‘Why Haven’t You Liberated Palestine Yet?’: Hamas Leader Yahya Sinwar’s Relentless Race To Achieve His Goals
Operation Al-Aqsa Flood can be seen as an effort to accelerate events and pull the future into the present, forcing all to confront reality, whether they are prepared or not
In an Arab capital, Palestinian factions have gathered for a meeting. The room is noisy and the debate over the wording of the political statement is intense. Suddenly, one of the faction’s secretary-generals interrupts, saying, “Comrades, brothers … there’s no need for all this disagreement. We’re just passengers in a speeding car. Abu Ibrahim is the driver, and we all know this car has no brakes.” This rare moment of humor perfectly captures the political temperament of Abu Ibrahim, also known as Yahya Sinwar. Yes, he is in a hurry.
Analysts are divided on Sinwar, who assumed leadership of Hamas’ political bureau after Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran in late July 2024. Some view him as an extremist, a narrow-minded leader with rigid views, while others see him as a pragmatist and master strategist. He appears to oscillate between the center and the far right of Palestinian factions and leave different impressions on different observers, having supported peaceful resistance against Israel in 2018 and spearheaded the October attacks of last year that started the war in Gaza. Since then, he has emerged as the most prominent figure in the Palestinian landscape, becoming Israel’s most wanted man, and now Hamas’ leader, and a focal point of concern for writers, analysts and the general public — whether they support his actions or not.
To understand the mindset of Sinwar, one need only look at his first statement after leaving prison: “Why haven’t you liberated Palestine yet?” His obsession with time has defined his character. This acute awareness became even more pronounced after his release 13 years ago. Since then, his actions have been consistently driven by the pressure to make every moment count. He is a man convinced that there is always a road not taken.
Sinwar was born twice: first in 1962, into the impoverished alleys of Gaza’s Khan Younis refugee camp, and again in 2011, when he was freed from prison through the landmark “Shalit deal,” a prisoner exchange that released him and over 1,000 others after 23 years in Israeli captivity.
Since his release, Sinwar has seemed perpetually hurried, driven by the belief that the time he has left after his liberation is limited. At 27, he was imprisoned, charged with the kidnapping and killing of two Israeli soldiers and the murder of four Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel. He received four life sentences plus 25 years. By the time he emerged from prison, he was in his 50s.
This sense of urgency provides a lens through which to view the last 13 years of Sinwar’s life leading up to Oct. 7, 2023. An old prison photo shows him wearing a Casio watch, prompting the question: What does time mean to a man whose sentence far exceeds his own lifespan and possibly that of several generations after him?
A few days after his release, Sinwar confided in a close friend his desire to “break the wire,” a reference to the fence separating Gaza from Israel, signaling his intent to storm the border. At the time, he had not yet taken on any official role that would indicate such personal ambitions. However, the Hamas he returned to had changed. It had evolved from a small, isolated group into a large institution, exerting control over the Gaza Strip and maintaining a complex governmental and security apparatus for five years.
Sinwar wasted no time in pursuing his objectives. Just months after returning to the Gaza Strip, he became a member of Hamas’ political leadership. In November 2012, following the assassination of the deputy commander in chief of the Al-Qassam Brigades, Ahmed Jaabari, Sinwar assumed the role of liaison officer between the political and military wings of the movement. This position gave him a strategic vantage point for many significant decisions he made to challenge the status quo, from the March of Return (2018-19) to Operation Sword of Jerusalem (2021), culminating in Operation Al-Aqsa Flood (2023-24).
Although Hamas’ use of tunnels was not new, Sinwar’s emphasis on developing the network was noteworthy. The projects he oversaw — increasing their depth, efficiency and extent — provided crucial spatial expansion, especially when he publicly declared that Hamas possessed another city underground, the “Gaza Metro.” Intelligence sources suggest that some of these tunnels may extend as deep as 15 floors below ground.
As Sinwar rose through the ranks of Hamas, the harsh realities of life in Gaza, under siege since 2007, increasingly felt like an extension of his time in prison. This connection is reflected in a 2018 interview. “I never came out. I have only changed prisons,” he told Italian journalist Francesca Borri. “And, despite it all, the old one was much better than this one. I had water, electricity. I had so many books. Gaza is much tougher.” In the same interview, he expressed hope that time would favor Gaza, alluding to the future he envisions for Palestinian generations to come. For Sinwar, time has always been a constant companion — not just as the watch on his wrist since his early days in prison, but as a driving force behind his thoughts and ambitions.
Sinwar’s portrayal as either a realist or an extremist often stems from simplistic interpretations of his actions. Some point to his efforts to reconcile with the Fatah movement and strengthen regional ties with Egypt as evidence of pragmatism, while others view the Oct. 7 attack as proof of his extremist tendencies. In reality, Sinwar’s personality is far more complex, characterized by a remarkable ability to oscillate between positions depending on what he deems most effective.
In several speeches, Sinwar has emphasized his commitment to liberating prisoners, a goal he first declared to his comrades when they were about to be released as part of the Shalit deal in 2011. He actively pursued this objective in the years following his release, especially after Hamas captured four Israeli soldiers, including two during the 2014 war, although the circumstances surrounding the others’ capture remain unclear. Despite multiple rounds of negotiations, these efforts did not yield significant results until the Oct. 7 operation, which aimed to seize as many enemy personnel as possible, ultimately leading to the capture of 233 Israelis. This unwavering dedication to a goal could suggest a more rigid personality.
Politically, Sinwar launched a serious effort toward reconciliation just months after assuming leadership in Gaza in 2017, even going so far as to threaten to “break the neck of those who do not want reconciliation.” This statement came shortly after the collapse of reconciliation efforts with Fatah under the 2014 Beach Agreement, which was followed by the dissolution of the Administrative Committee that Hamas had set up to manage the strip unilaterally. The committee’s formation had provoked a strong response from the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas, who imposed sanctions on Gaza, leading to power outages as Abbas refused to pay for fuel, demanding the committee’s dissolution.
Sinwar vowed to make further “astonishing concessions” to achieve reconciliation, declaring that “there are no more opportunities to waste.” However, within less than a year, he reversed course after concluding that Fatah and the Ramallah authorities either did not want or were unable to pursue reconciliation. Sinwar eventually abandoned the effort entirely, with rumors circulating that he even refused to take a phone call from Abbas at a social event.
The Istanbul Agreement that Hamas signed with Fatah in late 2020 left him equally dissatisfied, especially after Abbas canceled the elections that had been agreed upon. The rift with Abbas persists to this day. No political contact has occurred between Hamas and Abbas during the current war. In contrast, the Fatah movement has recently held meetings and made agreements with Hamas in Moscow and Beijing, though these agreements remain in a cautious, trial phase.
Sinwar’s pragmatism became evident in 2017 when he initiated dialogue with Mohammed Dahlan, a Fatah leader who is a rival to Abbas, formerly based in Gaza. Dahlan, who now resides in the United Arab Emirates, led the Preventive Security Service in Gaza in the 1990s and early 2000s — a branch of the Palestinian Authority known for persecuting and torturing Hamas members and leaders. This dialogue led to initial understandings that quickly solidified after the reconciliation process with the Abbas government in Ramallah failed. This ongoing relationship explains Dahlan’s politically calculated statements and his conciliatory rhetoric toward Hamas during the war. The motivation behind this controversial relationship, which raised eyebrows both then and now, was the deadlock in reconciliation with Abbas’ Fatah. It was also linked to Sinwar’s desire to engage with Egypt, which hosted his first meeting with Dahlan.
Sinwar’s political vision, as he articulates it, is rooted in the political document Hamas adopted in 2017, which advocates for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. He has emphasized this document in numerous meetings, asserting that his movement has shown the necessary flexibility to engage in dialogue with the international community — although, he claims, the international community has not reciprocated. Sinwar also highlights other key elements of this document, such as fostering relationships with civil society, uniting Palestinian factions and advancing the Palestinian national project.
However, Sinwar doesn’t wait for others to define the national project; instead, he governs Gaza according to his own vision and philosophy. In a notable 2017 interview, Sinwar asserted that his movement was focused on building strength, “not for the sake of ruling Gaza, but for the dream of liberation.” This statement raises questions about his long-term expectations for Hamas’ rule in Gaza.
During this time, Sinwar was a strong advocate for the March of Return protests in 2018 and 2019 that took place in several Palestinian areas and notably in Gaza, focusing on adjacent settlements. Sinwar described them as a form of “peaceful resistance.” He appeared on various media outlets defending the initiative, emphasizing the peaceful nature of the Palestinian movement involved in these marches and calling for an end to the siege of Gaza. However, true to his strategic approach, he set a limited time frame to assess their effectiveness, and the demonstrations ceased less than two years after they began in March 2018. Amid these “peaceful demonstrations,” which were met with gunfire, resulting in the deaths of dozens of young men and thousands of injuries, Sinwar began to frame military operations as a final resort rather than simply another option.
Beyond the question of pragmatism or extremism, Sinwar appears unconcerned by contentious labels. Hamas leaders have traditionally avoided using the term “peaceful” to prevent unfavorable comparisons with Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), particularly the perception that they “sold out” the Palestinian cause and abandoned armed resistance. Instead, phrases like “popular resistance” or “comprehensive resistance” are more commonly used in Hamas’ rhetoric, subtly preserving the option of armed struggle — a strategy the group has never shown any intention of abandoning or downplaying.
Indeed, military operations continued alongside Sinwar’s flexible discourse toward other Palestinian factions. Following the Israeli war in 2021, he revealed the enigmatic number 1111, sparking widespread curiosity until it was understood as a reference to a missile launch planned for the anniversary of the late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat’s death on Nov. 11. This operation served a dual purpose: maintaining the resistance while signaling rapprochement to the grassroots supporters of the Fatah movement. Some saw this as an attempt to emulate Arafat’s symbolic leadership and political inclusivity, extending beyond his own party to resonate with various segments of the Palestinian populace. By invoking Arafat’s memory and name, Sinwar demonstrated that he does not confine himself to the traditional rhetorical boundaries of Hamas. Between pragmatism and extremism, Sinwar creates a broader scope for his words and actions, allowing observers to see him as sometimes realistic, sometimes extremist — with both assessments holding some truth.
Hamas’ relationship with the Iranian-led “axis of resistance” has been restored in recent years after a period of strained relations, following Hamas’ support for the Syrian uprising against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus between 2011 and 2016. Discussion between allies within this axis began to anticipate a major event, often referred to as the “great battle,” which led to the emergence of the concept of the “unity of the battlefields” following Operation Sword of Jerusalem. This operation was the name given by the factions to the attacks they launched in response to ongoing Israeli aggression in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of Jerusalem in May 2021.
Statements began to surface suggesting that a comprehensive war was not just possible but inevitable. Among these was a declaration by Sheikh Saleh al-Arouri, deputy head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, about a month and a half before the October attack. “The resistance is prepared, equipped, motivated and ready for a regional war,” al-Arouri said. It seemed that Sinwar had already marked the date. The Oct. 7 attack appears to have been meticulously timed, aimed at collapsing the future into the present and shattering the barriers that delayed the anticipated conflict.
Under Sinwar’s leadership, the line between military and political spheres has blurred. This is evident in the inclusion of Qassam leaders, such as Marwan Issa, the deputy chief of staff, in the political office. While Sinwar’s visions and methods differ from Hamas’ previous approaches, however, his project remains inseparable from Hamas’ overarching mission, which is fundamentally rooted in resistance to Israeli occupation. Yet Sinwar appears to be several steps ahead of others within the movement.
Sinwar’s departure from Hamas’ traditional policies in Gaza was likely facilitated by his early reliance on teams of young people, regardless of their experience or achievements. This approach sparked controversy over his leadership style, but the change proved to be smooth and swift enough to avoid major setbacks.
Ultimately, Sinwar can be viewed as a pragmatist in some instances and an extremist in others. To some, he is a soldier loyal to the cause; to others, a rebel challenging the status quo. As he assumes the presidency of Hamas’ political bureau, Sinwar faces his greatest test yet. It is too early to fully assess his leadership, especially as he navigates the movement through its most significant challenges, including the ongoing all-out war in Gaza.
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