CHATHAM HOUSE Turkey has emerged as a winner in Syria but must now use its influence to help build peace Turkey feels its longstanding support of the Syrian opposition has now been vindicated. But its increased influence in Damascus also comes with significant responsibilities. Expert comment Published 13 December 2024 3 minute READ Galip Dalay

 CHATHAM  HOUSE 

Turkey has emerged as a winner in Syria but must now use its influence to help build peace

Turkey feels its longstanding support of the Syrian opposition has now been vindicated. But its increased influence in Damascus also comes with significant responsibilities.

Expert comment

Published 13 December 2024 3 minute READ

Galip Dalay

Senior Consulting Fellow, Turkey Initiative, Middle East and North Africa Programme

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No other crisis has redefined Turkey’s place in regional and international politics as much as the Syrian conflict. Turkey shares its longest land border with Syria, over 900 km. Syria is therefore not merely a foreign policy issue for Turkey but also a domestic one.

While Turkey has shaped the course of the Syrian conflict, the Syrian conflict has in turn shaped the dynamics of Turkish domestic politics and international relations for more than a decade. The relationship between Turkey and the Syrian crisis has been a story of mutual reshaping. Almost all ethnic, sectarian and ideological identity cleavages that exist in Syria also exist in Turkey. Turkey also hosts around 3.6 million Syrian refugees, which has led to the emergence of far-right and xenophobic parties and redefined the nature of nationalist politics in the country.  

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Of all external players in Syria, Turkey has remained the most steadfast supporter of the Syrian opposition. This has been an increasingly unpopular policy, given the steep cost of this conflict for Turkey in security, political and economic terms, and in the form of refugee inflows. Vocal critics of the government’s policy, Turkey’s opposition has long advocated for Ankara to normalize relations with the now deposed Assad regime and to cut support for opposition groups. 

With the fall of Assad, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his government feel that their policy has been vindicated. As actors with whom Turkey has developed close ties with over the years are poised to assume more influence and power in Damascus, Ankara is set to gain essential levers of influence in Syria.

Before the fall of Assad, four key goals featured prominently in Turkey’s Syria policy: a partial refoulement of Syrian refugees; border security; rolling back the political and territorial gains of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); and extracting some concessions from the regime for its allied Syrian opposition groups in any negotiations. 

With the fall of the regime, the fourth goal has become obsolete. But Ankara will try to achieve its other goals through its influence with the new leaders in Damascus and its connection with the Arab community and Arab tribes  – while maintaining military pressure on the SDF. 

The fall of Assad will likely put more pressure on Turkey’s relations with Russia and Iran while driving Turkey and the West closer. 

With the Assad regime gone, there are expectations within Turkey that Syrian refugees will return home. Although Syrians living in neighbouring countries, including Turkey, have already started heading back to Syria, the country has been ravaged by 13 years of a brutal civil war and conditions are still dire. Therefore, Syrians will not be able to return home en masse, at least not in the immediate term. Turkish politicians – not least the opposition – and public figures should refrain from inflating expectations regarding the return of Syrian refugees. 

For Syrians who do want to return, Turkey, Syria’s Arab neighbours, the EU, and Gulf countries should meet to devise a roadmap to help facilitate this. These countries should also meet regularly to discuss humanitarian aid and reconstruction in Syria. Such steps will reduce the pressure on the governments of Syria’s neighbours.

Geopolitical implications for Turkey – in Syria and beyond

The Syrian crisis has redefined Turkey’s international relations. Assad’s ability to hold onto power – largely thanks to Russia, Iran and Hezbollah – brought Ankara, Moscow and Tehran closer, particularly following the coup attempt in Turkey in  2016, while driving a wedge between Turkey and the West. 

The fall of Assad will probably have a reverse effect: it will likely put more pressure on Turkey’s relations with Russia and Iran while driving Turkey and the West closer. Despite this, Moscow will have to manage its discontent with Turkey as it needs Ankara’s support to preserve its interests in Syria, not least its vital naval and air bases in the country.

Defaced portraits of Bashar al-Assad and Vladimir Putin hang above an entrance to a building

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During Assad’s rule, Russia had effectively positioned itself as a gatekeeper for any possible normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime, and was playing a similar role between the regime and the SDF. This gatekeeper role gave Russia some leverage vis-à-vis Turkey. 

When the Astana process – a conflict-management and freezing mechanism on the Syrian conflict which sidelined the UN-led Geneva process and was  led by Turkey, Russia and Iran – had run its course, Moscow wanted to use its gatekeeper role as a means to restructure its relations and maintain the dynamics of interdependency with Ankara. 

This dynamic with Russia in Syria became a key factor that informed Turkey’s policy towards other issues involving Russia, such as Ukraine, Libya or the Black Sea. For a long time, Russia skilfully used Syria and Turkey’s vulnerabilities there to influence Ankara’s policy choices elsewhere.

Image — People hold a banner featuring Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as members of the Syrian community and supporters celebrate the fall of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, in Istanbul on 8 December 2024. Photo: YASIN AKGUL/AFP via Getty Images.

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Now, the roles are reversed. Ankara may come to serve as a gatekeeper for Moscow to reach out to Damascus. The same is likely to be the case with Iran. With its partners and allies wielding power in Damascus, Ankara now has the upper hand vis-à-vis both Moscow and Tehran. Its dependence on Russia and Iran is decreasing. Syria can also serve as a common point of interest for Turkey, Arab states, the US, and the EU for dialogue and cooperation, both in Syria and beyond.

With its partners and allies wielding power in Damascus, Ankara now has the upper hand vis-à-vis both Moscow and Tehran.

After 13 torturous years of war in Syria, Ankara feels it has finally won. But the real task ahead is to win the post-conflict phase, secure peace in Syria and prevent a relapse into conflict. 

This responsibility largely falls on the shoulders of Syrian actors. But Turkey, as arguably the most committed external supporter of the opposition groups, must use its influence to push them to develop a more inclusive and legitimate political order in Syria. Achieving this would be a hugely positive development not just for Syria and the wider region, but also another win for Turkey.