CT (Critical Threads) and ISW ( Institute for the study of War) IRAN CRİSİS UPDATES Iran Update, October 11, 2024

 

CT (Critical Threads) and ISW ( Institute for the study of War) 

IRAN CRİSİS UPDATES

Iran Update, October 11, 2024

The IDF 91st Division has seized terrain in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north.[i] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Israeli forces seized territory along ridges and hills just inside of Lebanon within a few days of the ground operation starting on October 1.[ii] The military correspondent reported on October 10 that Israeli forces were continuing to clear Hezbollah military infrastructure from rural areas. Hezbollah fighters have previously used rural territory along the Israeli border to fire direct fire weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles and anti-tank guns, targeting Israeli forces and civilians.[iii] Preventing Hezbollah from using these areas for its direct fire weapons does not mean that Israel has achieved its objective to return Israeli civilians to their homes in the north because Hezbollah can still fire longer-range indirect weapons, such as rockets and mortars.[iv] These operations do, however, disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to use some of its weapons systems to target Israeli border towns.[v]

Israeli forces also appear to have at least partially secured some villages in southern Lebanon given the presence of Israeli journalists and unarmored engineering vehicles. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) guided Israeli journalists through towns in southern Lebanon on October 10 to report on the status of Israeli operations in the area..[vi] Securing a village would require Israeli forces to prevent Hezbollah from using direct or observed indirect fire weapons against it.[vii] A commander usually only secures an area for a time limited period. The presence of these journalists and unarmored vehicles suggests some villages are at least partially secured given that the IDF would presumably employ armored engineering vehicles, as it has in the Gaza Strip, and would not allow civilian journalists access during major operations.[viii] The IDF would need to meet these conditions prior to allowing Israeli civilians to visit Lebanese towns.

It is unclear why Hezbollah is not conducting meaningful defensive operations in response to Israel’s ground operations. CTP-ISW noted on October 10 that Hezbollah fighters do not appear to be defending against Israeli forces in these villages, as the Israeli forces have consistently encountered weapons caches and infrastructure formerly used by Hezbollah fighters that ”left the area.”[ix] Israeli forces have also observed that Hezbollah fighters have preferred to engage Israeli forces from a distance or have fled outright during the IDF’s ground campaign in southern Lebanon.[x] CTP-ISW assessed that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon has likely severely disrupted the strategic- and operational-level military leadership in Hezbollah and impeded Hezbollah‘s ability to conduct and sustain coherent military campaigns at least in the short term.[xi] Even isolated tactical units should be capable of fighting effectively on their own for some time, however. Hezbollah could have made a deliberate choice to intentionally hold back its fighters, given that tactical elements would likely defend against Israeli forces absent direction from above.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to start an “energy war” on October 10, which is likely part of an Iranian-led effort to compel the United States to pressure Israel into a less-costly retaliatory strike. The Iranian foreign minister reportedly threatened senior Saudi officials that the Axis of Resistance would attack Saudi energy assets if Saudi Arabia were to support an Israeli attack on Iran.[xii] Reuters reported on October 10 that Gulf countries are pushing the United States to prevent Israel from attacking Iranian energy assets or infrastructure because they fear that such an attack could trigger Iranian-backed attacks on them.[xiii] This reporting suggests that Iran and its proxies are attempting exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which Iran could calculate would then cause the US Gulf Arab allies to encourage US efforts to pressure Israel to conduct a less-costly strike on Iran.[xiv] Kataib Hezbollah spokesman Abu Ali al Askari released a statement on October 10, threatening to start an energy war with the aid of Iran in the Strait of Hormuz and the Houthis in the Bab al Mandab.[xv] Askari’s statement characterized Arab and Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, as “evil regimes” for their support of Israel.[xvi] Askari also threatened to target US forces in Iraq and the region if Iraq is attacked or if Iraqi airspace is used to attack Iran, likely to pressure the United States to deter Israel from attacking Iran.[xvii] These threats support Iran’s efforts to deter a more-costly Israeli strike on Iran.

Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen bilateral relations. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on October 11.[xviii] Pezeshkian expressed hope that Iran and Russia will sign the comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement during Pezeshkian’s upcoming trip to attend the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, from October 22-24.[xix] This is a 20-year cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia that will replace previous cooperation agreements, but the exact specifics of the agreement are not publicly available.[xx] Putin and Pezeshkian both said that Russia and Iran frequently share positions and coordinate regarding international events.[xxi]  Putin approved the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Iran on September 19.[xxii] Pezeshkian stated that he asked Putin to act ”more effectively” in response to Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.[xxiii] Putin said that he was satisified with the volume of trade between Iran and Russia.[xxiv] Russian media reported that Pezeshkian accepted Putin’s invitation for an official visit to Russia at an unspecified time in the future.[xxv]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately met with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedow in Turkmenistan on October 11.[xxvi]  Pezeshkian expressed readiness to increase cooperation with Uzbekistan in scientific, industrial and cultural fields.[xxvii] Pezeshkian stated that Iran and Turkmenistan made agreements in the industries of gas and electricity that will be finalized in an upcoming joint economic cooperation commission in Tehran.[xxviii]

The Israeli security cabinet convened on October 10 but did not vote on how to respond the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1.[xxix] An unspecified Israeli official told Israeli media that the cabinet did not make any “big decisions.”  An unspecified Israeli security official stated that the cabinet seeks to postpone the vote to decrease the length of time between approval and execution of the Israeli retaliation.[xxx] Three US and Israeli officials separately told Axios that US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ”moved closer to an understanding” on the scope of Israel’s response to the Iranian ballistic missile attack during a phone call on October 9.[xxxi]

Key Takeaways:

Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF 91st Division has seized terrain in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north. It is unclear why Hezbollah is not conducting meaningful defensive operations in response to Israel’s ground operations.

Iran and Iranian-backed Militias: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened to start an “energy war” on October 10, which is likely part of an Iranian-led effort to compel the United States to pressure Israel into a less-costly retaliatory strike. Current reporting suggests that Iran and its proxies are attempting exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which Iran could calculate would then cause the US Gulf Arab allies to encourage US efforts to pressure Israel to conduct a less-costly strike on Iran.

Iran-Russia Relations: Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen bilateral relations. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on October 11.

Israeli Strike on Iran: The Israeli security cabinet convened on October 10 but did not vote on how to respond the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1.

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The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War will provide regular updates, including daily updates, as the crisis warrants.