IPS Foreign and security policy 25.10.2024 | Alexandra Sitenko From Kazan, with caution The BRICS alliance promoted the Global South at its summit in Russia. The promise: to overcome Western hegemony

 IPS 

Foreign and security policy 25.10.2024 | Alexandra Sitenko

From Kazan, with caution

The BRICS alliance promoted the Global South at its summit in Russia. The promise: to overcome Western hegemony

picture alliance / REUTERS | Maxim Shemetov

The three-day BRICS summit chaired by Russia has ended in Kazan. More than 200 events were held in several Russian cities throughout the year in preparation for the summit. The participation of more than 30 delegations, 22 heads of state and government and several representatives of international organisations could not be ignored by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, who also travelled to the summit and met with Vladimir Putin for the first time since 2022. In his address, he said, among other things, that BRICS could play a greater role in strengthening multilateralism for global development and security.

This year’s summit comprised two parts: a meeting of the nine full members of the group and a BRICS+/outreach session on the topic ‘BRICS and the Global South — Building a Better World Together’. Russia’s efforts were obviously focused on demonstrating the growing economic and political influence of this group of states and showing that it is by no means internationally isolated following its aggression against Ukraine.

A challenger to the West?

In the Western world, the BRICS group is largely perceived as an anti-Western and anti-US association, and its activities are criticised almost without exception. Initially, however, the group wanted to avoid being seen as a challenger to the West. Russia itself was a member of both BRICS and the G8 until 2014. Its purpose was rather to provide a forum for informal consultations among members rather than to formulate and implement alternative, structured policy initiatives. In their statements after the first summits in Yekaterinburg in 2009 and in Brasília in 2010, the participants emphasised the central role of the G20 in solving global problems and expressed strong support for multilateral diplomacy, in which the United Nations plays a central role in addressing global challenges. Overall, the topic of global stabilisation after the 2007/2008 global financial crisis dominated the agenda.

From 2013/2014, geopolitical tensions between East and West increased. As its economy grew, so did China’s geopolitical and foreign policy ambitions. Xi Jinping’s rise to power as president and the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 accelerated this trend, leading to geo-economic competition with the United States, while the conflict between Russia and the West intensified after the former’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. These developments were reflected in the BRICS agenda: the 2015 BRICS declaration from the summit in Ufa, Russia, for example, condemned economic sanctions that violated international law and argued that no state should enhance its own security at the expense of the security of others. Russia and China began to see the BRICS as a geopolitical instrument in their confrontation with the West, while the other three members continued to prioritise the economy, trade and development.

Ahead of the summit in Kazan, President Putin explained, following the wording of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, that the BRICS is a non-Western group, but not anti-Western.

But since the admission of new members, the priorities of Russia and China, on the one hand, and Brazil, India and South Africa, on the other, have converged. Moscow and Beijing have had to tone down their hegemonic attitudes somewhat. At the 15th summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in August 2023, Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were invited to join the association on 1 January 2024. However, the new Argentine President Javier Milei rejected the membership after taking office in December 2023, while Saudi Arabia chose to refrain from a formal membership for the time being, instead participating in the BRICS+/Outreach format.

Most of the new members, such as the United Arab Emirates or Egypt, are pursuing a foreign policy that balances a partnership with the West with the cultivation of strong economic and political ties with China and Russia. Ethiopia also maintains close relations with Moscow and Beijing, which are its most important trading partners, and is also a long-standing partner of the US. According to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, his country’s membership of the BRICS group is important in helping to deepen South-South cooperation. Thus, for all new members except Iran, the BRICS is an alternative to the West, but not explicitly an expression of anti-Western policy. The majority of the BRICS members want to have a different platform that gives a voice to their (development) policy and economic interests, as well as their growing weight in the world. Clearly, they do not feel sufficiently heard within the framework of the existing multilateral institutions.

Ahead of the summit in Kazan, President Putin explained, following the wording of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, that the BRICS is a non-Western group, but not anti-Western. He was no doubt trying to appeal to the new and potential new members. Although the expansion ultimately fell short of the original announcements, it did succeed in increasing the importance of the BRICS group of states and achieving broader popularity among the countries of the so-called Global South: since then, more than 30 states have expressed an interest in cooperating with BRICS as members or partners. This year’s motto, ‘Strengthening multilateralism for just global development and security’, explicitly reflects the concerns of the so-called Global South, such as global justice and development.

Summit outcomes

In this regard, it is an irony of fate that the BRICS summit in Kazan began almost simultaneously with the annual meeting of two Bretton Woods institutions – the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – in Washington. This is particularly ironic given that the demand for a reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, including stronger representation of developing and emerging market economies in leadership positions, is one of the first of the 134 points in the BRICS final communiqué.

The BRICS members also welcomed the initiative of the Russian side to create a platform for grain trade within the BRICS and to later expand it to other agricultural sectors. The use of national currencies in financial transactions between the BRICS countries and their trading partners was endorsed by all. The Russian state development and investment corporation VER.RF has already signed agreements with China and South Africa to provide credit lines in local currencies. The member states also agreed to examine the feasibility of setting up an independent payment and reserve platform (BRICS Clear). However, a BRICS payment system is not expected to be introduced in the near future. Unanimously, the BRICS countries are calling for the lifting of unilaterally imposed economic sanctions.

In view of India’s growing global influence, it cannot be ruled out that Delhi also wants to play an increasingly prominent role in the BRICS as the voice of the Global South, thus influencing the internal balance of power.

Even though most of the BRICS members (with the exception of Iran) do not share Russia’s position on the war in Ukraine and want to see it ended as quickly as possible, this topic was not a priority for most of the guests at the summit. Nevertheless, the final declaration states: ‘We recall the respective national positions on the situation in and around Ukraine, which have been presented in the relevant fora, including the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. We emphasise the need for all States to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in their entirety and in their interrelation. We note with satisfaction the relevant offers of mediation to ensure a peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue and diplomacy.’ Much greater attention is paid to the situations in the Middle East, Sudan, Haiti and Afghanistan. Israel’s actions are heavily criticised, while Hamas (without being explicitly named) is called upon to release the remaining Israeli hostages. The urgent need for an immediate, comprehensive and lasting ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is underlined.

Although the Global South is the addressee for most BRICS initiatives, the East, with Russia, India and China, is the original, strong core of the group. As the Russian presidential adviser Yury Ushakov emphasised in the briefing on the BRICS summit, from Moscow’s point of view, the establishment of the RIC format in 2006 in St. Petersburg paved the way for the BRICS exchange platform. That the heads of state of India and China are now meeting again bilaterally in Russia after a five-year freeze due to a border dispute can be chalked up as a diplomatic success for Putin.

In view of India’s growing global influence, it cannot be ruled out that Delhi also wants to play an increasingly prominent role in the BRICS as the voice of the Global South, thus influencing the internal balance of power. The latest Indian-Chinese agreement on military patrols by both sides along the Line of Control in the Himalayas represents a step towards defusing their border dispute, which could contribute to an improvement in their bilateral relations and consequently to more cooperative engagement in the BRICS.

The common denominator after the summit in Kazan is that, despite the differences between the members and partners, the BRICS is a coalition of mostly emerging middle powers that want to overcome Western hegemony and achieve greater voting diversity in world politics.

The weight of the East is also evident in the published list of the group’s partner countries — a new category that allows countries to work with the BRICS without becoming members. In June 2024, it was announced that the BRICS countries had overwhelmingly decided not to accept any new full members for the time being. Among the new partner countries are Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

Overall, the summit reflects the priorities of Russian foreign policy as anchored in the concept of 2023: building the Great Eurasian Partnership and strengthening relations with the Global South. It is no coincidence that Russia hosted the meeting in Kazan. The capital of the Republic of Tatarstan, which is located in Europe, has been the venue for the ‘Russia–Islamic World’ forum since 2009. The choice of venue is a gesture towards the Asian continent and the Islamic world, where Russia can count on important allies.

‘Forget the BRICS’ was the headline of both The Guardian and Time Magazine in 2014. Ten years later, it was said that BRICS was a ‘geopolitical challenge’. There is no doubt that the BRICS is developing dynamically, both in terms of content and institutionally. The common denominator after the summit in Kazan is that, despite the differences between the members and partners, the BRICS is a coalition of mostly emerging middle powers that want to overcome Western hegemony, particularly in the global trade and financial architecture, and achieve greater voting diversity in world politics.