CT - Critical Threats and ISW (Institute for the Study of War) Iran Update, October 24, 2024 - Hamas is seeking Russian support in pressuring the Palestinian Authority (PA) to negotiate over a national unity government

 CT - Critical Threats and ISW (Institute for the Study of War)

Iran Update, October 24, 2024

Hamas is seeking Russian support in pressuring the Palestinian Authority (PA) to negotiate over a national unity government with Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[i] Hamas Political Bureau member Mousa Abu Marzouk met with Deputy Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow on October 23 to request that Russia pressure PA President Mahmoud Abbas to negotiate with Hamas over a national unity government.

Hamas is likely responding to the Emirati-proposed plan for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.[ii] The plan would involve appointing a reformed PA led by an independent prime minister to administer the Gaza Strip, leaving Hamas excluded from post-war governance. Negotiating a national unity government with the PA, on the other hand, would allow Hamas to retain a role in post-war governance. Hamas would likely exploit the establishment of a national unity government to gradually expand its control and influence in the Gaza Strip.

US and Israeli officials will resume negotiations in Qatar on a ceasefire-hostage agreement for the Gaza Strip in the coming days.[iii] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Qatari Foreign Affairs Minister Mohamad bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced the plans on October 24. Al Thani added that Qatar has reengaged Hamas since Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.[iv] A Hamas delegation separately traveled to Egypt on October 24.[v] Senior Hamas official Khalil al Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist negotiating position on October 18.[vi]

PA President Mahmoud Abbas has “poured” forces into Tubas in the West Bank in recent weeks in order to crack down on the Palestinian militias there.[vii] This PA effort is meant to diminish the influence of the militias in the northern West Bank in response to Iranian efforts to empower the militias and undermine the PA. PA forces have arrested at least three Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters in Tubas during this period.[viii] Residents have reported violent clashes between PA forces and militias there in recent weeks as well.[ix] Palestinian militias, including Hamas and PIJ, have accused the PA of serving Israeli interests and called on militants to confront the PA forces in Tubas.[x] The PA operation into Tubas came as Israeli forces conducted their own campaign in August and September 2024 to degrade Palestinian militia across the West Bank in recent months.[xi]

Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said that all relevant parties have fully implemented UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon. Berri’s assertion ignores the extensive, decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily in southern Lebanon. CTP-ISW has previously argued that the UN Interim Force in Lebanon has largely failed to undertake its assigned tasks, which includes enforcing UNSCR 1701.[xii] Berri reportedly made the assertion that all relevant parties are adhering to UNSCR 1701 during a meeting with senior US official Amos Hochstein in Beirut on October 21.[xiii] Hochstein has reportedly suggested amending UNSCR 1701 by expanding the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to southern Lebanon.

Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati separately announced on October 24 that his government plans to recruit more LAF troops and possibly deploy 8,000 soldiers to southern Lebanon.[xiv] The LAF currently has about 5,000 personnel in southern Lebanon.[xv] It is unclear whether the 8,000 number is the envisioned end strength for the LAF in southern Lebanon or would be in addition to the 5,000 soldiers already there. Increasing the LAF force size is unlikely to improve the enforcement of UNSCR 1701, however, so long as the Lebanese state and LAF are unwilling to prevent Hezbollah activity in the area.

Key Takeaways:

Gaza Strip: Hamas is seeking Russian support in pressuring the PA to negotiate over a national unity government with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is responding to an Emirati-proposed plan for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, which would marginalize Hamas.

Gaza Strip: US and Israeli officials will resume negotiations in Qatar on a ceasefire-hostage agreement for the Gaza Strip in the coming days. Qatar has reengaged Hamas since Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.

West Bank: PA President Mahmoud Abbas has “poured” forces into Tubas in the West Bank to crack down on Iranian-backed militias there. The PA effort is meant to diminish the influence of the militias in the northern West Bank.

Lebanon: Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said that all relevant parties are adhering to UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah activity in southern Lebanon. Berri ignored the decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily there.

SEE FULL UPDATE

DraftIsraelCOT October 24, 2024.png

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War will provide regular updates, including daily updates, as the crisis warrants.

If you are not already subscribed and want to receive email notifications when our updates are published, click here.