REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES Reassessing U.S.-Türkiye Relations The View from Ankara Hasan Mesut Önder, Ph.D. Independent Consultant Joshua Yaphe, Editor

 REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

Reassessing U.S.-Türkiye Relations

The View from Ankara

Hasan Mesut Önder, Ph.D.

Independent Consultant

Joshua Yaphe, Editor

Contents

• America’s Loss 3

• Britain’s Gain 4

 Syria’s Pivotal Role 6

• Next Steps 9

Executive Summary

The Trump Administration clearly recognizes the critical importance of Türkiye as a key partner, though top officials do not yet appear to have a vision for astrategic alliance. President Trump’s warm remarks at the recent NATO Summit

and the removal of sanctions have been well received in Ankara. Nevertheless, it has been seven years since the F-35 aircraft sales were halted, and in that time Turkish foreign policy has drifted away from Washington to develop a wide rangeof security partners to suit Türkiye’s specific needs. Above all, Britain has seized the opportunity to make Türkiye a cornerstone of its post-Brexit strategy for engaging with Europe. The White House may not yet fully appreciate the scope ofthe challenges it faces in restoring the strategic alliance, but it will soon.

The new regional security dynamics that are emerging in the Middle East will put Türkiye front and center as an essential player for promoting peace and stability in the region, especially in Syria. Türkiye is enjoying a remarkable period of stability at home, with security along its borders, and can therefore engage with regional

neighbors and international partners largely on its own terms. A resurgent Iran will probably leave Türkiye more cautious in its approach to Syria, Lebanon, and other regional hotspots, but President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will still be in a good

position to shape the agenda. As a result, other powers will have to deal directly with him to accomplish their policy goals. If the United States hopes to influence Turkish thinking on the issues that matter most to Washington, it will have to craft

a broader vision for the bilateral relationship that goes beyond defense sales. 

01

America’s Loss

The attempted coup of July 15, 2016, created a

rupture in U.S.-Turkish relations that was more

than just a crisis of trust. It prompted a profound

Turkish reassessment of the nature of the alliance,

with enduring consequences, despite the Trump

administration’s recent overtures at the NATO Summit

in Ankara. At every level of the Turkish Government

and in every walk of public life, there were voices that

openly questioned American motives. A confluence

of events contributed to this climate of fear and

mistrust, from the U.S. support for the Kurdish People’s

Protection Units (YPG) in Syria to the criticism of

Türkiye’s handling of the judicial case against Pastor

Brunson and the U.S. refusal to extradite Fethullah

Gülen, whom the Turkish government identified as the

leader of the organization behind the coup attempt.

Officials in Ankara understood that in each case

America was pursuing its national interests in line with

what Washington perceived to be the greatest regional

and global threats to peace and security. However,

many people also felt that America’s approach was

coming at the direct expense of Turkish national

security and sovereignty.

Throughout the first Trump Administration, and again

today, both sides benefitted from open and regular

channels of communication between President Trump

and President Erdoğan, which successfully defused

the worst tensions as they arose. Nevertheless,

the complicated structure of decision-making in

Washington, including the many actors in Congress,

at the Pentagon, and in the State Department,

prevented these two leaders from moving beyond the

many constraints in military cooperation, diplomatic

coordination, and intelligence liaison activities.

Türkiye’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense

system triggered debates on NATO interoperability

and Russian access to U.S. technical data. The

American response was to impose sanctions under

the Countering America’s Adversaries Through

Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which placed Türkiye on par

with Russia, North Korea and Iran. The arrest of an

evangelical preacher in Izmir, Pastor Andrew Brunson,

during the security sweeps that followed the attempted

coup in 2016, on charges of espionage for obtaining

state secrets on behalf of the Gülen organization and

others, prompted protests on Capitol Hill and within

the Administration. Due to concerns about the S-400

system, the United States removed Türkiye from the

F-35 program. The arrest and conviction of Hakan

Atilla, a Turkish bank executive accused of evading

U.S. sanctions on Iran, created suspicions in Türkiye

that the American judicial system was being used as

a political tool, further deepening the mutual distrust.

Many Turks believed that the Atilla case was an

American attempt to send a bigger message to Ankara

about cutting ties to Iran and readjusting Turkish

policies toward the region.

In reaction to these developments, Türkiye took steps

toward diversifying its international relations with the

aim of achieving strategic autonomy. Ankara moved

closer to Russia, and various regional actors like

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, using these relationships

as balancing elements in its dealings with the United

States. During this period, U.S.-Türkiye relations took

on the character of “competitive cooperation.” This

meant that the two countries continued to cooperate

in long-standing, well-defined areas, like maintaining

NATO commitments, while they adopted divergent

approaches on other issues, such as defense

procurement and relations with Israel.

The July 2016 rupture brought about a fundamental

transformation of security perceptions, strategic

priorities, and the understanding of the term alliance.

To emphasize this point, Foreign Minister Hakan

Fidan recently noted that U.S. sanctions on Türkiye

are incompatible with the spirit of alliance, and he

chose to describe the sanctions relief as “a return to a

more rational relationship.” In other words, the idea of

an alliance requires greater trust and is still a way off.

Meanwhile, the rupture in bilateral relations has paved

the way for Türkiye to redefine its position within the

Western system and to pursue a more independent,

multi-dimensional strategy, particularly in the Middle

East. One of the most important relationships that

Türkiye has sought to develop in this context has

been with the United Kingdom.

Britain’s Gain

In many ways, the British have more influence

today in Türkiye than the Americans. This should be

understood as a stage in a long historical process

in which the pendulum swings back and forth

between the United States and the United Kingdom,

with much of the activity taking place behind the

scenes in intelligence circles. In the 1950s, Türkiye’s

Democratic Party sought rapprochement with

America and modeled many of its reforms after the

development agenda of leading American experts.

Cemal Madanoğlu, one of the leaders of the 1960

coup that overthrew the Democratic Party, was in

close contact with Satvet Lütfü Tozan, a Turkish

businessman active on the side of the British during

World War II who was granted honors by King George

VI for his contribution to British wartime intelligence.

Tozan may have shaped the 1960 coup process under

the guidance of British intelligence. This connection

is strongly suggested in the accounts of many recent

historians, particularly that of Mahir Kaynak, who was

working with Turkish intelligence in 1960 and who

monitored Madanoğlu’s visits to the United Kingdom.

Similarly, some Turkish historians argue that Britain

played a behind-the-scenes role in the process

leading up to the 1971 military memorandum,

an ultimatum that was issued by the military

demanding a new government led by senior officers

who would crack down on Leftists and Islamists.

It was a reactionary movement, intent on reversing

the many democratic reforms that America had

long advocated. Again, many Turkish commentators

believe that the United Kingdom encouraged this

move as part of a British effort to counter-balance

a political tool, further deepening the mutual distrust.

Many Turks believed that the Atilla case was an

American attempt to send a bigger message to Ankara

about cutting ties to Iran and readjusting Turkish

policies toward the region.

In reaction to these developments, Türkiye took steps

toward diversifying its international relations with the

aim of achieving strategic autonomy. Ankara moved

closer to Russia, and various regional actors like

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, using these relationships

as balancing elements in its dealings with the United

States. During this period, U.S.-Türkiye relations took

on the character of “competitive cooperation.” This

meant that the two countries continued to cooperate

in long-standing, well-defined areas, like maintaining

NATO commitments, while they adopted divergent

approaches on other issues, such as defense

procurement and relations with Israel.

The July 2016 rupture brought about a fundamental

transformation of security perceptions, strategic

priorities, and the understanding of the term alliance.

To emphasize this point, Foreign Minister Hakan

Fidan recently noted that U.S. sanctions on Türkiye

are incompatible with the spirit of alliance, and he

chose to describe the sanctions relief as “a return to a

more rational relationship.” In other words, the idea of

an alliance requires greater trust and is still a way off.

Meanwhile, the rupture in bilateral relations has paved

the way for Türkiye to redefine its position within the

Western system and to pursue a more independent,

multi-dimensional strategy, particularly in the Middle

East. One of the most important relationships that

Türkiye has sought to develop in this context has

been with the United Kingdom.

Britain’s Gain

In many ways, the British have more influence

today in Türkiye than the Americans. This should be

understood as a stage in a long historical process

in which the pendulum swings back and forth

between the United States and the United Kingdom,

with much of the activity taking place behind the

scenes in intelligence circles. In the 1950s, Türkiye’s

Democratic Party sought rapprochement with

America and modeled many of its reforms after the

development agenda of leading American experts.

Cemal Madanoğlu, one of the leaders of the 1960

coup that overthrew the Democratic Party, was in

close contact with Satvet Lütfü Tozan, a Turkish

businessman active on the side of the British during

World War II who was granted honors by King George

VI for his contribution to British wartime intelligence.

Tozan may have shaped the 1960 coup process under

the guidance of British intelligence. This connection

is strongly suggested in the accounts of many recent

historians, particularly that of Mahir Kaynak, who was

working with Turkish intelligence in 1960 and who

monitored Madanoğlu’s visits to the United Kingdom.

Similarly, some Turkish historians argue that Britain

played a behind-the-scenes role in the process

leading up to the 1971 military memorandum,

an ultimatum that was issued by the military

demanding a new government led by senior officers

who would crack down on Leftists and Islamists.

It was a reactionary movement, intent on reversing

the many democratic reforms that America had

long advocated. Again, many Turkish commentators

believe that the United Kingdom encouraged this

move as part of a British effort to counter-balance

American influence in the region, though ultimately

the effort failed as President Sunay, Prime Minister

Demirel, and the intelligence services restored

order. Some of the publishing activities supported

by British intelligence during both of these periods

also promoted an anti-Zionist discourse, showing

how Türkiye was an important node in London’s

multi-layered approach to the Middle East. This

was Great Power competition in the Cold War era

following the Suez Crisis, with a rising America

displacing a declining Britain all around the world.

There are parallels with today’s circumstances that

can be useful in understanding Türkiye’s present

foreign policy, and the environment in which Ankara

is operating.

Since Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union in

2020, the United Kingdom has struggled to maintain its

former levels of trade and influence in Europe. Despite

the Trade and Cooperation Agreement of January

2021, the Windsor Framework of February 2023, and

the notional reset in relations following the UK-EU

Summit in May 2025, Britain has lost a lot of ground. It

is only within the last year that London has been able

to negotiate a limited opening to participate in a joint

defense fund and to pursue realignment with EU rules

on trade in agriculture. The UK’s GDP has failed to keep

pace with global growth, with 6 to 8 percent of that lag

possibly attributable to Brexit, and Whitehall has now

seen seven Prime Ministers in ten years.

Once again, Türkiye has become a focal point

for British attention. It is instructive that in MI6

Chief Richard Moore’s farewell address in Istanbul

in September 2025, he acknowledged that: “On

almost all of the issues that I have grappled with

as Chief of MI6, Türkiye has been a key player.” The

speech outlined three main areas of British external

intelligence concern: systemic competition with

China, Iran-centered instability, and the security threat

from Russia. The message that Türkiye lies at the

intersection of all three dossiers was not lost on the

audience. Within the context of the war in Ukraine,

dynamics in the Caucasus, Middle East security

architectures, and many other hot-button topics,

Türkiye is an “influence-generating intermediate

power,” one that can define and reshape the field.

Since Moore’s speech, Türkiye has concluded a

major deal to purchase over £8 billion of training and 

equipping from the UK, as part of the Eurofighter

Typhoon aircraft program, and signed a new

Defense and Security Partnership agreement. Both

moved ahead despite the embarrassing arrest of a

British national in October 2025, just a day before

PM Keir Starmer’s arrival in Ankara, on charges of

aiding a key Turkish opposition politician to commit

treason. Opposition politicians like Namık Tan, an

MP for the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and

formerly Türkiye’s Ambassador to the United States,

were critical of the ruling coalition for leveling a

“tragicomic espionage accusation against… our

[opposition] presidential candidate” with the arrest

of the British national. But even they acknowledge

that transatlantic tensions have led to a remarkable

opening in UK-Turkish bilateral ties, including the

powerfully symbolic signing of the UK-Türkiye

Strategic Partnership Framework on April 23. This

date is the anniversary of the founding of the Grand

National Assembly in 1920, a period in which Mustafa

Kemal Atatürk was establishing modern Türkiye.

Syria’s Pivotal Role

Türkiye is deeply involved in many issues of

importance to the Great Powers. Ankara has offered

to alleviate the upward pressure on global oil prices

by opening additional pipeline transit capacity from

Iraqi oilfields and President Erdoğan has personally

attempted to mediate the war in Ukraine on several

occasions. However, for America and its allies,

Türkiye’s role is perhaps most consequential in

Syria, which leading Western governments see

as a key test for improving regional stability and a

cornerstone for reshaping the new security order

in the Middle East. Iran is struggling to make up

the ground it lost since the fall of the Asad regime

as it tries to restore its supply lines to Hezbollah in

Lebanon, while Israel has carved out a buffer zone

and provides support for minority groups in the hopes

of converting this leverage into a peace treaty and

diplomatic recognition. The Transitional Government

in Damascus has to contend with all these competing

pressures, even as it aims to channel Gulf funding

into high-tech opportunities that will transform Syria

into a regional hub for telecommunications.

Türkiye has been, and will remain, the most influential

and important external player in Syria. But after

more than a decade of contentious disputes with

Washington and with absolutely no support for its

fight against terrorism along the border, Ankara

is hesitant to engage with anyone other than

President Ahmed al-Shara‘a and his administration

in Damascus. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil

war in 2011, Turkish authorities have viewed the U.S. Government's 

actions in Syria as a threat to Turkish national security on multiple 

fronts.

The first problem for Turkish leaders has been

Washington’s hesitancy in dealing with Islamist

opposition forces. U.S. concerns quickly turned to

reluctance and finally became outright rejection of

units that could not be vetted for connections to

Sunni extremist groups. Yet as the Syrian civil war

dragged on into 2013 and 2014, virtually all Syrian

opposition forces with any effective fighting capability

had some association with Islamist movements,

and Türkiye adopted what was the only rational and

realistic approach in choosing to work with them.

The second problem is the U.S. government’s supply

of weapons and training to Kurdish forces in Syria

that have been directly linked to the Kurdistan

Workers’ Party (PKK), a group that has a welldocumented record of terrorist attacks inside Türkiye.

American support to the YPG and its autonomous

civilian administration in northern Syria created

the sharp impression in Türkiye that Israel and the

United States were promoting the formation of a

transnational corridor of Kurdish power and influence

from Iraq to the Mediterranean.

Yeni Şafak columnist Professor Süleyman Seyfi

Öğün has been the leading exponent of this line of

analysis. In his view, developments in Syria reflect a

deeper strategic divergence within the Western world,

one in which Israeli intervention has come to play a

major role in exacerbating divisions. Öğün argues

that the U.S. approach in Syria is relatively narrow and

security-driven, largely aligned with Israel’s regional

security perspective and in many ways intertwined

with it. Israeli leaders long viewed Syria as a buffer

with Türkiye during the Syrian civil war, and built

relations with local actors in order to maintain a

regional status quo that suited Israeli security needs.

Washington relied on other local actors – particularly

Kurdish groups – to maintain U.S. influence on the

ground. It is a strategy that, while perhaps tactically

effective, has tended to deepen regional fragility and

to fall short of producing a sustainable political order.

By contrast, Öğün suggests that the United Kingdom

has aimed to establish a new form of Pax Britannica

in the Middle East, positioning Syria as a central

geopolitical hub in this vision. This approach includes

restructuring energy corridors, linking Europe more

closely to Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean

resources, and fostering economic and logistical

integration among Türkiye, Iraq, the Gulf, and Syria.

For its part, Türkiye has approached Syria largely in

reaction to what its leaders have viewed as damaging

U.S. policies. President Erdoğan has consistently

emphasized that U.S. strategy – particularly through

its support for the YPG and, by proxy, the PKK –

poses a direct threat to Türkiye’s national security.

As Erdoğan has repeatedly stated, the extensive U.S.

provision of weapons and equipment to the YPG in

Syria produced not merely a tactical divergence, but a

deeper strategic crisis of trust. That narrative justified

Türkiye’s willingness to undertake unilateral military

operations to secure its borders.

Türkiye’s 2016 Operation Euphrates Shield sought

expressly to defeat Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

(ISIS) extremists in Syria and to halt the westward

expansion of the Kurdish forces there. Later Turkish

operations in Syria, Operation Olive Branch in 2018,

and Operation Peace Spring in 2019, brought Afrin

under control and established a safe zone along the

Turkish-Syrian border, from Tel Abyad to Ras alAyn, 

respectively. In 2020, Operation Spring Shield created

 a bubble in the Idlib region that allowed

Ahmed al-Shara‘a and his allies to mount a more

effective defense against the onslaught of the

Asad regime. Each of these Turkish military actions

improved conditions for everyday Syrians, making it

possible for families to eventually return home from

their exile abroad.

While the United States was pursuing its own interests 

in Syria, the British Government was quietly working

 behind the scenes in ways that

closely dovetailed with Turkish national security

objectives. Several Turkish commentators have

hinted that British intelligence was assiduous from

an early stage in establishing contacts with Hayat

Tahrir al-Shams and other opposition groups in Idlib.

This open communication allowed Britain to move

quickly after the fall of the Asad regime in supporting

the transformation of the Syrian Government and

contributing to reconstruction. The convergence

of regime-change perspectives between London

and Ankara has not been lost on Turkish officials.

According to a report by Reuters, Türkiye’s National

Intelligence Organization (MIT) asked MI6 for

increased British support to protect newly-installed

Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara‘a.

Today, the rise of a new government in Damascus

that is intent on reasserting sovereign control over all

Syrian territory has been a severe setback for Iran and

is breaking the Shi‘a Crescent of Iranian control that

once extended across the Middle East. Israel might

be the immediate beneficiary of that change and

America might support the move, but the perspective

in Ankara is that Türkiye was the one to achieve this

new regional order. And it did so with the assistance

of the United Kingdom, in the face of incredible

opposition from the United States and despite

numerous obstacles thrown up by Israel.

Next Steps

Türkiye will be the key player helping to maintain the

Syrian Transitional Government’s control over the

country’s territorial sovereignty and to re-establish

a credible centralized state. Türkiye will almost

certainly be in the lead in encouraging the Israelis to

behave in a more restrained and responsible manner,

while Ankara carefully refrains from openly hostile

actions that might enflame tensions with Israel.

Turkish leaders also want to serve as credible and

trustworthy mediators between Iran and the West,

something that the United States may need after

the dust settles from the current round of military

operations. 

Above all, Türkiye shares U.S. concerns that actors

aligned with Russia and China will enter the Middle

East in the absence of a strong American presence.

Ankara has little choice other than to maintain

working relationships with these global powers, but

it is fundamentally looking toward a future in which

the United States remains the dominant force in

promoting peace and stability. Thus, Turkish officials

want an America that helps promote a genuine peace

process, with real hope for Palestinian statehood, and

calibrated U.S. and Israeli approaches to Lebanon that

address the problem of Hezbollah through political

channels and not only by purely military means.

What Türkiye wants is a more balanced, predictable,

mutually beneficial relationship with the United States,

with a strategic framework that lays out a real vision

for the future. Most countries in the world would

likely want the same thing. But unlike many others,

Türkiye is in a position to help advance U.S. national

interests on a wide range of key issues in both Europe

and the Middle East. Moreover, President Erdoğan is

enjoying a period of remarkable peace and stability

at home, which can allow his government to take a

more forward leaning and collaborative approach in

international relations, to an extent that might not

have been possible ten years ago. The issue of the

Russian S-400 air defense system is a case in point;

Türkiye has offered multiple compromise formulas,

such as non-activation, indefinite storage, or transfer

to a third country. Ankara’s core position emphasizes

protecting its sovereign decision-making and

rejecting external interference in its defense policies

rather than operating the S-400 system. Achieving 

a more balanced relationship between the United

States and Ankara will require greater recognition

of Türkiye’s security priorities and the development

of joint decision-making mechanisms on sensitive

issues. This process should not be limited to the

two presidents but should also include political

actors, diplomats, and working-level officials within

both governments. A sustainable relationship will

require regular engagement among a broader range

of institutions and actors, including foreign policy

and security institutions, legislative bodies, think

tanks, academic communities, and other civil society

channels. Such a multi-layered approach would help

rebuild trust between the two countries, strengthen

communication channels, and enable them to

manage disagreements while preserving cooperation

in areas of mutual interest.

About thre Author

Hasan Mesut Önder received his Ph.D. from Süleyman

Demirel University, with a dissertation titled “The Use

of Intelligence in the Process of Securitization: The

Case of the U.S. Invasion of Iraq.” He is an independent

researcher on intelligence studies and Middle East

politics, the author of several peer-revered papers in

academic journals, and a regular contributor to Türkiye 

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