Returning to normalcy is not impossible.
Gursel Demirok
Last Update: August 30, 2026 18:55
Gursel Demirok
Tensions between Türkiye and Israel are rising again due to the situation in Syria. Israel's August 18Its attack on the Abu al-Uhur air base, relatively close to Türkiye border, and its justification for this attack based on the possible Turkish military presence, transformed the issue from a theoretical disagreement into a serious security problem.
The US, which has strategic ties with both countries, is uneasy about the developments. The fact that Washington is working on a "de-escalation mechanism" to prevent a conflict between Turkey, Israel, and Syria, whether direct or resulting from miscalculation, also demonstrates the seriousness of the danger.
In Israel, a harsh anti-Turkey sentiment has been prevalent for some time. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's statements are accompanied by anti-Turkey commentary and analysis in the Israeli press. However, there are also figures like former Prime Minister Ehud Barak who criticize Netanyahu's Turkey policy. Barak argues that Türkiye is neither Iran nor Syria under Assad, and that there is no strategic problem with Ankara that cannot be resolved.
So why did relations between the two countries, which were in a normalization process before October 7, 2023, reach this point?
There are several main reasons for this.
First, and most importantly for today, is Syria. The increase in Turkey's political and military influence in post-Assad Syria has created a new strategic situation for Israel. Israel wanted to see a decrease in Iran's influence in Syria; however, it also did not want the resulting vacuum to be filled by a strong Turkey. While Turkey wants a Syria with a strong central government, capable of preserving its territorial integrity and ensuring its own security, Israel is concerned that a Syria supported by Turkey and with a strengthened military capacity could restrict its own freedom of action in the future.
The second important issue is Gaza and Palestine. Ankara's harsh criticism of the Netanyahu government during the Gaza war and its firm stance on the Palestinian issue changed the Israeli government's view of Turkey.
The third factor is the balance of military power. Turkey's membership in NATO, its large army, and its developing defense industry are significant in Israel's strategic calculations. The F-35 issue is a concrete example of this.
To these factors, we must add the increasing convergence of the two countries' interests in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, the future of Gaza, and the struggle for influence in Washington, as well as domestic politics. In Israel, in particular, security policy is central to Netanyahu's political struggle during the election period.
Despite all this, it would be incorrect to conclude that Israel wants to go to war with Türkiye. Both sides know that the cost of a direct military conflict would be extraordinarily high.
Today, Israel is one of the strongest states in the Middle East militarily and technologically. Its advanced air force, intelligence capabilities, missile defense, and US support are significant advantages. Its economy, despite bearing the brunt of war, remains resilient. However, Israel's real vulnerability lies in the political and social spheres. Serious polarization exists around the secular-religious divide, the issue of military service for Ultra-Orthodox Christians, the handling of the Gaza War, responsibility for the October 7th attacks, and Netanyahu's personality.
In short, Israel is militarily and technologically very strong, economically resilient, but politically and socially more fragile than in the past.
It's too early to say for sure about Netanyahu's future. He has been thought to be politically finished many times, but each time he has managed to make a comeback. It's possible he will form a right-wing coalition again in the upcoming elections, or he might not be able to form a government even if Likud becomes the largest party. Regional crises have an interesting effect on Netanyahu: while protracted wars wear him down, a strong perception of external threats can reinforce his image as an "experienced security leader."
So what should Türkiye do?
The policy that serves Türkiye's interests is neither surrender nor uncontrolled conflict. While maintaining its principled stance on the Palestinian issue and its criticisms of Israel based on international law, it should avoid direct military confrontation.
A direct military communication mechanism is of paramount importance, especially in Syria, to prevent accidental confrontations between the aircraft, drones, or soldiers of the two countries.
Türkiye's policy can be summarized in three points: strong diplomacy instead of harsh rhetoric; military deterrence but avoidance of military adventures; and a principled stance on Palestine but without closing all communication channels with Israel.
Normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations is not impossible. This path doesn't involve a grand "peace declaration," but rather small, controlled steps. Establishing a conflict prevention mechanism in Syria, maintaining diplomatic and intelligence contacts, and achieving a lasting ceasefire and improved humanitarian conditions in Gaza could pave the way for normalization.
From Israel's perspective, completely antagonizing Türkiye is not rational. Turkey is a NATO member, a regional power with a population of approximately 90 million, a large army, and significant influence in Syria. Similarly, from Turkey's perspective, viewing Israel solely as an enemy unnecessarily restricts its room for maneuver in terms of long-term state policy.
Relations may become even more strained in the coming period, particularly due to Syria. However, under current conditions, the likelihood of direct war seems low. A more probable scenario is continued intense political and military competition, but with both sides avoiding armed conflict.
Because despite all the tension, one thing remains unchanged:
Türkiye and Israel don't have to love each other. But they have to take each other into account in the same geographical region.
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