CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup
Documents Provide New Details on Mosaddeq Overthrow and Its Aftermath
National Security Archive Calls for Release of Remaining Classified Record
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 435
Posted - August 19, 2013
Edited by Malcolm Byrne
For more information contact:
Malcolm Byrne: 202/994-7043 or mbyrne@gwu.edu
Washington, D.C., August 19, 2013 - Marking the sixtieth anniversary of the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, the National Security Archive is today posting recently declassified CIA documents on the United States' role in the controversial operation. American and British involvement in Mosaddeq's ouster has long been public knowledge, but today's posting includes what is believed to be the CIA's first formal acknowledgement that the agency helped to plan and execute the coup.
The explicit reference to the CIA's role appears in a copy of an internal history, The Battle for Iran, dating from the mid-1970s. The agency released a heavily excised version of the account in 1981 in response to an ACLU lawsuit, but it blacked out all references to TPAJAX, the code name for the U.S.-led operation. Those references appear in the latest release. Additional CIA materials posted today include working files from Kermit Roosevelt, the senior CIA officer on the ground in Iran during the coup. They provide new specifics as well as insights into the intelligence agency's actions before and after the operation.
The 1953 coup remains a topic of global interest because so much about it is still under intense debate. Even fundamental questions - who hatched the plot, who ultimately carried it out, who supported it inside Iran, and how did it succeed - are in dispute. This posting adds new evidence that should help clarify some of these disagreements.
Check out today's posting at the National Security Archive website - http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb435/
Find us on Facebook - http://www.facebook.com/NSArchive
Unredacted, the Archive blog - http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/
Saturday, November 26, 2016
Joseph Nye : Responsibility to Protect
One Nation's Responsibility Is Another's Invasion
14 June 2012
By Joseph Nye
When should states intervene militarily to stop atrocities in other countries? The question is an old and well-traveled one. Indeed, it is now visiting Syria.
In 1904, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, referring to Cuba, argued that the United States should intervene by force of arms when "there are occasional crimes committed on so vast a scale and of such peculiar horror." A century earlier, in 1821, as Europeans and Americans debated whether to intervene in Greece's struggle for independence, U.S. President John Quincy Adams warned his fellow Americans about "going abroad in search of monsters to destroy."
More recently, after a genocide that cost nearly 800,000 lives in Rwanda in 1994 and the slaughter of Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995, many people vowed that such atrocities should never again be allowed to occur. When Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic engaged in large-scale ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution recognizing the humanitarian catastrophe but could not agree on a second resolution to intervene, given the threat of a Russian veto. Instead, NATO countries bombed Serbia in an effort that many observers regarded as legitimate but not legal.
In the aftermath, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan created an international commission to recommend ways that humanitarian intervention could be reconciled with Article 2.7 of the UN Charter, which upholds member states' domestic jurisdiction. The commission concluded that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens. If a nation disregards that responsibility by attacking its own citizens, the international community can consider armed intervention.
The Responsibility to Protect principle was adopted unanimously at the UN's World Summit in 2005, but subsequent events showed that not all member states interpreted the resolution the same way. Russia has consistently argued that only Security Council resolutions, not General Assembly resolutions, are binding international law. Meanwhile, Russia has vetoed a Security Council resolution on Syria. Somewhat ironically, Annan has been called back and enlisted in a so-far futile effort to stop the carnage there.
Until last year, many observers regarded the Responsibility to Protect principle as, at best, a pious hope or a noble failure. But in 2011, as Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi prepared to exterminate his opponents in Benghazi, the Security Council invoked the Responsibility to Protect principle as the basis for a resolution authorizing NATO to use armed force in Libya. U.S. President Barack Obama was careful to wait for resolutions by the Arab League and the Security Council, thereby avoiding the costs to U.S. soft power that former U.S. President George W. Bush suffered when the country intervened in Iraq in 2003. But Russia, China and other countries felt that NATO exploited the resolution to engineer regime change rather than merely protecting citizens in Libya, as the resolution wording stipulated.
In fact, the Responsibility to Protect is more about struggles over political legitimacy and soft power than it is about hard international law. Some Western lawyers argue that it entails the responsibility to combat genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes under various conventions of international humanitarian law. But Russia, China and others have become reluctant to provide a legal or political basis for actions such as what occurred in Libya.
There are other reasons why Responsibility to Protect has not been a success in the Syrian case. Drawn from traditional "just war" theory, Responsibility to Protect rests not only on right intentions, but also on the existence of a reasonable prospect of success. Many observers highlight the important physical and military differences between Libya and Syria that would make Syrian no-fly zones or no-drive zones problematic. Some Syrians who oppose President Bashar Assad's regime, pointing to Baghdad in 2005, argue that the one thing worse than a cruel dictator is a sectarian civil war.
Such factors are symptomatic of larger problems with humanitarian interventions. For starters, motives are often mixed. Moreover, we live in a world of diverse cultures, and we know very little about social engineering and how to build nations. When we cannot be sure how to improve the world, prudence becomes an important virtue, and hubristic visions can pose a grave danger. Foreign policy, like medicine, must be guided by the basic principle "Do no harm."
Prudence does not necessarily mean that nothing can be done in Syria. Other governments can continue to try to convince Russia that its interests are better served by getting rid of the current regime than by permitting the continued radicalization of his opponents. Tougher sanctions can continue to delegitimize the regime, and Turkey might be persuaded to take stronger steps against its neighbor.
Moreover, prudence does not mean that humanitarian interventions will always fail. In some cases, even if motives are mixed, the prospects of success are reasonable, and the misery of a population can be relieved at modest expense. For example, military interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, East Timor and Bosnia did not solve all problems, but they did improve the lives of the people there. Other interventions — for example, in Somalia — did not.
Recent large-scale interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, though not primarily humanitarian, have eroded public support for military action. But we should recall U.S. writer Mark Twain's story about his cat. After sitting on a hot stove, it would never sit on a hot stove again, but neither would it sit on a cold one.
Although interventions will continue to occur, they are now more likely to be shorter, involve smaller-scale forces and rely on technologies that permit action at a greater distance. In an age of cyber warfare and drones, the end of Responsibility to Protect or humanitarian intervention is hardly foretold.
Joseph Nye is a professor at Harvard University and author of "The Future of Power." © Project Syndicate
Thursday, November 24, 2016
How Japan And The Ottoman Empire Influenced Each Other to Become Great Nations
Throughout history, Japan has been the distant, mysterious “world’s end” for travellers, mapmakers, traders, and scholars in different parts of the world. For some, this made Japan a place they were keenly interested in learning about and visiting (or, at least in one case, attempting to conquer). For many—including many of the Japanese themselves—Japan’s “splendid isolation” was a reason for the world to instead focus on nations that were easier to reach and more open to engagement.
Muslims were no exception to this. Despite the fact that Islam spread and thrived on the nearby Chinese mainland and in Southeast Asia for centuries, it wasn’t until the late 19th century that the Muslims and Japanese expressed any real interest in each other. Of course, Muslims had heard of “al-Yāban” (or “Chāpun”), and the islands first appeared on a Muslim-made map in 1430 as part of the work of a Persian scholar, Hāfiz-i Abrū, on the Far East. In the 17th century, an Ottoman historian described the Japanese (or people of “Caponya”) as people who “love to take cold baths and have high morals”. The Japanese probably had similarly basic ideas about Muslims, and they may have briefly encountered Muslim traders or diplomats over the centuries as well. The possibility of individual Muslims settling down in Japan in this period can’t be ruled out either. In the late 19th century, two parallel trends suddenly piqued the interest of the Muslims and Japanese for each other: European imperialism in the Muslim world, and the sudden emergence of Japan as a modern, independent nation that could hold its own against predatory European powers.
The role of the Ottoman Empire in the relationship between Muslims and Japan
Recognizing this, Sultan Abdülhamid II of the Ottoman Empire—the only Muslim state still in control of its foreign affairs—sent the imperial warship Ertugrul to Japan in 1889, loaded with 609 Ottoman sailors and gifts for Emperor Meiji (r. 1867-1912), whose brother had visited Istanbul two years earlier. The Ertugrul made it to Japan, where its crew was welcomed with great hospitality; however, on the return voyage in 1890, the ship was hit by a typhoon in southern Japan and all but 69 of its crew perished. Despite the tragic ending, the goodwill mission established a positive relationship between the Ottoman Empire and “the rising star of the East”.
Two years later, in 1892, Yamada Torajirō arrived in Istanbul. A young and well-educated man, he had organized a fundraising campaign in major cities in Japan to collect money for the families of the Ottoman sailors who had perished. The response was so incredible that the Japanese government asked Yamada to personally take the amount (equivalent to nearly USD $100M today) to Istanbul. Yamada visited Egypt along the way, and after finishing his mission in Istanbul he decided to settle down there for the next 20 years, doing everything he could to foster Japanese-Ottoman political and cultural relations. Meanwhile, the Muslim world had become fascinated with Yamada’s leader, Emperor Meiji, especially after 1905, when the Japanese humiliatingly defeated the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War. Muslim observers watched in awe as tiny, unheard-of Japan crushed the Russian Empire, which had been harassing Muslims in Central Asia for generations. ‘Abd al-Amīn Sāmī, a court scholar in Bukhara, spread that Meiji (“pādshāh-e Chāpun”) had secretly embraced Islam, that he was a descendant of the Qahtānī Arabs, and that his victory over the Russians meant the Day of Judgement was near. The Ottoman poet Mehmet Akif and historian Abdurreçid Ibrahim expressed their admiration for Japanese achievements; in Iran, Adib Pishāvari, wrote an epic poem titled the Mukado-nāmeh in praise of Meiji.
While some admired Japan from a distance, others took the initiative to actually go there. One Egyptian military officer, Ahmad Fadhli, enrolled in a military academy in Tokyo in 1905 and stayed on for several years, during which time he married a Japanese wife. In 1907, an Egyptian Islamic scholar named Ali Jaljawi visited Japan, presumably to attend a conference on world religions held at the time in Tokyo. In 1909, Abd al-Rashid Ibrahim, a Tatar born in the Russian Empire, fled to Japan seeking refuge from Russian authorities, who were after him because of his struggle for Tatar independence. A pious man, he became the first Muslim preacher in Japan, and many indigenous Japanese embraced Islam through his work.
Meanwhile, the Japanese themselves had been taking some initiative as well. In 1451, a Japanese envoy to China’s Ming dynasty had met a delegation of Hui (ethnic Chinese) Muslims, who gifted him 20 horses. However, Japanese-Muslim relations were very slow in the making.
The introduction of Islam in Japan
In 1715, a Tokogawa scholar named Arai Hakuseki published a book in which he discussed Islam; several other works described Muslim-majority world in detail. In the late 1870s, a book on the life of Prophet Muhammad (s) was translated into Japanese. And it was only in 1920―after the sudden influx of about 600 Muslim immigrants from Central Asia into Japan during WWI―that the first translation of the Qur’an into Japanese was published by a Buddhist scholar, Sakamoto.
Japan’s first mosque was built in 1905 by Russian prisoners-of-war in Japanese captivity. Another mosque was built in 1914 (and rebuilt in 1935) in Kobe by Indian and Arab businessmen. In 1938, a mosque opened in Tokyo as well, complete with an Islamic school, printing office, and magazine. The grand opening was attended by dignitaries from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Meanwhile, new translations of the Qur’an into Japanese continued to appear in the following decades, and over 100 books and journals were published in Japan between 1935 and 1943.
The Japanese government co-opted Islam during WWII to spread propaganda in Muslim-majority Southeast Asia, which Japan was occupying; in a conference in April 1943, Japan declared itself a true protector of the Islamic faith against the Christian European imperial powers in the region, a claim that was endorsed by the Muslim leaders and scholars who were present. The imam of Tokyo’s mosque, Abdurreshid Ibrahim, claimed in 1942 that “Japan’s cause in the Greater East Asia War is a sacred one and in its austerity, is comparable to the war carried out against the infidels by the Prophet Muhammad in the past.”
The Muslim community in Japan continued to spread after the war, and interest in Islam was refreshed by two events in particular: the 1973 oil crisis, which caused the Japanese to pay attention to oil-producing Muslim states, and the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The advent of television had also given the Japanese a glimpse into Muslim culture. Egypt’s al-Azhar University provided scholarships to those who were interested in Islam so that they could live and study the religion in Cairo. And Muslim organizations, such as the Tablighi Jama’at in India/Pakistan, began to pour into Japan to spread the message of Islam among the indigenous Japanese.
Today, the Muslim minority in Japan faces many challenges. However, this is to be expected―Islam arrived at “world’s end” relatively late, but the community is active, growing, and increasingly in touch with Muslims around the globe. For many parts of the world, the arrival of Islam is distant history; for the Japanese, it is history in the making.
Muslims were no exception to this. Despite the fact that Islam spread and thrived on the nearby Chinese mainland and in Southeast Asia for centuries, it wasn’t until the late 19th century that the Muslims and Japanese expressed any real interest in each other. Of course, Muslims had heard of “al-Yāban” (or “Chāpun”), and the islands first appeared on a Muslim-made map in 1430 as part of the work of a Persian scholar, Hāfiz-i Abrū, on the Far East. In the 17th century, an Ottoman historian described the Japanese (or people of “Caponya”) as people who “love to take cold baths and have high morals”. The Japanese probably had similarly basic ideas about Muslims, and they may have briefly encountered Muslim traders or diplomats over the centuries as well. The possibility of individual Muslims settling down in Japan in this period can’t be ruled out either. In the late 19th century, two parallel trends suddenly piqued the interest of the Muslims and Japanese for each other: European imperialism in the Muslim world, and the sudden emergence of Japan as a modern, independent nation that could hold its own against predatory European powers.
The role of the Ottoman Empire in the relationship between Muslims and Japan
Recognizing this, Sultan Abdülhamid II of the Ottoman Empire—the only Muslim state still in control of its foreign affairs—sent the imperial warship Ertugrul to Japan in 1889, loaded with 609 Ottoman sailors and gifts for Emperor Meiji (r. 1867-1912), whose brother had visited Istanbul two years earlier. The Ertugrul made it to Japan, where its crew was welcomed with great hospitality; however, on the return voyage in 1890, the ship was hit by a typhoon in southern Japan and all but 69 of its crew perished. Despite the tragic ending, the goodwill mission established a positive relationship between the Ottoman Empire and “the rising star of the East”.
Two years later, in 1892, Yamada Torajirō arrived in Istanbul. A young and well-educated man, he had organized a fundraising campaign in major cities in Japan to collect money for the families of the Ottoman sailors who had perished. The response was so incredible that the Japanese government asked Yamada to personally take the amount (equivalent to nearly USD $100M today) to Istanbul. Yamada visited Egypt along the way, and after finishing his mission in Istanbul he decided to settle down there for the next 20 years, doing everything he could to foster Japanese-Ottoman political and cultural relations. Meanwhile, the Muslim world had become fascinated with Yamada’s leader, Emperor Meiji, especially after 1905, when the Japanese humiliatingly defeated the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War. Muslim observers watched in awe as tiny, unheard-of Japan crushed the Russian Empire, which had been harassing Muslims in Central Asia for generations. ‘Abd al-Amīn Sāmī, a court scholar in Bukhara, spread that Meiji (“pādshāh-e Chāpun”) had secretly embraced Islam, that he was a descendant of the Qahtānī Arabs, and that his victory over the Russians meant the Day of Judgement was near. The Ottoman poet Mehmet Akif and historian Abdurreçid Ibrahim expressed their admiration for Japanese achievements; in Iran, Adib Pishāvari, wrote an epic poem titled the Mukado-nāmeh in praise of Meiji.
While some admired Japan from a distance, others took the initiative to actually go there. One Egyptian military officer, Ahmad Fadhli, enrolled in a military academy in Tokyo in 1905 and stayed on for several years, during which time he married a Japanese wife. In 1907, an Egyptian Islamic scholar named Ali Jaljawi visited Japan, presumably to attend a conference on world religions held at the time in Tokyo. In 1909, Abd al-Rashid Ibrahim, a Tatar born in the Russian Empire, fled to Japan seeking refuge from Russian authorities, who were after him because of his struggle for Tatar independence. A pious man, he became the first Muslim preacher in Japan, and many indigenous Japanese embraced Islam through his work.
Meanwhile, the Japanese themselves had been taking some initiative as well. In 1451, a Japanese envoy to China’s Ming dynasty had met a delegation of Hui (ethnic Chinese) Muslims, who gifted him 20 horses. However, Japanese-Muslim relations were very slow in the making.
The introduction of Islam in Japan
In 1715, a Tokogawa scholar named Arai Hakuseki published a book in which he discussed Islam; several other works described Muslim-majority world in detail. In the late 1870s, a book on the life of Prophet Muhammad (s) was translated into Japanese. And it was only in 1920―after the sudden influx of about 600 Muslim immigrants from Central Asia into Japan during WWI―that the first translation of the Qur’an into Japanese was published by a Buddhist scholar, Sakamoto.
Japan’s first mosque was built in 1905 by Russian prisoners-of-war in Japanese captivity. Another mosque was built in 1914 (and rebuilt in 1935) in Kobe by Indian and Arab businessmen. In 1938, a mosque opened in Tokyo as well, complete with an Islamic school, printing office, and magazine. The grand opening was attended by dignitaries from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Meanwhile, new translations of the Qur’an into Japanese continued to appear in the following decades, and over 100 books and journals were published in Japan between 1935 and 1943.
The Japanese government co-opted Islam during WWII to spread propaganda in Muslim-majority Southeast Asia, which Japan was occupying; in a conference in April 1943, Japan declared itself a true protector of the Islamic faith against the Christian European imperial powers in the region, a claim that was endorsed by the Muslim leaders and scholars who were present. The imam of Tokyo’s mosque, Abdurreshid Ibrahim, claimed in 1942 that “Japan’s cause in the Greater East Asia War is a sacred one and in its austerity, is comparable to the war carried out against the infidels by the Prophet Muhammad in the past.”
The Muslim community in Japan continued to spread after the war, and interest in Islam was refreshed by two events in particular: the 1973 oil crisis, which caused the Japanese to pay attention to oil-producing Muslim states, and the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The advent of television had also given the Japanese a glimpse into Muslim culture. Egypt’s al-Azhar University provided scholarships to those who were interested in Islam so that they could live and study the religion in Cairo. And Muslim organizations, such as the Tablighi Jama’at in India/Pakistan, began to pour into Japan to spread the message of Islam among the indigenous Japanese.
Today, the Muslim minority in Japan faces many challenges. However, this is to be expected―Islam arrived at “world’s end” relatively late, but the community is active, growing, and increasingly in touch with Muslims around the globe. For many parts of the world, the arrival of Islam is distant history; for the Japanese, it is history in the making.
Wednesday, November 23, 2016
Iran and Chinmilitary ties
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Monday, November 21, 2016
Trump (should) encourage Saudi-Iranian Dialogue to stop war in Midle East
Published on November 21st, 2016 | by Henry Johnson
1Trump: Encourage Saudi-Iranian Dialogue to Stop War in Middle East
by Henry Johnson
As Donald Trump prepares to take office as U.S. president, he’ll inherit a set of conflicts in the Middle East more intractable and destructive than at any other point in recent history. The very territorial integrity of the region is at risk. The killing in Syria, where close to half a million people have died since 2011, grinds on with no end in sight. Iraq must successfully reconcile its various ethnic and religious groups if it is to make its gains against the Islamic State stick. And Yemen may well split apart if the warring sides, largely divided along a north-south axis, don’t come to a compromise. Across the backdrop of these conflagrations is a zero-sum game between the two centers of regional power, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
According to a newly released report by the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), the best way for President-elect Trump to address these conflicts is to reposition the U.S. as a neutral player that abstains from choosing sides in the Saudi-Iranian struggle for power. The report’s overarching recommendation is for the United States to reduce its decades-long military presence in the Persian Gulf. Doing so would “lower operational demands on the armed forces,” end the “terrorist blowback the irritations of its presence there tends to generate,” and facilitate America’s pivot to Asia. But most of all, a withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would force Saudi Arabia and Iran to confront their differences, and, importantly, recast the United States as a third party that can ease the tensions from a dispassionate remove.
The report’s authors assert that there is no need for the United States to maintain its military presence in the region. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran has the capability to singlehandedly beat the other in a conventional conflict—a military equilibrium that would keep the peace with or without U.S. forces. Since war won’t break out either way, then the U.S. doesn’t need to be there and should leave, goes the thinking. The report adroitly explains how this redundancy came about, tracing it back to Bill Clinton’s policy of “dual containment,” in which the U.S. shifted from offshore balancing—outsourcing the containment of a mutual adversary to regional states—to a direct military presence. Taking Iraq out of the picture, this policy fractured the Arab coalition that the U.S. had assembled for its former strategy. The 2003 U.S. invasion tipped the political scales further in favor of Iran by paving the way for a friendly government to rule Baghdad. As the report says, “There is no longer any obvious combination of Arab countries that can balance Iran politically.” What is left of that policy now is “a permanent and unsustainable U.S. military presence in the Gulf directed at containing Iran alone.”
Deescalation Possible?
The report doesn’t tackle the question of how to actually reduce that military presence. Its specific recommendations revolve around encouraging Iran and Saudi Arabia to de-escalate their rivalry. Some level of rapprochement, it says, “is a prerequisite for any adjustment of U.S. policies in the Persian Gulf.” Until then, the report recommends that the president tell Iran and Saudi Arabia that the U.S. interest is to “avoid taking sides,” and ask them to “cooperate against terrorism” and start a “Sunni-Shi’a dialogue.”
In theory, these are sensible measures. But calls such as these have been made before and don’t address the structural factors driving the two countries apart. As long as the two countries oppose each other in places like Yemen or Syria they will refuse to cooperate on issues such as counterterrorism. This was made clear in dueling op-eds by the countries’ foreign ministers in The New York Times (Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism) and Wall Street Journal (Iran Can’t Whitewash Its Record of Terror). Both officials said they would welcome a constructive role by the other country if only it were to halt its policy of “supporting extremists” and “promoting sectarian hatred” and so forth. The implication is that a U.S. retrenchment from the Persian Gulf is contingent on a process of Iranian-Saudi reconciliation that is unlikely to happen independent of a decisive shift in the balance of power.
This renders the boldest suggestion in the report—to “avoid being enlisted in tipping the balance of power in favor of one or the other”—somewhat meaningless unless backed up by action. The U.S. very clearly supports Saudi Arabia in its rivalry with Iran. The Obama administration has sold a reported $115 billion in weapons, military equipment, and training services to Saudi Arabia, more than any other administration before it. As a result, Saudi imports of arms have ballooned by an astounding 275 percent over the last five years, making it the second biggest arms importer in the world after India. The United Arab Emirates, the world’s fourth biggest arms importer, isn’t far behind. More so than the modestly sized U.S. troop presence in the Gulf, this relationship provides Saudi Arabia with its hard power, much as it once did for the Pahlavi monarchy. And regardless of what the U.S. says about its intentions, these prodigious arms transfers amount to a U.S. projection of power against Iran given the antipathies of those paying for them.
The report’s call for a more balanced U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, one that is neutral in the rivalry between Iran and other regional powers, rests on the assumption that “Americans ‘have no dog’ in most of their fights.” U.S. allies in the region would doubtlessly beg to differ. To them, it’s an urgent U.S. interest to isolate Iran and limit its influence in Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, and other places where it challenges the status quo. If it doesn’t, then Iran, they warn, would further corrode the regional order that underpins U.S. influence. The tacit argument made by this report is that these powers, including the U.S., must admit that Iran is a regional power whose influence is here to stay, and reduce their hostility accordingly.
This leads to a second question about the nature of Iran’s regional policy, whether it’s primarily defensive or offensive. Is Iran driven by an interest in deterring an attack by the U.S. and its allies, or by an expansionist impulse to topple U.S. allies and replace them with revolutionary actors? And, furthermore, is the “permanent American garrisoning of the Persian Gulf,” as the report puts it, stopping Iran from upending the regional order, or prompting it to meddle abroad as a form of extended deterrence?
Iran as Threat?
The report doesn’t answer these questions, although it suggests that the U.S. and its regional allies should acknowledge that Iran’s power is not necessarily a threat. Politically, this is a hard sell for U.S. allies in the region, a point illustrated at an event organized by the Middle East Institute on Thursday. Nabil Fahmy, a former Egyptian foreign minister, and Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, the former head of Saudi Arabia’s internal security service, expressed the view that Iran is an expansionist power that must be checked by countervailing U.S. force. Both men also served as ambassadors to the U.S. Their opinions differed over the Iran nuclear deal, with Fahmy arguing that it failed by not including Iran’s regional policies and Al Saudi arguing it could work as a model for establishing a nuclear-weapons free zone in the Middle East. But they agreed that Iran’s “very aggressive regional policy” warrants a muscular response by the U.S., especially in Syria. This argument runs counter to the thesis of the NIAC report: that picking sides is doomed to fail, since no victory is possible.
A third speaker, Mohsen Milani, a professor of politics at the University of South Florida, was the lone dissenter. “If you look at Iranian regional policy today and compare it to its policy prior to signing the historical nuclear deal, you don’t see Iran being more aggressive, if that’s the word you want to use, than it was before,” he said. Building on that point, Milani took issue with the characterization of Iran as innately “aggressive, expansionist, imperialist.” Iran, he said, is “expanding its sphere of influence, which is what every other Middle East player has been trying to do to varying degrees of success…
it’s a player that can’t change the Middle East, but it can make it very difficult for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to implement their agendas for the region.”
A U.S. disengagement from the Persian Gulf could settle some of these long-standing fears about the nature of Iranian foreign policy. Those on the right depict Iran as dedicated to its ideology of anti-Zionism and opposition to U.S. clients. Would a U.S. withdrawal bring that tendency into the open, allowing Iran to pursue its malicious agenda unburdened by the constraints imposed by U.S. containment? Or would a U.S. withdrawal prove that Iran is primarily concerned with its national security, a perspective represented by the NIAC report? If Iran’s regional policy is indeed motivated by security concerns shaped by the U.S. policy of containment, then a dismantling of that policy would lead Iran to shrink its regional footprint. Perhaps, in the end, Iran is just as overextended as the U.S. is.
Photo: Turki bin Faisal Al Saud
About the Author
Şlllerin 40 günlük (Arbaeen) yas dönemi
Arbaeen Pilgrimage
Arbaeen Pilgrimage
February 28
In the year 680 c.e., Imam al-Hussein died during the Battle of Taf in Karbala, Iraq. He was the grandson of the Prophet Mohammad and, for Shiite Muslims, one of the three holiest figures in their religion. To commemorate his passing, Shiites from around the world hold the week-long Arbaeen Pilgrimage to his gravesite 40 days after his death. This period of 40 days is the traditional Muslim mourning period following a death. Imam al-Hussein's tomb is in the town of Karbala, about 50 miles south of Baghdad.
Karbala is one of the holiest cities for Shiite Muslims. It has more than 100 mosques and 23 religious schools in its old quarter. For Shiite Muslims, the city is also believed to be a gate to paradise. Many elderly believers come to the city to die, hoping to enter paradise more easily.
During the regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, the Arbaeen Pilgrimage was banned. Clashes between pilgrims and the Iraqi military resulted in the arrest of thousands of people and the deaths of hundreds more. Since his overthrow in 2003, the number of people celebrating the Shiite holiday has grown every year. While there have been deaths from attacks made by Sunni suicide bombers, the Arbaeen Pilgrimage has been a largely peaceful affair in which some seven million people participate.
Karbala is one of the holiest cities for Shiite Muslims. It has more than 100 mosques and 23 religious schools in its old quarter. For Shiite Muslims, the city is also believed to be a gate to paradise. Many elderly believers come to the city to die, hoping to enter paradise more easily.
During the regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, the Arbaeen Pilgrimage was banned. Clashes between pilgrims and the Iraqi military resulted in the arrest of thousands of people and the deaths of hundreds more. Since his overthrow in 2003, the number of people celebrating the Shiite holiday has grown every year. While there have been deaths from attacks made by Sunni suicide bombers, the Arbaeen Pilgrimage has been a largely peaceful affair in which some seven million people participate.
Sunday, November 20, 2016
İngiliz casusları
Gertrude Bell - Ingiliz Casusu Kadin
Takunyacı ihlas holding’ten tgrt’yi satın palıp, ismini fox tv olarak
değiştiren dünya medya imparatoru Rupert Murdoch, atv’yle sabah’ı da
almak için Ankara’ya geldi, asrın liderimizle buluştu, baş başa
görüştü, hatıra olarak da John Philby’nin kitabını hediye etti.
*
Murdoch, tgrt’yi Ahmet Ertegün aracılığıyla almıştı. Ertegün’ün dedesi
Üsküdar Özbekler Tekkesi’nin şeyhiydi. Babası, Washington
büyükelçimizdi. Beyaz Saray’ın pek kıymet verdiği bir aileydi, babası
görev başında vefat etmiş, cenazesi Missouri zırhlısıyla
gönderilmişti.
*
Murdoch’ın babası ise, 1915’te Melbourne Age gazetesinin muhabiri
olarak Çanakkale savaşını takip eden Avustralyalı gazeteciydi. Cephede
gözlemler yapmış, sonra da sekiz bin kelimeden oluşan meşhur “Gelibolu
mektubu”nu yazarak, gizlice Avustralya başbakanına göndermişti.
“İngiliz istihbaratı Londra’ya yalan raporlar gönderiyor, Çanakkale
geçilemez, boşuna ölüyoruz” demişti.
*
Murdoch’ın asrın liderimize hediye ettiği “The Empty Quarter” isimli
kitabın yazarı John Philby, İngiliz casusuydu. Anadili gibi Arapça
biliyordu. Güya müslüman oldu. Şeyh Abdullah ismini aldı. Biz
Çanakkale’de İngilizlerle boğuşurken, Osmanlı’ya isyan bayrağı açan
Mekke Şerifi Hüseyin’e yardımcı olması için Arabistan’a gönderildi.
Bir yandan sırtımızdan hançerleyen Arapları organize etti, bir yandan
İngiliz petrol şirketlerine imtiyaz topladı, bir yandan da tarihi
eserleri araklayıp İngiltere müzelerine sattı, servet yaptı.
*
İngiltere’ye dönünce, siyasete atıldı, seçilemedi, küstü. İkinci dünya
savaşında saf değiştirdi, kendi ülkesini satmaya başladı, çaktırmadan
Hitler’e çalıştı. Yakalandı, bir süre tutuklandı, sonra ev hapsine
alındı, savaş bitince İngiltere’yi terketti, Lübnan’a taşındı. Kalpten
öldü. Beyrut’ta müslüman mezarlığına gömüldü.
*
Bu casus arkadaşın bir oğlu vardı, Kim Philby… O da babası gibi
Cambridge’ten mezundu, o da sular seller gibi Arapça biliyordu, o da
casustu. 1947’de konsolosluk sekreteri ayağıyla İstanbul’a gönderildi.
CIA ve MI6’in irtibat görevi için Washington’a tayin edildi. Soğuk
Savaş tarihine “asrın casusu” olarak geçti. Çünkü, çift taraflı
çalışıyordu. Köstebekti. Sovyet gizli servisi tarafından
devşirilmişti, Moskova’ya bilgi satıyordu. Şüphelenildi, takip edildi,
bir türlü suçüstü yapılamadı ama, kovuldu. O da gitti, babası gibi
Beyrut’a yerleşti. Güya gazeteciydi.
*
Gel zaman git zaman, 1961’de Anatoliy Golitsy isimli KGB subayı ABD’ye
iltica etti, bülbül gibi öttü. Kim Philby’nin ipliğini pazara çıkardı.
Aranan kanıt nihayet bulunmuştu. İngiliz siciminin boynuna dolanmak
üzere olduğunu anlayan Kim Philby, Suriye üzerinden Ermenistan’a,
oradan Rusya’ya kaçtı.
*
Daha önce bir İngiliz, bir Amerikalı eşinden boşanmıştı, bu sefer
Polonya kökenli Rus yazar Rufina Pukhova’yla evlendi. Hayatı roman
oldu, Hollywood’ta film oldu. Alkolik oldu. İki defa intihara
kalkıştı, beceremedi. 1988’de babası gibi kalpten gitti. Rusya, onun
hatırasına posta pulu bastırdı.
*
Ölümünden sonra ortaya çıktı ki… İstanbul’da çalıştığı sırada,
SSCB’nin İstanbul başkonsolosluğunda görevli olan ve İngiltere’ye
iltica etmek isteyen Konstantin Volkov isimli KGB subayını, usta
manevralarla bizzat kendi elleriyle KGB’ye teslim etmişti. Çünkü,
Volkov’un çantasında köstebeklerin listesi vardı ve listenin en
başında Kim Philby yazıyordu!
*
Bu casus arkadaşın, kendisi gibi casus olan babasına dönersek…
Suudileri örgütleyen John Philby, Irak’ın örgütlenmesi işini Gertrude
Bell isimli bir kadınla yürütüyordu.
*
Gertrude casustu. Oxford mezunuydu. Türkçe, Arapça, Farsça, Kürtçe
dahil, şakır şakır yedi lisan biliyordu. Çok güzeldi. Kızıl saçlı,
yeşil gözlü, narin yapılıydı. Gören çarpılıyordu. Etrafına ışık
saçıyordu. Arkeolog ayaklarıyla Mezopotamya’yı karış karış gezdi,
aşiretleri örgütledi. 1919’da Paris Konferansı’na delege olarak
katıldı. Haritaladı… Kürt, Arap, Türkmen bölgelerine ayırdı, bugünkü
Irak’ın sınırlarını elleriyle çizdi. 1924’te Türkiye’yle İngiltere
arasında imzalanan Irak sınırı, onun eseriydi. Bir de kral buldu… John
Philby’nin kankası Şerif Hüseyin’in oğlu Faysal’ı, kukla olarak Irak
tahtına oturttu.
*
Araplar ona “çöl kraliçesi” diyordu. Hiç evlenmedi. Aşıktı aslında…
Binbaşı Dick Doghty-Willie’ye aşıktı. Talihsizliğe bakın ki, binbaşı
evliydi. Gizli gizli mektuplaşıyorlar, buluşuyorlardı ama, binbaşı
eşinden boşanmıyor, Gertrude bunalıma giriyordu. Meseleyi biz çözdük…
Binbaşıyı Çanakkale’de vurduk, herif öldü, aile faciası yaşanmasına
gerek kalmadı!
*
Gertrude’un Türk nefreti böyle başlamıştı. Sevgilisi ölünce kendini
Kahire’ye attı, İngiliz gizli servisinin Arap bürosuna katıldı.
Yukarda özetlediğim işleri halletmek için Irak’a geçti. Önce bizim
kuyumuzu kazdı, sonra kendi başını yedi. 1926’da, 58 yaşındayken aşırı
dozda uyku hapı alarak, intihar etti. Bağdat’a İngiliz mezarlığına
gömüldü.
*
Kendini öldürmeden önce, gene arkeolog ayaklarıyla defalarca
Anadolu’ya geldi. Kadın konusundaki zafiyetimizi biliyordu, gayet iyi
kullandı, kapıları ardına kadar açtırdı. Yetmedi, istediği gibi
kurcalasın, memlekette cirit atsın diye, yanına rehber bile verdik iyi
mi… Hakkını verdi. Memlekette dört döndü. Ne Diyarbakır bıraktı, ne
Adana, ne Konya, ne Kayseri, ne Kapadokya… Cudi’ye bile tırmandı. Kürt
köylerini listeledi, hangi aşiret devletten yanadır, hangi aşiret
ihanete müsaittir, şeceresini çıkardı. Nereler kuytudur, nerelerden
nerelere geçilir, haritaladı. Mesela bir mektubunda “Zaho kampında
konakladım” diyordu. Bilmiyorum bi yerlerden hatırlıyor musunuz, Zaho
kampını!
*
Antakya’ya gitti. Karkamış’ta kazı yaptı. Bugün ne hale geldiğini
gördüğümüz Suriye sınırında kiliseleri geziyorum dümeniyle, ahalinin
etnik kökenini, mezheplerini raporladı. Öldüğünde, kendisinden geriye,
elyazısıyla 16 günlük, iki bine yakın mektup, yedi bin fotoğraf kaldı.
*
Mustafa Kemal 19 Mayıs 1919’da Samsun’a çıktı, Gertrude dört ay sonra
Anadolu’ya sızdı, Malatya’ya geldi, Kürt aşiretlerini devşirmeye
çalışan İngiliz casusu binbaşı Noel’le buluştu, Elazığ’a geçmek
isterken enselendi, kendisiyle anladığı lisandan konuşuldu. Kuvayi
milliyecilerin padişahçılara pek benzemediğini öğrenmiş oldu, milli
mücadele bitene kadar Anadolu’ya adım atmadı.
*
Dedim ya, hiç evlenmemişti. Ama, anne sayılırdı. Çünkü “manevi oğlum”
dediği biri vardı. Yarbay Thomas Edward Lawrence… Namı diğer,
Arabistanlı Lawrence!
*
Evlat yetiştirir gibi yetiştirdi, yol gösterdi, akıl hocalığını yaptı,
nüfuzlu kişilerle tanıştırdı. Arabistanlı Lawrence, kendisinden 20 yaş
büyük olan bu kadın için “annemden farksız, bildiğim her şeyi ondan
öğrendim” diyordu.
*
Tayyip Erdoğan’la Abdullah Gül’ü kaldığı oteline, ayağına getirtip
madalya takan Suudi kralı var ya… İşte bu Lawrence’in Cidde’de
yaşadığı evi restore ettirdi, kapısına da kocaman harflerle “bu ev
Türklere karşı savaş vermemize yardımcı olan Lawrence’in karargahıdır”
diye plaket astı!
*
Neyse… 1953’de henüz 46 yaşındayken motosiklet kazasında ölen
Arabistanlı Lawrence’ın hayatı film oldu. 1962’de vizyona girdi, en
iyi yönetmen dahil, yedi dalda Oscar kazandı. ABD Kongre Kütüphanesi
tarafından, tarihi değeri nedeniyle, Ulusal Film Arşivi’nde koruma
altına alındı.
*
Ancak…
The End olmadı.
*
Gertrude Bell’in hayatı da film oldu. “Çöl Kraliçesi” isimli filmde,
efsane kadın casusu Oscar ödüllü Nicole Kidman canlandırdı. Çekimleri
Fas’ta ve Ürdün’de yapıldı. Beş bin figüran kullanıldı.
*
Bu cuma günü vizyona giriyor.
*
Zamanlaması ne tesadüf di mi.
*
Takunyacı ihlas holding’ten tgrt’yi satın palıp, ismini fox tv olarak
değiştiren dünya medya imparatoru Rupert Murdoch, atv’yle sabah’ı da
almak için Ankara’ya geldi, asrın liderimizle buluştu, baş başa
görüştü, hatıra olarak da John Philby’nin kitabını hediye etti.
*
Murdoch, tgrt’yi Ahmet Ertegün aracılığıyla almıştı. Ertegün’ün dedesi
Üsküdar Özbekler Tekkesi’nin şeyhiydi. Babası, Washington
büyükelçimizdi. Beyaz Saray’ın pek kıymet verdiği bir aileydi, babası
görev başında vefat etmiş, cenazesi Missouri zırhlısıyla
gönderilmişti.
*
Murdoch’ın babası ise, 1915’te Melbourne Age gazetesinin muhabiri
olarak Çanakkale savaşını takip eden Avustralyalı gazeteciydi. Cephede
gözlemler yapmış, sonra da sekiz bin kelimeden oluşan meşhur “Gelibolu
mektubu”nu yazarak, gizlice Avustralya başbakanına göndermişti.
“İngiliz istihbaratı Londra’ya yalan raporlar gönderiyor, Çanakkale
geçilemez, boşuna ölüyoruz” demişti.
*
Murdoch’ın asrın liderimize hediye ettiği “The Empty Quarter” isimli
kitabın yazarı John Philby, İngiliz casusuydu. Anadili gibi Arapça
biliyordu. Güya müslüman oldu. Şeyh Abdullah ismini aldı. Biz
Çanakkale’de İngilizlerle boğuşurken, Osmanlı’ya isyan bayrağı açan
Mekke Şerifi Hüseyin’e yardımcı olması için Arabistan’a gönderildi.
Bir yandan sırtımızdan hançerleyen Arapları organize etti, bir yandan
İngiliz petrol şirketlerine imtiyaz topladı, bir yandan da tarihi
eserleri araklayıp İngiltere müzelerine sattı, servet yaptı.
*
İngiltere’ye dönünce, siyasete atıldı, seçilemedi, küstü. İkinci dünya
savaşında saf değiştirdi, kendi ülkesini satmaya başladı, çaktırmadan
Hitler’e çalıştı. Yakalandı, bir süre tutuklandı, sonra ev hapsine
alındı, savaş bitince İngiltere’yi terketti, Lübnan’a taşındı. Kalpten
öldü. Beyrut’ta müslüman mezarlığına gömüldü.
*
Bu casus arkadaşın bir oğlu vardı, Kim Philby… O da babası gibi
Cambridge’ten mezundu, o da sular seller gibi Arapça biliyordu, o da
casustu. 1947’de konsolosluk sekreteri ayağıyla İstanbul’a gönderildi.
CIA ve MI6’in irtibat görevi için Washington’a tayin edildi. Soğuk
Savaş tarihine “asrın casusu” olarak geçti. Çünkü, çift taraflı
çalışıyordu. Köstebekti. Sovyet gizli servisi tarafından
devşirilmişti, Moskova’ya bilgi satıyordu. Şüphelenildi, takip edildi,
bir türlü suçüstü yapılamadı ama, kovuldu. O da gitti, babası gibi
Beyrut’a yerleşti. Güya gazeteciydi.
*
Gel zaman git zaman, 1961’de Anatoliy Golitsy isimli KGB subayı ABD’ye
iltica etti, bülbül gibi öttü. Kim Philby’nin ipliğini pazara çıkardı.
Aranan kanıt nihayet bulunmuştu. İngiliz siciminin boynuna dolanmak
üzere olduğunu anlayan Kim Philby, Suriye üzerinden Ermenistan’a,
oradan Rusya’ya kaçtı.
*
Daha önce bir İngiliz, bir Amerikalı eşinden boşanmıştı, bu sefer
Polonya kökenli Rus yazar Rufina Pukhova’yla evlendi. Hayatı roman
oldu, Hollywood’ta film oldu. Alkolik oldu. İki defa intihara
kalkıştı, beceremedi. 1988’de babası gibi kalpten gitti. Rusya, onun
hatırasına posta pulu bastırdı.
*
Ölümünden sonra ortaya çıktı ki… İstanbul’da çalıştığı sırada,
SSCB’nin İstanbul başkonsolosluğunda görevli olan ve İngiltere’ye
iltica etmek isteyen Konstantin Volkov isimli KGB subayını, usta
manevralarla bizzat kendi elleriyle KGB’ye teslim etmişti. Çünkü,
Volkov’un çantasında köstebeklerin listesi vardı ve listenin en
başında Kim Philby yazıyordu!
*
Bu casus arkadaşın, kendisi gibi casus olan babasına dönersek…
Suudileri örgütleyen John Philby, Irak’ın örgütlenmesi işini Gertrude
Bell isimli bir kadınla yürütüyordu.
*
Gertrude casustu. Oxford mezunuydu. Türkçe, Arapça, Farsça, Kürtçe
dahil, şakır şakır yedi lisan biliyordu. Çok güzeldi. Kızıl saçlı,
yeşil gözlü, narin yapılıydı. Gören çarpılıyordu. Etrafına ışık
saçıyordu. Arkeolog ayaklarıyla Mezopotamya’yı karış karış gezdi,
aşiretleri örgütledi. 1919’da Paris Konferansı’na delege olarak
katıldı. Haritaladı… Kürt, Arap, Türkmen bölgelerine ayırdı, bugünkü
Irak’ın sınırlarını elleriyle çizdi. 1924’te Türkiye’yle İngiltere
arasında imzalanan Irak sınırı, onun eseriydi. Bir de kral buldu… John
Philby’nin kankası Şerif Hüseyin’in oğlu Faysal’ı, kukla olarak Irak
tahtına oturttu.
*
Araplar ona “çöl kraliçesi” diyordu. Hiç evlenmedi. Aşıktı aslında…
Binbaşı Dick Doghty-Willie’ye aşıktı. Talihsizliğe bakın ki, binbaşı
evliydi. Gizli gizli mektuplaşıyorlar, buluşuyorlardı ama, binbaşı
eşinden boşanmıyor, Gertrude bunalıma giriyordu. Meseleyi biz çözdük…
Binbaşıyı Çanakkale’de vurduk, herif öldü, aile faciası yaşanmasına
gerek kalmadı!
*
Gertrude’un Türk nefreti böyle başlamıştı. Sevgilisi ölünce kendini
Kahire’ye attı, İngiliz gizli servisinin Arap bürosuna katıldı.
Yukarda özetlediğim işleri halletmek için Irak’a geçti. Önce bizim
kuyumuzu kazdı, sonra kendi başını yedi. 1926’da, 58 yaşındayken aşırı
dozda uyku hapı alarak, intihar etti. Bağdat’a İngiliz mezarlığına
gömüldü.
*
Kendini öldürmeden önce, gene arkeolog ayaklarıyla defalarca
Anadolu’ya geldi. Kadın konusundaki zafiyetimizi biliyordu, gayet iyi
kullandı, kapıları ardına kadar açtırdı. Yetmedi, istediği gibi
kurcalasın, memlekette cirit atsın diye, yanına rehber bile verdik iyi
mi… Hakkını verdi. Memlekette dört döndü. Ne Diyarbakır bıraktı, ne
Adana, ne Konya, ne Kayseri, ne Kapadokya… Cudi’ye bile tırmandı. Kürt
köylerini listeledi, hangi aşiret devletten yanadır, hangi aşiret
ihanete müsaittir, şeceresini çıkardı. Nereler kuytudur, nerelerden
nerelere geçilir, haritaladı. Mesela bir mektubunda “Zaho kampında
konakladım” diyordu. Bilmiyorum bi yerlerden hatırlıyor musunuz, Zaho
kampını!
*
Antakya’ya gitti. Karkamış’ta kazı yaptı. Bugün ne hale geldiğini
gördüğümüz Suriye sınırında kiliseleri geziyorum dümeniyle, ahalinin
etnik kökenini, mezheplerini raporladı. Öldüğünde, kendisinden geriye,
elyazısıyla 16 günlük, iki bine yakın mektup, yedi bin fotoğraf kaldı.
*
Mustafa Kemal 19 Mayıs 1919’da Samsun’a çıktı, Gertrude dört ay sonra
Anadolu’ya sızdı, Malatya’ya geldi, Kürt aşiretlerini devşirmeye
çalışan İngiliz casusu binbaşı Noel’le buluştu, Elazığ’a geçmek
isterken enselendi, kendisiyle anladığı lisandan konuşuldu. Kuvayi
milliyecilerin padişahçılara pek benzemediğini öğrenmiş oldu, milli
mücadele bitene kadar Anadolu’ya adım atmadı.
*
Dedim ya, hiç evlenmemişti. Ama, anne sayılırdı. Çünkü “manevi oğlum”
dediği biri vardı. Yarbay Thomas Edward Lawrence… Namı diğer,
Arabistanlı Lawrence!
*
Evlat yetiştirir gibi yetiştirdi, yol gösterdi, akıl hocalığını yaptı,
nüfuzlu kişilerle tanıştırdı. Arabistanlı Lawrence, kendisinden 20 yaş
büyük olan bu kadın için “annemden farksız, bildiğim her şeyi ondan
öğrendim” diyordu.
*
Tayyip Erdoğan’la Abdullah Gül’ü kaldığı oteline, ayağına getirtip
madalya takan Suudi kralı var ya… İşte bu Lawrence’in Cidde’de
yaşadığı evi restore ettirdi, kapısına da kocaman harflerle “bu ev
Türklere karşı savaş vermemize yardımcı olan Lawrence’in karargahıdır”
diye plaket astı!
*
Neyse… 1953’de henüz 46 yaşındayken motosiklet kazasında ölen
Arabistanlı Lawrence’ın hayatı film oldu. 1962’de vizyona girdi, en
iyi yönetmen dahil, yedi dalda Oscar kazandı. ABD Kongre Kütüphanesi
tarafından, tarihi değeri nedeniyle, Ulusal Film Arşivi’nde koruma
altına alındı.
*
Ancak…
The End olmadı.
*
Gertrude Bell’in hayatı da film oldu. “Çöl Kraliçesi” isimli filmde,
efsane kadın casusu Oscar ödüllü Nicole Kidman canlandırdı. Çekimleri
Fas’ta ve Ürdün’de yapıldı. Beş bin figüran kullanıldı.
*
Bu cuma günü vizyona giriyor.
*
Zamanlaması ne tesadüf di mi.
*
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