Iran Update, December 27, 2024
An explosion from a former SAA ( Pro-government Syrian Arab Army) position in Homs City suggests that HTS does not yet have full control on the ground and that local groups and individuals can access and repurpose unexploded ordinance. Syrian media reported a large explosion near a former SAA barracks in Homs City on December 27, injuring nine people.[i] The Homs Police Commander Colonel Alaa Omran told state media that former regime elements rigged and detonated ordinance in a missile warehouse in the city to target a passing civilian.[ii] A Syrian source contradicted the police commander’s statement, however, and claimed that the explosion was the result of Syrians attempting to remove parts from old air defense missiles to sell them.[iii] Taking apart and repurposing explosives inside of munitions is one way military organizations can build rudimentary improvised explosive devices. The incident demonstrates that HTS does not control all former SAA weapons stockpiles and that locals can still access some of these stockpiles. This incident also suggests that the HTS-led security forces have not fully established total control over Homs City if these positions are easily accessible.
The HTS-led interim government has thus far failed to prevent individual opposition fighters from targeting members of the Alawite community. Unspecified opposition fighters have looted homes and stolen vehicles belonging to Alawites in Lattakia Province—a former regime stronghold—since the fall of the Assad regime.[iv] An Alawite sheikh in Damascus told Reuters on December 26 that there have been multiple instances of “[Alawites] being beaten at a checkpoint.”[v] The HTS-led interim government has established several checkpoints across Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, but it is unclear who has attacked Alawite citizens at the checkpoint in Damascus.[vi] An HTS fighter in Damascus separately told Reuters that unspecified individuals offloaded a bus and beat Alawite passengers on December 26.[vii] These Alawite community members are framing these events as sectarian-motivated, underscoring the mistrust and fear that is permeating Alawite communities at this time. These instances of sectarian violence have caused some Alawites to refuse to hand in their weapons to the interim government, highlighting how the Alawite community currently distrusts the interim government to guarantee their security.[viii]
The HTS-led interim government deployed forces to the Christian town of al Masmiyah in Daraa Province on December 27 to maintain security in the town during Christmas celebrations.[ix] The deployment of forces to al Masmiyah comes after members of the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria, a member of the HTS-led military coalition with links to al Qaeda, set fire to a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah, Hama Governorate, on December 23.[x]
The HTS-led interim government is continuing to pursue and detain former members of the Bashar al Assad regime. HTS forces have pursued Assad regime remnants in areas of Hama, Homs, Lattakia Tartous, Deir ez Zor, and Damascus provinces since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on December 26.[xi] HTS forces arrested a large number of former Assad regime members, including:
Khaled al Zubaidi. Zubaidi is a Syrian businessman with ties to the Assad regime.[xii] The United States sanctioned Zubaidi in June 2020 for supporting Assad’s “corrupt reconstruction efforts.”[xiii]
Fakhri Darwish: Darwish headed the office of the pro-Assad regime Palestinian militia Liwa al Quds in Aleppo.[xiv]
Riyad Hassan. Hassan previously served as the head of political security in Damascus under Assad.[xv]
HTS-led security forces engaged alleged former regime fighters in several villages west of Homs on December 26. HTS-led security forces entered Balqassa village, west of Homs City, on December 26, reportedly to pursue regime-affiliated official Shuja al Ali.[xvi] Ali was the leader of a regime-supported armed group that operated near the Lebanese border and was accused of kidnapping and torture. [xvii]Syrian media reported that HTS-led security forces clashed with alleged former regime-affiliated fighters in Balqassa.[xviii] HTS killed Ali and former regime elements killed two HTS-led security force members in the fighting.[xix] A Deir ez Zor-focused social media user stated that the HTS-led security forces used long-range rockets and drones to target former regime remnants in Balqassa and nearby town Khirbet al Hamam.[xx] CTP-ISW cannot confirm HTS-affiliated forces’ use of these weapons. This would be the first reported use of indirect and deep strike fires by HTS-affiliated forces since HTS assumed control of Damascus.[xxi]
The HTS-led interim government is not publicly responding to SDF overtures to negotiate the SDF’s incorporation into the new Syrian army and incorporation into a Syrian state. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi reiterated his desire for the incorporation of the SDF into a future Syria to Asharq al Awsat on December 27.[xxii] Abdi said that the SDF has not yet engaged in direct negotiations with HTS despite Abdi’s repeated expressed interest in negotiations since the fall of the Assad regime.[xxiii] Abdi outlined his priorities for negotiations with HTS—should such negotiations occur—and noted that the SDF would require an end to Turkish and Turkish-backed attacks on the SDF so that Syrians may discuss the future without “external interference.”[xxiv]
It appears increasingly unlikely, however, that the HTS-led government’s leadership views negotiating with the SDF as a priority as it formalizes relations with Turkey. HTS, while not a Turkish proxy or beholden to Turkey, has been quick to deepen its cooperation with Turkey since the fall of the Assad regime. HTS’s intensifying alignment with Turkish interests continues to pose an existential threat to the SDF as Turkey continues to signal a possible Turkish incursion into Syria or a Turkish-backed operation in northern Syria to “eliminate” the SDF. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on December 27 that Turkey shall ensure security “beyond its southern borders” and “eliminate terrorist threats” starting in 2025.[xxv] Abdi warned of a potential “catastrophe” facing Kobani from the Turkish military buildup on the border.[xxvi] Syrian media reported on December 27 that Turkish military reinforcements arrived in the town of Suluk, which is located north of Raqqa in SNA-controlled territory.[xxvii]
The SNA continued to engage the SDF west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.[xxviii] Local sources reported that the SNA sent reinforcements to the frontlines near the Tishreen Dam.[xxix] The SDF claimed on December 27 that it engaged SNA forces near Abu Qalqal in the Manbij countryside.[xxx]
Local sources reported that the SDF continued to advance southwest of Lake Assad into SNA-controlled territory south of Tishreen Dam on December 27.[xxxi] A pro-SDF social media user posted a photo of SDF members on the “Deir Hafer and Khafsah front” and said that SDF forces are operating in the area.[xxxii] An Aleppo-based outlet reported on December 27 that the Khafsah water treatment plant, which the SDF had reportedly taken control of on December 23, is not operating at ”maximum capacity” due to nearby fighting.[xxxiii] The Khafsah water treatment plant is a critical plant services in Aleppo City. The Aleppo Water Establishment asked Aleppo citizens to ration water consumption.[xxxiv] The SDF advance in the south may intend to relieve pressure on the Tishreen Dam area by forcing the SNA to redeploy its forces to respond to a new threat.
Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri inspected combat units along the Iraq-Syria border on December 26 and 27. Ameri met with combat units at the Rabia border crossing in northern Ninewa Province on December 26.[xxxv] Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Ninewa Operations Commander Khadir al Matrohi, who is affiliated with the Badr Organization, accompanied Ameri.[xxxvi] Ameri met with a military official named Majid Saleh Jassem, although it is unclear whether this official serves in the Iraqi Army, PMF, or Iraqi Border Guard.[xxxvii] The 15th and 20th Infantry divisions redeployed to areas between Rabia and Sinjar on December 7.[xxxviii]
Ameri separately reviewed security and intelligence plans and emphasized the need to conduct unspecified “preemptive operations” during a visit to the Iraqi Army 7th Infantry Division in al Qaim, western Anbar Province, on December 27.[xxxix] 7th Infantry Division Commander Major General Hassan al Silawi and unspecified PMF commanders attended the meeting. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah controls several PMF brigades that control the al Qaim border crossing.[xl] The Iraqi Army 27th Infantry Brigade, which operates under the 7th Infantry Division, oversees border security north of al Qaim across from the Syrian town of Baghouz.[xli]
Ameri’s inspections come as Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani implicitly threatened on December 27 to militarily intervene in Syria if the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurges and threatens Iraq. Sudani stated that “any dysfunction” in Syrian prisons would “push [Iraq] to counter terrorism.”[xlii] Sudani was likely referring to the SDF-controlled al Hol camp and network of Syrian prisons that contain thousands of ISIS supporters and fighters.[xliii] Iraqi National Intelligence Service Director Hamid al Shatri similarly suggested on December 26 that Iraq would consider intervening or allowing Iraqi militias to intervene in Syria if unspecified Syrian armed groups threatened Iraq.[xliv] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS while contending with threats from Turkey and its allies in Syria, namely the SNA.[xlv] Ongoing Turkish-backed operations against the SDF have forced the SDF to prioritize the existential threat posed by Turkey over the counter-ISIS mission.
An Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework member said on December 26 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will resume attacking US forces in Iraq and Syria if US forces extend their presence in Iraq beyond the agreed–upon withdrawal date of December 2026.[xlvi] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining troops will withdraw by the end of 2026.[xlvii] Mukhtar al Musawi, a Shia Coordination Framework member of parliament, denied reports that the Iraqi government is considering its request for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026 due to concerns that the fall of Bashar al Assad in Syria threatens Iraqi security.[xlviii] Musawi also told Iraqi media that the Iraqi militias had stopped targeting US forces due to the withdrawal timeline but added that operations could resume if the United States extends its presence in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias last claimed an attack targeting US forces in Iraq on August 5, 2024.[xlix] Likely Iranian militias also launched three rockets at Baghdad International Airport on October 1, but no militia claimed this attack.[l]
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)'s Jenin Battalion said that it engaged with “occupation forces” in multiple areas of Jenin on December 26.[li] Palestinian militias, including PIJ, historically used the term ”occupation forces” to refer to Israeli forces.[lii] CTP-ISW has not observed any reports or indications of Israeli forces operating in Jenin at the time of this writing. The Palestinian Authority (PA), however, continued to operate against Palestinian militias in Jenin on December 26.[liii] Palestinian militia fighters killed a PA security forces officer in Jenin on December 26, marking the third PA officer killed in Jenin since the operation began on December 5.[liv] It would be a notable inflection if PIJ began referring to the PA as ”occupation forces.” It would, conversely, also be notable if the IDF began operating in Jenin at the same time as the PA operation against Palestinian militias.
Key Takeaways:
Explosion in Homs: An explosion in Homs suggests that HTS does not yet have full control on the ground and that local groups and individuals can access and repurpose unexploded ordinance.
Sectarian Tension in Syria: The HTS-led interim government has thus far failed to prevent individual opposition fighters from targeting members of the Alawite community.
HTS and Christian Communities: The HTS-led interim government deployed forces to the Christian town of al Masmiyah in Daraa Province on December 27 to maintain security in the town during Christmas celebrations.
HTS Operations Against Former Regime Elements: HTS-led security forces engaged alleged former regime fighters in several villages west of Homs on December 26. HTS-led security forces entered Balqassa village, west of Homs City, on December 26, reportedly to pursue regime-affiliated official Shuja al Ali.
HTS-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Negotiations: The HTS-led interim government is not publicly responding to SDF overtures to negotiate the SDF’s incorporation into the new Syrian army and incorporation into a Syrian state. It appears increasingly unlikelythat the HTS-led government’s leadership views negotiating with the SDF as a priority as it formalizes relations with Turkey.
SDF-Syrian National Army (SNA) Fighting: Local sources reported that the SDF continued to advance southwest of Lake Assad into SNA-controlled territory south of Tishreen Dam on December 27. The SNA also continued to engage the SDF west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.
Iraq: Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri inspected combat units along the Iraq-Syria border on December 26 and 27. Ameri also reviewed security and intelligence plans and emphasized the need to conduct unspecified “preemptive operations.” Ameri’s inspections come as Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani implicitly threatened on December 27 to militarily intervene in Syria if the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurges and threatens Iraq.
West Bank: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)'s Jenin Battalion said that it engaged with “occupation forces” in multiple areas of Jenin on December 26. Palestinian militias, including PIJ, historically used the term ”occupation forces” to refer to Israeli forces, but CTP-ISW has not observed IDF operations in Jenin in recent days. It would be a notable inflection if PIJ began referring to the PA as ”occupation forces.”
SEE FULL UPDATE
Syria CoT December 27,2024
The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War will provide regular updates, including daily updates, as the crisis warrants.
If you are not already subscribed and want to receive email notifications when our updates are published, click here.
No comments:
Post a Comment