BROOKINGS Commentary What do North Korean troop deployments to Russia mean for geopolitics? Andrew Yeo and Hanna Foreman October 29, 2024 In early October, Ukrainian intelligence reported that several thousand North Korean soldiers were undergoing training in Russia in preparation for deployment to the Ukrainian front line later this year. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) later corroborated Ukraine’s assertions, sharing satellite images of Russian vessels transporting the first batch of 1,500 North Korean special forces to Russia’s Far East. On October 23, White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby confirmed the presence of at least 3,000 soldiers. The Pentagon now believes that 10,000 North Korean troops are in Russia with a contingent heading toward the Kursk region in western Russia to battle Ukrainian forces. The large deployment of North Korean troops in Russia represents a troubling new phase in the Russia-Ukraine war while carrying deeper implications for global politics. We address five key questions related to accelerating North Korea-Russia military cooperation. What do Russia and North Korea stand to gain? Russian President Vladimir Putin will reap immediate military benefits from North Korean troops. Since August 2023, Russia has reportedly received 13,000 shipping containers that include artillery rounds, anti-tank rockets, and short-range ballistic missiles to replenish badly depleted Russian munitions and weapons. Now facing a potential shortage of conscripts, the use of North Korean troops will temporarily relieve domestic pressure to recruit more Russians this autumn. Deploying foreign forces to Ukraine also addresses the backlash Putin faced after sending fresh Russian conscripts to the front lines. North Korea will likely receive additional economic benefits and greater military-technical assistance from Russia, possibly including satellite and rocket technology. Once opposed to North Korea’s nuclear program, Putin may now find it useful to help improve North Korea’s missile capabilities and nuclear weapons delivery systems. Russia may also help North Korea upgrade its aging submarine fleet. North Korean soldiers could gain valuable combat experience fighting alongside Russians and be able to evaluate firsthand how effective its military technology fares against Western-manufactured arms and defenses. How effective are North Korean troops and what risks does the regime face? It is unclear how well North Korean troops will perform in combat. Although North Korean troops are undergoing training in Russian military facilities in the Far East, differences in language, culture, training, and warfighting doctrine could diminish the effectiveness of North Korean forces until they are better integrated with Russian units. Reportedly, Kim has dispatched special operations forces from the Eleventh Army Corps known as the “Storm Corps.” These are elite troops trained for infiltration and assassination missions, with more military training than new Russian conscripts sent to the frontlines. However, it seems unlikely that Kim Jong Un would continue to dispatch a large number of elite soldiers to Russia if casualties mount at the same rate as Russian casualties. One risk the North Korean regime faces is the possibility of its soldiers deserting the battlefield and seeking to defect to Ukraine or South Korea. Although the claim has not been independently verified, Ukrainian intelligence reported that 18 North Korean soldiers stationed near the Russia-Ukraine border had deserted their positions. It is possible that some North Korean soldiers who surrender or are captured by Ukrainian forces may not want to return to Russia or North Korea. These soldiers may seek asylum or ask to be transferred to South Korean authorities. North Korean prisoners of war may need to be protected under the Geneva Convention and eventually returned to Russia or North Korea. However, South Korea’s defense minister described North Korean troops in Russia as mercenaries disguised in Russian uniforms and acting under Russian military command, suggesting that Ukraine may not be obligated to repatriate North Korean soldiers seeking asylum. The defection of North Korean special operation forces would represent an embarrassing blow to the Kim regime. How has South Korea responded to North Korean troops in Russia? From the South Korean perspective, Seoul has yet to say what might catalyze its direct involvement in the form of sending military personnel and lethal aid to Kyiv. To date, South Korea has helped backfill weapons for Ukraine by supplying arms to NATO members. Since the start of the war, South Korea has been reluctant to directly send lethal weapons to Ukraine and has mostly provided economic and humanitarian support. However, this new development may force Seoul to consider supporting Kyiv by sending weapons, sharing intelligence, and sending military intelligence personnel. If Seoul decides to send arms to Kyiv, the move would require substantive legislative revisions to its Foreign Trade Act; South Korea is currently prohibited from sending lethal weapons to live conflict zones except for peaceful uses, and countries that purchase South Korean weapons cannot re-export them to third-party countries without Seoul’s permission. Regardless of whether South Korea provides Ukraine with offensive weapons, Pyongyang’s actions have pushed Seoul to work more closely with its European partners, including NATO. On October 28, a delegation of South Korean intelligence and defense officials briefed NATO’s North Atlantic Council and Indo-Pacific partners on their assessments of North Korean troop deployments to Russia and pledged to continue coordination on monitoring the situation in Ukraine. Increased cooperation between South Korea and NATO will enable Seoul to share and receive information regarding North Korean combat capabilities and tactics and track North Korean troops sent to the Ukrainian front line. South Koreans could also assist Ukrainians in carrying out psychological operations to encourage North Korean soldiers to defect. Where does China stand? China has avoided comment when asked whether North Korean troops are in Russia. Publicly, Beijing has offered diplomatic platitudes calling for de-escalation in Ukraine and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Privately, however, Beijing remains worried about the risks that it cannot directly control, potential instability on its doorstep, and likely increased security cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the United States and emerging coordination between NATO and Seoul as a response to Pyongyang’s military adventurism. While Beijing has provided diplomatic and economic cover for Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine, Beijing’s relationship with Pyongyang has been tepid lately. The communication gaps between the three governments have put China in the uncomfortable position of trying to prevent further regional destabilization, given its geopolitical and economic challenges. What are the global implications of North Korea-Russia military cooperation? The image of North Korean and Russian soldiers fighting together plays into the narrative of a growing “axis of upheaval” between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. To date, however, the most significant relationships between the four actors have been separate and bilateral in nature. The dispatch of North Korean troops to Russia indicates that Pyongyang is “all in” with assisting Russia’s unjust war effort in Ukraine. While North Korea has previously been known for its cyberthreat, money laundering, arms trafficking, and illicit trade activities, this new development may embolden Pyongyang to participate in other ongoing conflicts and future wars on behalf of like-minded partners opposed to the West. North Korea’s troop presence in Russia has at least two longer-term implications. First, Putin has demonstrated again that, far from being isolated, countries are willing to support Russia during its war in Ukraine. The lengths North Korea has taken to enable Putin’s war may encourage other states to strengthen their own bilateral military ties with Russia; Iran, for example, may increase its cooperation with Russia as it braces for possible escalation with Israel. Second, deeper Russia-North Korea military cooperation comes at a time of escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. This includes North Korea’s recent destruction of inter-Korea roads and railways and the alleged incursion of South Korean drones into North Korea this month. North Korea’s decision to dispatch troops to Russia indirectly suggests that North Korea is hardening its strategic position against South Korea. Should Russia further boost North Korea’s weapons capabilities and deliver troops and munitions to Pyongyang through its Far East, the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia will need to prepare for a new phase of greater instability and possible escalation in Northeast Asia. Authors Andrew Yeo Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies @AndrewIYeo Hanna Foreman Senior Research Assistant - Center for Asia Policy Studies @foreman_hanna

 BROOKINGS

Commentary

What do North Korean troop deployments to Russia mean for geopolitics?

Andrew Yeo and Hanna Foreman

October 29, 2024

In early October, Ukrainian intelligence reported that several thousand North Korean soldiers were undergoing training in Russia in preparation for deployment to the Ukrainian front line later this year. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) later corroborated Ukraine’s assertions, sharing satellite images of Russian vessels transporting the first batch of 1,500 North Korean special forces to Russia’s Far East. On October 23, White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby confirmed the presence of at least 3,000 soldiers. The Pentagon now believes that 10,000 North Korean troops are in Russia with a contingent heading toward the Kursk region in western Russia to battle Ukrainian forces.

The large deployment of North Korean troops in Russia represents a troubling new phase in the Russia-Ukraine war while carrying deeper implications for global politics. We address five key questions related to accelerating North Korea-Russia military cooperation.

What do Russia and North Korea stand to gain?

Russian President Vladimir Putin will reap immediate military benefits from North Korean troops. Since August 2023, Russia has reportedly received 13,000 shipping containers that include artillery rounds, anti-tank rockets, and short-range ballistic missiles to replenish badly depleted Russian munitions and weapons. Now facing a potential shortage of conscripts, the use of North Korean troops will temporarily relieve domestic pressure to recruit more Russians this autumn. Deploying foreign forces to Ukraine also addresses the backlash Putin faced after sending fresh Russian conscripts to the front lines.

North Korea will likely receive additional economic benefits and greater military-technical assistance from Russia, possibly including satellite and rocket technology. Once opposed to North Korea’s nuclear program, Putin may now find it useful to help improve North Korea’s missile capabilities and nuclear weapons delivery systems. Russia may also help North Korea upgrade its aging submarine fleet. North Korean soldiers could gain valuable combat experience fighting alongside Russians and be able to evaluate firsthand how effective its military technology fares against Western-manufactured arms and defenses.

How effective are North Korean troops and what risks does the regime face?

It is unclear how well North Korean troops will perform in combat. Although North Korean troops are undergoing training in Russian military facilities in the Far East, differences in language, culture, training, and warfighting doctrine could diminish the effectiveness of North Korean forces until they are better integrated with Russian units.

Reportedly, Kim has dispatched special operations forces from the Eleventh Army Corps known as the “Storm Corps.” These are elite troops trained for infiltration and assassination missions, with more military training than new Russian conscripts sent to the frontlines. However, it seems unlikely that Kim Jong Un would continue to dispatch a large number of elite soldiers to Russia if casualties mount at the same rate as Russian casualties.

One risk the North Korean regime faces is the possibility of its soldiers deserting the battlefield and seeking to defect to Ukraine or South Korea. Although the claim has not been independently verified, Ukrainian intelligence reported that 18 North Korean soldiers stationed near the Russia-Ukraine border had deserted their positions.

It is possible that some North Korean soldiers who surrender or are captured by Ukrainian forces may not want to return to Russia or North Korea. These soldiers may seek asylum or ask to be transferred to South Korean authorities.

North Korean prisoners of war may need to be protected under the Geneva Convention and eventually returned to Russia or North Korea. However, South Korea’s defense minister described North Korean troops in Russia as mercenaries disguised in Russian uniforms and acting under Russian military command, suggesting that Ukraine may not be obligated to repatriate North Korean soldiers seeking asylum. The defection of North Korean special operation forces would represent an embarrassing blow to the Kim regime.

How has South Korea responded to North Korean troops in Russia?

From the South Korean perspective, Seoul has yet to say what might catalyze its direct involvement in the form of sending military personnel and lethal aid to Kyiv. To date, South Korea has helped backfill weapons for Ukraine by supplying arms to NATO members.

Since the start of the war, South Korea has been reluctant to directly send lethal weapons to Ukraine and has mostly provided economic and humanitarian support. However, this new development may force Seoul to consider supporting Kyiv by sending weapons, sharing intelligence, and sending military intelligence personnel. If Seoul decides to send arms to Kyiv, the move would require substantive legislative revisions to its Foreign Trade Act; South Korea is currently prohibited from sending lethal weapons to live conflict zones except for peaceful uses, and countries that purchase South Korean weapons cannot re-export them to third-party countries without Seoul’s permission.

Regardless of whether South Korea provides Ukraine with offensive weapons, Pyongyang’s actions have pushed Seoul to work more closely with its European partners, including NATO. On October 28, a delegation of South Korean intelligence and defense officials briefed NATO’s North Atlantic Council and Indo-Pacific partners on their assessments of North Korean troop deployments to Russia and pledged to continue coordination on monitoring the situation in Ukraine. Increased cooperation between South Korea and NATO will enable Seoul to share and receive information regarding North Korean combat capabilities and tactics and track North Korean troops sent to the Ukrainian front line. South Koreans could also assist Ukrainians in carrying out psychological operations to encourage North Korean soldiers to defect.

Where does China stand?

China has avoided comment when asked whether North Korean troops are in Russia. Publicly, Beijing has offered diplomatic platitudes calling for de-escalation in Ukraine and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Privately, however, Beijing remains worried about the risks that it cannot directly control, potential instability on its doorstep, and likely increased security cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the United States and emerging coordination between NATO and Seoul as a response to Pyongyang’s military adventurism.

While Beijing has provided diplomatic and economic cover for Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine, Beijing’s relationship with Pyongyang has been tepid lately. The communication gaps between the three governments have put China in the uncomfortable position of trying to prevent further regional destabilization, given its geopolitical and economic challenges.

What are the global implications of North Korea-Russia military cooperation?

The image of North Korean and Russian soldiers fighting together plays into the narrative of a growing “axis of upheaval” between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. To date, however, the most significant relationships between the four actors have been separate and bilateral in nature. 

The dispatch of North Korean troops to Russia indicates that Pyongyang is “all in” with assisting Russia’s unjust war effort in Ukraine. While North Korea has previously been known for its cyberthreat, money laundering, arms trafficking, and illicit trade activities, this new development may embolden Pyongyang to participate in other ongoing conflicts and future wars on behalf of like-minded partners opposed to the West.

North Korea’s troop presence in Russia has at least two longer-term implications. First, Putin has demonstrated again that, far from being isolated, countries are willing to support Russia during its war in Ukraine. The lengths North Korea has taken to enable Putin’s war may encourage other states to strengthen their own bilateral military ties with Russia; Iran, for example, may increase its cooperation with Russia as it braces for possible escalation with Israel.

Second, deeper Russia-North Korea military cooperation comes at a time of escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. This includes North Korea’s recent destruction of inter-Korea roads and railways and the alleged incursion of South Korean drones into North Korea this month. North Korea’s decision to dispatch troops to Russia indirectly suggests that North Korea is hardening its strategic position against South Korea. Should Russia further boost North Korea’s weapons capabilities and deliver troops and munitions to Pyongyang through its Far East, the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia will need to prepare for a new phase of greater instability and possible escalation in Northeast Asia.

Authors

Andrew Yeo

Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies

@AndrewIYeo

Hanna Foreman

Senior Research Assistant - Center for Asia Policy Studies

@foreman_hanna