Atatürk – general McArthur görüşmesi 88 yıl önce bugün ( 27 Eylul 1932)
Sunday, September 27, 2020
Atatürk - General McArthur görüşmesi , Atatürk'ün inanılmaz öngörüleri
Saturday, September 26, 2020
COVİD -19 and a new social Europe
Covid-19 and a
new social Europe
by Patrick Thill
and Vassil Kirov on 23rd September 2020
With lessons not learnt, yet with
the ‘rebuilding’ of Europe very much under construction, it is time for a truly
social Europe.
The coronavirus crisis exposed not
just the lack of a European public-health strategy and of
solidarity across national health systems but also the emptiness of the
contextualising frame of ‘social Europe’—vital though this is to Europe’s
future social cohesion. Although it is still too early to capture the full
impact of the crisis, unemployment is rising and youth unemployment dramatically so, while
precarity and poverty are hitting the most exposed, exacerbating pre-pandemic
vulnerabilities.
The bleak socio-economic environment
appears tragically familiar. Yet experts are identifying the Covid-19 shock as even
more economically and socially damaging than the 2008 global financial crisis.
The GFC not only alerted us to the social consequences of unbridled
neo-liberalism but also to how long it takes to restore socially responsible
public policies.
Initially, there was a prudent
consent towards stronger government involvement in policy responses to the rapid spread of
the virus, albeit with reticence from the social partners, whose participation
depends on the different traditions of social dialogue across Europe. But
lockdown exit strategies have been marked by the absence of involvement by
social partners and the wider civil society.
Top of Form
Bottom of Form
The question of what kind of
Europe its citizens want has thus remained
unanswered. But it must be addressed during the ‘rebuilding’ process, at both
the European Union and national levels.
Common social standards
The European Commission led by
Jean-Claude Juncker attempted to rekindle Social Europe with the European Pillar of Social Rights agreed
in 2017. These latter included, for example, fair working conditions and
prevention of atypical and non-permanent work relationships.
This appeared a huge step away from
the ‘flexibilisation’ agenda promoted by the commission in the past. It was
an acknowledgement that common EU social
standards should be high on the policy agenda.
In the current ‘rebuilding’ dash,
however, the commission has taken on a role of ‘funding entrepreneur’,
implementing instruments such as Next Generation EU rather than acting as
the guardian of common social and employment standards. This shift risks
relegating the promising pillar of rights to a non-vital, dependent component
of a larger economic-recovery project, led by market forces.
Although social dialogue, with a
focus on fair standards and consensus, is not a new phenomenon, the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature identifies
a divergence in governance in Europe between liberal-market economies, where
decisions are often confined to market forces, and co-ordinated-market
economies, where socially-responsible policy-making is pursued, based on a
consensus between representative social partners. This variance has re-emerged
during the pandemic, as governments have balanced responding rapidly to crisis
effects and prioritising national stakeholders’ preferences.
Existing instruments
While countries such as Spain opted
unilaterally for state intervention through the implementation of a guaranteed social minimum, other EU
member-states have mobilised existing instruments, such as part-time work. In more prosperous economies,
such as Luxembourg, generous family leave has been adopted for families and
single parents, who were given the right to stay at home.
A country with a strong tradition of
neo-corporatism and state intervention, the Luxembourg case is worth
highlighting. Existing socially responsible policies, such as part-time working
arrangements, have been perceived as mechanisms to prevent mass unemployment
and cushion social hardship.
Debates among the social partners
traditionally involved in governance at multiple levels (national, sector,
company) have however shifted. Following initial caution towards government
policies that sought to strike a balance between crisis responses and existing
legislation, a cleavage, apparent since the GFC, has developed between
advocates of market forces and of socially responsible public policies.
Opposition from the latter quarter grew stronger when the government introduced
a 12-hour working day in specific sectors
relevant to the management of the crisis, for the duration of the ‘state of
crisis’ (état de crise).
Standstill in dialogue
Reaching consensus on working-time
arrangements has also proved difficult. Disagreement on reforms has recently
led to a standstill in social dialogue.
Within the ‘rebuilding’ narrative,
teleworking has been praised as a solution to a series of structural problems
the country is facing, such as traffic jams. But while there is a European
social-partner agreement of 2002, a potential national legal framework should
reflect sectoral characteristics and also focus on equity: some sectors, such
as cleaning, hardly benefit from telework and its related advantages, and
therefore require fair, compensatory time measures.
The question for stakeholders and
governments in the aftermath of the pandemic is to set up a socially
responsible and fair system of working-time arrangements that prevents new
segmentation of the labour market. One avenue is offered by the request
by the three national trade union confederations to
resume tripartite negotiations—to get the traditional, national,
consensus-seeking social dialogue back on track.
The challenge for Europe is to
engender strong social cohesion for all its citizens after Covid-19. This goes
beyond the economic task of ‘rebuilding’ Europe—the Europe as was—and entails a
consensus-based social Europe, incorporating common social and employment
standards. This project needs time and will succeed only if the convenient
‘back to normal’ narrative is replaced by a thorough and reflexive assessment
of policy-making.
Corona versus culture
Corona versus
culture
by Jess Smee on 22nd
September 2020
The pandemic closed theatres,
concerts and exhibitions, imperilling many freelances. How will the creative
industry re-emerge?
The creative sector has been hit
hard by the social shifts triggered by the coronavirus. Around Europe,
longstanding cultural institutions were forced to close their doors for the
first time in decades, some even for the first time since the second world
war. The economic woes hit at a time when
culture—films, books, music—was offering relief, solace and entertainment to
entire populations forced into lockdown.
The numbers reveal the extent of the
economic downturn. Early on in the crisis, a survey of galleries worldwide revealed
a 70 per cent drop in income, leaving many verging on bankruptcy. Museums saw earnings crash by 80 per
cent, according to the Network of European Museum Organisations.
The sector’s many freelances were
suddenly exposed to the perilous downsides of the gig economy. Take the
world-famous circus troop Cirque du Soleil, which in March laid off 95 per cent of its workforce,
calling off performances in seven countries.
Bottom of Form
Impact ‘devastating’
The European Commission was quick to
acknowledge the creative industry’s turmoil, with Mariya Gabriel, commissioner
with the cultural brief, describing the impact as ‘devastating’. European
politicians from around the bloc spoke of the importance of throwing a
lifeline to creatives.
And the sector is important: in
Italy, for example, the state-funded museums arena had, ahead of the outbreak,
been valued at €27 billion, or almost 2 per cent of
gross domestic product, making it only slightly smaller than agriculture.
Preliminary data from Eurostat suggest that the pandemic may affect 7.3 million
cultural and creative jobs across the European Union. Of these, around a
third are self-employed and lack adequate social protection.
Economic-stimulus policies are largely
the handiwork of national governments, which decide how to support an ailing
economy and which sectors to prioritise. Most European nations provided extra
relief for small businesses, staff and the self-employed—funds which are also
accessible for creative firms. Most governments have unveiled special measures
for the creative industries too.
Some of these have been small scale
and specific. The Bulgarian Ministry of Culture said it
would launch a competition to encourage reading and support
its library network. And Danish radio stations, in dialogue with the
Ministry of Culture, are pushing Danish-produced
music to support local artists.
There have also been large cash
injections. In May the French president, Emmanuel Macron, called for a 12-month extension to the
nation’s special unemployment benefits for actors, performers, musicians and
technicians—a scheme designed to protect them during the sudden pauses between
jobs. Macron said small companies and independent workers most vulnerable to
the crisis would be eligible for a special €7 billion support fund.
And the ‘particularly hard-hit’ National Centre for Music would be given an
extra €50 million.
Germany, too, has won
international praise for its speedy response to help a struggling
industry. In June, as part of a large stimulus fund, it unveiled a €50 billion package aimed at freelances
and small businesses, including the arts and
cultural industries. This was distributed within four days. The Berlin
Senate also offered grants to freelance workers and small businesses in the
cultural sector.
On the brink
However, many artists and creatives
are still on the brink. In Germany, for example, federal funding can only
be used to offset business costs, not personal expenses such
as health-insurance contributions or residential rent, leaving many
freelances stranded. One petition signed by almost 300,000 artists
warned that creatives ‘live on the edge of the subsistence level anyway, but
the current mass cancellation of events threatens to push them over this edge’.
It concluded: ‘Society may be able
to do without cultural life for some time. But if it does so for too long, we
could end up with nobody left to revive it.’
What will a post-corona creative
scene look like? So far, there are no firm answers. The industry has come up
with new formats which are imaginative but are financially unsustainable. Much
creative output has been redirected to online audiences, with films, plays and
courses often offered for free or at a low price. Once reopened, theatres and
cinemas have seen their ticket sales plummet due to the need for social
distancing in auditoria. Large performances and festivals remain off-limits.
Yet, indicative of the adaptability
of this vital sector, artistic creation has also shifted overnight, processing
and depicting a society in transition. Madrid’s Teatro Real opened
its doors again post-lockdown with a modified version of Verdi’s La
Traviata, incorporating distanced performers wearing surgical
masks—albeit not without problems.
As long as the show can afford to go
on, Europe’s creatives will keep creating.
An earlier version was published as part
of the Europa Dossier by
the German cultural quarterly KulturAustausch
Israel and the Emirates Sign the " Abraham Accords"
Israel And The Emirates Sign The “Abraham Accords”
Written by Thierry MEYSSAN on 25/09/2020
The situation in the Middle East has been blocked since the Oslo Accords
signed by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat in 1993. They were supplemented by
the Jericho-Gaza Agreement, which recognizes certain prerogatives of the
Palestinian Authority, and the Wadi Araba Agreements, which concluded peace
between Israel and Jordan.
At the time, the Israeli government intended to separate definitively from
the Palestinians. It was ready to do so by creating a Palestinian pseudo-state,
devoid of several attributes of sovereignty, including an independent army and
finances. Labour’s Yitzhak Rabin had previously experimented with Bantustans in
South Africa, where Israel was advising the apartheid regime. Another
experiment took place in Guatemala with a Mayan tribe under General Efraín Ríos
Montt.
Yasser Arafat accepted the Oslo Accords to derail the process of the Madrid
Conference (1991). Presidents George W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev had tried to
impose peace on Israel by removing Arafat from the international scene with the
support of Arab leaders.
Despite all this, many commentators believed that the Oslo Accords could
bring peace.
In any case, 27 years later, nothing positive has limited the suffering of
the Palestinian people, but the state of Israel has been gradually transformed
from within. Today this country is divided into two antagonistic camps, as
evidenced by its government, the only one in the world to have two Prime
Ministers at the same time. On the one hand the partisans of British
colonialism behind the first Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanhyahu, on the other
hand the partisans of a normalization of the country and its relations with its
neighbors, behind the second Prime Minister, Benny Gantz. This
two-headed system reflects the incompatibility of these two projects. Each camp
paralyzes its rival. Only time will come to end the colonial project of
conquering Greater Israel from the banks of the Nile to those of the Euphrates,
the comet tail of an outdated era.
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has implemented
the Rumsfeld/Cebrowski strategy aimed at adapting the US army to the needs of a
new form of capitalism based no longer on the production of goods and services,
but on financial engineering. To do this, they began an “endless war” of
destruction of state structures throughout the “broader Middle East” without
taking into account their friends and enemies. In two decades, the region
became cursed for its inhabitants. Afghanistan, then Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen
are the theater of wars presented as lasting a few weeks, but which last
indefinitely, without perspective.
When Donald Trump was elected president, he promised to put an end to the
“endless wars” and to bring US soldiers home. In this spirit, he gave carte
blanche to his special adviser and nevertheless son-in-law, Jared Kushner. The
fact that President Trump is supported in his country by Zionist Christians and
that Jared Kushner is an Orthodox Jew has led many commentators to portray them
as friends of Israel. If they do indeed have an electoral interest in letting
this be believed, it is not at all their approach to the Middle East. They
intend to defend the interests of the American people, and not those of the
Israelis, by substituting trade relations for war on the model of President
Andrew Jackson (1829-37). Jackson managed to prevent the disappearance of the
Indians he had fought as a general, although only the Cherokees signed the agreement
he proposed. Today they have become the largest Native American tribe, despite
the infamous episode of the “Trail of Tears”.
For three years, Jared Kushner travelled through the region. He was able to
see for himself how much fear and hatred had developed there. For 75 years,
Israel has persisted in violating all UN resolutions that concern it and
continues its slow and inexorable nibbling of Arab territory. The negotiator
reached only one conclusion: International Law is powerless because almost no one
– with the notable exception of Bush Sr. and Gorbachev – has wanted to really
apply it since the partition plan for Palestine in 1947. Because of the
inaction of the international community, its application if it were to happen
today would add injustice to injustice.
Kushner worked on many hypotheses,
including the unification of the Palestinian people around Jordan and the
linking of Gaza to Egypt. In June 2019, he presented proposals for the economic
development of the Palestinian territories at a conference in Bahrain (the
“deal of the century”). Rather than negotiating anything, the idea was to
quantify what everyone would gain from peace. In the end, he managed, on September
13, 2020, to get a secret agreement signed in Washington between the United
Arab Emirates and Israel. The agreement was formalized two days later, on September 15, in a watered-down version.”
The press in the Emirates does not have the same version of the events as
that of Israel. None of them has an interest in expressing itself frankly.
As always, the most important thing is the secret part: Israel was forced
to renounce in writing its plans for annexation (including the territories
allegedly “offered” by Donald Trump in the “deal of the century” project) and
to let Dubai Ports World (known as “DP World”) take over the port of Haifa,
from which the Chinese have just been ejected.
This agreement is in line with the ideas of the second Israeli Prime
Minister Benny Gantz, but represents a disaster for the camp of the first Prime
Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.
Not having read the secret part of the agreements myself, I do not know if
it clearly indicates the renunciation of annexing the Syrian Golan Heights,
occupied since 1967, and the Lebanese Shebaa Farms, occupied since 1982.
Similarly, I do not know whether compensation is provided for the port of
Beirut, since it is clear that its eventual reconstruction would be detrimental
both to Israel and to the Emirates’ investments in Haifa. However, the Lebanese
President, Michel Aoun, has already publicly evoked a real estate construction
project instead of the port of Beirut.
In order to make this treaty acceptable to all parties, it has been named
“Abraham Accords”, after the common father of Judaism and Islam. The paternity
was attributed, to the great joy of Benny Gantz, to the “outstretched hand”
(sic) of Benjamin Netanyahu, his toughest opponent. Finally, Bahrain was
associated with it.
This last point aims to mount the new regional role that Washington has
granted to the Emirates in replacement of Saudi Arabia. As we announced, it is
now Abu Dhabi and no longer Riyadh that represents US interests in the Arab world Other Arab states are
invited to follow Bahrain’s example.
The Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, has not had harsh words against
the Emirati “betrayal”. He was taken up both by those who remain hostile to
peace (the Iranian ayatollahs) and by those who remain committed to the Oslo
Accords and the two-state solution. Indeed, by formalizing diplomatic relations
between Israel and the new Arab leader, the Emirates, the Abraham Accords turn
the page on the Oslo Accords. The palm of hypocrisy goes to the European Union,
which persists in defending international law in theory and violating it in
practice.
If President Trump is re-elected and Jared Kushner continues his work, the
Israeli-Emirati agreements will be remembered as the moment when Israelis and
Arabs regained the right to speak to each other, just as the overthrow of the
Berlin Wall marked the moment when East Germans regained the right to speak to
their relatives in the West. On the contrary, if Joe Biden is elected, Israel’s
nibbling of Arab territories and the “endless war” will resume throughout the
region.
Relations between Israel and the Emirates had long since stabilized without
a peace treaty since there was never a declared war between them. The Emirates
have been secretly buying arms from the Jewish state for the past decade. Over
time this trade has increased, especially in terms of telephone interceptions
and internet surveillance. In addition, an Israeli embassy was already
operating under cover of an intelligence agency.
In addition, an Israeli embassy was already operating under cover of a
delegation to an obscure UN body in the Emirates. However, the “Abraham
Accords” challenge the dominant Arab-Israeli discourse and shake up internal
relations in the entire region.
Source: Voltaire Network
10 Hard realities About the U.N. on its Troubled 75th Anniversary
10 Hard Realities About the U.N. on Its
Troubled 75th Anniversary
Stewart M.
Patrick Monday, Sept. 21, 2020
The opening of the 75th United Nations General
Assembly finds international cooperation in crisis and the U.N. in the crosshairs.
Many critiques, especially from the United States, focus on the institution itself, as if it were somehow
disembodied from the interests and policies of its major member states. The U.N.’s troubled anniversary is an opportune moment
not only to reassess its strengths and weaknesses, but also to temper
expectations of what multilateralism can possibly deliver when the U.N.’s
leading members turn it into a geopolitical football—or are absent without
leave. With these ends in mind, I offer the following 10 propositions.
There are many United Nations. Broad-brush critiques of the U.N. often gloss over the distinct
institutional components of the U.N. system, ignoring the relative strengths
and weaknesses of each and their utility to the United States. The most
important of these are a U.N. Security Council dominated by permanent members,
where little gets done without U.S. assent; a General Assembly, with universal
membership, that possesses budgetary but little other authority beyond the
ability to pass symbolic resolutions; the U.N. Secretariat, which can be a
bastion of cronyism but whose performance depends strongly on who is
secretary-general; and the multiple specialized and technical agencies, from
the International Atomic Energy Agency to the World Food Program, some but not
all of which do indispensable work.
The U.N. is no longer the only game in
town, but it remains the world’s premier multilateral body. By virtue of its universal membership, binding Charter, multidimensional
mandate and primacy in matters of global peace and security, the U.N. remains
the foundational bedrock for international cooperation. To be sure, since 1945,
nations have created scores of regional and subregional organizations,
alliances and informal mini-lateral groupings like the G-7 and G-20 to assist
with global governance. Still, nothing else comes close to the U.N. and its
many affiliated agencies and bodies—including the Bretton Woods institutions of
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund—in terms of their existing technical
capabilities and perceived international legitimacy. It is an illusion to
imagine that all of these strengths could be recreated on an ad hoc basis.
The U.N. is built for frustration—not
least for its most powerful member. Although the U.S. was a lead architect
of the U.N. Charter, that blueprint guarantees outcomes that are often subpar
from an American perspective. The veto provision, which Washington has always
backed, allows other permanent Security Council members, notably China and
Russia, to thwart U.S. preferences. Likewise, the one-state-one-vote format in
the General Assembly permits ideological coalitions to play to the galleries
rather than exercise real responsibility. Finally, the U.N.’s budgetary
processes and labyrinthine reporting structure, which empower the General
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council over major U.N. donors, is a
constant aggravation. These are facts of life that American diplomats can hope
to ameliorate but never eliminate.
Multilateral bodies do not spring
magically to life in crises, nor are they immune from geopolitics. There is a strong temptation to blame U.N. agencies like the World Health
Organization for failures in international cooperation, like the haphazard and
uncoordinated response to COVID-19. An honest appraisal would concede
that multilateral institutions reflect the preferences of their major members.
The pandemic failures of the WHO, the Security Council, the G-20 and the G-7
all reflect decisions by China and the U.S. to prioritize strategic rivalry over practical problem-solving.
If a fully fledged, new Cold War emerges between the U.S. and China, we should
anticipate an enduring collapse of Security Council cooperation, akin to the
Soviet period.
The United States does better inside the
multilateral tent. International organizations can accomplish little without
strong U.S. involvement. When America defects—as it has under
President Donald Trump, leaving the Paris Agreement on climate change, the WHO
and the U.N.’s Human Rights Council—it undercuts not only international
cooperation, but its own long-term interests. The troubled Human Rights Council is a case in point. By
abandoning that admittedly flawed body, rather than fight the good fight, the
U.S. guaranteed that foxes would run the henhouse. In a similar vein, the White
House has warned of rising Chinese influence within U.N. agencies, but the
Trump administration created this opening for Beijing, by retreating from
multilateral diplomacy in New York and bilateral diplomacy around the world.
It’s hard to beat something with nothing.
The empty General Assembly Hall will be
a potent symbol of Trump’s “America First” agenda, which has seen the U.S. turn
its back on the world, and the world lose faith in the U.S.
The U.N. does not infringe on U.S.
sovereignty. Membership in the United
Nations poses no threat to U.S. constitutional independence, because
it does not involve a hierarchical relationship of political subordination to a
supranational entity, but rather a voluntary, intergovernmental arrangement among sovereign governments.
What U.N. membership does require is that each nation accepts modest
constraints on its notional freedom of action. This is in fact the very purpose
of multilateral cooperation: to bind all parties to basic rules and
responsibilities, so they can resolve shared challenges and advance common
aims.
Holding the U.N. accountable remains a
challenge. The U.N. and other multilateral bodies
do create accountability challenges, because they require governments to
delegate authority to international secretariats that may not be responsive to
their desires. As anybody who’s ever hired a contractor knows, agents don’t
always follow their principal’s instructions to the letter. Compounding the
problem of oversight, member states typically “pool” their authority within the
governing boards of international organizations, meaning that each gets only a
partial, albeit sometimes weighted, say. Given the dynamics of delegation and pooling, both Congress and the
White House must remain vigilant to the possibility that global bodies may go
off track.
U.S. funding for the U.N. is generous
but still modest. In 2018, the U.S. contributed just over $10 billion to the world body,
more than any other nation but less than 1.5 percent of the $700 billion it spent on the American
military. About two thirds of this came as voluntary contributions
to agencies like the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The remainder
reflected assessed U.S. contributions to the U.N.’s regular and peacekeeping
budgets, with America’s share pegged at 28 percent and 22 percent,
respectively. Although the U.S. peacekeeping assessment exceeds the U.S. share
of the world economy—23.4 percent—this $2 billion annual expenditure is money
well spent. For only $6 per American, Washington supports the life-saving
work of 95,000 personnel in 13 missions around the world,
at a fraction of
the cost of sending U.S. soldiers to perform similar tasks.
Security Council reform is
imperative—but unlikely. Any discussion of U.N. reform
invariably raises the need to adjust the composition of the Security Council to
global power shifts, not least India’s emergence as a major strategic player
and, soon, the world’s most populous nation. A Security Council whose permanent
membership continues to give too much weight to Europe is courting a legitimacy crisis. Absent a global catastrophe,
however, diplomacy seems unlikely to break the logjam among the
main aspirants to permanent membership and their regional competitors,
including the demands of a united African bloc.
The U.N.’s future depends on America. This year’s virtual General Assembly seems a fitting coda to President
Donald Trump’s four years in office. The U.S. has always been ambivalent about multilateral cooperation,
but Trump’s predecessors expressed their frustration in terms of the U.N.’s
failure to live up to its founding ideals—rather than by rejecting the entire
internationalist vision that inspired its creators and the purposes to which it
is consecrated. Indeed, Trump is the first American president one could imagine
actually withdrawing the U.S. from the U.N. entirely. The empty General
Assembly Hall this week will be a potent symbol of Trump’s “America First”
agenda, which has seen the U.S. turn its back on the world, and the world lose
faith in the United States.
Stewart Patrick is the James H. Binger
senior fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations and author of “The Sovereignty Wars:
Reconciling America with the World” (Brookings Press: 2018). His weekly WPR column appears every Monday.