Thursday, October 31, 2024

FPIF - by Steephen R. Shalom - October 29, 2024 - Does Israel Have the Right to Defend Itself? States do not possess the right of self-defense to uphold illegal occupations.

 

“Israel has the right to defend itself,” President Joseph Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris, and countless commentators have declared multiple times over the past year. But does Israel in fact have such a right?

Even if there were an Israeli right to self-defense, such a right would be limited by the standard of proportionality. This is not only the requirement of proportionality for any individual military operation, but of Israel’s response to the October 7 attacks taken as a whole: are the harmful effects of Israel’s military campaign outweighed by the benefits of achieving the claimed legitimate aims of the campaign?

Israel’s response certainly does not meet this standard given that it has subjected the people of Gaza to what the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has deemed a “plausible” genocide. Amnesty International called the “intensity and cruelty” of the Israeli government’s bombardment “unparalleled,” with a “pace of death” The New York Times found to have “few precedents in this century.” Oxfam and Human Rights Watch characterized Israel’s military actions as “indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks,” and the United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry found a “concerted policy” to destroy Gaza’s health-care system.

But does Israel have a right to self-defense at all?

Digging into the Arguments

On one level, of course it does. When confronted by someone about to commit an unjust act, such as killing a civilian, there is a right to self-defense. Consider a Soviet or American soldier in World War II preparing to unjustly slaughter a group of Japanese or German civilians. Even though the victims are citizens of evil regimes engaged in an unjust war, they still are not morally liable to being butchered. Therefore, a Japanese or German soldier, despite participating in an unjust war, would be justified in using force in defense of the endangered civilians.

Accordingly, Israeli security forces were engaged in legitimate self-defense when they acted to defend the innocent victims of October 7. Moreover, Israeli civilians who participated in “individual self-defense or defense of others” on that day did not thereby become lawful military targets. (Otherwise, as the International Committee of the Red Cross noted, “this would have the absurd consequence of legitimizing a previously unlawful attack.”) They too were engaged in legitimate self-defense.

On another level, however, Israel does not have the right of self-defense to an attack against its illegal long-standing occupation. Russian troops in occupied Ukraine cannot claim self-defense when they are attacked by Ukrainian forces. Japanese troops couldn’t claim self-defense when they were attacked by guerrillas in occupied China or the occupied Philippines during World War II. Russia’s and Japan’s occupations were illegal and their armies’ only morally legitimate recourse in the face of resistance was to end those occupations. In the same way, the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories is illegal and unjust and Israel cannot claim self-defense when Palestinians struggle by legitimate means to end the occupation. The proper Israeli response to such Palestinian actions is not self-defense but full withdrawal from the occupied territories.

Nor can Israel’s military operations in Gaza be deemed self-defense as a means of freeing hostages and thus ending an unjust abuse of civilians. The overwhelming majority of freed hostages were released in exchanges (105) or unilateral Hamas actions (4), while the number freed by the IDF (8) was almost certainly exceeded by the number inadvertently killed by them and far exceeded by the number of Palestinian civilians killed in the rescue efforts. Family members of the hostages charge that, in rejecting negotiations, “Netanyahu is knowingly, deliberately and protractedly abandoning the hostages held by Hamas in Gaza.” A former hostage family spokesperson stated that they had learned that “Hamas had offered on October 9 or 10 to release all the civilian hostages in exchange for the IDF not entering the [Gaza] Strip, but the [Israeli] government rejected the offer.” Israel’s assault on Gaza has not been aimed to secure the release of its hostages but to defend (and expand) its illegal occupation, which it has no right to do.

Illegal Occupation

Since the ICJ only issued its advisory opinion declaring the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories to be illegal in July 2024, one might argue that the occupation wasn’t illegal before that date. But the Court’s reasoning did not draw upon any recently occurring event that had rendered the occupation illegal. Rather it pointed to territorial acquisition and denial of self-determination — longstanding features of Israeli policy:

The Court considers that the violations by Israel of the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force and of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination have a direct impact on the legality of the continued presence of Israel, as an occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The sustained abuse by Israel of its position as an occupying Power, through annexation and an assertion of permanent control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory and continued frustration of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, violates fundamental principles of international law and renders Israel’s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory unlawful. (Para 261)

In any event, the illegality of the occupation was identified before this ICJ advisory opinion. In 2017, the Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories Michael Lynk submitted a report endorsing the four elements of a test proposed by international law scholars for whether an occupation was legal: (a) The belligerent occupier cannot annex any of the occupied territory; (b) The belligerent occupation must be temporary and cannot be either permanent or indefinite; and the occupant must seek to end the occupation and return the territory to the sovereign as soon as reasonably possible; (c) During the occupation, the belligerent occupier is to act in the best interests of the people under occupation; and (d) The belligerent occupier must administer the occupied territory in good faith, including acting in full compliance with its duties and obligations under international law and as a member of the United Nations. Lynk found that Israel failed all four elements of this test.

And in 2022, the report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory found Israel’s occupation to be illegal, focusing “on two indicators that may be used to determine the illegality of the occupation: the permanence of the Israeli occupation, … and actions amounting to annexation, including unilateral actions taken to dispose of parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory as if Israel held sovereignty over it.”

Israel argues that its occupation is legal (or even not an occupation at all) because it acquired the West Bank and Gaza as the result of a defensive war against an attack waged by neighboring Arab states. In fact, however, in 1967 it was Israel that attacked first. Those who excuse Israel’s action as justified preemption point to the Arab armies mobilizing on its borders. But whatever panic there was among the public, those who understood the military situation — policymakers in Tel Aviv and Washington — knew quite well that even if the Arabs had struck first, Israel would have easily prevailed in any war. Egypt’s leader was looking for a way out and had agreed to send his vice-president to Washington for negotiations. Before that could happen, Israel attacked. Menachem Begin, then an Israeli cabinet member, recalled that we “had a choice.” Egyptian Army concentrations did not prove that Nasser was about to attack. “We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.”

Yet, even if it were the case that the 1967 war was wholly defensive on Israel’s part, this could not justify Israel’s continued rule over Palestinians. A people do not lose their right to self-determination because governments that had no legal or moral right to be ruling parts of Palestine (Jordan and Egypt) went to war. Whatever penalties would have been warranted to impose on Amman and Cairo for having started the war, there was no basis for punishing the Palestinian population by forcing them to submit to foreign military occupation.

Moreover, as Michael Bothe has noted, even if Israel’s war in 1967 had been a lawful act of self-defense, “taking advantage of the situation for the purpose of annexation … would go beyond the limits of what is allowed as self-defense[:] namely[,] measures which are militarily necessary and proportionate means of self-protection.”

Israel argues that since it withdrew its forces from Gaza in 2005, the territory is no longer occupied. But both legally and practically, Israel’s withdrawal did not end the occupation. As John Dugard, the U.N.’s then Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, noted in 2006, Gaza remained under Israel’s control, with Israel retaining control of Gaza’s air space, sea space, and (with Egypt) land borders. And Human Rights Watch stated in 2008 that “even though Israel withdrew its permanent military forces and settlers in 2005, it remains an occupying power in Gaza under international law because it continues to exercise effective day-to-day control over key aspects of life in Gaza.” As the Israeli human rights organization Gisha observed, if Israel had truly ended the occupation, then it could not prohibit Gaza from trading by sea or air with other nations, or prevent people from coming in and out, or declare “no go zones” within the territory.

The same conclusion follows from basic principles of morality. Regardless of the legal status of the occupation, it surely cannot be morally acceptable to maintain a people under occupation and deny them self-determination for more than 50 years. Accordingly, on moral grounds there can be no right to self-defense on behalf of maintaining that occupation.

The Invasion of Lebanon

The Biden administration has used the same “Israel has the right to defend itself” language with respect to Netanyahu’s war against Hezbollah. Does Israel have such a right in this case?

As in Gaza, Israel’s bombing campaign in Lebanon has placed civilians at grave risk of harm. But it’s not just Israel’s illegitimate war tactics that negate any Israeli right to self-defense here. One of the rules of customary international law is that the exercise of the right of self-defense is subject to the condition of necessity. There is a corresponding moral standard from just war theory of last resort. According to these principles, it cannot be right to go to war when there exists some other, less violent, and less costly (in terms of human lives) means of achieving a just cause.

On October 8, 2023, after Israel launched its assault on Gaza in response to Hamas’s attack the previous day, Hezbollah fired some rockets at military targets in Shebaa Farms, a small piece of land occupied by Israel. Lebanon claims Shebaa Farms; Israel says it is part of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, conquered from Syria in 1967 and annexed by Israel in 1981. Israel’s annexation was declared null and void by a unanimous Security Council resolution and recognized by no country in the world other than Israel, until the Trump administration did so in 2019. Syria claims Shebaa Farms belongs to Lebanon, but neither Syria nor Israel has responded to the UN secretary general’s 2007 proposal for the demarcation of the border.

In any event, Israel retaliated for the Hezbollah attack, and the two sides proceeded to exchange fire across the border, with a majority of the projectiles coming from Israel, and with a large majority of the casualties, both military and civilian, occurring in Lebanon. Tensions increased over the summer, when what was likely an errant Hezbollah rocket killed 12 youngsters in a Druze village in the Golan. Israel assassinated a Hezbollah commander in Beirut (along with several civilians, wounding dozens of others), air strikes and rocket fire ensued, but by the end of August, the border had quieted down. Then in mid-September, Israel unleashed its pager and walkie-talkie attacks (condemned as war crimes by most human rights groups). Israel followed with extensive air bombardment and then a ground invasion into Lebanon. Was this justified self-defense?

Israel could have ended the Hezbollah rocket attacks at any point over the past year had it accepted a ceasefire in Gaza. (During the brief Gaza ceasefire in November 2023, Hezbollah had held its fire.) Of course, no country wants to be pressured to choose a policy by military threat, but morally and legally, the decision as to whether to accept a Gaza ceasefire was not optional for Israel. When one is committing massive human rights violations, it is not discretionary whether to continue doing so. As B’Tselem, the Israeli human rights group, stated in January, the only way to implement the ICJ order calling on Israel to prevent acts of genocide “is through an immediate ceasefire. It is impossible to protect civilian life as long as the fighting continues.” In May, the ICJ ordered Israel to end its Rafah offensive. Again, for the Israeli government this wasn’t  an option.

Israel had another opportunity to bring calm to the border, and perhaps much more, without needing to unleash a new, major war.

A few days after the pager bomb attacks, the United States and France drafted a call for a 21-day pause in fighting to allow for diplomacy aimed at reaching a longer-term truce. Washington informed the UN and Lebanon that Israel agreed. The New York Times reported that “the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, also sent word through an intermediary that his powerful militia supported the call for a cease-fire.” On September 25, the plan was publicly announced, with the backing of Australia, Canada, the European Union, Germany, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Qatar. Peace seemed possible. U.S. officials even  expressed hope that the peace might extend to Gaza.

According to The Times report, however:

Two days later, before diplomats could draw up a detailed cease-fire proposal, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel declared at the United Nations that Israel must “defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon.” Soon after, huge bombs fell on Beirut’s southern outskirts, killing Mr. Nasrallah and extinguishing any immediate prospect of a cease-fire.… progress toward a cease-fire was further along than previously known, but it was halted abruptly when Israel killed Mr. Nasrallah.

The Times noted that the killing of Nasrallah was “the second time in 10 weeks that Israel had quashed progress toward a cease-fire by striking a militia leader; Israel’s assassination in July of Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, led to the hardening of that group against any Gaza cease-fire proposal.”

Nasrallah certainly had blood on his hands. Hezbollah’s role in Syria during the civil war there was reprehensible. But his killing and the ensuing war can hardly be described as Israel exercising its right to defend itself. Rather than self-defense, these represented steps toward an unnecessary—and hence unjust— war, with all the horrible consequences that entails.

Self-defense is a basic right of individuals and countries. But it is not justified self-defense when it represents the defense of an unjust occupation. And it is not legitimate self-defense when war was neither necessary nor a last resort.

Stephen R. Shalom is emeritus professor of political science at William Paterson University in New Jersey. He is on the editorial board of New Politics and a member of Jewish Voice for Peace of Northern NJ.

FPIF - By Imran Khalid - October 24, 2024 - Hamas without Sinwar: A Setback or a Catalyst? Don't expect an immediate ceasefire or the imminent demise of Hamas.

 

Ever since the October 7 attack last year, Israeli intelligence claimed that Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s military leader, was hiding deep within Gaza’s complex underground tunnels, using Israeli hostages as a strategic shield. They alleged that he was using these hostages as a deterrent to complicate any rescue attempt or targeted strike. Sinwar’s elusiveness became almost mythic.

Yet, his death has proven that narrative wrong. Contrary to prior assessments, Sinwar wasn’t hiding underground. Instead, Israeli forces found him above ground, dressed in military attire, in the rubble of a building. He was actively participating on the battlefield, not cowering in tunnels.

This revelation has generated some prickly questions about the credibility of Israel’s intelligence agencies. How much does Israel truly know about the remaining hostages’ whereabouts? This question will intensify the pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to present a viable strategy for their rescue.

Sinwar’s death has also prompted deeper concerns. For instance, can Israel effectively monitor and control the situation in Gaza, especially when its intelligence regarding key figures like Sinwar appears flawed? Indeed, with Sinwar’s killing, new uncertainties have emerged about the fate of the hostages, the leadership of Hamas, and the broader trajectory of this protracted conflict.

Revolutionary movements often revolve around their charismatic leaders, whether in the shadows or out in the open. The reality is that Hamas has now lost one of its key figures. But this isn’t the first time Hamas has faced such a blow. The organization has a long history of surviving and recalibrating after losing its leaders. The list is not short: Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz el-Rantisi, and, more recently, Ismail Haniyeh. These figures have spanned the spiritual, political, and military realms.

Yet, Sinwar’s death carries unique weight, not just because of his position, but due to his personal trajectory. He wasn’t just a figurehead within a militant group. He was a hardliner, even by Hamas’ standards. He also carried unique clout, largely because of his deep ties to Hamas’s military wing, having served as the head of its counterintelligence. What set Sinwar apart from other leaders, many of whom operated in exile, was his physical presence in Gaza. While some in the upper echelons of Hamas led from afar, Sinwar remained entrenched in the heart of the besieged Strip. His leadership style reflected the intractable realities of life under siege, making him a figure of both fear and respect within the organization.

Replacing a leader in Hamas is not as simple as swapping one face for another. Each time a leader is killed, the spiritual, political, and military forces within the group must realign. What’s different now, however, is the fluid nature of the struggle itself. For nearly 80 years, Palestinians have remained trapped in a conflict that defies political or diplomatic resolution. Sinwar, like others before him, envisioned a way forward. With his death, Hamas faces a critical crossroads. The world is changing, and Hamas must change with it or risk becoming irrelevant. New leaders will undoubtedly rise. To be successful, they’ll need to align their strategies to a rapidly shifting global and regional landscape.

Israel’s current military campaign appears aimed at dismantling the leadership of groups like Hamas, a reflection of its long-standing struggle to resolve the Palestinian question. The devastation of Gaza and the suffering of its people speak to the brutal nature of this conflict. In many ways, the region has been caught in a vicious cycle of violence, where the killing of a leader like Sinwar doesn’t quell the resistance but adds fuel to the fire. The echoes of past conflicts—like those in Lebanon—continue to shape this grim and unresolved narrative as war appears only to breed more war.

Yet, despite these seemingly decisive blows, Hamas endures. Each fallen leader’s story becomes legend, inspiring a new generation that is often more militant, more extreme, and even harder to negotiate with. Sinwar’s demise does not signal the end of Hamas at all. Sure, it will temporarily reduce the immediate threat, offering Israel a brief sense of tactical respite. But it is unlikely to end the war or halt the bloodshed in Gaza, where the death toll has surpassed 40,000.

And it certainly doesn’t suggest that peace, or a two-state solution, is suddenly on the horizon. The hard truth remains: the occupation persists, and the establishment of a Palestinian state is as distant a dream as ever.

Imran Khalid is a geostrategic analyst and columnist on international affairs. His work has been widely published by prestigious international news organizations and publications.

STIMSON Center - Great Power Competition Shouldn't Drive US Policy in the Middle East

 

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RESEARCH UPDATE

Security & Strategy

ISSUE BRIEF

Great Power Competition Shouldn’t Drive US Policy in the Middle East

Stimson experts Christopher Preble and Will A. Smith evaluate how fears that China could emerge as a driving force in the Middle East can risk derailing US calibration on policy in the region.


Fears of China replacing the United States in the Middle East have emerged as a driving force of U.S. policy in the region. However, China’s ambitions in the Middle East remain modest and pose little threat to the United States. As deepening China-Middle East ties reflect an increasingly multi-aligned region, Washington is unlikely to succeed in forcing regional states to choose sides. Approaching the Middle East through the lens of great power competition risks derailing a necessary recalibration of the U.S. role in the region.

As China’s engagement in the Middle East grows, fears of Beijing displacing the United States as the preeminent regional power increasingly dominate U.S. policy toward the region. President Joe Biden encapsulated these worries during a 2022 trip to Saudi Arabia, declaring, “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran.”1 Such concerns risk hindering an overdue recalibration of the U.S. role in the Middle East and motivating risky concessions, exemplified by the Biden administration’s proposal to offer Saudi Arabia a defense treaty in return for Riyadh’s limiting ties with China. However, China has neither the ability nor the desire to replace the United States in the Middle East or direct the regional order. Although Beijing does not pose a serious challenge to U.S. interests in the region, attempting to contest Chinese influence at every turn is unlikely to succeed in an increasingly multi-aligned Middle East. With the United States stretched thin and facing pressing challenges in other regions and at home, Washington should resist the temptation to let great power competition drive its Middle East policy.

China’s Rise in the Middle East

A series of headline-grabbing developments has amplified worries that Beijing is positioning itself to supplant the United States as the dominant external power in the region. These include China’s facilitation of the 2023 Saudi-Iranian normalization agreement, BRICS’ invitation to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to join the grouping the same year, and the reported construction of a Chinese military facility in the UAE.2 Nonetheless, while China’s engagement in the Middle East has indeed grown, Beijing remains driven by its dependence on Middle Eastern oil and economic opportunities, with its diplomatic efforts and (very limited) military involvement intended to further that narrow set of interests, not pursue regional domination. 

China-Middle East economic ties have greatly expanded during the last two decades, with China becoming the largest importer of Gulf oil — which comprises 50% of its energy imports — and the top trading partner for much of the region.3 In 2023, China’s bilateral trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Iran topped $300 billion, up nearly 48% from 2018.4 The Middle East has also become a focal point of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — all 22 members of the Arab League have signed BRI agreements — leading to major Chinese investments in physical and digital infrastructure projects, a particular concern of the United States.5

As its economic interests in the region have grown, China has cautiously expanded its engagement in the military realm, though these efforts remain largely confined to arms sales and limited military cooperation and exercises. Although Chinese arms sales to the region are increasing, especially in systems the United States is reluctant to provide, they comprise less than 5% of the GCC states’ arms imports.6

Owing to its economic-centric approach to the Middle East, Beijing prioritizes regional stability and maximizing economic opportunities. As a result, China aims to stay out of fractious regional disputes, seeking stable, transactional relationships with all countries in the region rather than special relationships with a select few. This explains, for instance, why China has forged close partnerships with Iran and Saudi Arabia while avoiding taking a side in their longtime rivalry, as well as Beijing’s interest in facilitating their rapprochement.

China’s Inroads Reflect a Changing Region

U.S. partners’ concerns about Washington’s commitment to the region, as well as their security, have contributed to their growing engagement with China.7 But more important, surging China-Middle East ties are emblematic of an increasingly multi-aligned region in which more assertive powers, especially in the Gulf, are seeking to diversify relationships and maximize their diplomatic flexibility.8 Indeed, while China has made the most significant gains, an array of other countries, including India, Italy, and South Korea, have boosted their involvement in the region.9

Amid this shift, Middle Eastern states have eagerly deepened ties with China, which they see as an attractive partner because of its energy demand, ability to support economic diversification and energy transition initiatives, and hands-off approach to human rights. As Gulf states seek to transform their economies for a post-oil world, China’s ability to cut through red tape and implement projects quickly — often at a lower cost than comparable U.S. projects — makes it a very appealing partner.10 These countries are seeking opportunities to advance their interests wherever possible and have become more comfortable bucking U.S. pressure, especially in the wake of the Ukraine and Gaza Wars. This realignment is a reflection not of U.S. partners being won over by China but of their refusal to maintain exclusive relationships with any great power. In a comment reflective of attitudes across the region, Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the UAE’s president, said, “The UAE has no interest in choosing sides between great powers.”11

To be sure, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE also see U.S. anxiety about Chinese influence as an opportunity to extract concessions from Washington.12 For instance, the Wall Street Journal reports that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman “has said he expects that by playing major powers against each other, Saudi Arabia can eventually pressure Washington to concede to its demands for better access to U.S. weapons and nuclear technology.”13 But above all, these two countries’ growing ties with China come down to what Beijing offers them, just as China’s Middle East engagement is primarily driven by narrow economic interests, not a desire to replace the United States.  

US Response

U.S. officials have responded with alarm to China’s expanding influence in the Gulf and the broader Middle East — warning that it could “fully penetrate” the region — and labeling the Middle East a “vital theater for strategic competition.”14 With U.S. attention turning away from counterterrorism, officials now argue that a large-scale U.S. military presence must be maintained to prevent China from exploiting a vacuum.15 Likewise, a host of analysts have called for Washington to double down on the Middle East — including by extending a security guarantee to Saudi Arabia — to prevent China from filling a void created by U.S. disengagement.16

Concerned by China’s inroads, the United States has gone to great lengths to reassure partners of its commitment to their security. The Biden administration has done a U-turn on plans to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East and take a harder line with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, lifting freezes on arms sales to both countries and bolstering the U.S. military presence (even before the Gaza War).17 Most notably, the administration has relentlessly pursued a “megadeal” with Saudi Arabia aimed at bringing about Saudi-Israeli normalization and pulling Riyadh away from Beijing. Despite the ongoing Gaza War making the latter unlikely in the near future, the White House is reportedly on the cusp of offering Saudi Arabia a package of concessions — including a defense treaty and support for a civilian nuclear program — in return for its restricting security and technological cooperation with China.18 Following earlier talks on a formalized security guarantee for the Emiratis, the United States designated the UAE a “major defense partner” in September in a bid to pull it out of China’s orbit.19

At the same time, the United States has leaned on traditional partners such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE to choose sides on issues of sensitive technologies and security, with mixed results. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo summed up the U.S. perspective following an April trip to the UAE, saying, “When it comes to emerging technology, you cannot be both in China’s camp and our camp.”20 While Chinese technology continues to proliferate across the region, Washington has recently seen some success in forging more narrowly focused partnerships to limit countries’ tech ties with China, most notably with the UAE.21 Nevertheless, most Middle Eastern countries appear unwilling to fully forego cooperation with China.

Limits to Chinese Influence and Ambitions

Despite the alarm in Washington, China’s ambitions and influence in the Middle East seem modest. In a 2022 speech warning countries in the region against deepening ties with China, Colin Kahl, then the U.S. undersecretary of defense, correctly noted that “Beijing has neither the intent nor the capability to integrate the region’s security architecture. The PRC [People’s Republic of China] pursues ties based solely on its narrow, transactional, commercial, and geopolitical interests.”22 Although China’s Middle East engagement is growing, Beijing remains an opportunistic, transactional actor primarily focused on its energy and economic interests. Most important for U.S. concerns, China is not interested in or capable of assuming responsibility for the regional security order or dominating the Middle East.23

China’s ability to project power in the region is limited, and it remains highly averse to military intervention, alliances, and large-scale foreign basing, seeing U.S. misadventures in the Middle East as cautionary tales. Beijing’s reluctance to intervene has only been underscored by its muted response to the ongoing Houthi attacks against ships in the Red Sea — which have disrupted global supply chains — despite the serious threat they pose to Chinese economic interests.

Indeed, China has been more than happy to free ride off the U.S. security umbrella, reaping the economic benefits of its regional engagement while Washington shoulders the security burden. This is unlikely to change because China does not need to dominate the region to secure its interests and is much more concerned about escalating military competition in the Indo-Pacific, as well as domestic challenges. Directing its limited military resources to the volatile Middle East would be a costly distraction from China’s core priorities, and taking on a major role in regional security, especially as a security guarantor, would also challenge its prized reputation as a neutral actor.

Moreover, the significance of China’s recent diplomatic initiatives has been exaggerated, both in the United States and China. Consider the Saudi-Iranian agreement. Although the New York Times wrote that China “upend[ed] Mideast diplomacy” and China’s foreign minister claimed Beijing was fostering a “wave of reconciliation,” the deal was the product of two years of negotiations mediated by Oman and Iraq, with China merely facilitating the final meeting.24 More recently, China has steered clear of efforts to resolve the Gaza War and Red Sea crisis, making clear that its facilitation of the Saudi-Iranian deal did not mark the beginning of a new era of deep diplomatic engagement. Likewise, a number of China’s highly touted bilateral cooperation agreements — such as its stalled 25-year “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Iran —have not panned out.25

China might seek to undermine the United States in the Middle East — often by seizing on frustration within the region over U.S. policy — but there is no hard evidence that Beijing intends to supplant Washington in the region.26 Instead, China envisions a regional order in which U.S. power is diminished and the region’s states take responsibility for their own security and de-escalation, with China acting as a key diplomatic facilitator, not a security guarantor like the United States or even necessarily a mediator.27 This modest vision is hardly a plan for hegemony. Regional states are well aware of the limits of China’s utility as a partner and interest in the region. Although eager to forge deeper ties with China, they do not want or expect it to replace the United States.28

The Way Forward for Washington

As competition with China becomes a driving force of the United States’ Middle East policy, U.S. policymakers should be cognizant of two key dynamics. First, because China’s growing Middle East ties are a result of the region’s commitment to hedging and diversifying relationships, waging a zero-sum contest for influence and attempting to force countries to choose a side is doomed to fail — and risks backfiring. Just as coercion is unlikely to work, “recommitting” to the region or offering security guarantees will not win regional states’ allegiance.29 Middle Eastern powers have proved themselves willing and able to act according to their interests — not in response to U.S. carrots or sticks — and are set on deepening their partnerships with China. Fortunately, these countries have their own reasons to support key U.S. priorities, including ensuring the free flow of oil and countering terrorism, irrespective of their alignment vis-à-vis the United States and China.

Second, and more important, China’s inroads in the region pose little threat to the United States’ limited interests in the Middle East. In fact, there is growing recognition that the U.S. can secure its vital interests in the Middle East — energy security, counterterrorism, and preventing the rise of a regional hegemon — without maintaining a major military presence.30 Less appreciated is that U.S. and Chinese interests overlap in the Middle East more than in any other region. With its dependence on Gulf energy and sponsorship of many economic projects in the region, China has a key interest in ensuring the free flow of oil as well as regional stability. Beijing also shares U.S. concerns about terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Moreover, while China’s diplomatic clout is exaggerated, its diplomatic “wins” should not be assumed to be “losses” for the United States, especially when Beijing uses its unique position to advance stability, such as with Riyadh and Tehran’s rapprochement.

Misplaced fears of China’s exploiting a vacuum should not drive decisions about U.S. posture in the region or motivate risky security commitments. Longstanding security ties with Middle Eastern countries buy the United States little influence, and have often been a burden; thus, it is unclear what China would gain by assuming a major role in regional security. Indeed, the United States could even benefit from a reversal of roles, with Beijing expending its limited resources and attention on the region as Washington focuses on more pressing challenges.

If these realities are ignored, there is a risk that instead of ushering in an overdue pivot from the Middle East, competition with China will keep the United States entangled in the region. Rather than trying to turn back the clock, the United States should adopt an approach that reflects a changing Middle East — both its embrace of hedging and waning relevance for U.S. interests. In addition to straining U.S. resources and risking further conflict, doubling down on a zero-sum, securitized approach will fail to address what makes China appealing: the economic opportunities it presents.

The United States should prioritize competing in the economic and technological domains, offering mutually beneficial partnerships on renewable energy, infrastructure, and artificial intelligence (AI) (the recent US-UAE AI cooperation pact is a promising model). Specific areas of concern, such as emerging technologies, are manageable, including by clearly setting and enforcing redlines on the most sensitive issues. Above all, the United States should avoid overreacting as China-Middle East ties deepen or succumbing to pressure for concessions, recognizing that U.S. interests will remain secure and that at the end of the day, the countries of the Middle East need the United States more than it needs them. As Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT) put it, “if the Bahrainis, Emiratis, or Saudis threaten to turn to other powers, Washington can afford to call their bluff.”31

Approaching the Middle East through the lens of great power competition is a recipe for an unnecessary, unwinnable, and distracting struggle. Instead, Washington should adopt a narrower conception of the purpose of U.S. engagement in the Middle East focused on advancing the overarching goals of U.S. foreign policy — preserving the security, prosperity, and independence of the American people. At a time when the United States must urgently prioritize, Washington cannot afford to let misplaced fear of Chinese influence derail a much-needed recalibration of the U.S. role in the Middle East.32