CHATHAM HOUSE
Sanae Takaichi sees herself as the successor to Shinzo Abe. But changes in Japan’s politics present big challenges
The new Japanese prime minister and LDP leader has been elected partly to see off a surging far right, at a time of significant change in society.
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Published 22 October 2025 —
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Image — Sanae Takaichi stands up to acknowledge the applause after she was selected as Japan's new prime minister in Tokyo on 21 October, 2025. (Photo by PHILIP FONG/AFP via Getty Images)
Kazuto Suzuki
Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme
Following a vote in the House of Representatives on 21 October, Japan has elected its first female prime minister, Sanae Takaichi. Cabinet appointments are underway. But the Takaichi government now faces numerous challenges.
Takaichi claims to be the successor to former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his assertive Japanese foreign policy, which built new security partnerships, boosted defence spending, and expanded the remit of the country’s Self Defense Forces. But Takaichi’s ability to replicate Abe’s success is uncertain, as she leads a weakened Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), confronts a surging far right at home, and negotiates relations with an unpredictable US partner.
Komeito’s withdrawal
The most significant problem facing Takaichi’s ability to form a government was the withdrawal of the Komeito Party from its coalition earlier this month. Komeito had been a partner for the past 26 years.
Komeito’s decision to leave the coalition was ostensibly based on the LDP’s recent record in government. The LDP faced nationwide criticism after it was revealed during the Kishida administration that it had neglected its reporting obligations regarding income from party fundraising systems. This impacted Komeito’s performance in the 2024 House of Representatives election and the 2025 House of Councillors election, where it saw significant losses – a major blow to a party already facing an aging supporter base and declining strength.
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However, Komeito’s true reason for withdrawal was likely that it judged it impossible to maintain the coalition when Takaichi became LDP president. Komeito leader Saito has repeatedly made statements suggesting they would return to the coalition under the next president, implying that anyone but Takaichi would have continued to enjoy their support.
Komeito has historically appealed to pacifist, liberal-minded supporters, presenting itself as a check on the LDP security policies. The concern was likely that under Takaichi, this restraint would cease to function – Takaichi is described as a hawk on security issues and has previously visited the Yasukuni shrine which honours Japanese war dead. (Prime Minister Abe’s 2013 visit to the shrine angered China and South Korea).
Departure from pacifism due to generational change
This shift in Japan’s coalition politics can be attributed in part to changing social norms. Traditionally, older generations, who retain memories of the Second World War, have regarded Japan’s pacifist constitution as a national imperative, opposing measures like strengthening the country’s Self-Defense Forces. Such voters traditionally backed peace-oriented parties like Komeito and the Constitutional Democratic Party.
But for younger generations who have fading or no memories of war, the perspective is very different. Many feel threatened by China’s military rise and North Korea’s missiles. Events like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the re-election of President Donald Trump in the US have eroded their trust in an international order based on the rule of law.
A strong ally has emerged as a new coalition partner: The Japan Innovation Party (Ishin)…a libertarian party aspiring to smaller central government.
More voters believe Japan should strengthen its national capabilities, including its military, or risk being dominated by foreign powers. Domestically, migration is an increasingly important issue, fuelling discontent and feeding support for right wing parties.
This dynamic underpinned the breakthrough of the far-right Sanseito party, which campaigned on a ‘Japanese First’ platform in July’s House of Councillors election. It also led the overwhelming majority of LDP members to support Takaichi’s leadership bid in an effort to hold off the Sanseito challenge.
Coalition with Ishin
Fortunately for Takaichi, a strong ally has emerged as a new coalition partner: The Japan Innovation Party (Ishin). This coalition will be just two seats short of a majority in the House of Representatives and five short in the House of Councillors. While still a minority government, this significantly increases the administration’s stability.
The Ishin is a political party founded with the goal of expanding the Osaka Restoration Party nationwide. Its policies centre on the Osaka sub-capital concept, aiming to resolve the excessive concentration of power in Tokyo, and on eliminating administrative inefficiencies through the Osaka Metropolitan Plan. This reflects its character as a libertarian party aspiring to smaller central government.
Ishin presented twelve demands but identified three as minimum requirements: a proposal to make Osaka Japan’s secondary capital; social security reform; and a 10 per cent reduction in the number of Diet members.
The LDP-Ishin coalition increases the likelihood that Japan will pursue more proactive foreign and security policies than before.
The Secondary Capital proposal requires complex administrative measures and is a long-term issue, presenting few immediate problems for the LDP. Social security reform poses more significant challenges, as the LDP has significant elderly support and has allowed social security-related budgets to grow steadily. But Ishin is not expected to pursue radical policies on this point, planning instead to address it as a long-term goal.
The biggest issue is reducing the number of Diet seats. The LDP already signed an agreement with the ruling Democratic Party in 2012 to reduce seats – but, the effort stalled due to opposition from within the LDP. Consequently, the Ishin demand is also highly unlikely to materialize.
Ishin’s inclusion of seat reduction as a coalition condition was largely intended to test how seriously the LDP views the coalition and showcase Ishin’s libertarian policy of reducing administrative waste.
Foreign and security policy of the coalition government
The LDP–Ishin coalition increases the likelihood that Japan will pursue more proactive foreign and security policies than before. Previously, the LDP’s coalition with Komeito imposed constraints on ambitions to enhance Japan’s capabilities. Dissolving that coalition removes them. Ishin holds a more hawkish stance on foreign and security policy than the LDP and aligns closely with the international outlook of Prime Minister Takaichi.
Ishin also supports constitutional reform, and formally establishing the Self-Defense Forces as a national military. In this sense, it overlaps significantly with the foreign and security policy pursued by Shinzo Abe. For Takaichi, Ishin is an ideal coalition partner.
However, such hawkish foreign and security policies carry risk.
Relations with South Korea improved during the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. They remained positive under President Lee Jae-myung, a progressive who also advocates ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ and chose to visit Japan before visiting the US in August – a very unusual move for a newly elected South Korean president. It implies that Lee regards the relationship with Japan as highly important for his administration.
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However, were Takaichi or a member of her cabinet, to visit Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine or mention the Takeshima/Dokdo territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea, it could potentially appear as signs of resurgent nationalism in Japan and undermine these positive relations. (Takaichi has ruled out visiting the shrine as prime minister).
Regarding China, Takaichi has taken a clearly confrontational stance. The challenge now lies in how clearly she can articulate the difference between her position when she was outside the government and could speak freely, and her new role as prime minister.
Perhaps the greatest challenge for her administration will be navigating relations with the administration of US President Donald Trump. The Ishiba administration secured an agreement on tariffs and investment with Washington. But it falls to the Takaichi administration to implement it. Failure to do so could invite pressure from the US and potentially worsen relations.
Takaichi will need to build a personal relationship with President Trump – who tends to avoid international commitments and make statements undermining the credibility of extended deterrence – to ensure Japan maintains deterrence against China, North Korea, and Russia.
Takaichi sees herself as the successor to Abe’s diplomacy. She must now demonstrate her capabilities.
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