Online Press Briefing with Ambassador Julianne Smith, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO
Brussels Hub
MODERATOR: Good afternoon from the State Department’s Brussel’s Media Hub. I would like to welcome everyone joining us for today’s virtual press briefing. We are very honored today to be joined by Ambassador Julianne Smith, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO.
A quick reminder that today’s session is on the record. And with that, let’s get started. Ambassador Smith, I’ll turn it over to you for opening remarks.
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Thank you very much, John. I appreciate your help. I appreciate everything that the Brussels Media Hub always does to bring together and facilitate interviews and conversations like this.
As all of you know, we’re about one day out from the upcoming defense ministerial here at NATO HQ. Very much looking forward to this ministerial, not only because this now officially starts to the path towards The Hague summit, which will take place next June, but also because we have two big firsts occurring during the summit. It will be Mark Rutte’s first defense ministerial as our new secretary general, and for the first time we will have a session during the ministerial with our Indo-Pacific partners and the European Union to talk about a variety of subjects, shared challenges, and our shared support for Ukraine.
And because of those two firsts, I know there’s added energy in the halls of NATO right now getting ready for this big ministerial. But in addition, there will be a session at 32, where all 32 Allies will sit together around the table and take stock of where we are on a number of internal NATO matters, including how we are doing in implementing and executing the regional plans, among other subjects. And then we will also have a NATO-Ukraine Council over dinner tomorrow night with Minister Umerov, who will be able to sit with all of the Allies around the table and tell us more about events on the ground and some of their plans for the coming weeks and months.
Now, additionally, we will have a separate ministerial for the force contributing members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, also referred to, as many of you know, as D-ISIS or Counter ISIS. Secretary Austin is convening this group to focus on ways in which they can adapt this coalition to counter an evolving threat from ISIS in the Middle East and globally too, and we expect more than 30 countries to participate in those meetings at the minister level. So that will be an important part of the next two days and that will occur, if I’m not mistaken, tomorrow morning before the DMM gets underway.
I think that whether you look at the DMM or the D-ISIS ministerial, there’s kind of a clear throughline between these two events that continues to show just how united so many countries around the world are on countering a variety of threats that we face, threats that certainly include hybrid, cyber, terrorism, violent extremism, and threats to our democracies and international rules and norms as well. So, these types of partnerships, these engagements, help us form the connective tissue that we need to push back against actors who seek to undermine the stability and security that our countries hold dear.
So, with that, let me just pause. Let me thank all of you for taking time out of your busy schedules to join us today. And let’s open it up to questions, and I’m eager to hear what’s on your mind. Thanks for joining us.
MODERATOR: Thank you so much, ma’am. Why don’t we start with a live question? First question will go to Yaroslav Dovgopol. Yaroslav, please go ahead.
QUESTION: Thank you so much. Can you hear me?
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Yes. Loud and clear.
QUESTION: So, thank you for taking my question. Yesterday, Pentagon confirmed that Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will discuss enhancing military support for Ukraine at the NATO defense ministerial. And you also said about NATO-Ukraine Council. So, in this context, could you please explain the current attitude of the U.S. administration regarding permitting Ukraine to use long-range Western weapons against targets in Russia? And also, what is the U.S. position on the possibility of inviting Ukraine to a NATO membership, as proposed in the President Zelenskyy’s victory plan? Thank you.
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Sure. Thanks for your question. So, on enhancing support, absolutely. Every time ministers get together – whether it’s at a defense ministerial, such as the one that starts tomorrow, or in the form of the UDCGs which occur monthly – the goal is always the same, and that is to increase security assistance for our friends in Ukraine by starting first and foremost by listening to them in terms of what their current requirements on the battlefield are. Through that process, through those engagements, we then work throughout the meeting and engagements to try and identify additional forms of support. It’s no secret right now that the Ukrainians are in need of additional forms of air defense, artillery, ammunition, and armor.
Allies, no doubt, will be looking to make additional contributions. I sense here in the halls across the Alliance that unity remains strong. I don’t get the sense that anyone is looking away or saying that they can’t possibly do more. And so, I suspect coming out of this defense ministerial we will get some added contributions, along the lines of what the Ukrainians are seeking and asking for.
Now on your two specific questions about the question of whether or not the Ukrainians can use the long-range fires that they have in hand to strike into NATO territory, that is something that they have discussed with the United States. They did several months ago when they asked permission to use some of those weapons in and around Kharkiv. At the time, the President discussed it with his cabinet and other senior advisors and reached the decision that we would allow the Ukrainians in that case, around Kharkiv, to use it in a limited capacity.
Now the Ukrainians, as you well know, are asking the question about using those weapons in other locations. I don’t have anything to announce about a change in U.S. policy. I see that we still are at the same place where we’ve been, and that is that we will get Ukraine all the assistance that it needs to defend its territory. And the Ukrainians have been very effective in using the weapons that we’ve provided to date, particularly in Crimea and multiple other locations inside Ukraine.
On invitation, I think NATO’s position on this has been very clear. We stated this summer at the 75th Anniversary Summit that Ukraine is on an irreversible path of membership and that Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance. We are not at the point right now where the Alliance is talking about issuing an invitation in the short term. But as always, we will continue conversations with our friends in Ukraine to talk to them about ways in which they can continue to move closer to this Alliance.
MODERATOR: Thank you, ma’am. We’ll go to a submitted question now, this time from Sachiyo Sugita from NHK, based here in Belgium. They ask: “With fear increasing, will NATO be discussing an increase in its military presence in the eastern part of the Alliance?”
AMBASSADOR SMITH: I do not believe that, at this point, the Alliance or any individual country is looking at a dramatic shift in its posture. And I say that because a lot of things changed in the days and weeks following the start of the war in Ukraine in February of 2022. Several Allies moved significant levels of troops, but also equipment, into Eastern Europe to reinforce the eastern flank in the spring of 2022. And then NATO made a big announcement that same year to create four multinational battalions to add to the four existing multinational battalions that already existed in the three Baltic states and Poland. So, in light of those dramatic changes and the fact those battalions now must be scalable to a brigade level, I don’t anticipate the Alliance rolling out any additive announcements in the coming days. But of course, I know that General Cavoli, SACEUR, and other ministers continue to look for ways that we can best address the very real security concerns and requirements of our NATO Allies up and down the eastern flank.
MODERATOR: Thank you, Ambassador. Let’s go to another live question, Alex Raufoglu. Alex, please go ahead.
QUESTION: John, thank you so much for doing this. Ambassador, thank you so much for your time. I have multiparter, if I – if you please indulge me. Want to follow up with Yaroslav’s question. You mentioned Indo-Pacific dialogue and NATO-Ukraine ministerial dinner. In light of that, do you have any comment on concerns on both the PRC’s support to Russian defense industrial base and the growing military ties between Russia and the DPRK? Particular there are reports about they’re supplying troops to Russia. Does this change anything for your calculation? Does it now force the West to get more involved in defending Ukraine?
Can you also fill us in on the current status of Ramstein dialogue? As I understand it, the President is – his trip is back on. However, it doesn’t include Ramstein. So, what is the state of that?
And finally, on Georgia, if I may, given the election is coming up, we have seen increasing scope of disinformation campaign against the U.S. and NATO Allies prior to elections. Have you guys paused your relationship with the Georgian Dream government? And if you listen to them, they will tell you that this is a temporary difficulty and it’s about election, and once we are back in the power, so we still can have NATO pass away, even though we will continue these – this policy. Is that accurate? Thank you so much.
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Okay. So, you got a couple of things in there. So, on Ramstein, yes, you are correct; the President had to pull down his planned trip to Germany, which included a meeting of the UDCG at the leaders level, due to events back in the United States tied to the hurricane and his need to be back home. He, as I understand it, will be making a trip to Germany later this week, but you are correct in noting that it does not include a meeting of the UDCG, and we’ll wait to see when that will be rescheduled. So, stand by on that front.
On PRC support to Russia, here it’s interesting. The PRC does its very best to try and convince the world that it can maintain a very neutral status as it relates to the war in Ukraine. But in reality, the PRC has picked a side. It has put its thumb on the scale, and it has opted to support Russia in its war in Ukraine by providing a long list of dual-use components that are enabling the Russians to pursue a whole series of attacks against Ukrainian civilians and Ukrainian troops. So, thank you for raising that, and we in the United States and our friends and allies and partners around the world will continue to call out the PRC for this type of critical support to what Russia is doing inside Ukraine.
Similarly, we are worried about what we see in terms of the DPRK providing missiles, ammunitions to the Russians – both ballistic missiles and potentially thousands of cargo containers full of munitions. These are also critical to the Russian effort and their war inside Ukraine, and we will continue to go after the companies, anyone that’s involved in the transit of these items, and we’ll use all the tools at our disposal to call out these actions and put an end to them.
In terms of supplying troops, North Korean troops to the war effort, we’ve seen those reports. And obviously, if that is true – and I cannot tell you today whether that is, in fact, the case – but if it were to be true, it would be a serious increase in the direct support the DPRK is providing to Russia for its war of aggression in Ukraine.
Lastly, on Georgia, yes, the disinformation campaign – this is a classic play on the part of the Russians. They use disinformation to divide our societies from within to try and break up the unity that exists across our vast network of allies and partners around the world. And we have worked for many years with the people of Georgia to see if we can help them cope with this disinformation challenge. But also on another subject, we in the United States as well as many countries in Europe have been very direct with our friends in Georgia about our concerns for their democratic process, and that we want to ensure that the desire of the Georgian public to integrate into Western institutions like the EU or NATO, that those desires are heard loud and clear, and that they maintain their commitment to core democratic principles, to human rights, to democracy, and the rule of law.
MODERATOR: Thank you, Ambassador. We’ll go to one more live question. Nicholas Fiorenza from Janes. Nicholas, please go ahead.
QUESTION: Hello. Thanks for this opportunity to ask a question, for organizing this. I’m – I saw that Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski was – I don’t think for the first time was mentioned a few days ago the – that it would make sense for Poland to be able to – or the Aegis Ashore system based in Poland to shoot down Russian missiles if they were approaching Poland. I was just wondering if there’s been any U.S. response to that. And as far as Aegis Ashore is concerned, it was originally designed to counter an Iranian missile threat. But can it – is it now cleared for shooting down Russian missiles if there were a conflict with Russia?
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, look, let me just say at the top, for the United States, I mean, our focus continues to be on Ukraine and getting it all the assistance that it needs to defend its territory against continued Russian aggression, full stop. In terms of Poland’s efforts to defend its own territory, that is their own sovereign decision, although certainly, as I noted earlier, Allies continue to consult with each other and with SACEUR General Cavoli on what, if anything, Allies need to ensure that they can protect their territory.
But I do not have anything to say about a change in the existing BMD system at this juncture. No change.
MODERATOR: Thank you, ma’am. We have a couple questions regarding defense spending. One from Shona Murray, who asks: “Is the United States supporting or calling for 2.5 percent of GDP spending among all Allies?”
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, on defense spending, I mean, the goal right now remains 2 percent. And we had some very good news that came out of the 75th anniversary summit earlier this summer, when we were able to announce that this year, 10 years after the Wales investment pledge, we now have 23 Allies meeting the 2 percent target. What’s important now is that we move that number from 23 to 32. We need every member of this Alliance to get to 2 percent, and we need Allies to accelerate those timelines, and we believe that because of the new regional plans that we recently rolled out that provides tremendous clarity on what we need to defend every inch of NATO territory. And in order to execute and implement those plans, it will require resourcing, and the quickest way to get to resourcing is for every member of this Alliance to get to 2 percent. That’s the focus now.
Whether or not we would inch our way to another target remains to be seen. I will commend those Allies – and there are quite a few now, not just in Eastern Europe; we’re seeing some of the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, and others – moving well beyond the 2 percent target, and we applaud those countries that have already hit 2.5, 3, 3.5, and, certainly in the case of Poland, stretching beyond 4 percent. Those are important contributions to Alliance security and their own national security, and we want to see more of that type of initiative.
MODERATOR: Thank you, Ambassador. Next question comes from Roman Kot from RBC-Ukraine News Agency. He asks: “If (inaudible) ensure support for both Israel and for Ukraine?”
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Sorry, you cut out there, but I think I’ve got the nature of the question – concerns about commitments in the Middle East and Ukraine? Is that —
MODERATOR: Yes, ma’am.
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Okay. So look, I think the – from a U.S. perspective, we feel comfortable with maintaining the commitments we have to allies and partners, both in the Middle East and for our friends in Ukraine, and in fact, also maintaining our commitments in other corners of the world, including the Indo-Pacific. These are in many cases different types of systems that are being provided, using sometimes different forms of assistance in the U.S. Government.
So right now, I don’t think there’s anyone back in Washington that really looks at this as a zero-sum effort in any way, shape, or form. We do believe, with the great contributions that we have seen from so many nations around the world for Ukraine, that together we can continue to get them what they need while also ensuring that we can defend Israel at the same time.
MODERATOR: Thank you, ma’am. Next question comes from Elina Kervinen from the Helsingin Sanomat in Finland. She asks: “NATO has agreed in Washington that there will be an FLF model for Finland. Is the United States ready to participate in this, and if so, how?”
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, first of all, we just continue to count our lucky stars that we have Sweden and Finland sitting at the table. These are two countries that feel like they’ve been sitting there all along. They’re making daily contributions to our discussions. They give generously to a variety of NATO initiatives. They bring fresh thinking, and we are greatly appreciative of everything that they’re doing for this Alliance.
On that particular question, I don’t believe that I have anything to announce here in terms of a U.S. contribution, but I know that it feels a bit soon in the process, and no doubt Allies will be discussing this in the days and weeks ahead. So on that front, I think I would just suggest that you stay tuned.
MODERATOR: Excellent. Thank you, Ambassador. Next question, this time from Momchil Indjov from Club Z Media in Bulgaria: “How will the United States counter the threat of Slovak Prime Minister Fico to block the NATO membership of Ukraine as long as he is the prime minister?”
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, look, what was interesting is we didn’t have any trouble getting to a leaders’ agreement at the 75th anniversary summit that clearly articulated NATO’s position on Ukraine. What did we say in the declaration that came out of the summit? Not only did we commit to creating a new NATO command for Ukraine – that’s the NSATU mission that some of you are familiar with – we also agreed to a financial pledge to continue to provide financial resources to Ukraine over the next year. And we used that new language that Ukraine is on an irreversible path to membership, as I mentioned at the top, and then of course we’ve stated time and again that they will become a member of this Alliance.
So, my sense is that leaders are still in full agreement. That was clear when I was sitting in the room at the summit this summer about Ukraine’s future membership. We can certainly have discussions and debates about the timing and the mechanics of how that will occur and when it will occur. But what’s important for our friends in Ukraine to understand is that not a single leader at that summit this past summer in July argued with the overarching premise, and that’s what I think our friends in Ukraine should focus on and understand that that commitment is firm. Ukraine will become a member of this Alliance.
MODERATOR: Thank you, ma’am. Next question, this time from Marco Darius from Badea Republica in Romania: “If Donald Trump becomes president and does what he has promised – i.e. ends the war in Ukraine in just 24 hours – I guess the question is, is that a possibility.”
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, look, you’d have to ask Donald Trump. I hesitate to make any predictions here, either about the U.S. election that’s about three weeks away or about what a future president, whoever it may be, might do on any front. I think we need to wait and see the outcome of the election and go from there.
MODERATOR: Thank you, ma’am. I think we have time for one last question, this time from Valbona Bytyqi KTV, National TV in Kosovo: “Considering the developments in the region, the Balkans, and in Europe in general, do you consider it – that this is the appropriate time for Kosovo to join the Partnership for Peace? This is also the request of the current institutional leaders. And two, should the institutions of Kosovo act in the direction of realizing this goal or even the full membership in the transatlantic alliance?”
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Well, look, from a U.S. perspective, we certainly appreciate the Partnership for Peace program. We still find tremendous value in it, and we have been pleased to see Kosovo’s strong interest in joining P4P. But I think our friends in Kosovo have also heard us loud and clear. We want them to continue to invest in the EU-led facilitated dialogue. That is something that both NATO Allies and EU member-states strongly support. They have our full commitment to stay engaged in the region and do what we can to assist them to bring greater stability to their neighborhood.
And bit by bit, as we work towards the goals as outlined in that EU-led facilitated dialogue, one would hope that down the road we can then take on the question of P4P. But right now, the focus is on bringing more stability to the neighborhood and doing what we can to seek progress on that EU-led initiative.
MODERATOR: Thanks so much, Ambassador. And unfortunately, that is all the time we have for today’s call. Thanks, everyone, for your questions, and Ambassador Smith, thanks as always for joining us.
AMBASSADOR SMITH: Many thanks.
MODERATOR: Shortly, we will send the recording of the briefing to all the participating journalists and provide a transcript as soon as it is available. We always love to hear your feedback. You can contact us at any time at TheBrusselsHub@state.gov. Thanks again to all our friends for your participation. We hope you can join us for another press briefing in the near future. This ends today’s briefing.
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