Monday, December 16, 2024

Chatham House North Korea and Russia’s dangerous partnership The threat to global security from the Kim–Putin axis and how to respond Research paper Published 4 December 2024

 


Chatham House

North Korea and Russia’s dangerous partnership

The threat to global security from the Kim–Putin axis and how to respond

Research paper

Published 4 December 2024

ISBN: 978 1 78413 632 1

DOI: 10.55317/9781784136321 


Dr Edward Howell

Korea Foundation Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme


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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has prompted a rapid escalation in cooperation between North Korea and Russia, to the point where in October 2024 North Korea was confirmed to have sent troops to assist Russian forces. Such actions show that the North Korea–Russia relationship has moved beyond the merely transactional to become a longer-term strategic and ideological partnership.


This still-developing partnership poses a threat to the international community, by increasing the potential for regional conflict and undermining the current international order. This research paper provides a wake-up call for the US and its partners in northeast Asia and beyond, warning them to take this emerging Kim–Putin axis seriously and recommending a set of actions to prepare for where this dangerous partnership might go next.


Topics

Arms control Human rights and security

Regions

China Korean peninsula Russia Ukraine

Departments

Asia-Pacific Programme

Projects

Korea Foundation Fellowship

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Summary

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Summary

Introduction

The revival of the North Korea–Russia relationship

The China factor

How North Korea benefits

The threat to regional and global stability

Policy recommendations

Conclusion

About the author

Acknowledgements


Summary

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 catalysed an alarming mutual partnership between Russia and North Korea. While early bilateral ties between the two countries were heavily premised around a cash-for-weapons exchange, relations have escalated considerably in the past year to involve North Korea sending troops to Russia. Such actions show that the North Korea–Russia relationship has moved beyond the merely transactional to become a longer-term strategic and ideological partnership. As such, the nature of this relationship poses a significant threat to regional and global security.

This research paper argues that the revival in North Korea–Russia relations is driven by four interlinked factors: a desire for the North Korean regime to gain food, financial and, crucially, military assistance from Russia (the extent of the latter remains, as yet, unknown); Russia’s isolation and need for munitions to win the Ukraine war; a longer-term objective for North Korea to gain a great power partner to undermine international security institutions; and North Korea’s ongoing desire to strengthen its domestic nuclear weapons and missile development, to serve Kim Jong Un’s ultimate goal of regime survival.

The international community now faces a worrying dual-pronged threat emanating from North Korea, given the significant acceleration in its development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, North Korea’s outright refusal to denuclearize, its lack of appetite for dialogue with the US and South Korea, and its intensifying economic and security cooperation with Russia. First, the potential for conflict in northeast Asia will increase, not least given North Korea’s recent increase in belligerent behaviour towards South Korea. Second, the mutual relationship restricts the ability of international security institutions to constrain the illicit proliferation of weapons between the two countries.


The renewed North Korea–Russia relationship has not escaped China’s attention, especially since China has long been North Korea’s most significant economic partner. Although it has so far been reluctant to take a clear position, China will be monitoring how the relationship develops, and, crucially, will also be watching the international response, particularly for any form of strengthening bilateralism and trilateralism between the US, Japan and South Korea, towards which China’s opposition has grown in recent years.

In response to these multiple, intertwined threats, the US and its allies and partners – particularly Japan and South Korea – must now prepare for where this dangerous partnership might go. In particular, they should take action to deter North Korea’s provocations, including by:


Increasing South Korean support for Ukraine. Despite South Korea’s reluctance to date to provide lethal aid to Ukraine, the direct involvement of North Korean troops in Russia’s war means that South Korea’s interests are now increasingly at stake. South Korea must therefore seriously consider the provision of military assistance to Ukraine.


Strengthening US-led efforts to deter a nuclear North Korea and reassure Japan and South Korea of support for their security interests. The continuation of bilateral and trilateral military exercises between the three countries, coupled with high-level talks and information-sharing, is vital at a time when North Korea’s nuclearization only looks set to increase.


Sustaining momentum in bilateral and trilateral relations between Japan, South Korea and China. South Korea’s recent proactive diplomacy towards Japan should offer a base from which to strengthen relations between these two states, given the potential consequences of the North Korea–Russia partnership for regional security. China remains a key partner of both North Korea and Russia, and has so far been unwilling to condemn North Korea’s entry into the Ukraine war. But Seoul and Tokyo should not abandon efforts to engage in dialogue with Beijing.


Encouraging more robust engagement between South Korea and minilateral institutions in the Indo-Pacific region, together with European allies and partners. In addition to bolstering its relationship with the US, South Korea should strengthen partnerships with regional forums such as the Quad and AUKUS, but also enhance its bilateral ties with European partners. For example, it should seek to build on the Downing Street Accord signed with the UK in November 2023.


Conducting a concerted campaign to increase information flows into North Korea. Even given the low probability of regime change in North Korea, the US and its allies should recognize that the North Korea ‘problem’ is not limited to nuclear proliferation. In seeking to promote longer-term change in the attitudes of the North Korean people towards the Kim Jong Un regime, these countries should work with North Korean defector-led organizations in South Korea, the South Korean government and transnational non-governmental organizations to increase the flow of outside perspectives into the North.


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