CHATHAM HOUSE - Voter turnout will define Iraq’s 2025 election - 3 October 2025 Munqith Dagher

 CHATHAM HOUSE

Voter turnout will define Iraq’s 2025 election

3 October 2025

Munqith Dagher

CEO and Founder of Almustakilla Group for Research (IIACSS)

When Iraqis head to the polls on 11 November 2025, the central issue will not be which parties win seats but whether enough people turn out to vote. Turnout will be a referendum on the health of the political system itself. Since the US-led invasion of 2003, elections have been the main tool for granting governments legitimacy, even when marred by fraud, violence or sectarian competition. This year, however, the greatest threat is not violence or foreign interference but low participation – which could deprive elections of legitimacy altogether. 

The Al Mustakilla Group for Research (IIACSS), which has monitored every Iraqi election since 2005, has tracked pre-election sentiment closely. Recent surveys show a deeply disillusioned population sceptical of the ballot box as a means of accountability. If current trends hold, turnout in 2025 could be the lowest in Iraq’s post-2003 history. Such an outcome would not only decide parliament’s composition; it would determine whether elections remain a meaningful instrument of accountability or become another hollow ritual in a system already struggling to maintain credibility. 

Why turnout matters 

Turnout will be a decisive factor in Iraq’s upcoming elections. IIACSS surveys suggest participation may fall to the lowest level since 2003. A key factor is that only about 70 per cent of adults have biometric voter cards. This leaves nearly 9 million eligible Iraqis unable to vote. Even among card holders, only half expressed confidence or some degree of confidence that they would participate. Based on comparisons between survey intentions and official turnout in previous elections, IIACSS estimates turnout could range from a high of 40 per cent to a low of 25 per cent. These figures remain fluid and could shift with campaign dynamics, boycott movements, or broader political developments. However, they also show that low participation is not an abstract concern but an issue that will shape the distribution of power. 

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani illustrates how large blocs are most vulnerable to shrinking participation. Despite falling approval ratings following a summer of electricity shortages, water disputes and high-profile disasters – Sudani’s favourability fell to 64 per cent in September and job approval slid under 60 per cent, for the first time – his coalition, Al-‘Imar wal-Binaa (Construction and Development), leads in most Arab-majority provinces, particularly Baghdad. However, if turnout is low, the bloc could see its projected 20–30 per cent vote share fall by 1–3 per cent. Behind Sudani are Mohammed al-Halbousi’s Taqaddum (Progress) bloc and Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition, both competitive but trailing. Other parties remain further back. Kurdish dynamics, not covered in the recent survey, look set to further complicate outcomes. 

In a low-turnout environment, smaller, more ideological parties can thrive. Their core supporters are more likely to mobilise regardless of broader disillusionment, giving them disproportionate influence as participation shrinks. This dynamic incentivises polarising appeals rather than attempts to govern inclusively. Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)’s exclusion of former winners and office holders has reinforced perceptions that the elections are ‘pre-determined,’ and that alone risks discouraging thousands from participating.  

The battle over participation 

Survey data reveals a paradox. Although Iraqi prime ministers are rarely chosen directly by voters – post-election coalition negotiations decide the office – the IIACSS found that 60 per cent of respondents support Sudani, rising to two-thirds in Sunni-majority areas. This suggests that despite frustration, Iraqis can distinguish between systemic dysfunction and individual performance, and that they reward leaders they see as effective. However, the risk is that approval of Sudani will not turn into actual votes. This disconnect is dangerous: it indicates that Iraqis increasingly view elections not as a way to influence policy, but as a performative act with little impact on governance. 

This is why turnout is the ‘mother of all battles.’ If participation rises above 40–50 per cent, results could shift dramatically. At 60 per cent, Iraq’s political map could be reshaped entirely. Yet, achieving such levels will be difficult given the announcement from Muqtada al-Sadr to boycott elections, calls for abstention by influential voices and a generally toxic political climate. There is still time, however, for political forces and other stakeholders to persuade Iraqis that their votes matter. It is crucial for the IHEC and the government to intensify efforts to register more voters and issue biometric cards. 

The crisis of legitimacy 

Turnout is not just a statistic – it is the foundation of electoral legitimacy. Iraq’s post-2003 political system rests on the premise that popular participation can channel conflict into ballots. Every decline in turnout chips away at that fragile foundation.  

If only a quarter of Iraqis vote in November, how credible can parliament be as a representative body? How persuasive will its mandate be in managing foreign relations and dealing with protesters or its own fractious members? The perception that elites recycle power among themselves has already fuelled waves of unrest, including the 2019 Tishreen protests. A hollow election in 2025 could spark another confrontation between a disenchanted public and a political class unwilling to reform. 

There is no single fix to Iraq’s crisis of legitimacy. But one thing is clear: turnout in November will serve as a litmus test. If political elites can convince Iraqis to participate – by delivering voter cards, running cleaner campaigns and demonstrating responsiveness – the system may retain some credibility. If not, Iraq risks continuing a trend of holding elections that few believe in. 

That outcome would mark not only the decline of one accountability mechanism but also the erosion of one of the last remaining sources of legitimacy in Iraq’s fragile political order. 

This article is part of a special Iraq Initiative election series, featuring analysis and commentary on key developments shaping Iraq’s political landscape of the November 2025 parliamentary elections.