia itself. There is no overt manipulation, but everyone knows that Saudi Arabia – which has built up significant financial reserves and imposed austerity measures – is likely to be in a better position to weather the storm than states which are strapped for cash and may face a reduced capacity to project their power abroad. The longer Saudi Arabia can hold out, the thinking perhaps goes, the harder it will be for the others to maintain their level of engagement in Syria.
*
There is another important dimension to the war, to which Razoux doesn’t quite do justice. Some twenty years ago, not long after I began researching Iraq, I noted that Iraqi Kurds in the late 1980s had lost not only their lives but also their history. The pervasively repressive Iraqi police state and the mayhem caused by the Iran-Iraq war had made it more difficult to gain access to Iraqi Kurdistan, and more dangerous to stay there. The Iraqi regime’s widespread use of poison gas and the systematic murder of tens of thousands of noncombatants went largely unnoticed, unchallenged and unpunished. At that time, in 1994, not a single serious study of the post-1975 history of the Iraqi Kurds had been published. Moreover, the Kurds’ decision to ally themselves with Iran in the war, which the West castigated because of the Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis, resulted in a bias in Western intelligence reporting on the conflict that is glaringly evident in declassified documents from the time.
Three years later, Iran had managed to convince the two leaders to work together under Tehran’s authority. By opening a front in Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran hoped to relieve pressure on its forces in the south, and by early 1987 the strategy had been so effective that Saddam saw the need to mount a counterinsurgency. He appointed his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid as overseer of security operations in the north. In February 1988 the regime launched what it called the Heroic Anfal Operation, a six-month-long campaign in eight numbered stages designed to cover all of rural Kurdistan. Each stage was preceded by the extensive use of chemical weapons against Kurdish strongholds: this drove people out of the countryside and into the arms of the Iraqi military, which dispatched them in convoys to execution sites in the south. It’s estimated that between eighty and one hundred thousand people, most of them civilians, died this way.
In a separate operation, as part of the war, the Iraqi regime attacked the Kurdish town of Halabja with poison gas in March 1988 after it was captured by a combination of Iranian and Kurdish forces. The attack killed thousands of civilians, while leaving the fighters, who had protective clothing, mostly unscathed. (This wasn’t the first Iraqi gas attack on a population centre: that took place in the Iranian Kurdish town of Serdasht in June 1987.) Significantly, the Iraqi army couldn’t have been as successful as it was in dislodging Kurdish villagers, who had grown inured to constant shelling and air attacks, had events at Halabja not sent a powerful message as to what might befall them if they stayed. After Halabja, as chemical clouds wafted down in selective locations during the Anfal campaign, the merest rumour or hint of a gas attack would be enough to send people running, just as the army intended.
*
Regrettably, the scarcity of research on the Kurds I observed in 1994 hasn’t markedly improved since. Razoux’s otherwise excellent study is no exception: in these matters his book strays even from the basic facts, including the events and timing of the Anfal campaign. This is quite unnecessary, as access to Iraqi Kurdistan hasn’t been a problem for more than twenty years, and the war generation is alive and there to be interviewed. Yet without a proper understanding of what happened in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1980s and how it has shaped the Kurds’ worldview it’s hard to grasp what drives them today, and what sacrifices they would be willing to make to avoid ever again falling under Baghdad’s rule, regardless of who is in charge (which today, arguably, is nobody). Iraq’s Kurds are engaged in a long struggle for greater autonomy – and ultimately independence – that includes a demand for absolute control of additional territory, including its oil. This struggle is far from settled, and Western states, by providing unquestioned military support to the Kurds in the fight against Islamic State, are aggravating local conflicts that will persist beyond IS’s defeat, should it come to that. What happens in and around Mosul is likely to be of particular importance.
At the same time, the Iraqi regime had found a diabolic way of eroding Iranians’ morale at home. The ‘war of the cities’ had involved direct missile attacks on Tehran in February 1988, prompting a massive evacuation of its population. Days after the Halabja attack the Iraqi media began broadcasting threats that Iraq would place chemical warheads on its modified Scud missiles, the al-Husseins. Now Iranians fled Tehran in even greater numbers, while its hospitals began preparing for the arrival of large numbers of casualties from chemical strikes. For many Iranians this was a psychological turning point.
In the event, Saddam failed to make good on his threat: he may have realised he didn’t need to. In hindsight it’s clear that the actual and threatened use of chemical weapons proved instrumental in undermining public support of the Iranian war effort, just as it had done wonders in draining the Iraqi Kurdish countryside of a population that had enabled the rebels to move about with ease. The impact of this smart, strategic, depraved use of poison gas is missed by Razoux, as it is by many others writing on the war. This is surprising, in that the significance of the gas attacks wasn’t lost on the international community, which gathered for the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons immediately after the war; some years later, this led to the adoption of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Iraq’s escalating use of chemical weapons – greater quantities, ever more lethal and diverse agents, and an expanding set of targets reached over larger distances – may have been the precipitating factor in Iran’s decision not to pursue any longer a conflict it had come to acknowledge it couldn’t win. But this alone wasn’t enough to end the war. A combination of structural factors – dwindling oil revenues, international isolation, a decline in recruits to what was essentially a volunteer army, war exhaustion, popular demoralisation, the US engaging Iran in naval battles in the Gulf, and a changing international context with the thaw in the Cold War and the start of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in May 1988 – paved the way for Iran’s obstinate leader finally to bow to reality. To predict what may bring the Syrian civil war to an end, or the war in Yemen, or any other of the world’s current conflicts, will require a close analysis of the key factors influencing the course of events in each case, and of what might be needed to tip that course in the right direction.
Türk diplomatlarının katili Yanıkyan'ın portresi
HALUK ŞAHİN'in, Hürriyet Daily News gazetesinde İngilizce olarak yayınlanan "The anatomy of a forgotten Armenian assassination" başlıklı yazısında, 27 Ocak 1973 cumartesi günü Los Angeles' deki T.C. Başkonsolosu Mehmet Baydar ve Başkonsolos Yardımcısı Bahadır Demir'i katleden Ermeni Yanıkyan'ın kişiliği ve adli siciliş hakkında şu bilgiler veriliyor:
"Kısa süre önce, açıklanan FBI arşivlerine göre, Mehmet Baydar ve Bahadır Demir’in katili Gurgen Yanıkyan’ın sanıldığı gibi ent...ellektüel biri olmadığı, dosyası incelendiğinde, çocuklara taciz suçlamasıyla yargılandığı, bankadaki hesabında sadece 12 doları bulunduğu ve bir kaç yıldan beri soysal yardım aldığı anlaşılmaktadır.
Yaşam öyküsü uydurma değilse bile kuşkulu niteliktedir. FBİ ajanlarının elde ettiği bilgilere göre, Los Angeles’deki Ermeni cemaati kendisini güvenilmez bir karakter yapısına sahip, huzursuz ve böbürlenen birl olarak tanımlamaktadır. Amerikalı Ermenilerin işlerine ya da Osmanlı Ermenilerinin tarihi trajedilerine hiç ilgi göstermemiştir. Yanikyan yaşamının son kertesinde şerefli bir sayfa yazmak isteyen bir sahtekar olarak nitelenebilir."
"Kısa süre önce, açıklanan FBI arşivlerine göre, Mehmet Baydar ve Bahadır Demir’in katili Gurgen Yanıkyan’ın sanıldığı gibi ent...ellektüel biri olmadığı, dosyası incelendiğinde, çocuklara taciz suçlamasıyla yargılandığı, bankadaki hesabında sadece 12 doları bulunduğu ve bir kaç yıldan beri soysal yardım aldığı anlaşılmaktadır.
Yaşam öyküsü uydurma değilse bile kuşkulu niteliktedir. FBİ ajanlarının elde ettiği bilgilere göre, Los Angeles’deki Ermeni cemaati kendisini güvenilmez bir karakter yapısına sahip, huzursuz ve böbürlenen birl olarak tanımlamaktadır. Amerikalı Ermenilerin işlerine ya da Osmanlı Ermenilerinin tarihi trajedilerine hiç ilgi göstermemiştir. Yanikyan yaşamının son kertesinde şerefli bir sayfa yazmak isteyen bir sahtekar olarak nitelenebilir."
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