Project Syndicate How China Views the US Presidential Election Aug 5, 2024 Ian Bremmer

Project Syndicate

How China Views the US Presidential Election

Aug 5, 2024

Ian Bremmer

Though Chinese leaders are watching the US presidential election closely, they have already convinced themselves that the next American administration will be antagonistic. Will they respond with relative quiescence or pursue a more aggressive strategy?

NEW YORK – How will the Communist Party of China (CPC) react to America’s highly unpredictable election in November? China is convinced that the desire to stunt its natural growth and contain its legitimate exercise of global influence is one of the few points of agreement between Democrats and Republicans. Their only disagreement, Chinese leaders believe, is about which economic and political weapons to use to contain China, and how and when to use them.

This view should come as no surprise in Washington. After all, US President Joe Biden followed the Trump administration in imposing new tariffs and restrictions on technology exports, while also expanding anti-China alliances with partners like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and even India.

But this is not to suggest that China views the two parties as effectively the same. On the contrary, it appears to be preparing to meet the challenges that would come with a second Donald Trump presidency. Trump remains a slight favorite to win, and China’s leaders believe it is more important to prepare early for a new Trump administration than for a victory by the Democrats’ presumptive nominee, Vice President Kamala Harris.

China’s desire for stability – both in relations with the United States and in the international system more generally – remains strong, because its economy has been slow to re-emerge from the traumas inflicted by the CPC’s draconian lockdown policies during the COVID-19 pandemic. The official line from Chinese authorities is that a further closure of US markets – which is more likely if Trump wins – would force China to double down on strengthening its own consumer markets and shifting toward other foreign markets. The implication is that China itself would not escalate a trade war.

China has laid the groundwork for better inter-governmental and inter-military communication with the US. But CPC officials are also trying to figure out whether Trump intends to make good on his latest threat of 60% tariffs on all Chinese exports as part of a broader decoupling strategy, or is simply trying to squeeze China for better trade and investment terms. Their biggest worry is that Trump will revoke China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations status, which would amount to a reversal of the deal that brought China into the World Trade Organization, sustained US-China economic relations for more than a generation, and laid the foundation for its rise.

Chinese leaders could just try to take the pain imposed by Trump’s salvos, in the hopes that America’s own economic weakness and China’s unwillingness to put up a fight might persuade him to pick another foreign target. Alternatively, they could appeal to various US allies that remain dependent on good economic relations with China. In exchange for offering these countries greater market access, Chinese leaders would press them to lobby the Trump White House for a less confrontational approach (or to align themselves more with China if they, too, are targeted by “America First” policies).

But absorbing more economic pain when growth is already weak risks alienating Chinese consumers, who might turn their anger toward the CPC leadership. The bigger risk, then, is that China’s leaders conclude that the limited engagement of the past year has not produced good results, and that the next hostile US president will always be just one election away.

If that is their view, they might respond to US economic pressure (regardless of who is in the White House) with a more assertive security policy. In this scenario, if the US really does become more aggressive in decoupling from China’s economy, it could find that it has much less leverage to pressure China to back away from its military and diplomatic campaign against Taiwan.

True, the CPC could also adopt a friendlier approach designed to make anti-China policies less politically popular in the US. For example, if China pledged to invest in production and job creation in the US, and if it negotiated a deal to limit exports to some mutually agreeable level, it could create new leverage to influence US policy.

But Chinese officials know that Trump might view such moves as a sign of weakness, leading him to double down on his pressure strategy. And even if Trump or Harris were to pursue such an agreement, there is no guarantee that the next US president wouldn’t tear it up and demand a new one. Nor is it clearly to China’s advantage to hew closer to US positions on the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. After all, an end to those conflicts might allow the US to turn even more attention to “getting tough on China.”

The most likely scenario for 2025 is a period of tension in which China’s leadership and a new administration in Washington weigh each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps the best that each side can hope for is that today’s economic uncertainty will encourage pragmatism on both sides, limiting additional damage to the world’s most important bilateral relationship.

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Ian Bremmer

Writing for PS since 2006

33 Commentaries

Ian Bremmer, Founder and President of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media, is a member of the Executive Committee of the UN High-level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence.